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Press freedom in Asia: an uneven terrain 
Amanda Doronila 
espite the emergence of new 
democracies in East Asia during the 
last two decades of the 20th century, 
the freedom of the press continues to 
be under siege in the region. During those decades, the democratic wave 
in East Asia swept out authoritarian regimes in the Philippines (1986), 
Thailand (1992), South Korea (1992), and Indonesia (1998), making way for 
more pluralistic and open politics in those countries. Also in the 1980s, 
Taiwan abandoned authoritarian rule, and the press in that country is 
rated by the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists as one of 
the freest in the region. 
The emergence of an outspoken and assertive press is an indicator of 
political democratisation. But a free press is neither a gift from heaven 
nor of the democratic process. Often, a free press precedes the fall of 
authoritarian regimes. Indeed, it is a harbinger of political change towards 
more open politics. The press plays a frontline role in political change, 
but it has to continue to struggle to preserve its gains, even after the election 
of a democratic government. 
In Asia, one cannot talk about democracy or freedom of the press 
without qualifications. While democracy and freedom of the press are 
inseparable notions, one cannot assume these twin notions take the same 
focus in Asia as in North American and Western European democracies. 
A survey of the state of the press of the region must take into account the 
diversity of political cultures in the region and the specific ways that Asian 
governments are tolerant towards a critical or adversarial press. 
In Asia, it is a valid proposition that freedom of the press, even in new 
and restored democracies (like the Philippines), is measured in terms of 
degrees in which frankness and criticism are tolerated by governments 
and their societies. Thus, while the press in the Philippines is probably 
the most unfettered in the region and replicates the western models of a 
free press, the Philippine press is not necessarily the role model for the 
rest of East Asia. The Philippines is East Asia's oldest constitutional 
democracy and has copied American-style presidential democracy, much 
to the dismay of Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who considers 
the Filipino adversarial press and politics a source of political impasse 
that hampers economic development. 
Filipino democracy is not the same as Thai, Korean, or Indonesian 
democracy, although all have adopted the minimalist criteria of having 
free elections and varying degrees of press freedom. 
And so, as we scan the East Asian political landscape in the midst of 
the emergence of new democracies at the end of the century, and in the 
aftermath of the economic crises that shattered the bubble of the Asian 
tigers' economic miracles of the 1980s, we see an uneven, even treacherous, 
terrain of press freedom. I think the best metaphor to describe the political 
environment for press freedom in Asia today is that it is a minefield in 
wliich the press and journalists must tread carefully. They must be sensitive 
to such things as 'Asian values' -often a rationalisation for autocratic 
rule or political repression, or a justification of corruption. 
While the press is outspoken in the new democracies, journalists and 
newspapers face constraints on their freedom in much of the rest of East 
Asia. In Singapore and Malaysia, for example, draconian Official Secrets 
Acts and national security legislation, as well as legal action from 
governments, restrict publication of news that governments would 
consider inimical to 'national security' or 'national interests'. Newspapers 
in those countries are government controlled. Coincidentally, these two 
countries which, before the outbreak of the East Asian financial crisis in 
mid 1997, had been brilliant performers economically, were also the main 
sources of the doctrine of' Asian values', in defence of restrictive political 
environments (parliamentary systems of the Westminster mould). 
Foreign correspondents face risks of expulsion in a number of Southeast 
Asian countries if they write news that displeases regimes. And in 
Northeast Asia, after the handover of Hong Kong to China, the cloud of 
uncertainty hangs heavily over the freedom of the press. 
Only after the fall of the Soeharto regime was the system of licensing 
newspapers lifted, liberating latent restlessness of Indonesian journalists 
over the state of affairs under 32 years of authoritarian rule, and opening 
an era of a critical press. The Soeharto regime had been described by the 
Committee to Protect Journalists as a perennial among its annual '10 worst 
enemies'. Its collapse triggered a wave of political reforms, including 
widening the freedom of the press. 
Myanmar stands out as the worst case of political repression in Southeast 
Asia, and the press in Indochina suffers from the state-imposed restrictions 
of a socialist system, albeit trying to find its way into the market economy. 
Against this uneven terrain, there are some hopeful developments for 
press freedom. In the environment of politicalliberalisation in Southeast 
Asia, journalists in the Philippines, a restored democracy, and the new 
democracies of Thailand and Indonesia have moved to consolidate and 
protect the freedoms they have gained. In 1998, the press organisations 
from these three countries organised the Southeast Asian Press Alliance 
(SEAPA), devoted to promoting and protecting press freedom. 
The different paths towards political openness and the varying levels 
of tolerance for press freedom in East Asia have raised challenges to certain 
notions about democratic liberalisation or political change, and its 
relationship to economic development. 
The restoration of democracy in the 1986 People Power Revolution in 
the Philippines does not substantiate the theory that politicalliberalisation 
is a consequence of economic prosperity. The revolution exploded from 
deep national distress fostered by political and social unrest against a 
corrupt and repressive Marcos regime. The economy had plunged into 
negative growth, and the Filipino middle class, that had broadened its 
base in the earlier years of economic growth, was the moving force behind 
the revolution. It had lost its gains, and revolted against pauperisation. 
Prior to the East Asian financial crisis, there had been a fanciful 
perspective, supported by some Australian academics, that economic 
development had created a docile middle class which did not want to 
rock the boat lest they lose their economic gains. In this perspective, the 
middle class is deemed to have made a Faustian pact in which it trades 
off political activism in exchange for economic benefits. Singapore and 
Malaysia are cited as examples. 
But the Indonesian unrest leading to the resignation of President 
Soeharto in May 1998 turned this perspective on its head. Two decades of 
high economic growth fostered by an authoritarian regime that brooked 
no criticism from the press or politicians did not prevent the development 
of political movements originating from the streets and the distressed 
countryside to demand the resignation of Soeharto. 
The economic collapse in Indonesia stemming from the crisis forced to 
the surface the effects of the lethal combination of corruption and the 
economic slowdown, hitting both the Indonesian middle and lower classes. 
One of the important consequences of the East Asian financial crisis is 
that it accented the lack of transparency of financial systems in the region. 
While the crisis devastated all economies of the region, countries which 
were hit harder were also those that were least transparent about their 
financial transactions. These were countries where freedom of the press 
and access to information were restricted. 
Post-crisis assessments in international conferences surveying what 
went wrong with the Asian miracle now underline the importance of 
transparency as a condition for recovery and avoidance of another severe 
economic crisis. By implication, the free press is essential for transparency. 
This post-crisis assessment not only provides reinforcement for a free press 
in societies rebounding from the crisis but also deflates the 
notion that a free press is a western value, not suited to culturally and 
politically diverse Asia. 
On an anecdotal basis, I have always been uncomfortable with the 
notion that press freedom is alien to 'Asian values'. During decades of 
travelling to cover crises in Asia and even in Eastern Europe behind the 
Iron Curtain, I have had candid talks with journalists and editors in these 
regions. Over drinks and good food, journalists in countries with a captive 
press talk freely about what they know but cannot write because regimes 
don't allow it. Journalists everywhere have a universal bond-they are 
all the same. They talk freely among themselves. They know a lot, but 
they also know what not to disclose and are keenly aware of what is 
possible. 
So, when conditions permit, they break loose from their shackles, they 
write what they know and they plunge into the struggle for open politics 
and press freedom. Press freedom is a language journalists know by 
instinct. It is not a western construct. Thus, when the Soviet system broke 
down, Pravda overnight blossomed into a free newspaper in which 
journalists who dared to write the unprintable were no less rambunctious 
than their western counterparts. 
Indonesian editors I had met just before the fall of Soeharto were critical 
of the regime when talking to fellow journalists. However they said they 
could not write what they knew. But as soon as the windows opened to the 
new wind of change, journalists jumped into the stream of press freedom 
like fish swimming in water. 
What bothers me is that new ways of stifling the press have found 
their way into new democracies and even in a restored democracy like 
the Philippines. 
The press is used to conventional modes of suppression-libel cases, 
withdrawal of licences, expulsion of foreign correspondents, jailing, 
assassinations, censorship or self-censorship, and outright violence (as 
experienced by those covering ethnic riots). 
With the advent of democratisation, there are fewer blatant reprisals 
such as raids by soldiers or jailing of recalcitrant and independent-minded 
journalists. More subtle methods have found their way into East Asia 
from Latin America where, despite the democratic wave, old habits of 
press suppression die hard, even at the hands of democratically elected 
governments. 
The new method is economic strangulation of the press through 
withdrawal of advertising at the instigation of governments retaliating 
against press criticism. This new and insidious method, introduced by 
the democratically elected government of President Joseph Estrada, has 
hit the independent newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, the country's 
largest English daily. This method uses ostensibly democratic and legal 
means to strangle press freedom and undermine democracy. 
The introduction of new weapons to muzzle a free press warns against 
complacency. The fact that East Asia is moving-albeit slowly-towards 
more plural and participatory politics does not ensure that freedom of 
the press is protected. The press owes it to itself to continue to fight to 
preserve and expand its gains. 
I very much welcome the initiative to survey the state of the media in 
Asia in this book, Losing Control: freedom of the press in Asia, and I commend 
the Centre for Democratic Institutions at the Australian National 
University for seeing the project through to fruition. One of the strengths 
of the book is that it has been written largely by working journalists. It is 
important, every now and then, to look critically at one's own profession 
and industry and to compare it to best-practice ideals. Constructive 
criticism, especially that coming from local journalists themselves, can 
greatly assist the cause of achieving freedom of expression throughout 
Asia. 
The editors, Louise Williams and Roland Rich, have considerable first-
hand experience in the region and shared with me and other Filipino 
journalists the exhilaration of the first years of freedom following the fall 
of the Marcos regime while they were both posted in Manila. I am 
delighted to be working with them again. 
Amanda Doronila 
11 November 1999, Manila 
n 
At work, censors out of work 
Louise Williams 
nformation is power, or so the 
enduring dictators of history have 
understood. In so many of Asia's 
capitals, from Beijing to Jakarta, from 
Rangoon to Hanoi, the scene was the same. In obscure back rooms, rows 
of desks lay lined up, their surfaces rubbed smooth by years of diligent 
effort, as the faceless agents of authoritarian states dutifully poured over 
newspapers and magazines. Carefully, the swarms of censors cut out 
'subversive' articles from abroad, one by one, or bent low over' offensive' 
captions and photographs and blacked them out by hand. They laboured 
over their own local newspapers too, erasing hints of rebellion and 
allusions to unpalatable truths tucked within the reams of propaganda. 
The carefully edited articles that resulted were read by one and all, but 
believed by very few. 
The authoritarian, or quasi-authoritarian regimes of the post-colonial 
era in Asia, understood well the relationship between control over 
information and political power. In China, reading groups are convened 
to vet the ideological content of newspapers and to sway appropriately 
with the prevailing political winds. In Burma and Vietnam regimes still 
prefer risking the death of artistic expression by subjecting even song lyrics 
to the dour committees of ideological correctness. In the not-too-distant 
past, the enemy governments of South and North Korea, faced each other 
across the de-militarised zone, their regimes carrying labels from the 
opposite sides of the ideological spectrum, but their authoritarian controls 
over information much the same. And in Soeharto' s Indonesia the military 
intelligence service worked directly within parts of the local media as 
well as harassing, cajoling and co-opting the foreign press. 
The political leaders of hundreds of millions of people took a personal, 
almost petty interest in their own propaganda. To the Chairman, the Great 
Leader or Secretary Number One, even obscurely critical references in 
minor publications were enough to attract their attention, and spark 
offence. So concerned were they about the moulding of their own images 
as great statesmen that the line between ego and political control 
sometimes blurred. Thus it was in Indonesia that former authoritarian 
leader, Soeharto, raged over the slight to his family implied by the Sydney 
Morning Herald's decision to breach the unspoken taboo and publish details 
of their personal wealth. And so it was, and in some places still is, that 
senior politicians spent their late evenings personally checking editions 
of daily newspapers before they went to print. 
In North Korea citizens are subjected to the ultimate insult; the state 
security apparatus bans them from locking their doors at night so 
intelligence officials can wander in at will to ensure no unauthorised 
reading, listening or discussing is going on inside. Singapore has almost 
completed the electronic version of the same controls-a nationwide, 
government-run communications network which will bring the Internet 
into every home, and just as conveniently allow the authorities to wander 
into the cyberspace to check up on its citizens at any time. 
In Malaysia and Singapore a western-style press flourished in form, 
but not in content. A sophisticated combination of legislation and 
ownership concentration ensured the media remained under control. In 
nations wracked by periods of acute political instability, like Thailand, 
the Philippines, and Cambodia, the messengers themselves sometimes 
became the victims-murder serving as the ultimate sanction against 
freedom of the press. 
Control of the media has served as an integral part of maintaining 
political control in many authoritarian nations around the world. Whether 
claiming legitimacy from the political left or the political right, non-
democratic regimes all agreed to control the flow of information to their 
people. Communist regimes had a finely honed system of control inherited 
from Lenin and Stalin and perfected over decades in the Soviet Union. 
The right-wing generals who ruled much of the balance were quick to 
learn the tricks of the censor's trade. So uniform was the model of political 
power in Asia during the economic boom of the 1980s, that a new' Asian' 
model was widely discussed-one in which individual rights were 
curtailed in the name of stability and individuality was submerged in 
favour of the economic progress that, it was argued, unfettered leadership 
could deliver. Within that model of authority, control of the press was 
essential. 
Now the political map of the region is shifting, with control over the 
press and the technology of information dissemination never before so 
important in determining who will hold the reins of power. Losing control 
of information is one crucial factor in losing political control. Pro-
democracy movements, assisted by the underground press, the Internet, 
and even mobile phones, have swept away authoritarian governments in 
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and even 
Mongolia in the past 15 years. 
The new Wahid Goverment in Indonesia has simply abandoned control 
altogether, announcing the abolition of the Department of Information, 
where all those faceless bureaucrats at rows of wooden desks had wielded 
so much power under former President Soeharto. With a simple 
announcement the censors were no more. Among the new bureaucratic 
structures, a new Department of Human Rights would be established 
instead. 
It would be simple if the debate over freedom of the press stopped 
there-with a black and white battle between the censors and the 
proponents of free speech. But there are many other issues to confront. 
Are the region's remaining censors fighting a futile battle against satellite 
television and the Internet, or could a compact, sophisticated, affluent 
state such as Singapore, wrest control over the next generation of 
information technology? And when the censors lose, does freedom of the 
press necessarily follow? 
Here we learn that when the state relinquishes control of information 
a power vacuum is left behind. Into that vacuum rush a whole range of 
vested interests as new power structures are shaped. Can businesses or 
politicians just as effectively capture the press through the free market, 
using simple outright ownership or more underhand methods such as 
bribery? 
The much-vaunted free market itself is a far from perfect model for 
the media. In a truly free market will not sensationalism win the day as 
the consumers' taste for scandals,· violence and gore inevitably pulls the 
media away from serious news reporting? 
Without the censors who will control the press in their new role as 
society's self appointed watchdogs? In the newly democratising nations 
of Asia, where civil society and its institutions such as Press Councils and 
professional bodies to police press ethics are in their infancy, it is both fair 
and relevant to ask 'who will watch the watchdogs?' 
Information technology as friend and foe 
From South Korea to Indonesia, authoritarian regimes attempted to 
combine free market economics with closed political systems, which 
included significant controls over the flow of information. Many nations 
were successful in the short term, recording significant economic growth 
which, in itself, discouraged the millions who had gained material wealth 
from rocking the political boat. 
The most rapid industrialisation in the history of the world was 
occurring in East Asia. Despite the label'economic miracle', fast growth 
created urgent new social problems such as a yawning gap between the 
new rich and the old poor, mind-numbing pollution, the destruction of 
urban and rural communities to make way for development and massive 
migration flows towards the factories. The face of East Asia was being 
transformed. 
Rapid economic growth in East Asia was kindled by large, cheap labour 
markets. The tiger economies and their aspiring cubs realised, however, 
that both technology and capital were essential to take the next leap in 
economic development beyond the cheap clothing factories and 'dirty' 
industries. Information technology was at the cutting edge of that leap, 
as was integration into global financial systems. Both brought with them 
unwelcome bedfellows. 
It can be argued that new information technology so seriously undercut 
the ability of governments to control information, in nations such as 
Indonesia and Thailand, that the fall of authoritarian regimes was 
inevitable. Just as information is power, so too is technology. The 
spectacular advances in communications and information technology, the 
advent of satellite television and the globalisation of the media made the 
old-time censors, with their quaint armoury of scissors and thick, black 
pens, obsolete. New battle lines are being drawn for control of the Internet 
and the airwaves, but the speed of transmission and the volume of 
information flashing its way around the world means this is a much more 
difficult line to hold. 
It seems the dilemma now facing East Asia's remaining authoritarian 
regimes is how to balance the need for technology for economic 
development against the risk of losing control of information and, in tum, 
losing political control. The hermit states of North Korea and Burma seem 
to have decided to forfeit technology altogether, choosing autarky, and 
condemning their people to grinding poverty, to maintain tried and true 
models of information control. 
China, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore, on the other hand, are 
seeking ever-more sophisticated means of information control, erecting 
electronic 'firewalls' to control Internet providers or even building the 
entire information network themselves. But, pressures continue to build 
in the region for greater press freedoms. The integration of once closed or 
isolated economies into the world economy has brought new demands 
for transparency, openness and the functioning of civil society. There is a 
clear need for scrutiny and criticism of the political tools of power and 
there are ever louder calls for an end to tools of repression such as 
censorship and the imprisonment, or worse, of dissidents. 
So the autocrats are fighting a war on two difficult fronts. They have 
to face demands for democracy and the rule of law from their own people 
and from the international community while at the same time fighting to 
retain the tools of repression, including controls over information flows. 
Advances in information technology constantly move the bar higher. 
It starts with pencil and paper. In the late 1960s, as Soeharto consolidated 
his hold on power, more than ten thousand Indonesian 'leftists', many of 
them writers and artists, were rounded up and shipped off to Buru island. 
So isolated was this barren, windswept piece of land that the island itself 
was a sufficient prison. Included among the survivors was Indonesia's 
best known author, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who was held on Buru for 
more than ten years. There, he says, inmates were beaten if they were found 
with any reading material or caught with a paper, pens or pencils. 
In Ceasescu's Romania every typewriter in the country was registered 
to ensure that dissident views could not be printed or published. In Burma 
today, every fax machine must be registered with the authorities to ensure 
that contact with the outside world is always vetted by the generals. In 
the Philippines it was photocopying machines which assisted the samizdat 
(or 'guerrilla press') in publishing alternative newspapers exposing the 
Marcos regime. In Thailand it was the VCR which allowed people to view 
illegal, pirated tapes copied from foreign satellite television broadcasts of 
the massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators by soldiers in Bangkok. 
From the early 1990s mobile phones became important political tools, 
allowing organisers to pull together protest rallies in Jakarta, or disperse 
them in the face of a crack down. That tool carried pro-democracy 
movements one step beyond the illegal radio broadcasts which had called 
Filipinos into the streets in the mid 1980s. 
Today it is the Internet. In Indonesia, the Internet was widely used to 
distribute articles critical of the Soeharto regime and to organise mass 
protests. Beijing's ongoing rage against the Falun Gong is being insidiously 
countered by thousands of quiet emails and caustic chat comments. 
The Communist Party of China recognises that without information 
technology it cannot fuel its economic ambitions and thus continue to 
deliver even modest economic growth. And without growth it cannot hope 
to maintain stability and political power. Yet that very technology includes 
the Internet, allowing overseas Chinese pro-democracy groups to launch 
daily attacks on the regime across the telephone wires, opening and closing 
their web pages in a single 24 hour period to avoid detection. The Chinese 
Government can, and does, control Internet providers in China. It can, 
and does, impose harsh penalties on those caught accessing dissident 
material. But, the race to keep up with the Internet is a far more arduous 
task than maintaining control over conventional newspapers. 
In Laos, the government-controlled Vientiane Times suddenly appeared 
in an illegal Internet addition, launched from outside the country, its 
usually tame columns complemented by a readers' section filled with 
critical comments. The 'guerrilla' Internet edition was condemned in the 
pages of the local newspaper, a move which only attracted more attention 
to the rebel edition without stopping the perpetrators. 
In Burma and North Korea, progress is simply passing the people by-
thus avoiding, or at least delaying, the collapse of tragically archaic systems 
of government with their systems of information control. These regimes 
have chosen isolation over economic development-and so the censors' 
scissors still wield power because the Internet is banned and few have 
the technology or the knowledge necessary to use it anyway. 
It seems oddly incongruous that so backward a nation as Burma sits 
smugly besides Singapore, one of the most technologically advanced 
nations on earth. The Burmese generals prefer simply to keep their heads 
in the sand, while Singapore is intent on building the world's most 
elaborate sandcastle. All eyes must now tum to Singapore where the 
government is building the entire communications network itself-known 
as Singapore One. By next year every household in the island nation will 
be' online',linked into a national electronic network offering sophisticated 
communications options and the Internet in every home. But, with 
ownership and control of the technology, can the government also 
effectively 'spy' on its citizens merely by downloading personal emails, 
or monitoring what people are reading on the Internet? Filters can be 
installed blocking out pornography, for example, as well as politically 
sensitive material. 
It can be argued that Singapore is an exception to the rule-as a tiny 
nation more like a medium-sized city it can be much more easily managed 
(or controlled) than the vast reaches of China, for example. But Singapore, 
particularly founding leader Lee Kuan Yew, has played an important role 
in the' Asian values' debate of the 1980s, and may play an important role 
in demonstrating the outer limits of control of new information technology 
in the new millennium. 
For decades Singapore has fascinated political observers with its 
apparently contradictory mix of free market capitalism and political 
controls-Asia's 'big brother I or big father' society was making it out there 
in the freewheeling international marketplace. Lee Kuan Yew argued that 
curbing western-style freedoms, such as freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press, met a 'higher' goal of social stability which, in tum, paved 
the way for rapid economic development. Thus, a government had the 
moral right to curtail an individual's freedoms in exchange for economic 
rights. 
It is not surprising that Vietnam has already sent teams to Singapore 
to study 'firewalls' to be built into the Internet and other tactics for 
information control. In Vietnam attempts are being made to train officials 
of the security apparatus to chase electronic information across the 
Internet, and to limit use of global information networks by making them 
expensive and accessible only through government agencies. 
May the market forces be with you 
There is a divide emerging between regimes clinging to authoritarian 
political models and the region's new young democracies. This gulf is 
also reflected in attitudes towards the press. The range of attitudes span 
the totalitarian control of all information in Pyongyang, the use of 
information as propaganda in Beijing or Hanoi, the retention of the form 
but not the reality of a free press in Malaysia and Singapore and the 'wild 
west' freedom of the press in the Philippines. The problems of the press 
in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines are in many ways the most 
worrisome. The laws are largely in place but the result leaves much to be 
desired. Simply sacking the censor is not sufficient. In these countries, 
true freedom of the press is a distant ideal, not a reality. Censorship has 
been replaced by an uncomfortable form of information anarchy in the 
new democracies. 
Once state control is relinquished a much more complicated power 
struggle is unleashed for control over the media. First cab off the rank is 
the simple commercial interest of private media companies seeking profits 
through sensationalism. Then there is the power of advertisers to influence 
editorial content by threatening to remove their accounts. Next come the 
politicians and business people who can take control by gaining ownership 
of newspapers or radio or TV stations themselves. Finally, there is the 
threat of bribery of journalists by vested interest groups and, if that doesn't 
work, there is the threat of violence against journalists by the old power 
holders such as the military. 
Ironically, in a number of East Asia's young democracies, freedom of 
the press has unleashed the forces of sensationalism and voyeurism in 
such extreme forms that they are challenging cultural norms and 
community standards. With freedom comes the right to sell newspapers 
using bikini girls and horrific, intrusive photographs of terrible accidents. 
With freedom comes the right to use local movie stars as newsreaders 
and choose to lead the news bulletin with gossip about show business 
figures. 
So serious is the drift towards the 'tabloidisation' of the media in Hong 
Kong, that a local group felt the need to set up a 'pollution index' to try to 
monitor sleaze, fabrication and scandals. The driving force behind tabloid 
journalism is simply profit; demonstrating that with the free market comes 
the right to disseminate any kind of information, including pornography, 
violence and gore. Market forces are ultimately amoral. 
The price of press freedom in the short term has been information 
anarchy, with the free market the new bottom line. The free market, 
however, does not take into account ethics or values, nor does it necessarily 
reject biases based on commercial interests, nor demand the media play a 
public service role by providing high quality, independent news and 
analysis. 
The problem, too, with an entirely private, commercial media is that 
profits will continue to be the driving force behind television 
programming. Can an entirely private media serve the public honestly? 
Without independent, government or publicly funded broadcasters, such 
as the BBC, Australia's ABC, PBS in the United States, or Germany's 
Deutcshe Welle, it is difficult to imagine where high quality current affairs 
and news programs will come from. 
It is possible, however, that global news services, such as CNN and 
the BBC World Service, may be able to influence local demand for quality 
current affairs because they are now being beamed into Asia via satellite. 
This helps explain the fascination of the authoritarian states with the Ted 
Turners of this world. They recognise raw power when they see it. 
Pyongyang was fascinated that a fellow pariah state, Iraq, had been able 
to tell its side of the story to the world on CNN. Beijing continues to dangle 
the prize of a billion viewers in front of a fascinated Rupert Murdoch. 
Autocrats have the choice of banning CNN or courting it. They cannot 
ignore it. So global news may have its positive side. It might be guilty of 
simplification, trivialisation and, at times, obfuscation, but it will not risk 
its global audience by allowing itself to be the vehicle for a one-party 
state's national propaganda. 
In a truly free market there are no gatekeepers, only consumers. In a 
number of countries important debates are underway on how to impose 
controls which deal with issues of values, taste and respect for privacy 
without allowing governments to use the issue of media quality as an 
excuse to return to government controls. 
Already, tentative moves are being made in Thailand and Hong Kong 
to create Press Council type bodies to protect the public from the excesses 
of tabloid journalism and industry bodies to produce self-regulatory 
guidelines for the media. But with heavy-handed censorship such a recent 
memory in Thailand, and with fears of intervention in the media by Beijing 
in Hong Kong, these are sensitive debates indeed. 
In Thailand and Japan in 1999, landmark freedom of information 
legislation was introduced, opening up government departments to 
scrutiny by the public and the press. Thailand's Prime Minister Chuan 
Leekpai put the matter simply and eloquently: 'the public should know 
what the government knows'. This is the debate the newly democratic 
countries of East Asia must engage in. They are debating the limits of the 
market as a regulator and the need for legal and professional institutions 
to act as a brake on the excesses to which the market will otherwise lead. 
Reporting corruption, corrupt reporting 
A free press is not a luxury. A free press is at the absolute core of 
equitable development, because if you cannot enfranchise poor people, 
if they do not have a right to expression, if there is no searchlight on 
corruption and inequitable practices, you cannot build the public 
consensus needed to bring about change (James Wolfensohn, 
International Herald Tribune, 11 November 1999). 
The conspiracy of silence on corruption is over. Wolfensohn is right to 
put reporting about corruption at centre stage. Reporting corruption can 
also be used as a gauge to test the degree of freedom the press is being 
allowed. In totalitarian societies, the leadership can do no wrong so the 
reporter is committing the crime in reporting corruption. The Burmese 
generals won't even allow consumer complaints about businesses run by 
their families or friends. The more progressive Chinese and Vietnamese 
leaders value the role the press can play in investigating and reporting 
official corruption. As such they have begun to incorporate a role for the 
state-controlled media in corruption investigations, adding a veneer of 
accountability to their own regimes. But they nevertheless insist on the 
final say in what will be printed and who will be shielded from the press. 
Only middle-level bureaucrats are lined up and sentenced to death on 
government television in China, serving as an example to others. 
Journalists who misunderstand this reality can themselves be jailed. The 
question is whether regimes such as China can manage to finesse the issue 
of the reporting of corruption to use it to enhance their own credibility. 
Corruption by strongmen and their cronies has been the dominant 
theme of Asia's pro-democracy movements. Former Philippines 
strongman, Ferdinand Marcos, and his counterpart in Indonesia, Soeharto, 
were visibly seen to have amassed vast fortunes for their families by 
abusing their political power. At every level authoritarian regimes boasted 
a raft of officials who did just the same; the nature of the political power 
structure facilitated corruption because there were no watchdogs to hold 
the power elite to account. At an every day level, on the street comers 
where police braved the thick fumes and the tropical heat, in the queues 
for driving licences, and in the offices where applications for school places 
were shuffled, the example from the leadership was followed. Corruption 
was part of the system and no one was allowed to complain lest the finger 
be directed at the billionaire president. 
Overlaying any discussion of press reporting on corruption is both the 
legacy of the recent past and dominant cultural mores. Investigative 
reporting is a skill much in demand but little evident. In the new 
democracies, analysts have pointed to the problem of a free press being 
run by a generation of journalists trained under government controls. 
Journalists now face the task of making sense of the new political power 
map and the complex social and economic changes industrialisation has 
brought, often without the necessary analytical or research skills. A number 
of media commentators have pointed to an inadequate understanding of 
press ethics, such as the Indonesian tabloid which proudly and 
unselfconsciously calls itself Trial by the Press. In Mongolia, the flagship 
communist mouthpiece modelled on Pravda tried to lure back readers by 
changing its name from Truth, to the more provocative Is It True? 
The reskilling of journalists is a challenge. The culture of fact-checking 
needs to be instilled in an entire generation of journalists accustomed to 
being told what to report. This problem goes well beyond the communist 
states of East Asia. Early indications in Thailand suggest few reporters 
are seeking the previously classified documents under the new Freedom 
of Information Act. So accustomed are journalists to simply being 'handed' 
information to publish that the majority have remained in the comfort 
zone of the past, merely waiting for news to be leaked through highly 
politicised channels instead of taking the initiative themselves. 
The information comfort zone must also include culture. In Japan, East 
Asia's first industrialised nation with a long history of democratic 
processes and freedom of the press, what the public is offered is strongly 
influenced by the long-standing practice of herd journalism. In Japan, a 
sophisticated system of information management has been established 
which pulls journalists together into press clubs, known as kisha clubs. 
These clubs are attached to political parties, chambers of commerce and 
even business groups, where the same information is provided to all. The 
warmth of the herd discourages individual initiative and the cosy press 
clubs this system is built around have their own subtle censorship codes-
such as the denial of further cooperation with journalists who break from 
the pack. 
How a free press will report corruption remains a crucial issue. It is 
already apparent that information about corruption can be used as a 
political tool. Just as political camps leak details of the corrupt practices 
of their opponents in the west, and the media is used in a political power 
play, so too will a free press be used in Asia. 
At the same time self-censorship continues. In Hong Kong, journalists 
fearful of the implications of the return to the former British colony to 
China have steered clear of sensitive subjects despite no direct intervention 
from Beijing. Right across the board self-censorship is determined by the 
personal experiences of journalists; those raised with the fears of censure 
of the past must be more reticent despite recent changes. South Korea's 
press is still recovering from the wounds of the strongman's controls. 
Indonesia's journalists are delighted but stunned by the abolition of the 
Department of Information. After more than three decades of intimidation, 
direct controls, harassment and co-option, reporting taboos have been 
built in to the media's psyche. It takes more than overnight political change 
to build a new media. 
Many journalists in East Asia's new democracies are poorly paid and 
equally poorly trained. They find it difficult to operate effectively within 
a free press environment. In a number of countries, including the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, there is an ongoing 
culture of' envelope journalism' despite the reforms of the political system. 
Bribes paid directly to journalists have long been used to influence editorial 
content, and this kind of corruption is rationalised as not morally wrong 
but simply a part of the system and an expected bonus for journalists. 
Corruption within the media is potentially a very serious problem, 
given the dominant role the press is playing now in reporting on corruption 
within governments in young democracies. When authoritarian 
governments controlled the press the public was unable to gain access to 
information about the corrupt practices of officials. With a free press, 
however, corruption at all levels can be reported, including corruption of 
the media industry itself. 
'Envelope journalism' is perhaps the greatest threat to the credibility 
of a free press. It cannot be justified by reference to the poverty of the 
journalist in question. In Australia, the two most highly paid radio 
journalists in the country insisted on being paid millions more from 
business for favourable editorial comments about those business' 
products. The 'cash for comments' scandal in Australia is merely the end 
point that envelope journalism reaches. 
The endgame is democracy 
'When people look back at what happened in this century, they will find 
it difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the 
preeminently acceptable form of governance' (Sen 1999:4). This was Nobel 
laureate Amartya Sen's response to the question of what was the most 
important thing to have happened the 20th century. 'This recognition of 
democracy as a universally relevant system, which moves in the direction 
of its acceptance as a universal value, is a major revolution in thinking, 
and one of the main contributions of the twentieth century.' 
Democracy made its way in East Asia in the last years of the last decade 
of the century. There are the examples of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
in Northeast Asia, and the Philippines and Thailand in Southeast Asia. 
The entire international community is keeping its fingers crossed that 
Indonesia can also make the transition. Successful transition to democracy 
with multi-party elections and liberal values is now seen as the key to 
good governance and sustainable economic development. 
The decisive battle for democratisation is the fight for freedom of the 
press. The flow of information is the key to empowering people. The most 
powerful weapon in the battle for democracy is the truth and it is the 
media that is charged with delivering it as best it can to the people. This is 
a fact that autocrats understand even better than democrats. So the issue 
of freedom of the press takes on the broadest dimensions. It is not just a 
battle to ensure respect for Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. It is a battle to determine the shape of society, its mores 
and the functioning of its political system. 
Losing Control: freedom of the press in Asia takes us right up to the end of 
this tumultuous century. It deals with the Chinese media cranking up its 
latest propaganda campaign, this time against the Falun Gong. It discusses 
how the Indonesian media lost its way in reporting the tragedy in East 
Timor. And it comments on how the Cambodian media-or at least parts 
of it-surprisingly reported the allegations that the Prime Minister's wife 
had her husband's movie star girlfriend assassinated. 
The book adopts a country-by-country approach dealing with all the 
countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia. It does not attempt to sweep 
across to the sub-continent. It would not be possible to do justice to any 
discussion of freedom of the press in that region by sandwiching it in 
between the pages of a book about East Asia. 
The methodology is based on an underlying assumption: that 
journalists are best placed to provide the most up-to-date analysis of their 
own industry. Where possible, local journalists have contributed the 
country chapters. In some cases a more useful outcome could be achieved 
by employing foreign correspondents and commentators. Authors have 
written their chapters using journalistic research tools, such as first hand 
interviews, as well as more conventional academic methods. 
Willy Lam, one of the most respected journalists writing on China, 
gives us insight into the thought processes of the decision-makers in China 
and explains how they are trying to handle the dilemma of dealing with 
information flows. Walter Hamilton puts his years in Japan to good use 
in explaining the difficulty of breaking free of the herd mentality. Kavi 
Chongkittavorn traces the development of Thai democracy and the press 
freedoms which now accompany it from the perspective of one who has 
participated in that struggle. 
Andreas Harsono lives through his chapter on Indonesia, a journalist 
both exhilirated and concerned over the speed and direction of events. 
And in Sheila Coronel's chapter on the Philippines one can discern both 
pride in the country's achievement in democracy and exasperation at how 
it is being used. 
Peter Mares and Roger du Mars explain the situation in Vietnam and 
South Korea respectively by analysing their histories. Both nations have 
difficult pasts which point to problems in their present handling of media 
issues. Mary Yang and Dennis Engbarth trace the path by which Taiwan 
could boast perhaps the freest media in Asia. 
Chris Yeung devotes considerable attention to the handover of Hong 
Kong to China and the shadow Beijing will cast in the future. 
It has been left to Krzysztof Darewicz and my co-editor Roland Rich 
to deal with the difficult totalitarian end of the press freedom spectrum in 
North Korea and Burma. Roland Rich nevertheless finds a few rays of 
light in Cambodia and Mongolia. 
Amando Doronila provides his perspective in an insightful essay on a 
complex issue, one which he has long faced as a prominent journalist and 
editor both in the good years and the bad. He is the doyen of Asian 
journalists and his voice needs to be heard. 
All the contributors attacked their subjects individually but many have 
taken up similar themes and issues and it is on these and the many 
examples provided in the book that this overview chapter has drawn. 
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A few rays of light 
Roland Rich 
any political dissidents have died 
within the walls of Burma's notorious 
Insein prison, where former inmates 
say the thick stone walls run with 
water in the wet season and the wind howls through the open bars as 
prisoners huddle like caged animals. In 1996, sexagenarian Leo Nichols, 
the Anglo-Burmese acting Honorary Consul for several European 
countries, died within the prison complex a few months into his three-
year sentence. His crime: possession of an unregistered fax machine. 
Perhaps, more to the point, though, was his friendship with opposition 
leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. In Burma censorship and control of the media 
is complete. The Internet is banned and the grinding poverty imposed 
upon the people through isolation and authoritarianism means few own 
the technology which could give them access to alternative forms of 
information anyway. 
There is a depressing theme which dominates any discussion of the 
state of freedom of speech in Burma, as well as in Brunei, Cambodia, 
Laos and Mongolia: the struggle against authoritarianism in its various 
forms. It matters little whether the form of authoritarianism is monarchical, 
communist or a military dictatorship, intolerance of press freedom 
produces the same results. It is virtually by definition that the leadership 
of such countries can do no wrong, and so the crime in reporting corruption 
or incompetence is therefore committed by the reporter. In such an 
environment, however, the voracious appetite of the public for reading 
or viewing material remains much the same. So, in the absence of any 
real news, information or analysis, the Burmese and Lao look straight 
past the propaganda and pour over the colour advertisements around it. 
The promotions for haircuts and new consumer products are as close to 
symbols of the outside world as you can get in these tightly controlled 
societies. And although several of these governments are now in their 
post-authoritarian phases, the current state of the media demonstrates 
that a culture of freedom cannot be established overnight. 
While full press freedom does not exist in any of the five countries 
dealt with in this chapter, some are moving purposefully in that direction. 
Of the five, perhaps the country with the greatest degree of freedom of 
expression is Cambodia, probably a legacy of the period of government 
by the United Nations (UN) in 1992-93. The United Nations Transition 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) endowed Cambodia with a liberal 
constitution and thus broke some of the shackles of a twelve-year-old 
orthodox communist regime. Cambodia today boasts a vibrant civil society 
determined to hold onto the freedoms inherited from the UN period, but 
it is at times a difficult battle where the weapons are not only state power 
but assassins' bullets. Beyond the higher principle of defending press 
freedom, lies another challenge-facing the problems of the low quality 
of reporting. 
The emergence of Mongolia from seven decades of communism also 
illustrates some important themes. The main means of controlling the press 
in communist countries has always been self-censorship and in post-
communist societies many journalists have found it difficult to reinvent 
themselves. Press freedom is clearly not achieved simply through new 
legislation or the tearing up of old laws. It also requires a culture of a free 
and responsible press and a critical mass of journalists who value and 
defend that culture. Mongolia no longer routinely practices state 
censorship yet media freedom remains stunted. The Mongolian example 
argues for the proposition that a culture of press freedom cannot be 
developed where the state has a monopoly on media ownership. The 
Mongolian and other examples here also demonstrate that one necessary, 
though clearly not a sufficient, condition of press freedom is private and 
diverse ownership of the media. In this sense Mongolia is moving in the 
right direction. 
The Burmese generals have learned some lessons since they fooled 
themselves into believing that the people would vote for them. Their 
mentor, General Ne Win, never bothered trying to be loved. He was 
satisfied with being feared. Burma's problems today flow from Ne Win's 
autocratic rule. Like Napoleon's puppies in George Orwell's Animal Farm, 
Ne Win locked his military successors away from the outside world and 
when they emerged it was as the SLORC, an expressive acronym for the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council, since renamed the State Peace 
and Development Council (SPDC). Having been rebuffed overwhelmingly 
in 1990 in the popular vote they thought they would win, the Burmese 
generals now understand their relationship to the Burmese people better. 
They won 10 of the 485 seats while the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) won 392. They refused to hand over power to NLD leader, Aung 
San Suu K yi, and instead, placed her under house arrest. Another response 
to the poll was to reassess an already repressive press policy, to ensure 
total domination of the mass media by the state. As we enter the 
Information Age, Burmese authoritarianism has no place to go other than 
autarky and the poverty that will inevitably accompany it. 
There are also lessons to be drawn from the one-dimensional media of 
Brunei and Laos where there is no pretence of freedom of the press, but 
neither does there appear to be the public will to fight for it. Media freedom 
is part of a wider process of engaging the people in the government of 
their affairs. It cannot exist where, for reasons of apathy or resignation, 
the broader public is not prepared to demand and defend it. Here again 
the Internet is playing its role. It will allow opinions to be expressed, 
anonymously if necessary, and thus test the proposition that the people 
are content with their lot as the official media will have us all believe. 
Burma 
Every year Guardian Sein Win would hold his press party inviting foreign 
diplomats, stringers for foreign publications and a few locals. The guests 
would sit around discussing politics and personalities, focusing in 
particular on what was often grandly called the post-Ne Win era. The 
press parties were held in the 1980s, before SLORC had taken charge. It 
was as if the group lived in a country where the press had some use for 
political analysis. Respect for Sein Win was the reason the group came 
together at all. Sein Win had been a crusading newspaperman in the 1950s, 
when Burma was by and large a democratic country with something 
approaching a free press. His association with his newspaper was such 
that, in a country where a small stock of unisex names is shared by a large 
population, the name of his paper-The Guardian-had come to be tacked 
on to his own, thus distinguishing him from the thousands of other Sein 
Wins in the country. 
Among the regular guests was the stringer for the Far Eastern Economic 
Review, a skeletal old man who many years before had lost the courage to 
file anything but government press releases. There was also the stringer 
for Agence France Presse-a reallivewire. Everybody knew that while he 
liked to put the French news agency on his business card, his income 
came from his very competent tennis coaching. Of the diplomats, one 
could pick out the occasional spooks, just as Sein Win no doubt recognised 
the operatives from the Department of Defence Services Intelligence 
(DDSI) who had come as representatives of the now tame local 
newspapers. 
In Ne Win's Burma there was a certain level of tolerance of such facades, 
as long as one stuck to form and did not attempt to stray towards 
substance. Political censorship was standard operating procedure and it 
remains in daily use by his political successors. 
Today there is neither freedom of the press, nor tolerance for any kind 
of freedom of expression in Burma. The mass media has been directly 
controlled by the government for nearly four decades, with the most 
diligent of censors focusing on the local print media, locally made films 
and movies, and the state-run broadcasting stations. The government does 
not bother too much about foreign uncensored films and satellite TV access 
because so few people have access to them in what is now one of the 
poorest countries and when few Burmese have any knowledge of foreign 
languages. 
There are two major newspapers in Burmese-the Kyemon (The Mirror) 
and the Myanma Alin (The New Light of Myanmar)-and one in English 
under a translated name of the latter. They are published in Rangoon, 
with a circulation around 200,000 copies for each of the Burmese versions. 
All are under the supervision of the News and Periodicals Enterprise 
(NPE) of the Ministry of Information. And, all articles, news items and 
feature articles are prepared and selected by the NPE. The Office of the 
Strategic Studies (OSS), of which SPDC Secretary 1, Lt Gen Khin Nyunt, 
is the helmsman, prepares all articles on political and social issues. Any 
local writers, journalists or cartoonists wishing to preserve their 
independence prefer not to contribute to these newspapers, and the 
general public well understands their propagandistic nature. There is one 
evening newspaper called the City News run by the Yangon (Rangoon) 
City Development Committee (YCDC), another government organisation. 
The City News differs from the other newspapers only in that it carries 
film news, commodity prices, and some foreign tabloid news. It has an 
estimated circulation of about 35,000 copies. 
In Mandalay, there are two newspapers in the Burmese language-
the Ratanabon (the Mandalay) and the Mandalay Daily. The former is run 
by the NPE and the latter by the Mandalay City Development Committee. 
The Ratanabon is Mandalay's version of the New Light of Myanmar and the 
Mandalay Daily of the YCDC's City News. Circulation is around 30,000 for 
the Ratanabon and 20,000 for the Mandalay Daily. While the Ministry of 
Home Affairs has approved over 70 weekly magazines, only 48 actually 
appear, covering pop issues, sports, business, crimes, international news, 
cartoons, women's issues, student guides and, of course, propaganda. 
The best selling weekly has a circulation of some 30,000 and concentrates 
on cases of adultery, rape and murder, but most smaller weeklies survive 
with around 10,000 to 20,000 copies sold. There are also over 100 magazines 
produced each month. The best-selling monthly has a circulation of more 
than 40,000 copies but no one knows the exact number of sales becaus.e 
publishers prefer not to share these facts with either the revenue 
department or the contributors. The best-selling magazines cover 
astrology, mysterious events and tales of miraculous traditional remedies. 
Before SPDC came to power, there were very few weeklies and the 
number of monthlies were just a half of the existing figures. After the 
takeover, the regime issued permission to publish weeklies and monthlies 
to its offshoots. Staff welfare committees of various government 
departments were given this privilege. For instance, the staff welfare 
association of the Ministry of Information has three publications-
International Affairs, Sports, and the Pyay Myanmar (Burma)-and all three 
sell well. As a result, staff from these departments enjoy free monthly 
supplies of rice, edible oil and a small amount of cash. Other committees 
usually give concessions to private companies and individuals to publish 
the magazines on their behalf. Of the 48 weeklies only 14 are privately 
owned-one of them is run by a daughter of SPDC Secretary 3, Lt Gen 
Win Myint, while the remaining 34 licences are owned by government 
agencies or civil service staff welfare committees. The OSS publishes two 
weeklies-the International Economics News Journal and the Myanmar 
Morning Post, the latter in Chinese. The Department of Defence Services 
Intelligence (DDSI) also publishes a couple of propaganda journals but 
they are the least popular of the weeklies. 
Private ownership of the monthly magazines is more common, with 
only 20 being run by the government. However, some of the privately 
owned monthlies still have strong government connections and one of 
the best selling magazines, Living Colour Advertisement and Buying Guide 
Magazine, is owned by the son of SPDC Secretary 1, Lt Gen Khin Nyunt. 
Similarly, a group of Wa people (former insurgents along the Chinese 
border, with whom the government has signed a ceasefire agreement) 
owns another monthly magazine called Fashion Image, which is reportedly 
printed on machines in the compound of a DDSI unit. Another DDSI unit 
publishes a monthly propaganda magazine called Myet Khin Thit (New 
Pasture), but it does not sell well. 
The Printers and Publishers Registration Law enacted by the Ne Win's 
Revolutionary Council in 1962 still applies to the print media. According 
to this law, publication of any kind of written material without official 
knowledge and approval if forbidden. It is also illegal to own an 
unregistered printing machine of any kind including cyclostyling 
machines, computer printers, photocopiers, modems and fax machines. 
It was under this law that Leo Nichols, was sentenced to jail. The New 
Light of Myanmar dismissed the ensuing diplomatic protests simply by 
describing Nichols as 'a bad hat' (Reuters 1996). 
General Ne Win also introduced the Press Scrutiny Board (PSB) in the 
mid 1970s on the pretext of ensuring correct Burmese spellings (Khin 
Maung Win 1999). However, within a few years it had become the 
censoring agency. Although it is under the General Administration 
Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the director of the board has 
been an army officer from DDSI since the mid 1980s. There are no specific 
or clear-cut guidelines for censorship, and the process is indiscriminate, 
depending on the prevailing political situation. All printed material other 
than the daily newspapers, which are published by the government, has 
to be submitted to the PSB. 
Control of journalists is another method of stifling freedom of 
expression. Since the junta took over, at least 14 Burmese journalists have 
been sent to jail (www.freemedia.at). Two have died in prison and seven 
journalists, all members of the NLD, remain in Burma's jails. One of them, 
San San Nweh has been held in Rangoon's Insein prison since August 
1994. On 6 October, 1994, under Article 5 of the country's emergency laws, 
a court whose proceedings took place in the prison, sentenced her to seven 
years in jail for 'spreading information prejudicial to the state'. Among 
other charges, she was accused of taking part in a video report by two 
French journalists inApril1993. Like the other six jailed journalists, she is 
being held in extremely poor conditions and is reported to have been ill-
treated. Win Tin, editor of the daily Hanthawadi and deputy chairman of 
the Burmese Writers' Association, who was sentenced to a ten-year jail 
sentence in 1989, spent several months in a cage usually used for dogs. 
Political criticism is not tolerated, nor are complaints about the activities 
of government departments, not even genuine consumer complaints with 
no overt political motive. Publishers, writers and journalists understand 
well these two golden rules and generally abide by them. Even so, the 
PSB is ever watchful and intervenes when it thinks necessary to direct 
publishers to omit or amend material which may be regarded as sensitive 
by the senior leadership, for example when a story contains characters 
whose names are identical to those of senior military figures-a not 
uncommon occurrence. 
The PSB also monitors material closely for symbolic or hidden 
messages. Stories, including those with religious or cultural themes, with 
vague or ambiguous messages are not approved. No slang is allowed, no 
matter how widespread their use. Consumer complaints and criticisms 
of the private sector are sometimes permitted if the business concerned is 
not connected with the military leadership or their family members. 
Government propaganda is compulsorily included in all publications 
and, since March 1999, weeklies owned by staff welfare committees have 
to reproduce from the government daily newspapers at least one article 
or a cartoon attacking Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party. All weekly 
magazines are from time to time also directed to include articles on matters 
'of contemporary interest', for example denying rumours which are 
implicitly critical of the government or which the government is concerned 
could lead to unrest. 
The obligation to include government propaganda is a particularly 
difficult requirement for publishers given the rather pathetic and puerile 
content of the official vitriol directed at Aung San Suu K yi. The News and 
Periodicals Enterprise (NPE) is apparently so smug about the articles 
attacking the NLD that it had two compilations published in 1998 (News 
and Periodicals Enterprise, October 1998 and December 1998-all quotes 
are sic). Aung San Suu Kyi is variously described as 'the unrivalled world-
renown political stunt democracy princess' (Pauksa 1998), 'an animal 
with a long tale that has been placed on the throne' (Sithu Nyein Aye 
1998) and as 'an axe-handle engaged in subversive acts to give trouble to 
Myanmar' (Maung Kya Ban 1998). She is often referred to as 'the wife of 
a White' (Pauksa 1998) and in a bizarre denunciation she is addressed in 
the second person as follows: ' ... you are extremely hot or do you take 
pleasure scorching others as you are the one who possesses intense heat' 
(Than Eint Hmu 1998). 
Her crimes are numerous, often concerning her 'doing paid jobs as 
assigned by the British and the US' (Bamathi Khin Aung 1998), or along 
the lines of 'the democracy miss champion of peace goes roving to the 
West bloc embassies and diplomatic mission heads residences having 
meals at mealtimes and tea at teatime' (Maung Saw Tun 1998). One 
ingenious accusation concerns the many awards she has received including 
the Nobel Peace Prize which carries one million dollars. Daw Suu Kyi's 
critics argued 'that woman did not declare such amount of foreign 
currency, nor did she pay income tax and bring even a penny into 
Myanmar' (U Mingala 1998). 
The criticisms of Aung San Suu Kyi are complemented by incessant 
criticism of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America 
(VOA), Radio Free Asia (RFA) foreign broadcasts to Burma. In one, the 
views of the generals on certain issues becomes quite clear. 'Myanmars 
clearly know that democracy, human rights, freedom of the Press and 
free flow of news of the Western media are only lies and conspiracies to 
give trouble to Myanmar with evil intention' (Thadindauk Thetsay 1998). 
This is virtually the only sort of political commentary available to 
Burmese readers. There is no regular underground press in the print media. 
Unlawful organisations such as the Rangoon University Students' Union 
or the Young Monks' Union occasionally distribute photocopied leaflets, 
but possession of these is illegal and most people are reluctant to risk 
being seen reading them, given the severity of punishments for minor 
political 'crimes'. Political leaflets and newspapers printed in other 
countries are smuggled into Burma from time to time and their contents 
spread by word of mouth. 
Although there is no Burmese samizdat, some unlawful publications 
do appear, including student guides, which are widely available and 
'adult' literature, which is less so. A few foreign publications are available 
in supermarkets and bookstores and the major hotels generally have copies 
of daily newspapers from Singapore and the International Herald Tribune, 
but with contentious articles, such as the fall of Soeharto, clipped out. It is 
possible to subscribe to Asiaweek or Reader's Digest but subscribers are not 
allowed to receive them until PSB has removed any article deemed to be 
sensitive. The readership of English-language publications is quite low, 
around 2,500 copies in a country of nearly 50 million people. 
The government controls the two television stations and one radio 
station. The Myanmar Television and Radio Department (MTRD) of the 
Ministry of Information runs one television station and the radio station, 
while the Public Relations and Psychological Warfare Department of the 
army runs the Myawaddy channel on television. Both organisations make 
their own programming decisions and approve all advertisements before 
putting them on air. MTRD tends to be the more conservative and 
businesses prefer to deal with the Myawaddy channel. Myawaddy also 
attracts a wider viewing audience, partly because it shows Taiwanese 
soap operas and movies. Approximately 10 per cent of the population 
own a television set and has access to local stations. 
All radios are required by law to be registered but in practice this is 
widely ignored since cheap Chinese-made short wave radios began to 
flood the market in the 1990s. Costing about 2,500 kyats (about US$12), 
they run reasonably well with 6 to 9 different short wave bands. Many 
people listen to Burmese-language radio programs broadcast by foreign 
stations. The BBC, VOA and RFA and the Democratic Voice of Burma 
(DVB), based in Norway and run by exiled dissidents, are the most popular 
among Burmese listeners. Japanese NHK and the All India Radio also 
have Burmese-language programs but do not attract a wide audience. 
While actual figures are impossible to obtain, a rough estimate would be 
that about ten per cent of the population listens to foreign short-wave 
broadcasts. 
Satellite television is expensive and thus not widespread and, even 
among those who own receivers, many are hampered by the language 
barrier and end up watching mainly music and action movie programs. 
They are therefore of little interest to the government and its censors. 
Burma's economic deterioration has seen a decline in the number of 
domestic motion pictures produced from over 60 a year in the 1970s to 
only 19 in 1998, while about 20 video movies are produced each month. 
Burmese movies are generally of low quality, both technically and 
artistically. While some filmmakers claim this is due to censorship, the 
reality is that soap operas, action movies, and comedies sell better. Many 
foreign movies, American, Chinese (Hong Kong) and Indian in particular, 
are available from video shops and remain uncensored, probably because 
of the comparatively few people with the money to buy them. 
On the other hand, the music industry is closely scrutinised because 
cassette players are more widely owned. Prior to recording, a singer or a 
producer is obliged to submit the lyrics to PSB for scrutiny and official 
approval. Upon completion of recording, several copies of sample tapes 
together with the approved copy of lyrics must be resubmitted to PSB to 
check the singer's compliance. Advertisements for the album and even 
album covers require PSB' s approval. 
It is not surprising in a country where the regime insists on controlling 
all mass media that the Internet is not available. The military government 
understands that it would have difficulty controlling Internet material on 
the Internet and so the most sensible tactic from its perspective is to ban 
it. Unlike other governments who would be concerned to forgo the 
economic advantages of the Internet, SPDC is not uncomfortable with 
notions of autarky and seems prepared to accept the poverty that, 
inevitably, will accompany it. 
Links to many sites about Burma including the Internet edition of the 
New Light of Myanmar may be accessed through the Burma Project on the 
Open Society web page at www.soros.org/. 
Laos 
A recent conversation reported as taking place between a diplomat and 
an editor of a Lao newspaper focused on how the newspaper could be 
made more readable and relevant to its readers, while not trespassing on 
forbidden ground. The diplomat suggested road accidents and the plight 
of the victims as a worthy subject. The editor recoiled in horror. 
'Impossible', he explained, 'because children of one of the nation's leaders 
might have caused an accident and it could thus not risk being reported'. 
The Lao media remains mired in its communist origins. There is 
certainly no freedom of the press and the public seems largely willing to 
accept the version of the news the authorities wish to present. While the 
content and tone of the media continues to be closely regulated by the 
ruling communist Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), the industry 
is nevertheless cautiously seeking to reflect the sentiments and concerns 
of society, thereby hesitantly drifting away from its political raison d'etre 
as a mere conduit for official ideology. 
At first glance, Laos appears to have a healthy print media 
environment-along with the Vientiane Times and its French-language 
cousin Le Renovateur, there are a host of Lao-language papers. The major 
daily publications are Pasason (The People), Viengchan Mai (The New 
Vientiane), and Khao San Pathet Lao (Lao Nation's News Brief). Endorsed 
as the 'official voice of the Central Committee of the Lao People's 
Revolutionary Party', Pasason is presented to the public as the pre-eminent 
information organ. Articles and editorials unreservedly reinforce and 
promote government policy. With its attention fixed firmly on domestic 
events, international coverage in Pasason tends to be an afterthought, with 
overseas stories normally sourced from Laos' fraternal neighbours, 
Vietnam and China. The Sunday edition of the paper seeks to offer lighter 
fare with politics giving way to sport, society and entertainment. In acting 
as the official mouthpiece of the Party, Pasason is supported by a raft of 
other publications-each of the LPRP's mass organisations (the Youth 
Union, Women's Union and Federation of Trade Unions) produces a 
monthly publication, with weekly newspapers published by the Ministry 
of National Defence and the Ministry of Interior. Pasason's ideological 
responsibilities also colour its presentation. Over the past two years, the 
paper has substantially reduced the volume of advertising for fear that 
its ideological message was becoming overwhelmed by trading notices 
and classifieds. This perceived conflict hints at the LPRP's deeper 
challenge: to maintain its political relevance in an increasingly market-
oriented and open society. 
Viengchan Mai's open-door approach to advertising has been central 
to its emergence as Laos' most popular paper. The paper's centrespread 
of classifieds selling haircuts, motorbikes, and construction materials is 
its major drawcard. In addition, Viengchan Mai offers a number of other 
features less prevalent in Party publications-a greater diversity of articles, 
more international news, short fictional stories, and special interest pieces. 
Producing a similar kind of product for readers in Laos' capital city are a 
number of other newspapers-such as the weekly publication Viengchan 
Toolakith-Sangkom (Vientiane Business and Social)-all of which seek to 
offer a richer diet of information whilst fulfilling their political dues to 
the Party. 
Vientiane Times, however, has sought to push the boundaries of 
acceptability by cautiously reflecting community feelings on a range of 
politically sensitive issues-anger at the state of Vientiane's roads, concern 
over the slow response times of police, and frustration at the inviolability 
of the military from proper financial and legal scrutiny. These English-
language articles have not been reprinted in the Lao-language press. 
In the electronic media, the Lao population is served by three television 
stations-National Television, Channel Three (a former joint venture with 
a Thai company which has since been taken over by the Lao government), 
and Channel Five which shows a blend of French-language and Lao 
programs. Two radio stations also exist. Lao radio and television services 
are of minor significance however, because of the similarities of language: 
Lao viewers receive more entertaining and informative programs 
broadcast from Thailand. Along the Mekong Valley, where 75 per cent of 
the Lao population is located, households have switched en masse to signals 
from northeastern Thailand. In a survey of Vientiane society undertaken 
by Australian academic Grant Evans in 1998, 94 per cent of respondents 
indicated that they had tuned in to Thai television during the past week; 
significantly, 51 per cent of this group indicated that their motive was to 
view news and current affairs thereby pointing to widespread 
dissatisfaction with Lao news services (survey published by the Lao 
Institute for Cultural Relations but not yet distributed). 
The advent of the Internet-another threat to the Party's ability to 
control information-has naturally raised alarm bells within official circles. 
After several years of cautious consideration, the government finally 
issued its Internet Decree in 1997. It divided authority for the Internet 
between four government ministries. In this highly confused environment, 
the Ministry of Information and Culture seized the initiative and struck a 
joint venture deal with a Philippines-registered company to become Laos' 
first Internet service provider. In an intriguing bureaucratic tussle, the 
Communications Ministry has hit back by establishing a rival provider, 
and ominously holds the potential authority to starve its competitor of 
trunk lines. In the meantime, efforts have also been made to block sites 
considered either politically or morally undesirable for Lao users. 
By the end of 1998, political hard-liners opposed to the arrival of the 
Internet in Laos could claim to have been vindicated when an 
'unauthorised' Vientiane Times web page appeared, put up by overseas 
Lao in the United States. The page draws on the hardcopy version of the 
but is complemented by additional commentary which occasionally 
levels stinging criticism at authorities. Efforts by the Lao government to 
disclaim the site including prominent denunciations in the printed version 
have, of course, simply drawn greater attention to it. The unauthorised 
Vientiane Times web page may be viewed at www.vientianetimes.com/. 
Mongolia 
The bloodless 'Democratic Revolution' of 1990 with its massive popular 
demonstrations against the communist system resulted in a wide open 
stable door to a free press-but initially the journalist horses refused to 
bolt. In the state television station MRTV, for example, almost everything 
continued as before. MRTV operated sedately in the distant rear of the 
free press pack, persisting in its historical, life-long role as mouthpiece of 
the government-still resolutely communist. The old guard was in control 
of Mongolian broadcasting and the election of the reformed communists 
in the 1992 elections seemed to vindicate its inertia. 
Observers watched the polling stations again in 1996-the second free 
elections for national parliament-as families dressed in their Sunday best 
rolled up to cast their votes in a turnout close to 95 per cent of the electorate. 
To many people's surprise, the vote produced the first non-communist 
government of Mongolia since 1921. The changes, which began with the 
people power movement of 1990, would now be accelerated, particularly 
through the privatisation of state-owned companies and the encouragement 
of competition. 
These days there are more than 500 registered newspapers in Mongolia. 
Back in the 1980s all publications were owned by the State, but by 1998 a 
transition was underway and most newspapers became privately owned 
and operated. It was only from 1 April1999 that the newspapers with the 
biggest circulation were placed 'on the market'. The country's very first 
regular publication, called Capital News, was printed in pre-communist 
Mongolia in 1913 but the first national newspaper was not published until 
1924 when Soviet communism was the dominant influence. It was called 
Unen (Truth) and was a replica of the Soviet party paper, Pravda. Unen 
was generally understood to be a means of advancing party views and 
policies and was never considered an accurate news source. During the 
1980s Unen sold 180,000 copies. Over the past few years interest in Unen 
has waned and in 1997 it changed its named to Unen Uu? ('Is It True?') as 
part of an unsuccessful readership push. Now, circulation is down to less 
than 10,000. 
The newspaper with the largest readership is the daily, government-
owned Ardyn Erkh (People's Right). Like its main competitors, Zasgyn 
Gazryn Medee (Government News) and the privately owned Onoodor 
(Today), the daily is a broadsheet and rarely more than eight pages. Ardyn 
Erkh was established in 1990 after a communist journalist defected from 
Unen and started the official publication. Both Ardyn Erkh and Zasgyn 
Gazryn Medee are scheduled for privatisation by the end of 1999 and 
legislation requires that 40 per cent of ownership will be offered to 
employees with the remainder auctioned. 
Mongolia's first English-language publication, established in 1991, is 
The Mongol Messenger, owned and run by the government news agency, 
Montsame. Initially it was seen as a method of attracting foreign investment, 
but with an increasing number of foreigners living in Mongolia it has 
become a vital information source and a sound generator of advertising 
revenue. Its increased advertising content and considerable potential will 
make it a sought after publication when the time comes to privatise. 
Other popular publications include the weekly Ulaanbaatar which is 
controlled by the Mayor's office; Nugel Buyan (Sin and Virtue) which is 
owned by the Police Department; Haluun Khonjil (Hot Blanket) published 
twice a month and privately owned; Khuumun Bicheg (Human Scripture) 
published by Montsame in traditional Mongolian script; and II Tovchoo 
(Open Chronicle) which is a very popular privately owned weekly. The 
privately owned and scandalous weekly newspaper Seruuleg (Alarm) has 
also increased in popularity and circulation now stands at more than 25,000. 
In addition to the State television stations (three in total) there are two 
privately run stations-one by a local entrepreneur and the other by an 
American Christian concern. The government-owned radio and television 
networks will not be privatised until the Law of Pubic Service Broadcasting 
is finalised. The erratic Mongolian television network, Channel 25, is 
owned by former Communist rebel Baldorj, whose growing media empire 
also includes the Onoodor newspaper, Jaag Radio and the city's second 
English weekly, the UB Post. Since 1995, there has been access to 
international satellite networks such as CNN, Star TV and Moscow TV 
Before 1989, the Ideology Department of the ruling Communist Party 
(Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP]) issued guidelines for 
editorial policy. There was also a Censorship Bureau which examined 
and at times rejected publications before they went to press. The bureau 
was abolished in 1990 and the editors were given censorship control 
tempered by a list of 200 subjects to avoid. Ironically, it was after the MPRP 
was ousted from office and the Democratic Coalition came to power that 
the new government made moves to halt the publication of The Mongol 
Messenger because a particular front page was 'an international 
embarrassment'. The paper continued to be printed thanks to the 
journalistic principles of the news agency director who ignored the party 
directive. 
Since 1994 the number of publications (including erotica) sold openly 
and seemingly without censorship, has increased and publishers basically 
print what they want when they want. As in so many countries where 
journalistic freedom has followed a period of authoritarian rule, however, 
the journalists have not been sufficiently responsible and there is a pressing 
need to improve journalistic ethics. 
Journalists tend to belong either to the Mongolian Free Democratic 
Journalists Association or the Mongolian Journalists Union, but they both 
seem to spend more time opposing each other than pursuing issues of 
ethics, standards and workers' rights. Early on in Mongolia's transition 
to a market economy, the Danish Government funded the development 
of the Press Institute of Mongolia. This has had positive effects on 
journalistic ethics in both the electronic and print media. The Institute 
also offered an alternative publishing house and since its inception the 
production quality of many newspapers has improved. 
Officially, all foreign correspondents are supposed to register with the 
Ministry of External Relations and all foreigners entering the country for 
a period of more than 30 days must also register with the police. 
Currently there are over 20 Internet cafes in Ulaanbaatar, with no 
restrictions on access. The casual user can access the Internet at any of the 
cafes for less than US$2 an hour (the average family income is around 
US$20 a week). International information is freely available from anywhere 
in the world. There are no apparent electronic fences. Domestic information 
is available on the daily independent update on the net, from the many 
newspapers and from radio and television stations. There seems little real 
possibility of controlling the competing flow of information via 
independent and foreign media, or the Internet. The state of the freedom 
of the press in Mongolia seems nearer the opposite end of the spectrum 
from that ten years ago; all that is needed, it seems, may be a better 
observance of the code of ethics by the journalists themselves. 
Media websites 
Mongolian National News Agency, www.mol.mn/montsame/ 
Mongolia Online 2000, www.mol.mn/ 
Mongolian Government State Property Committee (SPC), 
www.spc.gov.mn/ 
Mongolian Ministry of External Relations, www.mol.mn/ mer I 
Brunei 
In the tiny kingdom of Brunei, the authorities control the content of the 
local television and newspapers and reporting and programming is bland 
and matter of fact. There is no editorial page in the papers and little 
comment on government press statements or policies. A readers' letter 
page introduced in 1997 is a very popular vehicle for voicing discontent 
on a number of local issues. The family of Foreign Minister Prince 
Mohamed owns the major English-language paper, the Borneo Bulletin, 
and staff understand the limits of what they can and can't report. Local 
television is state owned and features significant religious content. 
A new daily English-language paper, News Express, commenced 
publication in Brunei in time for the Southeast Asian Games in August 
1999. The paper initially concentrated mainly on the Games and it is not 
clear if it will challenge the Borneo Bulletin. Singapore and Malaysian 
papers are also available. 
Satellite dishes are permitted and for a small fee viewers can access 
Krista[ TV which is a cabled local version of Star TV. Australian Television 
is available and viewers can subscribe to the Malaysian TV service ASTRO. 
Some overseas publications are not allowed in the country and others are 
stopped from time to time if they have an article that the local authorities 
consider offensive. Some women's magazines have bare skin blacked out 
to meet local Islamic sensitivities. Krista[ censors MTV, the music channel, 
because of immodest dress and perhaps because of the lyrics of some 
songs. The Internet appears to be free of interference. 
There is legislation covering visiting journalists, but those few who go 
to Bandar Seri Begawan tend to do so without necessarily letting the 
relevant authorities know. 
Cambodia 
Did the Prime Minister's wife have the Prime Minister's movie star 
girlfriend murdered in the hail of assassin's bullets on 6 July 1999? This 
is the question Cambodian newspapers are daring to ask after the 
accusation was first leveled at Bun Rany, wife of Hun Sen, by a French 
weekly news magazine, L'Express (Louyot 1999). The death of Piseth Pilika 
had touched a nerve in a Cambodian society inured by decades of war, 
genocide, communism and uncertainty. Cambodia's most popular movie 
star, a beautiful young woman, had been shot dead in broad daylight 
and, naturally, the press reported fully. But the test for the Cambodia press 
was whether it would also report the allegations of the Prime Minister's 
wife's involvement. To their credit, many newspapers did. The issue could 
no longer be ignored. Mrs Bun Rany claimed to have been libelled and 
said she would sue the French magazine. The issue was in the public 
domain, the press had done its job. It is unthinkable that Hun Sen in the 
communist era before the UN intervention would ever have allowed such 
an accusation to be published anywhere in Cambodia. But with Cambodia 
groping towards multi-party democracy, the Prime Minister no longer 
has total power to direct the media. 
Descriptions of Cambodia's press are usually paraphrased with a 
paradox: 'vigorous but not professional' or 'free but not responsible'. 
Freedom of the press is, indeed, a complicated and paradoxical issue in 
Cambodia; as in so many other areas of public life, the relatively recent 
imposition of multi-party democracy sits uncomfortably with the 
leadership's autocratic instincts. The media as it now exists in Cambodia, 
essentially began with the UNTAC regime in 1992-93. The regime 
attempted by means of military demobilisation, law reform and 
democratic elections, to bring democracy to Cambodia. The legal regime 
introduced by UNTAC included a constitution guaranteeing that 'Khmer 
citizens shall have freedom of expression, press, publication and assembly'. 
The response was the emergence of a huge number of new newspapers 
and bulletins, the vast majority in the Khmer language, but several written 
in English, French and even Japanese. From the beginning, most of these 
publications were affiliated with political parties and used their new-found 
media freedom to write biased and often slanderous stories about their 
rivals and to publish aggressive opinion pieces about the issues of the 
day. Deeply scarred by the destruction of all media during the Khmer 
Rouge era of 1975-79 and followed by the restrictions of an old-style 
communist regime for 12 years thereafter, Cambodia lacked capable 
journalists and any tradition of a free and responsible press. 
Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, the free press flourished with 
little interference during the UNTAC period. Following the election of a 
fragile coalition and the departure of the UN administrators, however, 
the situation deteriorated rapidly. In 1994, the media was rocked by the 
murder of two newspaper editors and one journalist, as well as a grenade 
attack on the office of one newspaper that injured five, including two 
staff members. All of the publications involved were anti-Cambodian 
People's Party (CPP)-the junior, but powerful, partner in the coalition 
government. There have been sporadic attacks on journalists and editors 
every year since by unknown assailants invariably following criticism of 
the government or government officials in the newspapers involved. 
Murders of editors critical of the regime in 1996 and 1998 point to the fact 
that the ultimate form of censorship remains in use in Cambodia. 
In addition, the CPP-dominated government, a descendant of the 
previous Communist leadership, exercised ever-tighter control over the 
Cambodian press. Cambodia's 1995 Law on the Regime of the Press 
reiterated the constitution's guarantee of press freedom, but allowed the 
Ministry of Information to take action against the press for a range of 
offences, including the broad power to suspend publications for printing 
'any information that may cause harm to national security or political 
stability'. Ostensibly under the authority of this law, many newspapers 
have been threatened with closure and several shut down or suspended, 
for the publication or broadcast of material deemed 'inappropriate', 
usually because it was critical of the political leadership or the King. 
In early 1998 the Ministry of Information suspended several 
newspapers on the grounds that they had insulted national leaders and 
threatened national security. The Ministry ordered the seizure of all copies 
of these newspapers and banned companies from printing the 
publications. The six opposition newspapers, Samleng Samapheap, 
Antarakum, Kumnit Kaun Khmer, Proyuth, Neak Tosu and Kolvoth Angkor, 
had criticised Co-Premier Hun Sen. 
Following elections and the formation of a new coalition government 
in late 1998, suppression of the Cambodian press relaxed along with the 
general political atmosphere. The new Minister for Information, 
representing the junior coalition party (FUNCINPEC), stated his intention 
to allow press freedom and improve the quality of the press, saying 'my 
duty is not to close down newspapers, but to guide them the right way'. 
This guidance has translated into a new and vigorously pursued concern 
to preserve Khmer culture by attempting to ban foreign words and foreign 
influences from the Khmer media. 
Cambodian newspapers in 1999 remain consumed with politics and 
crime. They are notable mostly for the poor quality of reporting, short on 
fact but expansive on aggressively stated opinion, and for the increasingly 
violent, often colour, photographs of murder and accident victims 
routinely gracing the front pages. Almost all the Cambodian newspapers 
have proven unable to move beyond their political biases, and the reason 
for this is, at least in part, economic. With over 200 newspapers registered 
with the Ministry of Information (of which 30 or so publish at least weekly) 
and a paucity of paid advertising to go around, most rely on wealthy 
patrons, with various political allegiances and agendas, to stay in business. 
One newspaper trainee recently told a foreign analyst that 'the industry 
we work in is not journalism, it's politics'. 
Moreover, despite the return of political stability, the ruling party and 
its ideas about controlling information largely remain in place. Journalists 
admit that they still work within an enduring climate of fear, such that 
investigative journalism and stories reflecting badly on those in power 
are often self-censored. The 1995 Press Law still awaits amendment, and 
the Ministry of Information's attempts to draft media regulations clarifying 
its powers over the press have been met with criticism. 
It was to the great credit of the fortnightly English-language Phnom 
Penh Post that it produced a series of articles in mid 1999 on corruption in 
Cambodia. The articles criticised the government's approach and called 
for tighter legislation. That these articles seemed to be accepted as a 
legitimate part of national debate on the issue speaks well for the growing 
tolerance of the diversity of political opinion in Cambodia. 
The electronic media is a slightly different phenomenon. It is tightly 
government controlled, with the ruling CPP controlling all six of 
Cambodia's local television stations and eleven of its twelve radio stations 
(the twelfth, owned by an outspoken government critic, was shut down 
for several months for 'irresponsible broadcasting' during 1998-99). A 
small number of stations previously controlled by other parties were lost 
to CPP during the political upheaval of 1997. 
Coverage of news and politics in the electronic media is minimal with 
news-reports tending to focus on the public activities of political leaders. 
Speeches and press conferences by the Prime Minister are frequently 
broadcast on all channels concurrently during prime time. 
During the 1998 election, freedom of the electronic media emerged as 
a significant issue for opposition political parties and human rights groups. 
The United Nations Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia published 
several reports criticising the lack of access for other parties to the electronic 
media, and the blatant bias in reporting on political issues (United Nations 
1998a, 1998b ). One example often noted is that the return of ousted Prime 
Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh from self-exile in early 1998 was the 
top story on CNN's worldwide coverage of the day, but failed to be even 
mentioned on any of Cambodia's local stations. The bias problem was 
only partly resolved by the late. passage of special provisions allowing 
airtime to all parties during the designated campaign period. 
In the post-election environment the electronic media does not play a 
particularly significant political role. It continues to broadcast karaoke and 
movies rather than news and politics. There appears to be no move to 
reform what news and political coverage exists. Opposition parties and 
human rights groups are already preparing to fight the same battles for 
the airwaves in the 2000 local-level election campaign as they did in 1998. 
Media websites 
Cambodian Internet Service2rovider, www.cambodian.com/ 
Phnom Penh Daily, www.phnompenhdaily.com/ 
National Assembly of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
www.cambodian-parliament.org/ 
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State power versus the Internet 
Willy Wo-Lap Lam 
ower grows out of the barrel of a gun'. 
said Chairman Mao Zedong on the 
success of the Communist Revolu-
tion. Yet it is equally accurate to say 
that power grows out of, and is sustained by, the nib of a pen. Propaganda, 
through the heavy-handed manipulation of the media, has been just as 
essential as the army and police in upholding the mandate of heaven of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As China celebrated the 50th 
anniversary of Communist rule on 1 October 1999, the administration of 
President Jiang Zemin seemed to have barely deviated from the view that 
propaganda remains essential in promoting uniformity of thinking and 
support for the state, despite the telecommunications revolution which 
has transformed the global media. 
More than the leaders of other communist and socialist countries, CCP 
chieftains have taken, and continue to take, a personal interest in 
propaganda. Mao himself was responsible for widespread pamphleteering 
before the Communist triumph in 1949. Then, from the early 1950s to the 
end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the media was used to build faith 
in the Communist utopia and the vision that China could 'overtake' the 
United States and the United Kingdom in 20 years. After Deng Xiaoping 
launched the reformist open-door policy in 1978, the theme of the official 
media was how to mix socialism with market reforms. In the wake of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre and following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Bloc in the 1990s, the leadership used the press to shore up faith in the 
CCP and to counter the 'infiltration' of 'bourgeois-liberal' ideas. Under 
the leadership of President Jiang it seems unlikely that the 'traditional' 
functions of the Chinese media, such as promoting cohesion among the 
Chinese people and denigrating western values, will change in the new 
millennium. In fact, President Jiang appears to be building his own quasi-
Maoist personality cult. Calls in the press for patriotism and cohesiveness 
are thinly disguised attempts to promote the present leadership, with Jiang 
at its core. 
Regardless of the prevailing view within the CCP, the crucial question 
facing China is how long the quaint Communist party 'reading groups' 
of censors, the vague media laws and regulations which encourage self-
censorship, and the more blatant controls such as intimidation, arrest and 
imprisonment of journalists can hold back the tide of information 
technology. Already, the Internet is making significant inroads by linking 
dissident networks, and forcing the security apparatus into a seemingly 
futile race to try to stay one step ahead of a technology which allows new 
web sites to be opened and closed on a daily basis. At the same time 
market economic reforms are introducing new forces into the media. As 
government handouts decline, the media is being forced to make market-
driven changes, adding racy stories on issues such as crime, smuggling 
and prostitution to lure readers. More broadly, the market place is 
facilitating the rise of civil society. Despite the CCP's dogged refusal to 
share power, non-party civic organisations have proliferated. The role the 
media might play in ending the one-party state in China, and how far off 
or how inevitable that demise may be, is a critical challenge for President 
Jiang and his fellow septuagenarian leaders. 
Within the official birdcage 
Media watchers in China believe it is unlikely the CCP's official 
will loosen in the near future, given the freeze on political 
reform which followed the crackdown of 4 June 1989. The Chinese media's 
reporting of the Balkan crisis in the spring of 1999, particularly the bombing 
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, provides a good example of recent 
CCP-style propaganda. According to the Chinese media, the 'Washington-
led NATO military machine' was trying to subjugate first Serbia, and then 
the rest of the world using the new doctrine of international 
humanitarianism. Ethnic cleansing carried out by the regime of Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milosevic rated only a passing mention. The apology 
by US President Bill Clinton following the bombing of the Chinese embassy 
on the night of 7 May 1999 by NATO forces was not reported for two 
days. Then the press fanned anti-US feelings as students and citizens 
protested outside US missions across the country and played a key role in 
stirring up nationalism and pressuring America and other NATO 
countries. But, all mention of the embassy bombing suddenly disappeared 
from the Chinese media towards the end of July, when the regime decided 
it was time to revive ties with the United States in an effort to rein in the 
'pro-independence gambit' of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui. 
During the 1990s, there were several timid initiatives in press 
liberalisation. The most recent was the brief 'Beijing spring' of mid 1998, 
in the run-up to President Clinton's visit to China. At that time the 
administration was reportedly considering allowing intellectuals to form 
political parties. Chinese and diplomatic sources in Beijing cited internal 
papers written by CCP think-tank liberals recommending permission be 
granted for the establishment of a non-Communist Party and non-official 
publications. But behind the scenes the liberals lost. Following the Clinton 
visit there was a new clampdown on dissent and mass arrests of dissidents. 
Censorship was tightened considerably and observers anticipate that this 
phase of conservatism will last at least through to 2002, or the end of 
Jiang's term as Party General Secretary. 
But, even against this relatively bleak backdrop, subtle but highly 
significant changes are taking place. Some of the momentum is coming 
from within the CCP itself-but more significant pressures are building 
due to market economic reforms and the expansion of civil institutions. 
In this environment the CCP has called on the media to assist in Beijing's 
goal of limited reform: small-scale, within-the-establishment changes such 
as cracking down on corruption and mal-administration within the 
framework of one-party dictatorship. Newspapers cannot call for the birth 
of a new political party, but they can place the spotlight on corruption 
cases which do not threaten the single party state. 
A major development in 1998 and 1999 was the call by senior cadres 
for the press to play a more effective watchdog role, particularly in 
uncovering crimes committed by officials. Relatively liberal cadres argued 
that in the absence of an opposition party, the press should have the task 
of scrutinising government. Even conservative cadres recognised the 
media's role in blowing the whistle on corruption. Such calls were made 
by leaders as different as Premier Zhu Rongji and National People's 
Congress (NPC) Chairman Li Peng. In late 1998, Li said 'We must better 
foster the media's power to supervise [government operations] ... We must 
expose outstanding cases which severely infringe upon the law so that 
the cadres and the masses can be educated'. The former premier even 
asked the media to do its part in the 'construction of democracy and the 
legal system' and in fostering the ideal of 'running the country according 
to law' (China News Service 12 December 1998). 
But, there can be no mistaking the proverbial birdcage. As Li hinted, 
the media could only expose certain designated cases sanctioned by the 
authorities. Throughout China, the prosecution and reporting of 
corruption by senior officials requires approval at the highest levels of 
CCP. For cases involving officials with the rank of vice-mayor, vice-
governor or vice-minister, or above, authorisation by CCP Central 
Committee's Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection is needed. 
Effectively, the media requires the nod of national or local-level 
propaganda departments before it can run stories on the misdemeanours 
of senior officials. 
Taboos, mostly unwritten ones, are too numerous to detail. News 
blackouts are imposed on embarrassing events such as labour unrest or 
protests by overtaxed peasants. The same goes for the anti-government 
activities of pro-independence elements in Tibet or Xinjiang. Journalists 
are not allowed to play up political reform, except such innocuous exercises 
as administrative streamlining and boosting public consultation. Calls 
for accelerated democratisation or the dilution of the CCP's monopoly of 
power are clearly off limits. Generally, the media is discouraged from 
dwelling on the dark side of society, a reference to negative phenomena 
including the brain drain to western countries, suicide rates, prostitution 
and homosexuality. 
Changes, however, are taking place in spite of the CCP's strictures. 
The economy is the most significant force for change. The late patriarch 
Deng Xiaoping and his disciples, such as Premier Zhu, realised that the 
development of the market economy would chip away at the authority of 
the CCP. But this was the price to pay for developing the economy. One 
key conclusion Deng drew from the dissolution of the Soviet Union was 
that if the people's standard of living was not improved, the regime's 
mandate of heaven would be in tatters. 
To some extent the same applies to the media. Because the free flow of 
news and ideas is essential to the development of an information-based 
economy, more cadres have come to accept that the floodgate must be 
slowly opened (Straits Times, 13 June 1999 and 27 February 1999). There 
is also the economic reality that the state media must become financially 
self-sufficient. Facing bulging budget deficits, the administration of Jiang 
and Zhu has tried to end the media's dependency on government 
handouts. With declining Party or government subsidies, the media must 
appeal to the marketplace to survive-and tum up profits! Sensational 
stories on crime and prostitution are pushing out the boundaries, without 
trespassing on sensitive political issues in afternoon tabloids that rival 
the raciest of Hong Kong's scandal sheets. 
Also significant is the rise of civil society and the role of the Internet. 
While the CCP maintains a monopoly on political power, there is growth 
in non-party, civic organisations, from consumer-protection associations 
and chambers of commerce, to semi-clandestine outfits associated with 
cults and qigong sects. While most associations are not permitted to 
produce their own publications, they have contributed to a more pluralistic 
society and media. With the growth of the Internet, civic associations can 
air their own views on websites. One reason behind the crackdown on 
the enormously popular Falun Gong sect, a Buddhist-cum-qigong 
organisation, in mid 1999 was its ability to mobilise tens of thousands of 
followers via the Internet (Agence France-Presse, 22 July 1999). 
The yoke of orthodoxy 
China's government-controlled media now reaches deep into society. 
Eighty-eight per cent of Chinese have access to the network of 932 
television stations and 86 per cent of the population is served by 1,623 
radio stations. Three-hundred and five million households own a television 
set, and with plummeting retail prices due to industrial overproduction 
two television households are becoming more common (Reuters, 23 
December 1998). For news, rather than entertainment, the 2,160 
newspapers and 7,900 periodicals are still considered the main source of 
information. 
Despite official efforts to separate the government from the direct 
control of businesses, most media outlets are official organs or subordinate 
units of the CCP and government organisations. All heads of key media 
units are appointed by the CCP Central Committee's Organisation 
Department, or its local equivalent, and all report to the various 
propaganda departments of the CCP. The People's Daily and Outlook Weekly, 
for example, are mouthpieces of the CCP Central Committee. The China 
Youth Daily reports to the Communist Youth League and the Workers Daily 
is a subsidiary of the official-and only-trade union, the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (Fan Li 1999). Every newspaper, magazine 
and radio or television unit is sponsored by an appropriate unit of the 
CCP or the government. 
In this way internal ideological and power struggles can be played 
out through the media. The Nanfang Weekend, a subsidiary of Nanfang 
Daily, and the mouthpiece of the Guangdong Province Party Committee 
was repeatedly disciplined by the central Propaganda Department in the 
mid 1990s for its exposition of the darker side of society. The paper became 
a symbol of the unending tug of war between the zhongyang (central 
authorities) and local authorities. At the time the paper was protected by 
former Guangdong party secretary Xie Fei, a relatively liberal official. In 
September 1997, however, Xie was replaced by the hardline Li Changchun, 
who towed the Beijing line far more closely. By 1999, Nanfang Weekend's 
muckraking had declined and a number of the most senior journalists 
had resigned. 
The marketplace, too, has offered journalists new and innovative 
loopholes to circumvent the zhongyang line. As the tide of 
commercialisation began sweeping the nation in the mid 1990s, more CCP 
and government departments offered 'official sponsorship' to new 
newspapers or magazines for a fee. In this way a group of free-thinking 
editors who wanted to start a quasi-private publication could pay the fee 
to qualify as the subsidiary of, for example, a mediocre, provincial-level 
research institute. After pocketing the money, the institute would usually 
turn a blind eye to the contents of the publication. However, much of the 
efforts of the censors are now targeted at these small publications (Reuters, 
29 January 1999). 
Access to foreign publications is limited by a government monopoly 
on imports which uses quotas to control the circulation of papers such as 
the Asian Wall Street Journal, the International Herald Tribune and the South 
China Morning Post. Import quotas limit each publication to not more than 
10,000 copies and censors can ban entire daily consignments if, for 
example, the edition carries a picture of the Dalai Lama or Taiwan 
President Lee Teng-hui. 
New chinks in the armour of official censorship are more evident in 
television despite the CCP's determination to guard the airwaves against 
subversive foreign programs as zealously as it does its air space against 
enemy aircraft. With minor exceptions, foreign satellite broadcasts are 
not available to ordinary Chinese. In 1993 and 1994, the government 
introduced regulations to forbid individual households from setting up 
satellite dishes to get programs from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan or the 
United States. CNN and BBC TV are only available to hotel patrons (The 
Times, 5 June 1999). However, the official CCTV, which has nine channels 
reaching the homes of 900 million people, is planning a major marketing 
launch of satellite television. There are indications more foreign 
entertainment programs will be permitted. In 1998 and 1999 Rupert 
Murdoch's News Corp., the MIH Group of South Africa, and Encore 
International, a subsidiary of the American cable TV company TCI, all 
gained initial footholds with one-off sales of entertainment programs or 
documentaries. The Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, partly owned by 
Murdoch, is the only foreign satellite broadcaster with regular access to 
sizeable chunks of the urban population, at times broadcasting news 
programs containing material not deemed politically correct by the 
Chinese censors (Reuters, 5 August 1999). 
The rapid spread of cable TV will also add variety to the official fare. 
As of early 1999, there were more than 1,000 cable stations, mostly at 
municipal or county level. Each network transmitted an average of 20 
channels (Brent 1998). China's large state-owned enterprises, which often 
employ more than 100,000 staff, also run their own cable stations. These 
cable companies often buy entertainment programs from Hong Kong and 
other parts of Asia, and occasionally broadcast news and documentaries, 
particularly in relatively liberal cities in Guangdong. 
Can a hundred flowers bloom in the 21st century? Mao's 1950s' slogan 
was actually used to lure assorted 'anti-party elements' to speak their 
minds to provide the state security apparatus with enough evidence to 
jail them. It is particularly relevant for President Jiang. The head of the 
so-called Shanghai Faction in Chinese politics and considered more 
conservative than Deng in ideological matters, he has reinstated a number 
of Maoist norms (Xin 1996). To understand media policy in fin de siecle 
China, it is important to study the concerns of Jiang and his associates. 
More than his former mentor Deng, Jiang holds the Maoist viewpoint 
that the CCP must have a tight grip on the pen. Jiang is fond of proclaiming 
that the media must be in the hands of 'trustworthy Marxists who are 
loyal to the party' (People's Daily, 16 October 1999). Jiang's views on the 
media and propaganda were expounded during his landmark visit to the 
People's Daily in September 1996. He stated that '[t]he work of the media 
is ideological and political work-on which the future and fate of the 
CCP and country lie'. Jiang identified promoting the zhongyang line and 
maintaining socio-political stability as the media's key tasks. Or as the 
quasi-Maoist director of People's Daily, Shao Huaze said, 'Journalists should 
increase their capacity to distinguish between political rights and wrongs. 
There must be no ambiguity over the crucial principle of the Party's 
leadership over the media and the role of the media as the mouthpiece of 
the Party' (Agence France-Presse, 29 October 1999). As Propaganda Chief 
Ding Guan' gen sees it, the rightful role of media is to 'resolutely develop 
the leitmotif of patriotism, collectivism and socialism; and to combat the 
influence of corrupt and decadent thoughts' (Sing Tao Daily News, 16 June 
1997). 
The media was asked to steer clear of taboo subjects, ranging from 
scandals involving senior cadres to apparently innocuous subjects such 
as casualties from fires and floods. History, too, was manipulated with a 
1996 ban on the press carrying commemorative stories to mark the 30th 
anniversary of the start of the Cultural Revolution. On the 80th anniversary 
of the May Fourth Movement, which first introduced western theories of 
democracy to China, publication units were told not to dwell on the liberal 
aspects of what became known as the Chinese Enlightenment (Ming Pao, 
12 June 1999 and 20 November 1998). One of the most disturbing aspects 
of the Chinese media in the late 1990s, however, was the emergence of a 
quasi-Maoist personality cult around Jiang. Far more than previous leaders 
(including Deng), Jiang often monopolised the first three to four minutes 
of the nightly CCTV news. His speeches to officials, People's Liberation 
Army soldiers, model workers and peasants were reported in great detail, 
and touted as must-read material in ideological sessions. The President's 
minders made use of all media opportunities to show that the core of the 
third generation leadership was in control (Lam 1999). 
The media policy of Premier Zhu, widely considered the Politburo 
member most in tune with the new century, is worth assessing as it 
illustrates the most basic CCP contradiction in its attitude to the media. A 
cadre may have a liberal track record in economic reform, but he may still 
subscribe to the quasi-Maoist view that the media should serve the political 
ends of the CCP. Not unlike President Jiang, Zhu is a talented manipulator 
of the media. During recent trips abroad, his aides paid special attention 
to coverage in the local media, including Chinese-language papers in 
countries with sizeable Chinese communities such as the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom. Zhu regularly made himself, or at least 
some underlings, accessible to the press. During his visit to the United 
States in April1999, the few dozen Hong Kong journalists covering the 
premier complained that they had been given no access. The same day, 
his spokesman, scheduled an extra briefing for the Chinese-speaking press. 
Zhu made many friends among the press in 1998 when he toured the 
studios of CCTV and talked to the journalists responsible for the news 
magazine program In Focus. 'Supervision by the media is very important', 
the premier said, '[P]ress supervision can correct the mistakes of our work 
and reflect the voice of the masses'. Zhu praised the journalists for having 
'overcome many problems', perhaps an allusion to the fact that many 
government departments had blocked their work. He instructed the media 
to play a catalyst role for party and government policies (New China News 
Agency, 7 October 1998). But while Zhu likes to present himself as a patron 
of the media, he has also made it clear his support depends on not trying 
to second-guess the zhongyang line. Take, for example, the economic tsar's 
well-known views about not devaluing the renminbi, or the virtues of 
joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO). From 1997 onwards, official 
papers and journals were not permitted to carry the articles of scholars 
who advocated renminbi depreciation. Nor were the media allowed to 
air the views of the anti-WTO lobby after Zhu decided to move faster on 
the accession issue in early 1999 (Zhengqin 1998). 
Hazards for journalists 
While the ideal of 'rule of law' was enshrined first in the CCP charter in 
1997 and then in the State Constitution in 1999, efforts to promulgate the 
nation's first journalism or publication law have been repeatedly 
postponed. Early versions of the law, drafted in the relatively open mid 
1980s, borrowed elements of similar laws in the west. One key player, the 
liberal former editor of the People's Daily, Hu Jiwei, travelled to the 
Shenzhen special economic zone to exchange views with Hong Kong 
editors and journalism scholars. While upholding the overall theory of 
party guidance, the early drafts stated that a publication unit or journalist 
could only be penalised under clear-cut criteria such as endangering 
national security or libelling the CCP and cadres. They also acknowledged 
the journalists' rights to report the news in a truthful manner. The brief 
thaw of 1997 and 1998 revived pressure to enact media laws, but by mid 
1999 they had been mothballed. 
The absence of clear-cut laws has left many journalists frustrated and 
vulnerable to the whims of CCP officials. 'We often feel uncertain when 
we are dealing with tortuous news events, especially in investigative 
reporting', Workers' Daily senior editor Wang Xiaolong said in 1998. 'There 
should be a law to define what the media can and cannot do' (Agence 
France-Presse, 18 August 1998). This confusion, of course, can be used to 
the CCP's advantage. Without the protection afforded by a media law, 
journalists are left exposed to a plethora of draconian statutes and 
government practices. Most Chinese journalists, as well as foreign 
journalists based in China, live and work in fear of violating laws on state 
secrets or national security. The State Secrets Law (1988) and the 
Maintenance of State Secrets Law Implementing Procedures (1990) have 
given Party and government units, such as the Ministry of State Security 
and the State Bureau for Protecting Secrets, maximum flexibility in 
incriminating journalists. For example, Article 2 of the State Secrets Law 
defines state secrets as 'matters that affect the security and interests of the 
state, knowledge of which ... is restricted to personnel within certain limits 
for a definite time'. Such secrets include 'major policy decisions on state 
affairs', as well as classified material relating to defence, diplomacy, 
industry, science and technology (Fu and Cullen 1996). 
As veteran journalists delight in pointing out, however, 'whatever has 
not appeared in the People's Daily can be considered state secrets'. There 
is no freedom of information act, nor any tradition of the public's right to 
know, increasing hazards for journalist. In facing litigation, reporters 
accused of leaking state secrets cannot cite the public interest in self-
defence. 
In the 1990s, scores of domestic and foreign journalists were detained 
or harassed for alleged breaches of the state secrets codes. Breaches 
sometimes amounted to no more than running draft versions of speeches 
due to be delivered by senior cadres or disclosing trade or commercial 
information. Foreign, Hong Kong and domestic journalists have all been 
subject to the arbitrary imposition of legal sanctions. However, while 
western correspondents are expelled from China and Hong Kong reporters 
receive short jail sentences, Chinese journalists may be severely punished. 
New China News Agency (NCNA) journalist Wu Shishen, for example, 
was given a life sentence for making available to a Hong Kong paper an 
advance copy of the speech Jiang delivered at a Party Congress in 1992. 
By contrast, the Hong Kong journalist who allegedly bought the material 
from Wu was let off after a brief detention. 
Laws on defamation and related judicial procedures are also open to 
abuse. Article 101 of the Civil Law General Principles enshrines a citizen's 
right to his good reputation and provides legal protection against insults, 
libel and other means used to damage a person's good name. Defamation 
of a political nature can be dealt with under Article 105 of the Criminal 
Law. The statute says it is a crime to 'instigate the subversion of the political 
power of the state and the overthrow of the socialist system through 
spreading rumours, slandering or other ways' (Goodale 1999). A number 
of dissidents and avant-garde journalists have been successfully sued and 
punished for libelling the state. On the other hand, state media are usually 
protected from defamation charges or lawsuits when they carry reports 
of the supposed crimes of dissidents. Prominent dissident Chen Ziming 
attempted to sue the CCP's Propaganda Department, the NCNA and 
People's Daily for libel over a report stating he had 'participated in and 
directly commanded' attacks against martial law troops in 1989. The courts 
refused to hear the case (Schlesinger 1992). 
While the regime believes it must maintain the ideological barricades 
against hostile foreign forces, it is unlikely Beijing will allow foreign media 
outlets to circulate or broadcast in China, or establish joint ventures with 
local outlets. As of mid 1999, only a handful of foreign magazines 
specialising in non-political subject matters, such as Elle, Figaro and 
Cosmopolitan, have been permitted to publish Chinese editions with official 
publishing units. Why certain foreign publications are allowed to establish 
footholds and others are not is neither officially explained nor subject to 
any policy guidelines. It is assumed that a Politburo-ranked official must 
approve politically sensitive joint ventures. Evidently the personal 
permission of Politburo member in charge of propaganda, Ding Guan' gen, 
was given for the Shenxing Daily, a joint venture between a Shenzhen 
official unit and Hong Kong's Sing Tao Group. The paper, however, looks 
and reads much like a mainland paper. Efforts by other foreign or Hong 
Kong dailies to set up mainland-based papers have all been unsuccessful. 
Those foreign news companies which have secured a significant 
foothold in China, have invested considerable financial resources in the 
trust of leaders. Rupert Murdoch's News Corp., for example, has a 45 per 
cent stake in the Hong Kong-based Phoenix Satellite TV. Phoenix carries 
a mixture of racy entertainment and normally non-controversial news 
programs. According to his critics, Murdoch declared his good intentions 
by publishing an official biography of Deng Xiaoping, and scrapping plans 
by a subsidiary book company to publish East and West by former Hong 
Kong Governor Chris Patten. But it is no coincidence that on sensitive 
occasions, such as the run-up to the tenth anniversary of Tiananmen Square 
in 1999, signals for Phoenix are muffled, as are those of CNN and BBC 
which are in any case only available in hotels or foreigners' compounds. 
Blitz against the media 
Without western-style laws, media control is exercised mainly in the form 
of ad hoc notices, secondary regulations and administrative practices. One 
of the easiest methods is simply to cut down the numbers. To trim real 
and potential poisonous weeds, a wave of newspapers, magazines and 
television stations closures began in the mid 1990s, in the name of shrinking 
the budget deficit. From 1995, the State Press and Publications 
Administration stopped issuing licences for new newspapers and 
publishing houses and in mid 1996 applied the same principle to radio 
and TV. In-house newspapers and magazines run by the CCP and 
government departments were slashed. In late 1996, then Vice-Premier 
Zhu Rongji ordered the closure of dozens of newspapers sponsored by 
the state banking system (Singer 1997). As well as outright closures, Beijing 
concocted other innocuous sounding policies to prevent a hundred flowers 
from blooming. One was a massive merger initiative, swallowing existing 
publications into six mammoth media conglomerates: three in Guangzhou, 
two in Beijing and one in Shanghai (Reuters,4 August 1998). A key theme 
of the reform of state-owned enterprises was to form conglomerates along 
the lines of the Japanese zaibatsu and the South Korean chaebol. The creation 
of conglomerates makes it easier for the authorities to exert control. 
Dozens of politically incorrect magazines and publishing houses were 
closed down in the late 1990s. It is important to note that given the state's 
largely successful control of the underground opposition, publications 
by clandestine organisations similar to samizdat in the Soviet Union were 
almost non-existent. The media units axed were relatively tame intellectual 
journals that never opposed the CCP directly. They ran foul of Beijing for 
espousing relatively radical views on political or cultural modernisation. 
For example, the Beijing-based Oriental Monthly was disciplined in 1997 
and 1998 for running articles on ways to learn the lesson from the Cultural 
Revolution. Both The Way of Beijing and Cultural Times of Guangzhou were 
closed down in 1999 merely for advocating an open attitude towards 
western values and a faster pace of reform (Agence France-Presse, 15 
January 1999). 
According to watchdog units such as the New York-based Committee 
to Protect Journalists, the CCP administration is among the world's worst 
offenders for incarcerating reporters. In the summer of 1998, Shi Binhai, 
an investigative reporter with the China Economic Times, was detained for 
almost one year for conducting private interviews with ousted party chief 
Zhao Ziyang. Shi's case was never brought to public trial. Not a word 
about his fate ever appeared in the official media. Gao Yu was locked up 
in 1994 for allegedly leaking state secrets in the course of writing articles 
for Hong Kong publications. Gao had to serve her full five-year term 
despite numerous petitions by foreign governments and human rights 
organisations (Agence France-Presse, 28 March 1999). 
Censorship in Beijing remains much the same now as it was in the 
1950s, even as China is gearing up to launch its first satellites in 2001 and 
2002. Proofs of the front page of the People's Daily have to be approved by 
a senior Propaganda Department bureaucrat, usually Politburo member 
Ding, the night before publication. A 'reading group' in the department 
consisting of censors and ideologues pore through major papers every 
day in search of violations of CCP discipline. During national festivals 
such as the 1 October National Day or 1 August Army Day, media publish 
the requisite feel-good messages from relevant authorities. At times of 
crises such as the confrontation with Taipei in 1995-96 and 1999, 
newspapers and television dutifully performed the role of agents for 
psychological warfare. Newspapers and TV stations nationwide must 
follow the NCNA wire when reporting on the activities and speeches of 
leaders. 
The same tight control is exercised over the more than 100 foreign 
reporters based in China. Despite much-improved communications with 
the outside world, Beijing still sees the foreign media as no more than an 
adjunct of their governments-even as secret agents. This is perhaps a 
reflection of the fact that many Chinese foreign correspondents are much 
more than journalists; they also file internal reports to leading Party and 
government departments. Following the NATO bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade, the US media claimed that two of the three journalists 
killed were in fact intelligence officers. This was denied by the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry. 
The leadership's control of western correspondents has not changed 
greatly since the late 1970s, when the first batch of foreign reporters was 
granted residency visas for Beijing. By the mid 1990s, news bureaux could 
be opened in Shanghai and Guangzhou but the supervisory mechanism 
remains draconian. Journalists who want to conduct interviews must first 
apply to the foreign affairs bureau of government offices, factories or 
colleges. Correspondents who want to leave their bases and report in other 
provinces must first seek the approval of relevant local authorities. Many 
of the more active correspondents are subject to surveillance by state 
security agents on a daily basis. Taboo areas for foreign journalists include 
Beijing's treatment of dissidents and human rights in general, the 
underground church, and events in Tibet and Xinjiang. Throughout the 
1990s, an average of one foreign reporter per year was expelled for reasons 
such as leaking state secrets. In 1998, the reporter for Japan's Yomiuri 
Shimbun, Yukihisa Nakatsu, was forced to leave for allegedly handling 
Party documents considered to be classified information. The same year, 
the accreditation of Juergen Kremb, the veteran correspondent for the 
German magazine Der Spiegel, was abruptly cancelled, apparently for his 
work on dissidents including Wei Jingsheng (Agence France-Presse, 7 
October 1998). 
Forces for change 
The administration of President Jiang and Premier Zhu seems determined 
to pursue cautious economic market reforms while continuing the deep 
freeze on politicalliberalisation at least until2002 or 2003, when they are 
due to retire from the front line. The real changes in media policy and 
practice, then, are likely to stem from non-party factors such as the 
marketisation of the economy, the emergence of civil society, the impact 
of the Internet, the impact of foreign influences-and the initiative of 
independent-minded journalists. 
'You have your strategy, I have my counter-strategy.' This principle is 
often cited by local officials confident of foiling or at least diluting the 
zhongyang's strictures. Yet the slogan also describes in a vivid manner the 
ability of free-thinking publishers, authors and video producers to thumb 
their nose at authority. 
Since the mid 1990s, rebel book merchants have launched effective 
guerrilla warfare underground against the censors. In 1998 an estimated 
60 per cent of the book distribution market was controlled by non-official 
and illegal publishers and distributors. There are approximately 400 
official publishing houses. These clandestine operators have high mobility. 
They use the services of printers from different cities. The underground 
publishers, producing pirated or unofficial publications, usually disappear 
once their products are given to underground distributors, who then make 
them available to street-level booksellers. During police crackdowns, street 
vendors do not openly display the taboo books, which are only sold to 
trusted customers. The motive for many underground publishers is to 
make profits, not to fight for political freedom. And, not surprisingly, many 
of the illicit books are pornographic. But, a significant proportion of 
underground titles are politically taboo such as pirated editions of books 
first published in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Perennial favourites include 
Li Zhisui's, The Private Life of Mao Zedong, the memoirs of Xu Jiatun (the 
former head of Beijing's mission to Hong Kong who defected to the United 
States in 1990) and unofficial biographies of politicians ranging from Zhou 
Enlai to Madame Jiang Qing (Ming Pao, 2 April1999). 
According to Chen Fang, author of the best-selling The Wrath of Heaven, 
the phenomenon of underground publishing is both a blessing and a curse. 
Official criticism of his book, a fictional account of the corrupt empire of 
the former Beijing party chief Chen Xitong, provoked wider interest in 
China. But, its distribution through book pirates and illegal networks 
deprived the author of most of the profits. Most liberal authors agree that 
clandestine channels have opened up much wider choices for China's 
readers, but at the expense of the author's livelihood. 
China has caught on to the Internet. The number of surfers surged to 
more than four million in late 1999, compared to just 250,000 at the end of 
1997. E-commerce and e-business are thriving. At the same time new online 
services such as Shanghai.online and Shenzhen.online are providing 
traditional media outlets with new competition. Most of them began by 
merely reprinting reports from newspapers, but gradually some have 
developed their own editorial material. Shenzhen.online, for example, now 
runs sensational social stories, ranging from robberies and murders to 
supermarket security strip-searching female customers, while staying clear 
of overtly political topics (Wall Street Journal, 18 January 1999). Most 
importantly, the Internet offers Chinese a window on the outside world. 
Like other authoritarian governments in Asia, from the very beginning, 
China was aware of the destabilising influence of the Internet. Before 
Deng's demise in 1997, Propaganda Chief Ding was quoted as asking his 
experts whether the Internet could be grounded throughout China a day 
or so before the official announcement. In early 1996, Beijing required all 
Internet users to register with the police and later that year providers, 
who must be government-run or affiliated, blocked off some 100 sites. 
These included websites of the US Government, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
papers, as well as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. Yet as the Chinese 
saying goes, '[W]hile the guardians of orthodoxy put up one foot [of 
resistance], the devils can up the ante by ten times'. Beijing has been 
unsuccessful in blocking the thousand and one sites that dissidents in the 
United States and other parts of the world are establishing. And on a 
daily basis, rebel intellectuals are downloading reams of 'offensive' 
material provided by overseas sympathisers (New York Times, 18 October 
1998). 
Consider the artful dodging perpetrated by the US-based VIP Reference, 
a' subversive' Internet magazine that is being dispatched regularly to more 
than 300,000 e-mail addresses in China. Typical fare includes political 
news censored by the mainland media, information about dissidents, and 
stories about factional struggles within the leadership. The addresses, 
compiled from commercial and public lists, include those of public and 
state security units. To escape police detection, the New York and 
Washington-based organisers switch providers each day. 'We like the 
concept of free speech and we want a legal system to protect it', said Li 
Hongkuan, a Chinese intellectual based in New York who edits the 
magazine. '[W]e want to destroy the Chinese system of censorship over 
the Internet.' To protect Chinese readers, VIP Reference asks recipients not 
to forward the material to friends within the country (Flatin 1999). 
The Internet also worries the CCP because it is a potent tool for political 
organisation-and agitation. The China Democracy Party credited its fast 
growth to the word being spread on the net. The same was true for the 
Falun Gong, and many of the edicts of its founder Li Honzhi reached the 
faithful in the mainland and overseas via their websites. 
The Internet also has a powerful interactive function. During the 
Cultural Revolution, college students put up dazibao (literally big-character 
posters) on campuses to air their views. Electronic versions of the dazibao 
first appeared during protests against the Japanese 'occupation' of the 
Diaoyu or Senkaku islands off Taiwan in 1996 and 1997. By the time of 
the Belgrade embassy bombing incident, the use of the Internet as a vehicle 
to spread political opinion had become routine. Both college students and 
intellectuals are spreading politically incorrect ideas via computer screens. 
Even though the views expressed in Internet fora may sometimes be pro-
government, Beijing is alarmed its lack of control over a medium that can 
powerfully shape people's thoughts. 
In late 1998 the CCP struck back with a vengeance. In big cities, 
particularly those along the coast, police departments expanded their 
divisions dealing with security concerning electronic data and the Internet. 
In mid August, the Ministry of Information Technology and well as the 
Ministries of Public and State Securities published regulations asking all 
departments to upgrade their information technology security. 
Government departments were forbidden to link internal computer 
systems to those outside the offices. Beijing also rushed through 
Regulations Governing the Security and Protection of Computer 
Information Systems. Among other things, the rules prohibited Internet 
activities that undermine the interests of the state and the legal interest of 
other citizens (Smith 1999). Huge sums of money were spent on importing 
foreign Internet-nanny techniques, such as filtration systems to block or 
catch offensive websites and data. 
In January 1999, Lin Hai, a computer engineer in Shanghai, was 
sentenced to two years in jail for providing VIP Reference with a database 
of 30,000 addresses. Lin's wife, who was not allowed to attend the trial, 
said her husband had no interest in politics (Langfitt 1999; Asian Wall 
Street Journal, 19 January 1999). Police have been able to crack several 
Internet political journals published within China. The organisers of Public 
Opinion, whose contents were similar to those of VIP Reference, went into 
hiding in early 1999 (Farley 1999). 
Yet technology is fast outpacing the regulators and police. There has 
been a reasonably long time gap of at least several months if not a year or 
two between the arrival of new Internet technology and a new regulation 
forbidding its use. Most importantly, excessive control could stifle scientific 
development and economic growth. Knowledge of the information 
superhighway is critical in understanding and accessing tomorrow's 
technology. As early as 1996, the China Daily pointed out that 'the value 
of the Internet so outweighs its potentially harmful aspects-pornography 
and politically destructive information-that the Chinese government has 
approved its opening to the public' (Lam 1999). At least along the coast, 
the Internet had, by mid 1999, become a formidable rival to the government 
propaganda machinery. 
Looking toward the new millennium 
During his memorable tour of CCTV, Premier Zhu praised reporters for 
being 'the mirror of government [work] and the forerunners of reform' 
(New China News Agency, 7 October 1998). But, witness the thousands 
of editors and reporters who joined the students at Tiananmen Square 
during the six weeks prior to the crackdown. After the troops marched 
into the Square, dozens of journalists were detained for abetting if not 
masterminding the pro-democracy movement. Believing that time is 
hardly ripe for a major step forward, most of these avant-garde journalists 
have since kept a low profile. But in China media workers do have a unique 
role in expanding pluralism, if not in promoting democratisation itself. In 
the former Eastern Bloc, alternate power centres such as the church and 
trade unions were instrumental in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
dissolution of the Soviet state. Since 1949, however, the CCPhas been the 
only source of authority in the country. Newspapers and television stations 
have, albeit in an embryonic way, served the purpose of varying the 
ideological landscape. Most of the new ideas which have reached urban 
areas, have been disseminated through the media, not other networks. 
For two to three years before the 4 June 1989 crackdown, it was liberal 
papers such as the Shanghai-based World Economic Herald and the Beijing-
based Economics Weekly that coupled market reforms being with western-
style political freedom. Given the Jiang administration's tight control over 
the mainstream media, the relatively liberal papers of the late 1990s were 
most remarkable for their efforts in urging faster market reforms, 
particularly quasi-privatisation for small and medium state-owned 
enterprises. The Beijing-based China Economic Times and the Chongqing-
based journal, Reform, have delved into more fundamental questions such 
as the need for institutional and political change to match economic reform. 
For example, China Economic Times was at the forefront of the small-scale 
liberalisation movement in the run-up to the 15th Party Congress. It 
advocated the development of a mixed economy and the shareholding 
system. Even after the post 1998 freeze, the paper concentrated on sensitive 
areas such as the failure of the government to live up to its commitment 
to devote at least four per cent of gross domestic product to education. 
Liberal economist Wu Jinglian argued in Reform that one lesson of the 
East Asian economic crisis of 1997-99 was that China must liberalise its 
system of governance, including through the separation of government 
and business (Reform,April1998; South China Morning Post, 15 March 1999). 
Sometimes, small-circulation papers in remote areas have had the 
courage to ask overwhelming questions. Take the case of Asia-Pacific Wind, 
a weekly newspaper based in Kunming, Yunnan Province. On 4 September, 
1999 it reported the corruption case of the vice-mayor of Ningbo, Xie 
Jianbang, who took home at least 500,000 yuan and was responsible for 
economic losses of more than 900 million yuan. Xie was given a suspended 
death sentence, which in the Chinese context means he would be let off 
after a long jail term. In a commentary, Asia-Pacific Wind asked why many 
low-level officials were executed for pocketing much less money and doing 
much less harm (Asia-Pacific Wind, 4 September 1999). 
Books are also playing a significant role in political enlightenment in 
the late 1990s. Two publishing companies, Today's China Press and the 
Economic Daily Press, were instrumental in intensifying the debate on 
reform. Today's China Press published a highly influential series of books 
under the label, 'China's Problems'. Titles included Cross Swords, which 
chronicled the battle between reformers and leftists in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and The Trap of Modernisation, which criticised the administration for 
dragging its feet on reform. 
Looking ahead at the new millennium, it seems likely that Fortress 
CCP cannot withstand the winds of change for long. Government 
propaganda has increasingly lost credibility: the circulation of the People's 
Daily and other traditional mouthpieces is declining fast, as more urban 
intellectuals have access to satellite television and, in particular, dissident 
websites. As Beijing-based media professor Hu Zhengrong pointed out, 
more people are living in a global village. 'As the economy and society 
become more globalised, the globalisation of broadcasting, television and 
communications is inevitable' (author's interview with HuZhengrong, 3 
September, Kunming, China). 
The pace of change is tipped to accelerate after China's accession to 
the World Trade Organisation. The development of the non-state sector 
of the economy will also provide the basis for a pluralistic society. President 
Jiang and his fellow septuagenarians are hanging on to power thanks to 
their control of the army and other 'tools of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat'. On the one hand, the CCP's apparent stranglehold over 
propaganda may help to extend its mandate of heaven. On the other, the 
growing diversity and irreverence of the alternative media is paving the 
way for the end of one-party dictatorship. 
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A han dover of freedom? 
Chris Yeung 
ow free is too free? Or, perhaps more 
accurately, how low is too low? These 
are the questions that officials and 
consumers in Hong Kong are asking 
as the media dishes up an increasingly sensational, voyeuristic and 
sometimes fictional diet of scandal, gore and intrigue. Did the Apple Daily, 
one of the tabloid market leaders, step over the line when it paid a labourer 
to pose in bed with a prostitute, thus illustrating the infidelity which drove 
his wife to push her two sons out of their high-rise apartment window 
and to jump herself? At what point does the government intervene to 
enforce minimum standards to protect the morals or sensibilities of society, 
or does the media industry itself need to rein in its own activities? 
So serious is the slide into tabloid journalism in· Hong Kong that one 
pressure group has established a 'pollution index' to monitor the media 
and provide the public with a list of the most 'polluted' publications (Ming 
Pao, 26 April1999). The Hong Kong Journalists Association itself warns 
that pressures will grow for the policing of the media if the trend in 
sensationalism continues, opening up new avenues for government 
intervention in Hong Kong, a territory jealously guarding its freedoms as 
the 'Special Administrative Region' (SAR) following its handover from 
Britain to China in 1997. Could media irresponsibility so frustrate the 
public that the people of Hong Kong would be willing to trade off media 
freedoms and bring the local press more in line with Beijing? 
The handover and the media 
It seems ironic that two years after the handover which came with all the 
fears of Communist-style controls, that the biggest concern for press 
freedom in Hong Kong is the media's own irresponsibility. The shift 
towards sensationalism can be seen in a wider context than the commercial 
motivation for sleaze. As in other countries of the region where the fear of 
censorship has been an issue, crime, sex and violence have provided juicy, 
non-political fare to push up circulation figures, but to avoid political 
controversy. There is little concrete evidence that Beijing has applied overt 
pressure to the Hong Kong media since the handover. However, media 
analysts contend there is a pervasive feeling of self-censorship within an 
industry which was, for so long, a bastion of western liberal press values 
in a capitalist Chinese enclave. Although it is too early to judge the long-
term trends, the Hong Kong Government has, so far, adopted a hands-off 
approach. Under these conditions, media watchers tend to agree that the 
threat to Hong Kong's media at the tum of the century is coming from 
within the industry itself. 
The media plays an important social and political role in Hong Kong. 
Under the British administration, the media was an effective and powerful 
watchdog against government failure and abuses of power, and it 
continues to play this role. This has been particularly important because 
Hong Kong has not yet established a mature, democratic political system. 
The history of democracy, despite the political principles of the colonial 
British administration, is a relatively short story. Universal suffrage was 
not introduced until1982, and then only for the election of district boards, 
the lowest representative level in a three-tiered political structure. It took 
almost another decade of political agitation by Hong Kong's pro-
democracy movement for the then colonial administration to take the next 
step towards wider democracy. In 1991, 18 seats out of 60 were made 
available for direct election in the highest political body, the Legislative 
Council. Of the remaining seats, 21 were reserved for representatives of 
functional constituencies, or local interest groups, 17 remained for 
government appointments and 4 for government officials. In 1995, the 
number of directly elected seats was increased to 20 and is due to be 
increased to 24 in the year 2000 and 30 in 2004. The Legislative Council is 
not due to be fully elected under a one person, one vote system until 
2007, and then only under a set of strict requirements including the consent 
of the Chief Executive. 
Under the political framework outlined in the Basic Law (Hong Kong's 
post-handover constitution) the Legislative Council holds the purse-
strings, passes the laws and, above all, monitors the daily workings of the 
Tung Chee-hwa government and its administration. However, mixed 
electoral arrangements in the Legislative Council mean the majority of 
members have been drawn from business and political circles, with 
predominantly conservative political views, and a tendency to support 
the government. In the first two years as a SAR, the Legislative Council 
has not been able to operate as an effective check on government. The 
government is also complaining that with more democracy due to be 
introduced into the Legislative Council, administrative effectiveness will 
be hampered, signaling possible difficulties in the functioning of a future 
genuine democracy. 
In this environment the media has served as a more powerful watchdog 
than the Legislative Council. At the end of 1999, the media exposed a 
spate of mismanagement in the Urban Services Department, including 
possible conflict of interest involved in the establishment of a tax 
consultancy by the wife of a senior tax official, and the mishandling of the 
chaotic opening of Hong Kong's new airport in mid 1998. Pressure from 
the media has produced admissions of mistakes from the administration 
and the appointment of a secretary-level official to deal direct! y with media 
inquiries. Reforms in the pipeline include requiring under-performing 
senior civil servants to quit, and have pegged pay rises to performance. 
Many senior government officials, groomed in the days of the largely 
unaccountable colonial British government, are now more willing to talk 
to journalists, officially or on a background basis. They are also prepared 
to participate in radio talk-back and provide direct responses to public 
comments and complaints. In short, the media is functioning as a powerful 
fourth estate and a welcome part of daily life in the SAR. 
Fierce competition within the industry following the East Asian 
economic downturn has coincided with a decline in professional standards 
and a growing hostility to the press from some sectors of society, business 
and government. The media in Hong Kong now stands frequently accused 
of irresponsible reporting, bad taste, sensationalism, and fabrication. The 
pressure group, the Society for Truth and Light, set up the 'pollution index' 
to monitor sex and violence in Hong Kong's newspapers and released the 
results inAp:dl1999 (Ming Pao,26April1999). The three best selling dailies, 
Oriental Daily News, Apple Daily and The Sun, were identified as the 'most 
polluted'. While many agree that Hong Kong's media has become 
progressively more politically powerful, the new paradox is that fewer 
people believe what they read, hear on radio, or see on television. 
Increasingly the media is being consumed as 'info-tainment', but dismissed 
as a serious source of information. 
A survey of the front pages of the three most popular newspapers in 
October 1999 found entertainment news dominated, with the Apple Daily 
reporting on a new paparazzi team being set up by Asia Television, as well 
as the controversy over the same television station's decision to replace 
journalists with 'artists' to present the evening news bulletins. The Oriental 
Daily News devoted one of its entire front pages to a female pornographic 
actress who allegedly created mayhem in a luxury hotel after taking soft 
drugs. The Sun honed in on the conviction of a popular singer in a court in 
Hawaii for stealing a pair of US$75 sunglasses, which he said he absent-
mindedly picked up and forgot to pay for. 
Media analysts believe it is too early to be certain that the media will 
continue to operate without political pressure from China. As a June 1999 
joint report of the Hong Kong Journalists Association and Article 19: the 
International Centre Against Censorship, says of Hong Kong 
Self-censorship is still a threat to media freedom, but probably no more 
than we reported in our 1998 publication. We continue to hear reports 
that certain publications or broadcasters have played down sensitive 
issues concerning dissident or separatist activities in China ... a 
television station had cut back to just one episode its original plan to 
broadcast a six-part series on Tibet. However, some observers see the 
broadcasting on even a single episode, which includes excerpts from 
an interview with the Dalai Lama, as positive (Hong Kong Journalists' 
Association and Article 19 1999). 
The report also points to the prominent coverage given by the media to 
the tenth anniversary of the supression of the 1989 pro-democracy 
movement in China. 
Local journalists argue strongly that the Basic Law's infamous Article 
23 on subversive activities hangs like an axe over Hong Kong reporters. 
Article 23 states that the SAR 
[S]hall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, 
sedition, subversion against the Central Government, or theft of state 
secrets, to prohibit foreign political organisations or bodies from 
conducting political activities in the region, and to prohibit political 
organisations or bodies of the region from establishing ties with foreign 
political organisations or bodies. 
Local journalists have remained nervous despite signals that the Tung 
Chee-hwa government is not rushing to draft new laws to implement 
Article 23. 
Cut-throat diversity 
For just 6.8 million people, Hong Kong produces 26 Chinese-language 
dailies, eight English dailies, one bi-lingual daily and five dailies in other 
minority languages-one of the highest levels of media exposure on earth. 
Most of the dailies also carry Internet editions and Internet access is 
widespread within the general community. Hong Kong is also served by 
a government-run radio and television station, two commercial radio 
stations, and a cable television station. Most households have access to 
satellite STAR television and people who live near the border can receive 
mainland Chinese television programs. Except for the three dailies, Ta 
Kung Pao, Wen Wei Po and Hong Kong Commercial Daily, which are generally 
described as pro-Beijing, most print and electronic media are market-
oriented and non-ideological. There were a few traditional pro-Taiwan 
newspapers, such as Hong Kong Times and Hong Kong United Daily1 which 
operated before the handover but they closed down for political and 
commercial reasons before 1997. The two mass-market newspapers, 
Oriental Daily News and Apple Daily, have taken up the major share in the 
Chinese newspaper market, with unofficial figures suggesting they have 
70 per cent of market share. Their layout is bold and colourful, offering 
readers comprehensive low-rent guides to anything from cheap foodstalls 
to kinky brothels. Oriental Daily News claims a circulation of over 600,000, 
while Apple Daily says it sells a daily average of 400,000 copies. The Sun, 
launched in early 1999 as a sister paper of the Oriental Daily News, is 
believed to rank third with a circulation of less than 200,000. Most of the 
other dailies sell less than 100,000 daily copies. They include Ming Pao, 
Sing Tao Jih Pao, Hong Kong Economic Times and Hong Kong Economic Journal, 
which target educated, middle-income professionals and business 
executives. 
Of the two English-language dailies, South China Morning Post has been 
the market leader for decades. It sells an average of 110,000, more than its 
direct rival, The Hong Kong Standard. In addition to providing information 
to the expatriate and bilingual readers in Hong Kong, the English dailies 
also form an important channel for information on developments in 
mainland China to the rest of the world. Hong Kong's newspapers are 
available on the Internet and provide independent China coverage, from 
within China, for overseas China-watchers unable to access similar 
information through the government-controlled Chinese media. Partly 
because of its location at the southern tip of the mainland and partly 
because of its tradition of media freedom, Hong Kong has continued to 
provide a strategic regional base for many international media 
organisations, including Asiaweek, Financial Times, Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Cable News Network and International Herald Tribune. 
Hong Kong's television viewers have access to 48 domestic and regional 
channels in various languages. These include four free-to-air commercial 
channels funded by advertising, 40 pay-TV channels funded by 
subscriptions, and a variety of free-to-air satellite channels. The two 
commercial stations, Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB) and Asia 
Television (ATV) are each licensed to broadcast one Cantonese and one 
English-language channel until the year 2000. The government announced 
in late 1998 it would not limit the number of free-to-air licences. Its policy 
is to gradually open the market to more providers. However, to avoid 
conflict of interest and a build-up of control by a single media operator, 
cross-media ownership will continue to apply to domestic free-to-air and 
pay TV services. 
Commercialism versus social responsibility 
Speaking at a lunch with board members of the Newspaper Society of 
Hong Kong in April1999, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa expressed his 
concern over developments in the media. 
In the past six to 12 months, there have been a lot of views expressed 
in society. Many people have asked me: Why has the media become 
more market-oriented? Has it given top priority to making profits and 
increasing sales? It is true that everybody, every business organisation 
needs to make money, but apart from press freedom, should the media 
also shoulder some social responsibility (Hong Kong Standard, 10 April 
1999). 
His remarks were similar in tone and content to a speech given by Chief 
Secretary for Administration, Anson Chan Fang On-sang, in late March 
1999. The top SAR leaders are not alone in raising this concern. Various 
opinion surveys have shown growing public discontent with press 
commercialism and sensationalism. The first clear signs of declining media 
ethics were noticed several years ago. In 1996, for example, a weekly 
magazine ran a cover story claiming a local multi-millionaire was dying 
of cancer. It was a hoax perpetrated by a 19-year-old high school graduate, 
for which the magazine was forced to apologize publicly, but the fabricated 
story merely marked the beginning of the age of fiction and sleaze in the 
local news media. Other publications reported the fabricated suicides of 
both pop superstar, Leo Lai, and Yuan Mu, a retired Chinese official who 
had acted as government spokesman during the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
crackdown. 
Calls for ways to curb media excesses include a controversial proposal 
to set up a media council to review complaints against the press. Similar 
to the Press Council in the United Kingdom, the idea drew strong resistance 
from the industry when it was first mooted in early 1980s. At that time 
talks on Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty were in their initial 
stages and the proposal triggered grave fears of curbs on a free press. 
Now, some influential media figures and officials believe it can be safely 
pursued. The Hong Kong Journalists' Association has proposed an 
informal media forum for the industry to tap the views of concerned 
groups, such as academics. The News Executives Association, whose 
members are mainly senior journalists and editors, is drafting a set of 
professional ethics guidelines to promote uniform standards within the 
industry. The guidelines are due to be completed by the end of 1999. 
Although there seems to be a general consensus within the industry that 
something has to be done to address public concern, there is little 
agreement on what concrete steps to take. 
At a specially convened Legislative Council meeting in April, 
legislators warned that media organisations had better shape up or risk 
government intervention. The Democratic Party's Andrew Cheng Kar-
foo said, 'I don't want to see the Government introducing legislation to 
govern media conduct and ethics. However, if the trend continues, I'm 
afraid the authorities would be forced to intervene' (Hong Kong Standard, 
April211999). The whole issue of media credibility, however, goes beyond 
the question of professional practices on matters such as use of sensational 
pictures and headlines. It raises a more fundamental question of the role 
of the media in post-handover Hong Kong, and swings the issue of media 
content back again into the political arena. 
Traditionally, media organisations have aimed to balance the need to 
maintain commercial viability with varying levels of social responsibility. 
Despite the existence of some harsh laws on matters such as official secrets, 
Hong Kong's media has enjoyed minimal interference from the 
Administration in making independent news judgments and editorial 
comments. Clearly, the debate over the sleaze element has prompted the 
Administration to articulate is own stance on the social responsibility of 
the press. In her speech at a media awards ceremony on 7 March, Anson 
Chan urged the media to ensure the reports and information provided to 
readers were balanced and objective. '[Press media] should strive to 
maintain fairness when they try to arouse public discussion, take into 
account and respect the views and positions of different sides', she said 
(Fang On-sang 1999). 
So as far as government officials are concerned, the media should be 
obliged to provide fair, balanced and objective information to readers. 
But whose right or role is it to define the concept of fairness and objectivity? 
Privately, senior Hong Kong officials have complained that the media 
has failed to give the public the opportunity to understand government 
policies and decisions. Officials argue they are not preventing the media 
from criticising them, but asking for fair coverage. The media, they insist, 
should not criticise the government for the sake of criticism and should 
actively support the government when it is on the right track. But critics 
believe these private views represent pressure on the media in the overall 
interest of society. This view is closer to former Singaporean Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew's ideology of press control rather than to the western notion 
of press freedom. 
Because of the sensitivity of the issue of social responsibility, the 
government has not pushed too openly, or too hard, for controls. Privately, 
officials are hoping the industry itself will come up with solutions to put 
their house in order, thus leaving the government out of the potentially 
explosive censorship debate. 
Threats to freedom of the press 
Setting out a list of 16 benchmarks of Hong Kong's success in his swansong 
Policy Address in 1996, former Governor Chris Patten highlighted concern 
over whether the press would remain free after the handover. He asked 
'Is the Hong Kong press still free, with uninhibited coverage of China 
and of issues on which China has strong views? Are foreign journalists 
and media organisations in Hong Kong still free to operate without 
controls?'(Patten 1996). Locally and internationally, there were fears about 
whether self-censorship would become the norm rather than the exception. 
In a speech in late March 1999, Anson Chan said the first 20 months of 
the SAR showed great protection of freedom of speech, with journalists 
continuing to enjoy ample room for independent reporting. 
A Government report published to mark the second anniversary of 
the SAR on 1 July 1999 stated 
Hong Kong's media has operated freely and unfettered, generating a 
robust and critical exchange of views on important matters and 
government policies or actions. If anything, the media has become more 
critical and demanding in its role as the 'guardians of public concern' 
(Hong Kong Government 1999). 
At this point it does seem fair to say that the Hong Kong government has 
silenced cynics within and outside the SAR with its restraint and tolerance 
towards the local media over the past two years. The Beijing government 
has also won praise over its hands-off approach in allowing a genuine 
level of autonomy for the SAR. Top SAR leaders have repeatedly assured 
local journalists they are not intending to introduce legislative curbs on 
the media, despite vocal complaints against media abuses. Nevertheless, 
the high-profile remarks made by Tung Chee-hwa and Anson Chan give 
a clear signal that the government is not happy with the state of the media. 
It is an open secret that Tung Chee-hwa and his top aides feel frustrated 
and angry with the sharp criticism in some influential newspapers over 
its handling of the right of abode crisis. These included the leading English 
daily South China Morning Post, the popular Apple Daily and Hong Kong 
Economic Journal (a financial daily widely read in business and intellectual 
circles). They all spoke out strongly against the government decision to 
seek reinterpretation from the Standing Committee of the Chinese National 
People's Congress over key provisions in the Basic law. The 
unprecedented move, later approved by the Standing Committee, has 
effectively overturned a landmark ruling by the Court of Final Appeal. 
The government had earlier warned an estimated 1.67 million mainlanders 
would have the right to reside in the SAR under the final appellate court's 
ruling on 29 January 1999. After the reinterpretation of the provisions, 
less than 200,000 will now be given the right. Unconvinced by the 
government's argument, some parts of the media strongly criticised the 
reinterpretation as a fatal blow to the rule of law, the independent judiciary 
and Hong Kong's autonomy. Top officials mounted a vigorous defence 
and propaganda campaign by writing to newspapers, encouraging their 
supporters to speak out and send articles to the media. 
Recently, former South China Morning Post editor Jonathan Fenby said 
in a report in the New York Times, '[t]here's been a much stronger reaction 
to the newspaper, from officialdom, from business circles, from members 
of the establishment, than at any time since the handover' (31 July 1999). 
Whether these remarks provide any evidence of political pressure remains 
a matter for debate. It is difficult, however, to rule out the possibility that 
some journalists do feel the psychological pressure to carefully weigh their 
words. Some journalists admit they feel the problem of self-censorship 
does exist, but they have trouble giving concrete examples. The Legislative 
Council's legal constituency representative Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee, a 
practicing barrister and a former newspaper publisher, has observed in a 
New York Times report, 'As a whole, newspapers have become steadily 
more pro-government since the handover' (31 July 1999). The Tung Chee-
hwa leadership clearly understands the negative consequences of being 
seen attempting to gag the media. For Hong Kong, with its economy 
largely dependent on foreign investment, freedom of the media remains 
an important benchmark for investors. Businesses would be likely to 
become jittery over any blatant curbs on the free flow of information and 
a reduction in accountability of the government, and the Tung Chee-hwa 
administration is well aware of the potential economic consequences. 
Beijing's long shadow 
According to a survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong in April 
1999,41 per cent of respondents felt the media was irresponsible in their 
reporting. A separate survey done by the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong shows credibility ratings for the media had dropped across the 
board. About one-quarter of respondents believe there is self-censorship 
by the media. Conversely, though, 36 per cent said the media had 
performed better in criticising the government after the handover. But, 
the same percentage of people, by contrast, found the Hong Kong media 
had failed to continue criticising and monitoring the mainland Chinese 
government after the handover. The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
researchers concluded that local media has become more restrained in 
criticising China. 
China coverage remains the most sensitive aspect of press self-
censorship, reflecting the vast differences between Hong Kong and the 
mainland over fundamental concepts and values. Not long ago, a 
mainland-born Hong Kong reporter Xi Yang was jailed for what would 
usually be considered scooping his colleagues by revealing plans to sell 
gold and raise interest rates. Xi, who worked for the Ming Pao daily, was 
convicted of espionage charges in a Chinese court. He was sentenced to a 
12-yearjail term in. March 1994 and freed on probation in early 1997before 
the handover. He has now emigrated. Xi Yang's case had a far reaching 
impact. Some China-beat Hong Kong journalists have since resigned, 
fearing they could become the next victims. Others have clearly become 
more cautious in dealing with sensitive mainland issues. Both journalists 
and members of the public hold a strong view that self-censorship in 
relation to China has become a problem. The problem is that Hong Kong 
and the mainland have different political systems and different concepts 
of freedom of the press. 
One contentious example is the ongoing issue of the status of Taiwan. 
Mainland China has consistently claimed sovereignty over Taiwan, despite 
the reality of the anti-communist administration in Taipei. So sensitive is 
the Taiwan issue for Beijing, that nations with diplomatic ties to mainland 
China must relegate Taiwan's representatives to vaguely named 
commercial or tourist offices. Earlier this year, Taiwan's President Lee 
Teng-hui defined cross-Straits tensions as a problem between 'two separate 
states', launching a campaign which infuriated Beijing. When the 
government-run Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) broadcast remarks 
by Taiwan's unofficial representative in the SAR elaborating on the 
controversial concept, pro-China newspapers in Hong Kong were quick 
to lambast RTHK editorial staff for 'going far beyond the boundary of 
'press freedom' and 'independent editorial line'. The RTHK was accused 
of violating the 'one country, two systems' principle by which China 
governs Hong Kong and challenging the Basic Law by propagating 
divisive advocacy. In RTHK's defence, the Assistant Director of 
Broadcasting (Radio) Peter Shiu Lo-sin wrote in the South China Morning 
Post, 
[ o ]ne wider issue is the difference between 'promoting/ advocating' 
and 'reporting/ discussing.' Article 23 of the Basic Law guarantees 
freedom of speech and of the press. It is the firm view of our editorial 
colleagues and I am sure that of most journalists in Hong Kong, that 
discussing and debating an issue in the media does not in any way 
constitute an act of advocacy (9 August 1999). 
The sharp attacks on RTHK by the pro-China media sent shivers down 
the spines of Hong kong journalists because of the potential threat to 
press freedom and the broader question of freedom of expression under 
Article 23 in the Basic Law. The government may have indicated there is 
no urgency in enacting the new legislation, but it has never ruled out its 
future use. The ferocity of the criticism of RTHK indicated strong pressure 
from some quarters of the community for the media to adopt the Chinese 
mainland position when dealing with sovereignty issues. Any future 
legislation on Article 23 could impact on the media's coverage of issues 
relating to sovereignty and Communist rule. Will the Hong Kong media 
be allowed to give their backing to the 'two states theory'? Will journalists 
be allowed to report on the issue, discuss and analyse it, or raise it for a 
public debate? Will the SAR be given an entirely free hand to legislate on 
Article 23? 
Article 23 was written into the Basic Law at the latter stage of the five-
year-long drafting process. It responded to the historic opposition en masse 
by Hong Kong people against China's crackdown on Tiananmen 
demonstrators on 4 June 1989. Shocked by scenes of more than 1.5 million 
people, representing one out of every four Hong Kongers, marching in 
streets to condemn the shootings, Beijing was adamant that an anti-
subversive provision in the Basic Law would uphold the authority of the 
ruling communist regime. The vociferous attacks against President Lee 
over his 'two states theory' and the crackdown in the northern summer of 
1999 against followers of the Falun Gong, a religious sect in mainland 
China, reflect the depth of anxiety among Beijing leadership over threats 
to its rule. It is hard to imagine the SAR government will not quietly consult 
Beijing when it begins drafting the anti-subversive legislation. 
More than a year before the hand over, mainland Chinese officials had 
already spelled out their views on Article 23. In June 1996, the then head 
of the Chinese State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Lu 
Ping, said the Hong Kong press would not be allowed to advocate two 
Chinas after 1997 (South China Morning Post, 3 June 1999). Nor was the 
SAR given the power to advocate independence for Hong Kong and 
Taiwan under the 'one country, two systems' formula. Journalists are 
puzzled and worried that it will be up to the authorities to determine 
arbitrarily what is objective reporting and what is advocacy. The attacks 
from pro-China media against the RTHK do not augur well for the 
preservation of unfettered freedom for the media when Article 23 is put 
on the agenda of legislative program. 
Who will defend the media? 
The China factor aside, the future of freedom of the press and speech 
rests with the resolve of SAR leaders and the community at large to uphold 
it. Before the hand over there was no shortage of comforting promises. In 
January 1997, Anson Chan urged all Hong Kong journalists to 
practise their profession after 1997 as they have practised it, continue 
to write the stories and editorials that deserve to be written, responsibly, 
objectively without fear or favour ... How well they do their job after 
the transition will to a very large extent decide how well our other 
freedoms will be protected (Fang On-sang 1997). 
Behind the upbeat note from Anson Chan was the idea that the main 
threat would come from China, after the handover. Instead, the direct 
threat from China failed to materialise and the Hong Kong press began to 
pose a more imminent threat to the authority of the SAR, prompting new 
local pressures on journalists. Against this background, it is interesting to 
note the shift in emphasis by Tung Chee-hwa and Anson Chan on the 
need for the media to fulfill its social responsibility and behave themselves. 
Conspiracy theorists believe it may be a curtain raiser to some form of 
future controls over the media. 
A tighter grip on the media would be likely to receive the blessing of 
the central government in Beijing. Speaking to a group of senior journalists 
in mid-July, a deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office 
Liu Minqi said that news media 'should explain government policies' 
and 'reflect public opinion to the government' (South China Morning Post, 
20 July 1999). His remarks are in line with the calls by SAR leaders for 
officials to fulfil their social responsibility while exercising their 
freedoms. 
Like other freedoms and rights, the concept of a free press is entrenched 
in Hong Kong values. Anyone in the street will speak highly of the 
importance of a free press which works without fear and favour. But when 
asked by pollsters from the Baptist University of Hong Kong what is the 
most important area for more government effort, protecting freedom of 
the press ranks fourteenth. It follows areas such as luring more tourists, 
reducing pollution, improving people's livelihood and ensuring economic 
growth (Hong Kong Transition Project 1999). Positively speaking, it could 
be seen as a vote of 'everything is fine' with press freedom. Yet it might 
also reflect the prevalent feeling in the community that the problem with 
the news media now is not a question of whether or not they are free. 
Rather it is a question of whether they are excessively free to publish 
unwarranted criticism of officials, to indulge in trials by media and gross 
distortions of truth, all of which, in themselves, pose a threat to other 
freedoms in society. Some media analysts fear the public might become 
so frustrated and fed up that they are ready to accept some kind of press 
controls. If the credibility of the media continues to decline, there is a 
stronger likelihood of public support for curbs on the media. 
In his annual Policy Address delivered on 6 October 1999, Chief 
Executive Tung Chee-hwa warned that press freedom should not become 
a pretext for disregarding media ethics. He said, 'it is inexcusable for any 
media operator to resort to pornography, violence, libel or 
misrepresentation simply for profit'. Professional ethics and social 
responsibilities of the media, Tung Chee-hwa pointed out, 'is an issue of 
prime public concern which deserves the Government's due 
attention ... The SAR Government awaits with interest the outcome of the 
public consultation exercise' (Chee-hwa 1999). 
Tung Chee-hwa was referring to a set of controversial proposals 
published by the quasi-official Law Reform Commission in August 1999 
for a four-month consultation concluding at the end of November. The 
key proposal is the establishment of a statutory Press Council appointed 
by the Chief Executive to handle complaints and initiate investigations 
over privacy intrusions by the media. The Press Council would be 
empowered to impose a maximum fine of HK$500,000 on a newspaper 
for a first offence in a serious breach of a privacy code. For a second or 
subsequent offence a publication would face a maximum fine of HK$1 
million. 
The proposal has already been met with strong opposition from all 
journalists' groups, newspapers and many academics. They are worried 
the new body could mark the beginning of curbs on press freedom. 
However, opinion polls reflect a mixed response from the public. One 
major finding was that the public generally considered the media to have 
acted irresponsibly and to have intruded into the privacy of individuals. 
The government has said it remains open minded about the proposal, 
despite a strong hint from Tung Chee-hwa that his administration will 
have to do something if the media fails to introduce some kind of self-
regulating measures. 
The Independent Law Reform Commission, which is chaired by a 
university professor and plays an instrumental role in legislation, will 
make its final proposal to the government after taking into account the 
range of views collected during the consultation. The ball is then in Tung 
Chee-hwa' s court for a final decision on the long-standing issue of media 
excess. 
Two years after the change of sovereignty, life in Hong Kong remains 
much the same as it was under British rule. Following months of 
consecutive negative economic growth, in mid 1999 signs emerged that 
the worst is over. Politically, there have been no mass arrests of dissidents. 
Demonstrations remain part of the daily life. The annual 4 June candle-
light vigil in Victoria Park, marking the anniversary of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre, attracted a higher-than-expected turnout-70,000 
according to the organisers. Many media organisations gave prominent 
coverage to the memorial activities, now seen as a symbol of the 
preservation of Hong Kong's civil liberties and free lifestyles under 
Chinese rule. 
In her speech in March, Anson Chan said there are new problems to be 
explored and solved as the policy of 'one country, two systems' is 
implemented. The media can play a much bigger role in the historical 
process. Apart from monitoring the operations of the government and 
reflecting public opinion, the media play an important role in shaping 
community thinking and raising civic awareness. Media proprietors, 
executives and journalists, however, have yet to show a broad consensus 
on the need to define their role and the boundaries of press freedom in 
the new political game. The challenge is for them to give full play to the 
fourth estate to contribute to the development of a stable, equitable, free, 
democratic and compassionate society under the formula of 'one country, 
two systems'. 
I IIIII I 
Dancing in the dark 
Andreas Harsono 
sad lessons from East 
Timor 
In February 1999, as tensions over 
East Timor were building, scores of personally addressed faxes went out 
to Australian journalists, bringing a message of death into their offices 
and homes. 
An Australian journalist would suffer the ultimate sanction-murder-
as a protest against Australia's role in urging Jakarta to approve a ballot 
on independence which would cut the restive province free from 
Indonesian control. The threat to the press was then expanded to take in 
Australian diplomats and Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, 
too, was shown a written 'death notice' by two commanders of pro-Jakarta 
militia units from East Timor during a visit to Jakarta. The militia units, 
Mr Downer said at the time, were 'very aggressive and very angry' and 
vowed to make a bloody 'sacrifice' over Australia's policy switch on East 
Timor, which prompted the then Habibie government to approve United 
Nations' supervised ballot. But, there was still a sense of disbelief that in 
post-Soeharto Indonesia that such blatant terror tactics could be used 
against the media, and-in particular-foreign reporters. Under the former 
authoritarian President Soeharto a number of Indonesian journalists had 
died mysterious deaths which were never properly investigated, silenced 
for their part in challenging the power elite within their own society. 
However, under the supposedly reformist government of President, 
Dr B. J. Habibie, and with the nation virtually bankrupt and relying on a 
massive International Monetary Fund bail-out, the calculated murder of 
a foreign journalist would be likely to attract considerable pressure in 
western nations to cut ties with, and suspend this aid to, Jakarta. 
I"'do"'e..s ·,a 
As a tactic, the threat to journalists was hardly new. Prior to the 1975 
invasion of East Timor by Indonesian troops-who forcibly annexed the 
former Portuguese colony as Jakarta's 27th province-the Indonesian 
military broadcast similar menacing messages across the border. Six 
Australian journalists who stayed behind as the Indonesia military 
advanced were murdered, five at Balibo and one on the docks in Dili. 
Their deaths soured bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia 
for decades and, in some ways, have coloured Australian reporting on 
Indonesia. There is ongoing debate over how the men died, but it now 
seems clear that five members of two televisions crews seeking refuge in 
Balibo were killed by an Indonesian special forces unit ahead of the 
invasion, and the sixth, ABC journalist Roger East, was executed in Dili, 
according to published accounts of interviews with witnesses. 
The aim of the death threats both in 1975 and 1999, said James Dunn, 
former Australian diplomat and author of 'Timor: a people betrayed', was 
'to scare journalists away so that the military could operate with impunity, 
without witnesses'. In 1975, he said in a recent interview, the tactic was 
largely successful. The Indonesian military invasion, one of great brutality, 
was carried out without the watching eyes of satellite TV or foreign 
reporters. 
But, in 1999, both politics and technology had already changed the 
face of Indonesia and the international media. Hundreds of foreign and 
local journalists moved into Dili, many with their own satellite phones 
and satellite dishes to uplink photos, images and stories. In the lead up to 
the UN-supervised ballot, the violence by pro-Jakarta militia units against 
journalists escalated. First, journalists were merely stopped at roadblocks 
and machetes and knives were waved angrily in the air. Then journalists 
were chased with weapons and beaten. Specifically, the targets were 
western journalists-symbols of western governments pressuring 
Indonesia over human rights abuses and supporting the right of the East 
Timorese to choose their own fate. 
But carnage was unleashed when the 30 August 1999 ballot to end 
Indonesia rule was supported, with 78.5 per cent in favour of 
independence according to the UN-organised vote (UN Press Release SC/ 
6721, 3 September 1999). So terrifying was the violence, that the majority 
of foreign and local journalists did flee and-in a sense-the Indonesian 
military and their militia allies were able to plunder and pillage at will, 
either in a losers' orgy of revenge or as a calculated scorched earth message 
to other restive provinces. 
In the UN compound in Dili, however, enough foreign journalists and 
international staff stayed to keep lines open to the world. On satellite 
telephones, with bullets flying overhead, those huddling inside the 
compound told the story as best they could both from the accounts of 
those who came to seek refuge inside, and their own first hand experiences. 
The militia and their allies in the Indonesian military cut all telephone 
links in the province, even the mobile phone network, destroyed the radio 
relay stations and switched off the power. But, battery powered satellite 
phones could not be cut. 'We were getting a call every 90 seconds or so, 24 
hours a days, from all over the world', said one UN staffer. As such, the 
story of East Timor in 1999 was dramatically different to the virtual silence 
which met the invasion in 1975. Headlines all over the world urged 
governments to pressure Jakarta and, finally, in the last week of September 
1999, peacekeepers were allowed in. 
Tragically, one day after Australian-led peacekeepers had fanned out 
across Dili and an end to the violence was finally in sight, militia units, 
reportedly mixed with Indonesian troops, led two direct attacks on western 
journalists. Sander Thoenes, a Dutch national, who worked for the Financial 
Times, was brutally hacked to death just a couple of blocks away from the 
ruins of the Turismo Hotel where most of the press were staying. He was 
a tall, blonde young man, obviously a westerner. Two British journalists 
escaped a similar attack, but their driver was disfigured and their 
translator kidnapped, presumed to have been murdered. Several days 
later a 26-year-old Indonesian cameraman, Agus Muliwan, who worked 
as a stringer for the Tokyo-based Asia Press, was also killed by a mixed 
unit of militia and Indonesian troops. He was apparently targeted because 
he was travelling with a group of East Timorese Catholic elegy. 
In war zones journalists are not offered, nor should they expect, any 
special protection, unless they choose to travel directly under the 
supervision of a military force. But, in East Timor in 1999 the media was 
part of the conflict, because of the perception on the Indonesian side that 
international reporting from East Timor over the years was largely 
responsible for exposing decades of serious human rights abuses and 
maintaining pressure for independence. 
Much of Indonesia's political and military power elite were both furious 
over and humiliated by the results of the UN vote, which so 
overwhelmingly rejected Indonesian rule despite the militia's pre-poll 
terror campaign. For over 23 years the Indonesian government had told 
the world that the East Timorese wanted them there. With the arrival of 
Australian-led peacekeepers the Indonesian media was again cranked 
up, this time in the name of nationalism. 
The government wire service, An tara, which had been moving towards 
a more independent editorial position since the fall of Soeharto, led the 
condemnatory reporting of Australia's actions in East Timor, claiming 
gross human rights abuses on the part of Australian troops. Local 
newspapers carried photographs of supposed victims of Australian 
atrocities (actually the corpses of those murdered by pro-Jakarta militia 
units) and rent-a-mob demonstrators besieged the Australian Embassy. 
Again, the media was a crucial element to this new bilateral standoff. In a 
statement issued in October 1999, the Institute for the Studies on Free 
Flow of Information, said, 
We demand that the Indonesian intelligence community end its practice 
of infiltrating the press corp ... this results in reports which sound like 
propaganda and hurt the reputation of Indonesia in the international 
community. Let journalists look for the truth and do their job. It is 
wrong for the intelligence community to fill the media with lies that 
only serve to inflame anti-Australian sentiment (Goenawan Mohamad 
1999). 
However, the Institute also bemoaned the absence of Indonesian 
journalists on the ground in East Timor and difficulties in complying with 
Darwin registration requirements. At the same time, however, decades of 
information control under Soeharto meant few Indonesians have much 
sympathy for the East Timorese. Too often they see the East Trmorese as 
voracious and ungrateful consumers of aid budgets-an image promoted 
in Indonesian government propaganda about the conflict. On East Timor, 
the manipulation of the local press was not difficult. 
In the bigger picture of political developments in Indonesia, East Timor 
may historically be viewed as the last desperate attempt by elements of 
the Indonesian military and political elite to maintain control over the 
press. At a national level censorship was formally defeated with the 
collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. Advances in information 
technology, particularly the Internet, contributed significantly to an 
underground alternative news network in the last years of the Soeharto 
regime, and offered practical communications tools for the organisation 
of mass protests. 
However, those accustomed to power rarely exit the stage overnight. 
When the state relinquishes control of the press, particularly after years 
of censorship which have stifled the development of an independent 
media industry, a vacuum is left behind. Into this vacuum rush any number 
of forces-elements of the old power elite such as the military, businesses 
or politicians. The result may be that censorship is replaced by corruption 
and unprofessional practices as the new forces in society shake out and a 
new power structure is built. 
In October 1999 incoming PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid, announced 
his new Cabinet. Missing, for the first time in more than three decades, 
was a Minister of Information. Stunned, hundreds of employees of the 
now defunct Department of Information, the Minister had controlled, 
spilled out onto the streets to try to protest. Under former President 
Soeharto they had been amongst the bureaucracy's most powerful figures, 
charged with monitoring both the local and foreign media and dishing 
out the appropriate censures, such as the suspension of licences, 
harrassment and cancellation of visas. Control of information was central 
to Soeharto's hold on political power. Now, they were to be 
unceremoniously absorbed into other government departments. 
'Information is not the Government's business, it is the people's business', 
said President Wahid (1999). 
The dismissal of the censors is an enormously symbolic step in the 
move towards press freedom, but most media analysts agree that 
Indonesia still faces a myriad of structural, practical and historical barriers 
to the effective operation of a free and independent media. 
Indonesia's presidents inherit colonial controls 
The annals of the Indonesian media date back to 1744 when a Dutch 
national in Batavia, the Dutch-name for today's Jakarta, published the 
Bataviase Nouvelles. The paper was the first publication in the Dutch East 
Indies, and primarily chronicled business activities and the arrivals and 
departures of ships through the port. But, the Dutch, fearing the potential 
for criticism of their tough administration in the resource-rich colony, 
closed the newspaper within two years and discouraged other members 
of the public from taking similar initiatives. It was not until five decades 
later that a Dutch language publication, the Bataviaasche Coloniale Courant, 
was accepted, and members of society, including local Indonesians and 
Chinese immigrants, began to involve themselves in newspapers. 
By the beginning of the 20th century many Indonesians appreciated 
the power of the media to spread the message of the independence 
movement, realising the Dutch administration's early fears that 
newspapers could be turned against them. Many Indonesian freedom 
fighters were also writers, including Soekarno who was to become an 
independent Indonesia's first President following the end of World War 
II. Indonesia's most widely recognised novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 
also used a Javanese journalist as the inspiration for his main character, 
Minke, in his Buru Tetralogy series of novels which have been translated 
and distributed internationally, but were banned in Indonesia until1999. 
The novels are set in the 1900s on the Dutch-ruled island of Java and 
Minke is based on journalist Raden Mas Tirto Adisoerjo, who published 
the Malay-language Medan Prijaji newspaper and was repeatedly 
imprisoned by the Dutch for his writings. 
Writers such as Adisoerjo and Soekarno created so many problems for 
the Dutch government that in 1931 it introduced a law (pressbreidel 
ordonantie) which allowed the Dutch Governor-General to temporarily 
ban a publication (for up to eight days) which' disrupted public order'. If 
the banned publication continued to 'produce a disturbance', the 
Governor-General could implement a second banning of up to 30 days. 
The Dutch colonial government also introduced the notorious 'hate 
sowing' articles (haatzaai artikelen) of the Dutch Criminal Code, regularly 
used to punish independent journalists. Three of these articles forbid the 
publication of statements that 'incite feelings of hostility, hatred or 
contempt towards the government' and prescribe jail terms of between 
four-and-a-half and seven years for doing so. Another article, which 
provides for up to 18 months imprisonment for 'insulting a government 
authority or body', has also been used. 
Ironically, these articles were adopted by the new independent 
Indonesia. The Indonesian governments of both Soekarno (1945-65) and 
Soeharto (1966-98) simply made some modifications in the language, for 
example, changing the word Governor-General to President. The hate-
sowing articles were used extensively during Soeharto's rule. 
When the Japanese military occupied Indonesia in March 1942, the 
military administration immediately closed down all the local newspapers 
and then permitted only a handful to re-open. Unlike the Dutch rulers, 
who preferred punishment over preventive measures, the Japanese 
introduced a publishing licencing procedure to control the media. 
Although the Japanese surrendered and pulled out three years later, the 
licencing procedure, too, was incorporated into the armoury of the 
independent Indonesian government and was used particularly 
vigorously by former President Soeharto (Luwarso 1999). 
Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesia's independence 
on 17 August 1945, establishing a new constitution which states, 'Freedom 
of speech and of the press and similar freedoms shall be provided by 
law'. But in practice, severe restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly 
and association, including a raft of regulations and laws, have been 
imposed in post-independence Indonesia. 
The departure of the Japanese and the declaration of independence 
brought Indonesia a brief media honeymoon, with many new newspapers 
emerging. But Soekarno, the freedom fighter and writer, resorted to 
authoritarian measures to shore up his own power base and by 1959 had 
declared martial law, giving the military the right to censor the media. 
Soekarno controlled the press but failed to control the economy, and with 
inflation spiralling out of control and the people hungry, he was toppled 
in a military-sponsored coup in 1965, accused of links with the growing 
communist movement. 
A second false dawn for the media followed the ascension of the then 
Major-General Soeharto to the Presidency. In 1966 the parliament passed 
Indonesia's first Press Law which provides that 'no censorship or bridling 
shall be applied to the national press' and calls on the press to 'fight for 
truth and justice based on freedom of the press'. But a caveat was inserted 
denying such freedoms to those publications 'conflicting with the state 
ideology, Pancasila, such as those inspired by Communism, Marxism and 
Leninism'. Soeharto, too, proved to be an authoritarian strongman and 
by 1974 had consolidated his political power. Student protests that year 
were brutally suppressed and more than a dozen newspapers were closed 
because of their coverage of the uprising. Soeharto' s mantra was stability 
and economic development ahead of democracy and transparency, a 
formula which initially fuelled economic growth and made Indonesia the 
darling of international institutions despite tough restrictions on freedom 
of speech. 
In 1982, Soeharto upgraded the Japanese-inspired licencing 
requirements for publications, introducing an even more restrictive Press 
Publications Business Licence and the proviso that the press must be 'free 
and responsible'. Soeharto and his assistants were fond of the word 
'responsible' as it allowed them to impose informal censorship on the 
media on a day-to-day basis. The satirically named 'telephone culture' 
was born in this era, referring to telephone calls to editors from Ministry 
of Information officials or the military 'advising' them on how to report 
on particular issues (Schwarz 1994). Officials also made unexpected visits 
to newspaper offices to persuade editors not to run a particular story. 
This form of censorship relied on the implied threat that a publication's 
licence would be withdrawn, making it both confusing for editors and 
effective for the government because there was no clear line over which 
editors should not step. Known taboos included coverage of the Soeharto 
family's business dealings and those of other corrupt officials, but editors 
often self-censored beyond these limits. For journalists and editors who 
crossed the invisible line there was personal financial ruin, unemployment 
or worse-harassment, intimidation, imprisonment or, sometimes, death. 
Soeharto's crackdowns 
For foreign journalists similar threats were used-expulsion and the 
closure of the bureau. All Australian journalists were banned from 
Indonesia in 1986, over a Sydney Morning Herald article about the 
accumulated wealth of the Soeharto clan. As Australian journalists were 
gradually readmitted over the next decade, it was made clear they were 
expected to 'understand' the Indonesian government's perspective. Quiet 
pressure was also applied on Australian journalists by their own 
diplomats, who saw the press as one of the most difficult bilateral issues 
between Jakarta and Canberra. Within the then all-powerful Department 
of Information in Jakarta censors poured over copies of local and foreign 
articles, looking for references to bring to the attention of their bosses for 
their potential offence to the ruling elite. Foreign journalists were also 
banned from travelling to the troubled provinces of East Timor, Irian Jay a 
and Aceh or were expelled if caught without a special permit. 
One of the most dramatic-and eventually costly-decisions made by 
the Soeharto administration was to close the popular and relatively 
courageous, Tempo magazine and two other weeklies, Detik and Editor, in 
1994 (Lindsey 1999}. Information Minister, Harmoko, himself a former 
journalist, ordered the closures, accusing the publications of pitting 
government officials against each other over a controversial purchase of 
East German warships. At this time Indonesian society was feeling 
pressures for openness that a market-based economy delivering rapid 
growth, brings. The magazine closures prompted nationwide protests of 
journalists, students, lawyers, artists and other professionals and forced 
key groups of media professionals out of the industry at a time when 
there was growing public demand for alternative information sources 
The state-sponsored Indonesian Journalists' Union (PWI) issued a 
statement saying it could 'understand' the government's decision, 
angering many journalists and splitting the profession into two groups-
those who were prepared to continue to toe the line and protect their own 
personal interests and those who were willing to take some risks. Many 
younger journalists formed an illegal union, called the Alliance of 
Independent Journalists (AJI), to fight for press freedom and to offer 
advocacy services for media workers (Luwarso 1999). It gained 
considerable support in Jakarta and other large cities such as Surabaya, 
Yogyakarta and Bandung and challenged the government's licencing 
requirements by publishing an underground newspaper, Suara Independen 
(Voice of Independence). The state-sponsored union, came down heavily 
on the government's side calling for a ban on the employment of rebel 
joumalists associated with the publication. Three AJI journalists were 
eventually jailed for 'sowing hatred' against government officials and 
publishing an unlicenced newspaper. But, perhaps more importantly, 
hundreds of rebel journalists were barred from the industry (International 
Centre Against Censorship 1996). 
At that time former Tempo editor, Goenawan Mohamad, began assisting 
young, unemployed journalists to use their time more profitably. 'Let us 
not curse the darkness, let's light the candles', was a popular slogan in 
the early days of the underground press. While some ex-Tempo journalists 
apologised and returned to the state-controlled press, many did not. 
Instead, they set about trying to create a genuine political movement, 
studying pro-democracy movements elsewhere and establishing networks 
of their own. 
One of the critical tools of the mid 1990s was the Internet. Some former 
Tempo journalists established Tempo Interaktif which became an electronic 
version of the banned magazine. Another former Detik journalists set up 
'detik.com', which offered a free daily service of uncensored news. For 
those not connected to the Internet there was a printed version available 
on a confidential mailing list. 
According to Tedjabayu Basuki, an Internet specialist at the Jakarta 
Institute for the Study of the Free Flow of Information, it is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly when the Internet was transformed into a weapon of 
dissent in Indonesia. But, the banning of the weeklies was a significant 
turning point. However, Indonesians abroad had discovered the Internet's 
potential earlier than their compatriots back home. Indonesian students 
overseas set up many online conferences, discussing political 
developments in Soeharto's Indonesia. 
Then, there was also John McDougall, an American Indonesianist based 
in Maryland, who had established his own information company in 1984. 
McDougall's firm specialised in research findings and other quality articles 
about Indonesia. Initially, he sold the service commercially but, encouraged 
by such an enthusiastic response, he established a free Internet-based 
mailing list in 1990 called Apakabar (literally meaning, 'How are you?'). It 
offered a wide range of views from the most radical to the conservative, 
from pro-democracy activists to military intelligence officers 
masquerading as Internet enthusiasts. It also distributed various news 
reports from a wide range of mainstream media sources, both foreign 
and Indonesian, such as Kompas, Forum Keadilan Gushce Forum), the Sydney 
Morning Herald, the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Asian Wall Street Journal 
and the New York Times. A number of Indonesian journalist-based news 
groups also joined the mailing list, distributing their news reports, without 
the censorship of Indonesia's mainstream media newsrooms. 
'The Apakabar mailing list subsequently played a central role in 
spreading up to date information about Indonesia' (Basuki 1999). The 
number of actual recipients was quite small, but photocopy machines were 
used to boost circulation. Apakabar had also inspired Indonesian Internet 
users to establish their own mailing lists. The response from the Soeharto 
government to Internet sites appeared to be largely ineffective. Soeharto's 
regime was accustomed to wielding a large black pen to black out 
offending articles in foreign publications, not chasing challenging views 
across an international electronic network. 
Within Indonesia student publications were also a source of alternative 
views. Some, such as the Balairung magazine and the Bulaksumur tabloid 
in Yogyakarta, established websites to enlarge their audiences. Student 
newspapers are, of course, mostly read by students and swapped between 
campuses. However, the Internet was later used as a powerful organising 
tool for student protests against the Soeharto regime-from informing 
foreign correspondents of the latest protest sites to appealing for food 
and drinks for the exhausted demonstrators. 
Alternative media outlets began to play a crucial role in mid 1996 when 
the Soeharto government organised a rebel conference of the Indonesian 
Democratic Party (PDI) to topple its popular chairwoman, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri. The reason behind this clumsy political manoeuvre was 
Soeharto's fear of competing against Megawati, the eldest daughter of 
founding President Soekarno, in elections scheduled for 1997. The Internet 
mailing lists provided the public with information about the plot to topple 
Megawati, and her enraged supporters rioted for two days in Jakarta 
following her ouster-protests which can, in retrospect, be seen as the 
beginning of the end of Soeharto. 
The alternative media proved to be an effective medium for Megawati, 
who has more than a dozen websites dedicated to her struggle. Soeharto 
forced Megawati out of the PDI, and banned her from politics, but failed 
to sideline her from a growing national democratic struggle. From a 
relatively untested party leader, the housewife-turned-politician became 
a national symbol of integrity, against the backdrop of the corrupt Soeharto 
regime. Her hugely popular party won the largest share of the votes in 
the first post-Soeharto election in June 1999, with 34 per cent. She was 
relegated to the Vice-Presidency because of a deal cut within parliament 
to give the top job to her old friend, Muslim leader, Abdurrahman Wahid. 
The Internet also provided the public with information about a wide 
range of Soeharto-linked businesses. Journalist-turned-activist George 
Junus Aditjondro, from his self-exile in Australia, used the Internet to 
post details of dozens of companies controlled by the Soehartos, as did 
other activists. This information was downloaded and circulated in 
photocopy form while Soeharto was still in power. After his resignation, 
the mainstream international media, including TIME magazine, began to 
quote s research as publishing houses raced to print his books. 
The crisis hits, the students hit back 
When the East Asian currency crisis hit Indonesia in August 1997, the 
rupiah began its spectacular collapse, dropping from 2,400 to the US dollar 
to a low point of 17,000 in January 1998. Without economic development, 
the Soeharto mantra was meaningless. What point bowing to draconian 
political controls when the rice bowl was now empty. However, Soeharto 
appeared to be unable to understand the inevitability of his own fall, as 
did many members of the ruling elite and the main stream media. In March 
1998, the Indonesian parliament elected Soeharto for his seventh 
successive five-year term. His new cabinet was filled with cronies, 
including his wealthy eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, and his 
golfing buddy, tycoon Bob Hasan. 
The students reacted and a wave of protests began-at first cautiously, 
with sit-ins confined to campuses, but gradually spreading out onto the 
streets. At this time the Internet became more and more important, as an 
organising tool and as a means of spreading the opposition's views. When 
military sharpshooters killed four students fleeing riot troops at Trisakti 
University on 12 May 1998, the regime had crossed the public's line. 
Massive riots across Jakarta ensued and Soeharto was forced to resign-
the eyes of the world's media were on the tanks and troops roaming the 
streets of Jakarta and the airport filled with evacuating foreigners. 
When the line had been crossed Soeharto's power structure simply 
collapsed. Censorship can only be imposed when a regime holds genuine 
power to punish or hurt. With chaos on the streets the mainstream 
Indonesian media jumped into the fight, on the other side, broadcasting 
images of the students' protests and-arguably-contributing to the 
success of the students' campaign. The usually conservative, government-
controlled Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI) even repeatedly ran an eulogy 
of the dead students, galvanizing public awareness of the tragedy in 
Jakarta, and indicating that those at the top were no longer in control. 
Many government officials and military officers did not understand the 
winds of change. They harassed and intimidated journalists right up to 
the last minute, when Soeharto offered his humiliating resignation to his 
people, in a live national broadcast. 
And even beyond Soeharto the dark elements of the military continue 
to intimidate media figures. Military elements were behind the arson attack 
on the home of Riza Primadi, the news director of Surya Citra Televisi 
(SCTV), when he was leading his journalists in a live television broadcast 
of the shooting of protesting students in November 1998 by riot troops. 
Primadi, a former BBC journalist, is known to be an independent producer. 
Many of his reporters were threatened but the station continued to lead 
the news coverage on such formerly taboo issues as military violence 
against civilians, the fall of Soeharto and consequent efforts to bring 
Soeharto and his children to justice. 
On the part of the Soeharto regime, the dramatic events of May 1998 
illustrated a failure to understand the international and local media, and 
the impact the media, and information technology, could have on politics 
in the late 1990s. The controls in place-such as visa restrictions for foreign 
journalists and threats to suspend the licences of local publications-relied 
on a bureaucracy which believed in the power of its political leaders. It 
also relied on that bureaucracy's power to control communication. But as 
technology developed this simply became more and more impractical. 
As the political power visibly crumbled, immigration officials happily 
waved through scores of foreign televisions crews on tourist visas, censors 
were unable to make decisions, and the regime found itself totally isolated 
from the media. Decades of telling the media what to report, and refusing 
to be questioned meant there was no infrastructure in place, such as press 
officers to provide an 'official' version of events, to put a more favourable 
spin on the crisis. The students and the opposition had centre stage, almost 
by default. Information controls had totally collapsed. Chanting students 
waving colourful banners facing down riot troops and a city devastated 
by riots were such powerful images that government restrictions on 
uplinking TV footage from Indonesia were reduced to a joke. Technology 
was such that foreign TV crews had the capacity to by-pass officially 
approved transmitters anyway. 
Habibie bows to the inevitable 
When incoming President Habibie took over in May 1998, he had little 
choice but to liberalise the country's political system, to hold democratic 
elections, release political prisoners and to support a free media. 
Independent organisations found it difficult to believe that a Soeharto 
crony such as Habibie, who spent 15 years serving in Soeharto cabinets, 
would implement the promised reforms. 
But to the surprise of many, Habibie tried to keep his promises. He 
once told a delegation of foreign journalists, 'I will never, never tolerate 
an Indonesian government that interferes with the freedom of the press. 
Freedom of the press is very important. Not only for politics but also for 
economics.' 
Then, just a month after taking up the position as Habibie' s Information 
Minister, Muhammad Yunus announced that the media would be open 
to all. Journalists would be permitted to establish independent unions 
and professional organisations, undercutting the monopoly of the state-
controlled IndonesianJournalistsAssociation (PWI). Newspapers would 
no longer need political connections to secure a license to run a printing 
press. Private radio stations could also reduce the compulsory relay of 
the Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) (government radio) news reports from 
fourteen to three times per day, a welcome relief for millions of Indonesians 
after decades of dry, boring government propaganda. 
The result-many new newspapers immediately entered the market. 
One year after Soeharto' s fall, the Ministry of Information had issued more 
than 1000 press licenses-four times more than the Soeharto regime issued 
in over 30 years in power. Yunus even suggested that the ministry be 
abolished, as it since has been, saying that it was nothing more than a 
state apparatus to control the press. 
Even more so than Habibie, many were skeptical about Yunus' sincerity. 
Yunus, a three star General, was allegedly directly involved in the 1975 
murder of the five Australian journalists in Balibo, where he served as a 
special forces officer. But his decisions did spark a rush of new national 
and community newspapers and publications, not only in Jakarta, but in 
many smaller cities and towns. Private radio stations raced into news 
reporting, challenging an area which the government-controlled RRI had 
monopolised since 1945. Jakarta-based stations such as Trijaya, Sonora and 
Elshinta began producing their own news reports. Elshinta went even 
further, with live broadcasts of the BBC Indonesian Service since 
November 1998. The move was trailed by other private radios in other 
cities such as Prima in Banda Aceh or Smart FM network in Palembang, 
Manado and Ujungpandang. Other Indonesian-language programs of the 
Voice of America, Deutche Welle, Radio Australia and Radio Netherlands 
were also broadcast live in Indonesia for the first time in history. These 
were bold programming decisions in a nation where many government 
officials and army officers still consider the respected international radio 
services 'too critical'. 
But the new openness has also sparked sensationalism. Many of the 
new tabloids publish speculative and irresponsible reports, which freely 
mix facts with opinion and conjecture. Tabloids tend to spice up their 
reports with sex and crime. The Jakarta police charged several editors 
with distributing pornography in June and July 1999, questioning 
voluptuous actresses like Sophia Inneke Koesherawaty and Sarah 
Azhari for posing nearly nude on magazine covers in a predominantly 
Muslim nation. The editors denied the charges, saying the photographs 
were used for aesthetic, not pornographic, reasons. The Warta Republik 
tabloid, for example, published a December report on how former Vice 
President Try Sutrisno and former Defense Minister Edi Sudrajat had 
allegedly competed to date a widow. Neither Sutrisno nor Sudrajat were 
interviewed-and neither was the widow. The tabloid later admitted that 
it did not even know the whereabouts of the widow. The aggressiveness 
of the new press can be startling, in a nation emerging from decades of 
control. One paper is called simply Oposisi (Opposition), and its regular 
broadsides against Soeharto's legacy of corruption and nepotism leave 
readers no doubt about what it is opposed to. Another is called Gugat 
which means, 'accuse' in Indonesian. The tabloid proudly claims its motto 
as 'Trial by the press'. 
The result of this new culture of muckraking is a rash of lawsuits. The 
Jakarta military command, for example is suing the Tajuk bi-weekly. The 
military accused the magazine of tarnishing its reputation in a report which 
said former Jakarta commander Major General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, a close 
associate of Soeharto's son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, was involved in 
instigating the massive riots of May 14-16, 1998. Prabowo himself was 
transferred from his position one day after the fall of his father-in-law 
amid widespread speculation he was also involved in the kidnapping, 
torture and illegal detention of human rights activists as well as instigating 
the riots, in which more than 1,200 people died. Arnold Baramuli, an 
associate close to Habibie, also sued the Gamma magazine for publishing 
a taped conversation between Baramuli and a businessman who had 
allegedly help Baramuli to divert funds from a bank to the Habibie 
campaign. The police also questioned editors of the Panji magazine over 
a leaked telephone conversation between Habibie and then Attorney-
General Andi Muhammad Ghalib. Habibie allegedly ordered Ghalib to 
'pretend' to be going through the motions of questioning Soeharto, to 
appease the public as calls continued for Soeharto to be brought to justice. 
Such stories are, understandably, a spectacular departure from the 
bland, censored fare of 1998. But the problem for the Indonesian media 
post-Soeharto is that new press freedoms are not backed up by a sound 
legal system, nor the checks and balances that a Press Council, for example, 
could provide. At the same time decades of hand feeding a compliant 
press has created an industry vulnerable to new forces of manipulation:, 
particularly money. 
Take, for example, the concerns of Luzi Diamanda, a former journalist 
who now heads the Voice of the Public, a local media watch dog body in 
the provincial city of Padang, on the island of Sumatra. Every time a new 
newspaper hits the stands she becomes more concerned, she says. Most 
of the new publishers do not pay their reporters a fair salary, and the 
reporters themselves have little experience of how to conduct interviews 
and produce independent stories professionally. The main objective of 
the new publications is to increase the business influence or the political 
muscle of their owners, not to contribute to the flowering of a pluralistic 
media in post-Soeharto Indonesia. 
'These journalists end up working without journalistic ethics. They 
work only to collect envelopes', she says of the common practice of 
handing out envelopes of cash to journalists to cover official events or 
business news. So coloured by money has local reporting become, that a 
group of 14 journalists was attacked by 300 farm workers on a plantation 
near Padang in March 1999. The journalists had been 'invited' by a local 
business figure to witness a land appropriation case, one of the most 
sensitive issues in Indonesia because much land is occupied by illegal 
settlers. So biased was the coverage, the workers believed, that they were 
provoked to smash the windscreens of the journalists' cars and seriously 
injure two reporters. Three months later, Padang journalists went on 
'strike', clearly having learnt nothing from the plantation confrontation. 
Their complaint was that West Sumarta Governor D. Dunidja had failed 
to provide adequate transportation for them during their latest field trip 
with him. 
'The odds are that Indonesia will remain in a chaotic situation for some 
time', said editor Goenawan Mohamad, of the re-opened Tempo magazine, 
'Violence will be a constant threat and we will be the sick man of Asia. 
That frightens and saddens me. The best thing the press can contribute is 
to develop a culture of transparency and accountability in the 
government.' Goenawan, whose magazine was published again in October 
1998, said, 'I hope Tempo will become a vehicle to help defend and expand 
our freedoms'. 
The fall of Soeharto is not the end of the struggle. It fact, it is the beginning 
of a more complicated and time-consuming struggle to institutionalise 
democracy and freedom of expression. positive signs include the 
establishment of media watch groups like Diamanda's in ten cities-the 
Institute for the Studies of Information and Mass Media in Ujungpandang 
in southern Sulawesi, the Institute for the Studies of the Press and 
Information in Semarang, about 320 kilometers east of Jakarta. Other 
previously established players have also strengthened their networks. 
Independent journalist unions, like the AJI, have established seven full 
branches and three smaller bureau in ten Indonesian cities. Student 
are also learning to improve the quality of their reporting and 
analysis. But, there is much homework to be done and young journalists 
need to learn from the failure of their elders during the Soekarno and 
Soeharto eras-a task which runs counter to the culturally ingrained 
respect for one's elders. 
Two of the most active organisations in advocating changes to media 
laws are the Jakarta-based Indonesian Press and Broadcasting Society 
(MPPI) and the Indonesian Newspaper Publishers Association (SPS). 
Interestingly, both PWI and AJI, who used to be at loggerheads, are now 
trying to work together under the MPPI umbrella. The four most urgent 
tasks are 
'" to change the Dutch and the Japanese-inherited laws on the media 
which include the hate-sowing articles, the publishing licence 
procedure, dozens of ministerial decrees on print, radio and film as 
well as the 1945 constitution on freedom of expression. The constitution 
should be amended to totally guarantee press freedom in Indonesia 
'" to strengthen media organisations as well as journalists' unions so they 
have the ability to defend newly established press freedoms. This 
strategy means that more media training is needed, especially for new 
journalists 
'" to set up independent media watch groups as well as newspapers 
ombudsmen. This proposal is based on the reality that information is 
power, and power can be corrupted. The media should be monitored 
and reprimanded if its uses its power corruptly. During the Soekarno 
and the Soeharto eras, their administrations took the role of controlling 
the media. Now who controls the media? 
" to decentralise media concentration from the main island of Java to 
the other outer islands and small towns, thus providing more genuinely 
community-based services. By April1998 the Ministry of Information 
reported 415 or 48.7 per cent of 852 publishing licenses issued by the 
government were for Jakarta-based publications. 
Easier said than done. A transitional period always poses a very 
difficult question about how to draw the line between the past supporters 
of the status quo and the campaigners for democracy. In the post-Soeharto 
era many editors and journalists who complied with censorship are 
reinventing themselves as champions of media freedom. What role should 
they play? At the same time many of those who took the real personal 
risks of challenging Soeharto consider themselves heroes of the reformasi 
(reform) era and demand to be treated as such. But, courage, must be 
coupled with sound managerial skills and experience to produce new, 
quality media organisations. The situation is not black and white, but this 
political divide does complicate the picture. 
In May 1999 two Indonesian journalist groups along with three other 
groups from Thailand and the Philippines helped set up a regional 
organisation to monitor abuses against the press in Southeast Asia and 
strengthen press freedom in the region, '[i]t is time for Asian journalists 
to work together to build press freedom', said Kavi Chongkittavorn, the 
chairman of the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA). Kavi, executive 
editor of Thailand's daily Nation newspaper, said it was up to Asian 
journalists to defend themselves 'from attacks and threats', saying SEAPA 
aimed to develop an information network to research press laws, access 
to information, ethics as well as intimidation ot and physical attacks on, 
journalists. 
But, the reality on the ground is that transitions can be both chaotic 
and dangerous. As the new rules are written, the losers smart and plot. 
An Indonesian journalist was found hacked to death in August 1999 in 
the troubled province of Aceh, where horrendous human rights abuses 
by the military have been exposed both under Soeharto and during 
Habibie's rule. And so died Sander Thoenes in a senseless, tragic murder 
commited after Indonesia had already lost the war in East Timor. 
Media websites 
X-pos weekly print magazine (underground), apchr.murdoch.edu.aul 
minihub I xp I 
SiaR mailing list (online edn only and includes special sections on East 
Timr, Aceh, Irian Jaya and Indonesian military), 
apchr.murdoch.edu.aul minihub I siarlistl maillist.html/ 
Indonesia-L mailing list (popularly known as 'apakabar' mailing list), 
www.indopubs.coml 
Joyo mailing list (no official website, contains English-language 
international media reports), joyo@aol.coml 
Kompas daily newspaper, www.kompas.coml 
Tempo magazine, www.tempo.co.idl 
Republika daily, www.republika.co.idl 
Media Indonesia daily newspaper, www.mediaindo.co.idl 
The Jakarta Post, English www.thejakartapost.coml 
The warmth of the herd 
Walter Hamilton 
black limousine approached along a 
narrow street of clipped hedges and 
freshly-swept garden paths and 
stopped outside the home of Yoshi-
yuki Kono, a middle-aged salary man plucked from anonymity in one of 
Japan's most spectacular, and ill-founded, trials by media. 
For the three executives of the prestigious Asahi newspaper, this call 
was a humiliating duty they wanted to get over and done with as quickly 
as possible. Sensing their discomfort and alert to the least hint of insincerity, 
the shattered Kono brusquely pointed them towards the living room. 
Silently, the three dark-suited executives assembled in a row on the tatami 
mat floor and bowed low in apology towards the man whom the Asahi, 
and most of Japan's news media, had branded as a crackpot killer just a 
few months earlier. 
The investigation of the sarin nerve gas release in the city of Matsumoto 
in 1994, when seven people were killed and Kono's own wife was left 
paralysed, marked a low point for both the Japanese police and the media. 
Based on weak circumstantial evidence, the police focused on an unlikely 
suspect-an ordinary salary man with a fancy for old Volkswagens and 
no criminal record. Reporters, feeding off police innuendo, turned the 
innocent Kono into a pariah, despite the fact he was never charged. 
Meanwhile, both the law and press missed the real culprits-the Aum 
Shinrikyo religious cult which, a year later, would unleash a deadly sarin 
attack on the Tokyo subway. 
The Matsumoto episode highlights some important characteristics of 
the Japanese news media and the society they serve. While the law places 
few restraints on the right to gather and publish information, the exercise 
of a genuinely independent journalism is sometimes thwarted by other 
factors, such as the intense pressure to match competitors; the habit of 
Japanese reporters to work in groups; strong links between journalists 
and their official news sources; and a highly developed public taste for 
scandal. These factors don't always make the country's news media 
ineffective or irresponsible, but when contemplating the advantages in 
size, diversity and sophistication of the Japanese newspaper and 
broadcasting industries, it is well to remember Yoshiyuki Kono. 
A huge market 
Japan has one of the biggest newspaper markets in the world, with a daily 
circulation of 72.4 million copies. That is 576 newspapers per one thousand 
population-the second highest diffusion rate after Norway, and 2.5 times 
the rate in the United States. In the years 1950-85, newspaper production 
in Japan outstripped population growth three to one. There are now 107 
general-readership newspapers made up of five national dailies, three 
regional papers and 99 local papers. Between two and five newspapers 
are competing in every market. 
The Japanese passion for newspapers can be put down to near universal 
literacy, high urbanisation and the cultural imperative of a people who 
feel they need to keep themselves informed in order to belong. Surveys 
which find that 90 per cent of Japanese regard themselves as middle class 
reflect the wide penetration of a shared standard of information via the 
mass media (Feldman 1993). 
An abundance of newspapers, though, does not necessarily signify a 
market abundant with choice. In content and presentation Japan's major 
dailies are remarkably alike. This is due, in part, to the fact that 99 per 
cent of general-readership papers are sold by subscription and delivered 
to the home or office (Haruhara 1997; Amenomori 1997). There is little 
scope for selling additional copies of a one-off 'scoop' on the streets. 
Editors, it seems, live more in fear of missing a story which the other 
papers have, than in hope of publishing something which the others have 
ignored (Fujiwara 1997). This culture keeps the 'herd' together, closely 
watching each other's moves and trying to match them. 
Television too, is a dominant fixture in the lives of the Japanese. 
Virtually every household owns a television-they are often found in 
offices and restaurants and even in taxis. Almost one in three homes is 
connected to a dish to receive satellite TV. Cable television, though 
comparatively slow to develop, now reaches millions more. Foreign news 
broadcasts, including BBC World and CNN, are widely available in the 
Japanese language, and NHK also carries original news bulletins from 
the United States, China, France, South Korea, and several other countries. 
But, while the Japanese public tell pollsters they regard newspapers 
as 'trustworthy' and 'reliable', they perceive television as 'a medium for 
quick information' (Shimbun Kenkyu 1989). Stations invest heavily in 'live' 
coverage of breaking news, with regular doses of crime, accidents, 
earthquakes and typhoons. Even high-quality documentaries seek to 
inform their viewers rather than challenge them. This may be explained 
by the fact that the main source of ideas and planning for documentaries 
on commercial television is Dentsu Corporation-the world's biggest 
advertising agency (Westney 1996). 
Behind the safety of the 'herd' and the predominance of 'facts', over 
critical analysis, lies a unique system of press clubs. Every government 
ministry, city hall, court, police headquarters and major economic 
organisation has a press club on its premises. Press dub journalists eat 
and drink together and practice what is often described as 'pack 
journalism'. The physical confinement of the 'pack' means its members 
will notice immediately when one journalist is missing, and will all rush 
off to try to match the 'scoop'. The journalists' fear of censure hands a 
powerful control to the organisations that host the clubs. Those members 
who break ranks can find themselves cut out of essential information 
briefings and unable to do their jobs. 
There are two major news agencies, Kyodo News and Jiji Press, which 
conduct both domestic and international newsgathering. Four of the 
national dailies, the Asahi, Yomiuri, Mainichi and Nihon Keizai, have English-
language editions. The Japan Times, which publishes only in English, was 
founded in 1897. The only party-political daily of any note is the Akahata 
(the Communist Party paper). Foreign newspapers such as the Asian Wall 
Street Journal and the International Herald Tribune have comparatively small 
circulations, though magazines such as TIME and Newsweek, which are 
among more than thirty foreign publications with Japanese-language 
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gwes 
Modern newspapers date from the 1870s when Japan was starting to open 
to the west. The Meiji oligarches initially encouraged the press because of 
its ability to spread new learning, but then turned against press freedom 
as newspapers began clamouring for representative government. Many 
papers were begun in support of new political parties, although they found 
that this inevitably limited their readership. The Yomiuri, established in 
Tokyo as the first paper for the common people, was also hamstrung by 
its own partisan politics. When the Yomiuri's newly built offices were 
destroyed in the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, the Asahi and the 
Mainichi-two newspapers founded in the merchant-city of Osaka along 
commercial lines-stole a march on the field (Lee 1985). 
'Impartiality' in the treatment of news, as a declared policy, went hand-
in-hand with commercial and a new era of mass newspapers 
was born. 
When Japan went to war against Russia, and then expanded its empire 
in China, the national press cheered the military on. Circulations boomed 
as papers competed furiously to' scoop' the latest troop movements (Young 
1998). (For future generations of journalists the term 'scoop' 
became synonymous with 'being first', rather than necessarily 'being 
original'.) However, support for expansion abroad coexisted, in the press, 
with advocacy of universal suffrage and democratic reforms at home. 
These two postures reflected the popular mood 1985). 
The authorities reacted sharply against the anti-government temper 
of the press in domestic affairs. Three hundred journalists were jailed after 
the first Newspaper Ordinance came into force in 1875 (Lee 1985). But, 
for the next half century, press control was exercised mainly through 
bureaucratic surveillance and warnings, rather than prosecutions and 
closures. After 1937, many newspapers were forced to amalgamate and, 
as the New Order state embraced total war, writers were blacklisted and 
'communist' journalists were jailed and even tortured and killed. 
Totalitarian Japan did not have a 'party newspaper', nor did it completely 
eliminate criticism, but it found highly effective means of harnessing an 
existing commercial press to state policy (Shillony 1981). 
At the end of the war, Japan's commercial press remained intact. 
Indeed, some of its wartime features persist even today. For example, the 
present Sankei and Nihon Keizai newspapers are the result of the fusion of 
all trade newspapers, by decree in 1941, into one daily each for Osaka 
and Tokyo (Kasza 1988). The New Order curbs on newspaper ownership 
and profits, which have left the country's biggest newspapers still 
controlled by their own staffs, was a more significant legacy. 
The extraordinary career of Matsutaro Shoriki (1885-1969) 
illustrates the strange continuities of Japan's turbulent century. Shoriki 
came to prominence as chief of police intelligence, responsible for 
crushing the Rice Riots of 1918 and arresting Japan's first communist 
leaders. He quit the police in disgrace in 1923 after an assassination 
attempt on the prince regent Hirohito. But a year later, using right-wing 
political connections, he took over the ailing Yomiuri Shimbun. With a 
mix of innovation and populism he turned the business around and, 
with the success of the Yomiuri Giants baseball team, formed in 1934, the 
paper was set on a path to becoming the world's biggest-selling daily. 
But the Yomiuri was also an ardent supporter of Japan's war aims and 
Shoriki took a leading role in the 'state party' Imperial Rule Assistance 
Association. Purged by the Occupation powers in 1945, he was forced 
to sell out of his paper and was imprisoned as a Class 'A' war criminal. 
Yet, by the end of the Occupation, this staunch anti-communist former 
police chief was again back running the Yomiuri. In 1952 he founded 
Japan's first commercial television station (NTV), ran for parliament and 
returned to the front-rank of public influence serving in two post-War 
ministries. 
But, after 1945, the environment in which the Japanese press operated 
changed dramatically. Restrictive laws were repealed and a new 
constitution for the first time guaranteed 'freedom of speech, press and 
all other forms of expression' (Kodansha 1993). In recognition of their 
special role in society, newspapers were granted certain privileges, 
including concessional mail rates and exemption from local 'enterprise 
tax', a privilege, shared with broadcasting and publishing companies, that 
was abolished in 1998. Newspaper companies, even though incorporated 
under the Commercial Code, are allowed to withhold their shares from 
the open market. And an exemption from the Anti-Monopoly Law gives 
newspapers control over their retail price to prevent discount competition 
and keep a paper's price the same wherever it is sold. 
No government body oversees the newspaper industry in Japan. No 
operating licence is required. Self-regulation is exercised through the Japan 
Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association (Nihon Shinbun Kyokai). 
The Association's member-companies must observe a Canon of Journalism 
whose principles are 'accuracy', 'reporting free of opinion', 'vigilance 
against propaganda', 'restraint in criticism of individuals' and 'editorial 
truthfulness'. The Canon, adopted in 1946, is actually a reassertion of the 
old commercially-proven dictum of 'impartiality'. The higher valuation 
it places on 'fact', over 'opinion', casts the mainstream press more in the 
role of 'teacher' or 'watchdog', than of 'advocate'. 
None of the major newspapers has a declared party allegiance or 
ideology. At election time, they endorse no side. Profiles of their 
readerships reveal a great similarity in terms of age group, gender and 
socioeconomic background (Lee 1985). Each strives to be a mass 
newspaper, appealing to all interests. That is not to say the political 
'colouring' of the press is all of one hue. The Asahi and the Mainichi sit left 
of centre, a position consistently expressed through their opposition to 
reform of Japan's war-renouncing constitution. The Yomiuri tends to 
occupy the middle ground, although, since the 1970s, it has grown closer 
to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The world's biggest-selling financial 
paper, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (or Nikkei, as it's familiarly known) keeps 
in step with its mainly conservative readership, while the Sankei Shimbun 
sits well to the right on the political spectrum. In recent years, there has 
been a greater polarisation between Asahi/ Mainichi and Yomiuri/ Sankei 
as papers have felt a need to distinguish themselves from their competitors 
in a tough business environment. 
A tension between conformity and competition characterises the 
Japanese press. It is best observed in the press club, or kisha kurabu, system. 
Essentially a kisha club is a room attached to a government ministry or 
commercial organisation where reporters from the big media outlets spend 
their day attending briefings, processing news releases and cultivating 
official contacts. The 'pack' not only works but also socialises together. 
There are estimated to be 400-500 press clubs and the information 
generated within this closed system significantly influences the content 
of the news available to the public. Of Japan's 25,000 newspaper journalists 
half are assigned to press clubs (Hall1998). Broadcast journalists, too, are 
represented. 
Kisha clubs emerged early in the 20th century as a form of craft guild 
which journalists used to gain right of access to cover the Diet (Parliament), 
as well as to protect their own jobs. But, soon governments found them a 
convenient way to regulate the flow of public information, effectively 
corralling journalists in a pleasant professional environment which 
discourages independent research (Yamamoto 1989). The mere fact that 
'pack' journalists spend the entire day looking over their shoulders at 
their competitors ensures that any one reporter trying to work alone will 
be both noticed and pursued. Defenders of the system say it produces 
news reporting that is better informed and more accurate and, that by 
ensuring equal treatment for all club members, prevents official Japan 
from playing favourites (Aida 1999). Critics say the kisha clubs turn 
newspapers into government gazettes (Shimoyama 1999). 
One of the most familiar television images of 'government-in-
operation' in Japan is of the Prime Minister standing on the steps of his 
Official Residence surrounded by journalists, three and four deep, 
furiously transcribing his every word. The Nagata kurabu, named for the 
Nagata-cho district of Tokyo where the Official Residence is located, has 
some 370 members representing 70 news media outlets. A core group of 
ban kisha, or beat reporters, are permanently assigned to the Prime Minister, 
noting all his meetings and following him wherever he goes. As a result, 
political reporting is smothered in 'diary' details but often lacks clear 
explanations of events. Context and background disappear behind the 
'foreground' of daily comings and goings. Knowing their every word will 
be reported, politicians are expert at exploiting the native imprecision of 
the Japanese language to conceal their real views (Feldman 1996). 
Keenly aware of the wide gap between the tatemae (pr:inciple) of the 
public news conference and the honne (reality) of the private thought, 
beat reporters accept that most of their best stories will come from 
unattributable consultations (kondan) with politicians and bureaucrats. 
These prearranged get-togethers are augmented by other, less formal 
contacts. Beat reporters engage in so-called yo uchi ('night attacks') and 
asa gake ('morning calls') on a politician's home, expecting to be invited in 
for a chat, often over snacks and drinks served by his wife; the reporters 
afterwards checking their interpretations with each other before phoning 
the office. Sources are protected behind vague phrases like 'persons 
concerned say' or 'conditions are tending more towards'. In keeping with 
this journalism of inspired hints and shared information, bylines have 
traditionally been rare. 
Some estimate that 80 per cent of the information picked up through 
kisha clubs is off-the-record and not meant for publication (Feldman 1993). 
The system keeps members in line and a direct breach of confidentiality 
is easily traced. When Kakuei Tanaka became Prime Minister, he 
reportedly told a dinner group of reporters: 'If you don't cross a dangerous 
bridge, I will be safe. So will you. If I think a particular reporter is 
dangerous I can easily have him removed' (Kim 1981). In turn, Japanese 
politicians rely to a considerable extent on what they learn from friendly 
reporters. For bureaucrats, too, constantly engaged in turf-wars, the 
newspapers are often the best place to find out what's going on within a 
rival department. The climate of public opinion is especially important in 
a country where few people belong to a political party (Lee 1985). Most 
'leaks' to the press, therefore, are purposeful: one ministry trying to 
outman oeuvre another; politicians pressuring bureaucrats and vice versa; 
everyone testing the breeze. 
The closer the intimacy between a reporter and his source the greater 
the dependency, of course. The story is told of one reporter covering the 
Secretary-General of the LDP who spent so long in his company he started 
to walk like him (Feldman 1993). Though journalists in Japan do exert a 
professional autonomy and, like journalists in other societies, exercise a 
degree of scepticism in their dealings with authority, perhaps the greatest 
weakness of the kisha club system is that it does not encourage reporters 
to seek alternative sources of information. 
But the system is not as 'watertight' as it is sometimes made out to be. 
The threat that Prime Minister Tanaka made to his beat reporters did, for 
instance, become public. Indeed, a good deal of the '80 per cent' of 
information which kisha club reporters cannot publish themselves sees 
the light of day in other ways. Reporters sometimes pass on sensitive 
information to the Opposition parties who can take up the fight in the 
Diet. Often kisha club members are the source for articles in Japan's many 
weekly and monthly current affairs magazines. The magazines (though 
several are affiliated with big newspapers) cannot join kisha clubs because 
they do not belong to the Nihon Shinbun Kyokai. By staying outside the 
Association, the magazines are free to indulge in a more speculative 
journalism: in some cases highly respectable, in others thoroughly 
scandalous. They often break the stories the newspapers dare not print. 
In 1974, the Bungei Shunju, a leading monthly, published an expose on 
the 'money politics' of Kakuei Tanaka. The 'insiders' of the Nagata kurabu 
at first ignored the 'outsider' magazine. It wasn't until Tanaka was 
challenged over the Bungei Shunju articles, during an appearance at the 
Foreign Correspondents' Club, that the mainstream Japanese media were 
galvanised into action. Within two months Tanaka had resigned. Several 
Prime Ministers since have been forced from office as a result of scandals 
or loss of public trust following media disclosures. The newspapers have 
not always led the way but their influence in building a public consensus, 
once information filters out, can be decisive. 
The Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ), formed in Tokyo 
soon after the war, though less exclusive than the kisha clubs, is as much a 
professional association as a social gathering place. The Foreign Press in 
Japan is the FCCJ's own lobby group. There are more than 700 accredited 
foreign correspondents who are issued a special identity card to assist 
with their newsgathering. It is possible to work without official status but 
for visa purposes alone accreditation is usually necessary. Accredited and 
visiting foreign journalists can make use of a well resourced Foreign Press 
Centre that is funded privately but has close government links. 
The scandal-ridden 1970s and 1980s eventually led to the collapse of 
the old conservative ascendancy of the Liberal Democratic Party, and in 
1993 a coalition government led by Morihiro Hosokawa took office. After 
decades of drift, Hosokawa initially brought a new sense of urgency to 
decision-making. His hallmark was the 'midnight' news conference, 
carried 'live' on television, which fed rising expectations of a more 
transparent and accountable style of politics. 
The newspaper-dominated kisha clubs were disoriented by these 
changes. Clubs attached to each of the LDP's many factions lost importance 
when the factions themselves withered. Ban reporters had rarely bothered 
to make 'night attacks' on the homes of Opposition politicians; indeed, 
quite a few journalists regarded the press as Japan's real Opposition and 
held the minority parties in disdain. Now they were in government, this 
neglect produced a huge information gap. The sole kisha club for the entire 
Opposition had, by tradition, been located at the Socialist Party 
headquarters. Suddenly, space was in such demand there was 
pandemonium. When one of the new power-brokers, the former-LDP's 
Ichiro Ozawa, argued with his press corps he seized the chance to make 
some further renovations-and banned behind-the-scenes contacts with 
journalists, their precious kondan. 
Television influence switches on 
The power shift at Nagata-cho had parallels in the media, where broadcast 
journalists for the first time began to exert as much, if not more influence 
than their newspaper colleagues. The final acts that broke the LDP's 38-
year hold on power demonstrated the new influence of television news 
anchors. On TV Asahi, 20 million viewers tuned in nightly to watch Hiroshi 
Kume lampoon LDP corruption (Altman 1996). The criminal links of party 
boss Shin Kanemaru were forensically laid bare. Kume looked the viewer 
in the eye and asked: 'Hard to believe they run the country this way, isn't 
it?' (Sherman 1995). Then came a fateful interview which Prime Minister 
Kiichi Miyazawa gave on rival network, TBS. Agreeing to forgo the 
customary requirement only to accept questions on notice, Miyazawa was 
led into giving an unqualified commitment to electoral law reform. The 
interview pledge was held against him when he failed to deliver, forcing 
him to resign. 
By 1993, a survey found more people were influenced by political 
reporting on television, than in the press (Altman 1996). The newspapers' 
old formula of anonymous news stories set alongside rather pedagogic 
n agent for change 
Japanese have a strong sense of resignation. 'Shikata ga nai' 
('It can't be avoided') is a common expression. Some regard this mind-
set as 'masochistic' and link it to political passivity (Minami, 1998). 'The 
Japanese public', says one writer, 'maintain what is probably the world's 
highest threshold of indignation' (Gibney, 1996). If so, the rise of the 
influential newscaster Hiroshi Kume (1944- ) represents a boiling over 
of that indignation in the form of a new media assertiveness. Kume is 
not a trained journalist. His first 20 years in broadcasting were spent 
hosting singing and cooking shows. A freelancer, with his own 
production company, he was an unlikely choice to front the current affairs 
program, News Station, which TV Asahi launched in 1985. Kume injected 
humour, movement, stage props and, most tellingly, his personal 
opinions into the daily news. 'Reporting things impartially', he declared, 
'is just impossible' (Sherman 1995). News Station, fashionably long and 
late (in the 22:00-23:20 timeslot) became the nation's most-watched news 
show. Taking on corrupt politicians, Kume's rapid-fire, straight-talking 
style broke the mould of media 'impartiality'. Fourteen years on, his 
stocks aren't as high as they were. News Station still rates a respectable 
15 (the best of any commercial TV news), but Kume's energy seems 
diminished. Recently, a false pollution scare, leading to an on-air apology, 
dented his image. Japan's political story has also lost its sting. On 
reflection, it may be that, even at the peak of his success, Kume was 
more a product of the times than a free agent of change. 
opinion pieces by professional 'commentators' paled in comparison with 
the networks' heady mix of serious and light-hearted, factual and 
opinionated treatment of national affairs. Political 'amateurs'-often 
talent a from the entertainment world-joined panel discussions of current 
events, bringing issues closer to the people (Kodansha 1993). Former 
newspaper journalists, their images transformed by television exposure, 
became opinion-leaders. Politicians were flushed out of their 'smoke-filled 
rooms' and put before the cameras in 'live' debates. What some have 
described as the 'trickster' role of the media in Japan-having allegiance 
to none, but playing the jester or fool to the Establishment-found its 
sharpest expression through television (Pharr 1996). 
Broadcast news as an investigative and opinion-forming influence has 
come a long way, though this should not be overstated. Until 1947, 
broadcasting was a government monopoly. During the war, radio was 
harnessed for propaganda purposes much more directly than newspapers 
(Kasza 1988). Japanese first heard of the attack on Pearl Harbor through 
radio, and were told of Japan's surrender the same way. The Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) continues to hold a special status as a 
voice of authority. The non-profit public broadcaster raises a budget of 
635 billion yen (A$ 8.5 billion), 98 per cent of it through license fees. (It 
does not carry advertising.) It has 13,000 full-time employees maintaining 
three radio networks; two terrestrial and two satellite (DBS) domestic 
television networks; Radio Japan's international service; and satellite 
television broadcasts beamed to audiences in Europe, North America and 
Asia (NHK 1999). 
The Prime Minister with the approval of the Diet appoints NHK's Board 
of Governors. On a day-to-day basis it aspires to be free of political 
influence. NHK broadcasts Diet sessions and all formal news conferences 
by the Prime Minister. At election it carries the publicly funded 
personal 'introductions' of every candidate. News and current affairs 
occupy the biggest share of content on both its terrestrial TV (40 per cent) 
and AM radio (48 per cent) networks (Omori 1997), and NHK currently 
leads the television news ratings (Video Research 1999). The Corporation's 
approach to news is cautious, factual and unfailingly serious: devoting 
much attention to government decisions, proposals and ceremonies 
1996). Some journalists who have worked for NHK have 
expressed discomfort with its 'sins of omission' and tendency to its 
on controversial (Sherman 1994). As one astute observer 
has written: 'For the average citizen who watches NHK, the state appears 
not only the most frequent and important definer of events in Japan but 
also as conflict manager in almost all aspects of social and economic life' 
(Feldman 1997). 
There are five commercial broadcasting networks, all affiliated with 
major newspapers. Nippon Television (NTV) and Fuji Television, the 
ratings leaders, each has sales of around 300 billion yen (A$4 billion). The 
'big five' generate 80 per cent of the programming seen on the 125 member-
stations of the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters (not 
including the Association's six satellite station members) (Omori 1997). 
Unlike the newspaper industry, broadcasters are subject to direct 
Newspaper and TV station links 
Newspaper TV station No. of affiliate stations 
A sa hi TV Asahi 23 
Yomiuri NTV 24 
Sankei Fuji Television 27 
Mainichi TBS 27 
Nikkei TV Tokyo 5 
Source: Facts and Figures, 1999. 
government supervision by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications; 
a broadcasting licence is required. (A commission set-up during the 
Occupation as a buffer between the industry and government was 
abolished soon after the Americans left.) The Broadcast Law allows stations 
freedom from specific interference as long as they keep within the law 
(Luther and Boyd 1997). It does not prescribe content in detail, but says 
programming must conform to 'good morals and manners', 'not disturb 
public security', be 'truthful' and maintain 'political impartiality' 
(Kodansha 1993). 
The stations' historical dependence on a supply of news from their 
associated newspapers retarded the development of a strong, separate 
identity for broadcast journalism in Japan. It's no coincidence that after 
TBS pared back its financial links with Mainichi Shimbun in the 1970s the 
network's own news division grew in stature. Apart from NHK, though, 
Japan's broadcasting companies employ far fewer journalists than the big 
US networks. 
Ownership issues 
The pattern of ownership and influence within the Japanese media is 
complex and, in some respects, highly unusual. Related business interests, 
like Dentsu, are conspicuous on the share registries, as would be expected. 
The banks, trading houses, electronics firms, and industrial giants like 
Nippon Steel are there too. But across both newspapers and broadcasting 
no single player has anything approaching ownership dominance in any 
single market. Even the Fujisankei Communications Group, Japan's most 
powerful commercial media conglomerate, with 100 companies and 12,000 
employees, is a minnow compared with News Corporation. 
For broadcasters, a ministry ordinance limits the number of stations a 
person can own or control. Licensing criteria in principle prohibit control 
of three media enterprises, that is, newspaper, radio and television. If a 
newspaper also owns radio and television interests in the same market, 
'control' has been interpreted to limit involvement to 10 per cent of voting 
shares and 20 per cent of directors in common (Omori 1997). This does 
not prevent affiliated companies taking up shares, nor prevent larger cross-
shareholdings in the case of just two media enterprises; for example, a 
newspaper and a television station. In the latter case, the shareholding 
must remain below 50 per cent. 
Neither newspapers nor broadcasters are restricted from pursuing 
other avenues of investment, and earnings from real estate, fun parks, 
museums, books and movies, among other things, provide a significant 
portion of revenues. Competitors also join forces, from time to time, as 
they did when Japan's first commercial satellite broadcasting company 
(WOWOW) was formed (Nakada 1999). In recent years, regulations to 
restrict concentration of ownership have been relaxed in the broadcasting 
industry to allow for the development of new types of media (Otsuka 
1996). In the interlinked world of Japanese business, entities divide and 
merge somewhat mysteriously. 
Look into the ownership record of the Asahi Shimbun and the names 
Murayama and Ueno appear right back to the paper's creation last century. 
But, unlike media dynasties in other countries, the Asahi's founding 
families have long since become owners without editorial influence. The 
remainder of the paper's shares are held by staff until they leave the 
company, when they must be 'sold' into a trust. The same is true at the 
Yomiuri. The Nikkei is also 'staff-owned'; the Mainichi's staff-ownership 
was greatly reduced after it had to be bailed out by the banks; and the 
Sankei is mainly owned by Fujisankei group companies. 
Newspapers are protected from hostile takeovers by these tight 
holdings. The downside is that they cannot raise capital on the stock 
market and are heavily dependent on bank finance. Massive investments 
in labour-saving technology over the past two decades have made this 
indebtedness even greater. Some regard it as unhealthy, and believe it's 
influenced reporting on corporate Japan (Wolferen 1989). While 
newspapers may pick up on episodes of pollution, bid-rigging or unsafe 
products, the argument goes, there's been little questioning of the economic 
system itself. 
Legal freedoms, cultural controls 
Like ownership, the issues of press freedom and journalistic independence 
cannot be separated from the forces of history and culture. Within weeks 
of Japan's surrender in August 1945, newspaper staff were clamouring 
for democratic reform. First at the Yomiuri, then at other papers, they 
demanded that management quit to take responsibility for backing the 
militarists. For a time, the workers had control of the presses, until General 
MacArthur took fright, sent in police to break up union sit-ins, and ensured 
that the newspaper owners' prerogative over 'editorial rights' was 
reasserted (Lee 1985). 
Most staff today are organised in company unions. The print media's 
umbrella labour organisation is the Federation of Newspaper Workers' 
Unions, which has lost influence as automation has thinned the ranks of 
printers. The Japan Congress of Journalists (an association of some 1,500 
'progressive' journalists) is a member of the International Organisation 
of Journalists. Labour, on occasions, will still confront management over 
editorial issues. At the Mainichi, for instance, staff rebelled over the paper's 
support for the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1969, and again in 1975 when 
an article critical of the Emperor was suppressed (Lee 1985). On neither 
occasion did the paper change its policy. 
The journalism profession retains considerable respect in Japan-
despite recent controversies. Competition for a job with a major newspaper 
or broadcaster is severe and a university degree is essential. But traditions 
die hard. Among new recruits, degrees in Law or the Humanities greatly 
outnumber those in Communications or Media; 90 per cent of journalists 
are men (Haruhara and Amenomori 1997); and newspapers demand 
allegiance to company before profession, and will not hesitate to reassign 
a reporter who does not make the grade to a job in advertising or sales. 
Like other Japanese industrial enterprises, media firms are hierarchical 
and insiders speak of a factory-like 'production line' of news that can 
stifle originality and dissent (Emmott 1989). On the other hand, freedom 
from the influence of proprietors and a 'bottom up' news gathering method 
(entrusting young reporters to identify and shape their own stories) are 
both consistent with an active free press (Kim 1981). 
Outside controls on the media are comparatively light. One study has 
rated Japan among the twelve countries with the lowest tendency to 
control the press (Feldman 1993). An action for libel against a published 
report will not succeed if what it says is true. On a matter of public interest, 
if a journalist makes a mistake in good faith, Japanese courts are unlikely 
to convict for libel. Privilege attaches to reporting of official 
announcements, Diet proceedings and court evidence. Public figures (with 
the exception of the Imperial Family) have learnt to expect only a limited 
right to privacy. 
However, the constitutional 'freedom of reporting' is not the same as 
'freedom of news gathering'. Restrictions apply, for example, to the 
recording or filming of court proceedings. There is no explicit protection 
for news sources (Kim 1981). Courts have been found to have the power 
to demand television footage and other material as evidence. State' secrets' 
are protected by a law that targets the public servant who provides 
restricted information, rather than the reporter who obtains it. In a famous 
case, a court imposed a suspended jail sentence on a female secretary in 
the Foreign Ministry for 'leaking' information, while acquitting the 
journalist who'd seduced her to obtain it. (The Supreme Court later 
punished the journalist for using 'inducements'.) 
One area where, by law and convention, unusual restrictions do apply 
is in the coverage of elections. The pursuit of 'impartiality, is taken to 
mean that a news story identifying a particular candidate should give 
equal exposure to all his or her opponents. Especially on television, it 
makes in-depth coverage so unwieldy that often no candidate is identified, 
but is instead represented by a shot taken from behind or by a white-
gloved hand clutching a microphone. Candidates cannot buy time on TV 
or space in newspapers, although since the law was changed, political 
parties can. The Election Law prohibits the publication of 'popularity 
polls'. Media companies have long been allowed to argue that surveys of 
voting intentions are not 'popularity polls', a tolerance that is currently 
being challenged. In the final analysis, the national newspapers are 
considered to have little impact on results in specific electorates because 
of the overwhelming influence of parochial issues and local supporter 
groups in Japanese politics (Lee 1985). 
Informal pressures and cultural habits can distort reporting and hinder 
public access to information. Japan's complex relationship with China 
has led news organisations into special pleading and self-censorship. In 
the 1960s, the major newspapers did a secret deal with the Chinese 
government to abjure from 'hostile' reporting as the price for keeping 
correspondents in Beijing (Thayer 1975). While it hasn't always worked 
(the Sankei was only recently allowed to reopen its bureau after 31 years), 
frequently Japanese reporting of China turns a blind eye to human rights 
abuses. Other subjects handled 'delicately' in the media include the 
burakumin (descendants of feudal Japan's lowest caste, still the subject of 
discrimination), the yakuza criminal gangs and religious groups (notably 
the powerful Soka Gakkai lay-Buddhist sect). On occasions, the Imperial 
Household Agency has gained a news 'blackout' on sensitive topics. For 
more than a year, the mainstream media ignored the public interest in the 
Crown Prince's search for a bride, until the Washington Post revealed his 
choice in 1993. The couple's failure to produce an heir is a continuing 
object of media 'restraint'. 
Lese majesty used to be a crime punishable by death. These days 
Japan's right-wing extremists will sometimes take it upon themselves to 
apply the ultimate sanction. Cruising Tokyo's government district in their 
loudspeaker vans, the rightists are a constant reminder of the dangers of 
upholding liberal democracy, not only to the nation's bureaucrats and 
politicians, but also to the many journalists who work among them. In 
1987, in the midst of a right-wing crusade against the Asahi Shimbun, two 
young staff were killed when their branch office was sprayed with shotgun 
blasts. Threats against the so-called 'leftist' press, usually over matters of 
security policy or concerning the Imperial Family, are not uncommon. 
In 1999 the Diet finally passed a Freedom of Information (FOI) bill-
17 years after the first of many local government ordinances was enacted 
as a result of pressure from citizens' groups. The bill, which goes into 
effect in 2001, stipulates that the government must be accountable, 
although it does not formally enshrine a 'right to know'. The final push 
for a national FOI law came after disclosures about the Health and Welfare 
Ministry's involvement in the deaths of haemophiliac patients through 
the secret use of HIV-contaminated blood. However, just as in the 
campaign for the FOI bill, this scandal broke not because of stories in the 
press, but because the victims and their supporters demanded (and finally 
got) bureaucratic accountability. 
Looking ahead 
A sea change is occurring in the Japanese news media. Technological 
innovation, commercial deregulation, foreign pressure for market-
opening, calls for tighter editorial controls, and community unrest over 
media abuses are bringing some fundamental assumptions into question. 
The weakened economy is itself a factor, both in business terms and for 
what it has again revealed about the professional shortcomings of the 
Japanese news media. Journalists and commentators were slow to 
recognise the severity of the recession Japan entered in the 1990s, and 
have struggled to offer any clear picture of what needs to be fixed. 
Reporters in the Bank of Japan kisha club even helped conceal the full 
extent of the banks' bad debts (though some fed tips to The Economist 
magazine which kept well ahead of most of Japan's own publications), 
and editors at the venerable Nikkei were persuaded to the official view 
that corporate collapses could be avoided by withholding information 
(Landers 1999). All of this 'restraint' and dependence on overly optimistic 
official forecasts, of course, only made the problems worse. 
The kisha club system is under sustained attack. Foreign 
correspondents, once barred from the clubs, have lately broken down the 
doors to a dozen or more key ministries and economic organs. Meanwhile, 
some local citizens' groups have been agitating to close the kisha clubs in 
their city halls, and for the return of public money spent entertaining 
reporters. There's unease, too, about the presence of journalists from elite 
media organisations (especially NHK and the Nikkei) as members of no 
less than half of all government advisory bodies (shingikai). These advisory 
bodies play a crucial role in policy formation-and critics contend that 
journalists should not allow their independence to be compromised 
(Harari 1997). 
The reputation of television news suffered a heavy blow in 1996. In 
the uproar over the Aum Shinrikyo case, it was revealed that, seven years 
earlier, the TBS network had bowed to pressure not to air an interview in 
which serious allegations were first raised against the sect. Worse still, a 
TBS producer had secretly shown Aum leaders the taped interview with 
a human rights lawyer. The lawyer, his wife and infant son disappeared 
soon after-kidnapped and murdered by the Aum, as it turned out. The 
episode sparked calls for greater outside controls over broadcasters, if 
stations themselves could not uphold ethical standards (Goto 1997). 
The Liberal Democratic Party, under fire from Kume's News Station, 
had pressured companies, including Toyota, to withdraw advertising. 
When comments by an executive of TV Asahi, that the station had set out 
to' crush' the LDP, were made public, he lost his job and was hauled before 
the Diet and forced to apologise, just days before the station's license was 
up for review (Altman 1996). It was a sharp reminder of the broadcasting 
industry's statutory obligation to be politically 'impartial' (even though, 
in the view of this executive, his station had been 'under the thumb' of 
the LDP for years). 
Back in power again, the LDP is looking at setting up an around-the-
clock monitoring system to respond to alleged 'bias' in television reporting 
(Landers 1999). Advocates of greater media control often argue their case 
-whether ingenuously or not-on the grounds of 'human rights'. The 
notorious habit of certain Japanese media to 'convict' criminal suspects, 
sometimes before they're even charged, leaves them wide open to attack. 
When a weekly magazine recently published the photograph of a minor 
who was charged with murder, some shops unilaterally withdrew the 
publication from sale because of the public outcry: an appeal to 'human 
rights' was now being used to justify censorship (Foreign Press Center 
1997). 
The newspaper industry is worried. It depends for more than half its 
income on subscriptions, underpinned by a price cartel (Sato 1999). This 
arrangement, it argues, is essential for maintaining a public-interest ethic 
unsullied by the newspaper 'bingo' -type price wars seen in other countries 
(Kono 1999). But deregulation is the order of the day. A new code has 
opened the way for a measure of discounting; and the threat of more 
radical deregulation of the newspaper industry remains a powerful 
weapon in the hands of the government. 
Newspaper profits have tumbled in recent years. Some are running at 
a loss (Ono 1999). The arrival of new entrants only adds to the pressure. 
Rupert Murdoch stunned Japanese business in 1996 when he and a local 
partner, Masayoshi Son, grabbed 21.4 per cent of TV Asahi (foreigners 
are limited to holding 20 per cent of a broadcasting company in their own 
right), after Murdoch had declared his intention to tap 'one of the world's 
last media gold mines' through a new digital satellite service, JSkyB. The 
industry closed ranks. Two years later Murdoch had exited TV Asahi, 
merged JSkyB with an existing satellite company, PerfecTV!, and sold 
down his investment (to 11.4 per cent) by inviting Fuji Television, Sony 
Corporation and several other Japanese 'heavyweights' into the deal. Sky 
PerfecTV! and its digital competitor, DirecTV (substantially owned by 
Hughes Electronics), represent the first significant foreign incursions into 
Japan's media marketplace. 
Thirty years ago, 60 per cent of Japanese men in their twenties read 
newspapers. Today the proportion is half that (NHK Institute 1999). The 
proliferation of alternative sources of information, including direct access 
through the Internet, is displacing journalists working for conventional 
mass media from the centre-stage of opinion leadership. Digital multi-
channelling, which grants flexibility as to when and in what form the 
user can consume information, dilutes the importance of newspaper 
'scoops' or fixed-schedule news bulletins. 
Some responses are already evident. The content of Japanese 
newspapers grows increasingly diverse; journalists' bylines are appearing 
oftbank 
Masayoshi Son (1958- ) is a Japanese-born ethnic Korean 
who spent his formative years in the United States. After returning to 
Japan in 1980, he founded Softbank, a company that's ridden the Internet 
and computer software booms and carried him from obscurity to 
financial stardom. Son is Rupert Murdoch's partner in the digital satellite 
provider, SKY PerfecTV!, and a prime example of the 'new money' that's 
begun to challenge Japan's media Establishment. His strategic partners 
are not the familiar city banks and manufacturing firms, but a mobile 
telephone company, the owner of McDonalds Japan and a financial 
services group. Satellite TV is forecast to grow to a third the size of the 
terrestrial market-hundreds of new channels to draw upon the public's 
reading and viewing time. Softbank more than trebled its profits to 37.5 
billion yen (A$536 million) in the year to March 1999, at a time when 
newspaper profits were in sharp retreat. 
more often; readers are given space to tell their own stories; and the many 
Internet editions of papers allow for instant feedback on topics. The tone 
once adopted by papers of a teacher addressing pupils has become more 
like a discussion among friends. At the same time, some newspapers are 
trying to sharpen their identities by taking on a greater 'advocacy' role. 
For example, the Yomiuri Shim bun has produced its own detailed proposals 
for a new Constitution-once almost a taboo subject. Companies are also 
renovating their image through technology: introducing more use of colour 
and opening printing plants overseas to reach expatriates. Once the 
challenge was to sell the newspapers that were produced, now it's to 
produce newspapers that will sell. 
In radio, new licenses have spawned many low-powered FM stations, 
which identify closely with their local audience. In television, the pursuit 
of ratings has given rise to more opinionated journalism, as well as blurring 
the line between entertainment and news. The industry is having to fight 
off those who would tum back the clock to greater outside editorial control. 
Nevertheless, history suggests that the quality of press freedom in Japan 
ultimately will not be determined by overt regulation, or diversity of 
ownership, or technological innovation. It will rest, instead, with the 
preparedness of individual journalists and editors to resist their own 
cultural habits of deferring to authority and falling in line with shared 
opinion; dangerously comforted by the warmth of the herd. 
Media websites 
Asahi Shimbun, www.asahi.coml 
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National Association of Commercial Broadcasters, www.nab.or.jp I 
Fuji Television, www.fujitv.co.jp I 
TBS, www.tbs.co.jpl 
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Foreign Press Center, www.nttls.eo.jp/fpc/ 
Japan Congress of Journalists, www.tky.3web.ne.jp I 
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In the grip of the government 
Kean Wong 
began to see the Malaysian journalist as 
one of the saddest creatures in the nation. 
Our readers dismissed us as lapdogs of 
the government; the government 
considered us instruments of policy. But the truth was that Malaysian 
journalism was replete with people of intelligence and integrity, good 
and honourable Malaysians, who were finding that their careers 
demanded enormous efforts of conscience ... Malaysia's journalists 
would be among those most personally damaged by the Mahathir 
years, and their tragedy was that it was their idealism that kept so 
many of them going as long as they did (Rashid 1993). 
The Malaysian media, like the nation itself, has evolved a great deal 
since independence in 1957. In the immediate post-war years, the media 
was predominantly comprised of privately owned newspapers, while the 
state had a monopoly on radio and television that was broken only in 1983 
when the first private television channel was established. Malaysia has 
experienced fairly rapid growth since independence, and the media 
industry's expansion has been a close reflection of this. The media's 
commercial growth has been matched by the progressive introduction of 
stricter legislation controlling its output, with most of the media owned 
by interests close to the government. These conditions have led to more 
censorship and shrinking democratic space for the media. 
The decade between 1987 and 1997 has been the most tumultuous 
period so far for the Malaysian media. In 1987, four newspapers were 
closed down in a crackdown on dissent. By 1997, an unprecedented decade 
of strong economic growth had transformed the media business, as new 
money and newer technology flooded a newly middle-class market eager 
for fresh media. Newspapers, magazines and terrestrial and satellite 
television stations were established, hiring media workers at previously 
unheard-of wages. But the brief moments of heady optimism among 
journalists and readers alike soon faded, as Southeast Asia's economic 
crisis swept through Malaysia in 1997. Compounding the media's 
economic bruising of the past two years has been the political crisis brought 
on by the sacking and arrest of former deputy Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim. As a consequence, the Malaysian media business has retreated 
and regrouped, its brief flirtation with an expansive optimism-reflected 
in new investment and a tolerance of liberal elements-was soon discarded 
as growing ownership paranoia and shrinking revenues took hold. Senior 
editorial management linked to Anwar Ibrahim resigned or were ousted, 
while biased reporting and editorial attacks against dissenters appeared 
more regularly in print and on the airwaves. Recent crises experienced 
by neighbours such as Thailand and Indonesia may have given rise to 
new independent media and a diversity of voices, but it has not been a 
feature of Malaysia's mainstream media. 
Why this has been the case is a question best answered by examining 
the mix of legislation, licensing and ownership that has helped stifle the 
media's culture. It is also important to consider how the practice of 
Malaysian journalism in recent times has been marked by expensive 
lawsuits, a culture of self-censorship and fear, and a decline of 
professionalism. Moreover, the past year has seen the marked rise in the 
mainstream media's role as a propaganda tool for the establishment; it 
has also witnessed an information battle waged by opposition forces using 
new technologies such as the Internet and video CDs. 
Growing authoritarian culture 
After 42 years of independence from British colonisation, Malaysia has 
effectively wiped out poverty for most of the population, successfully 
raising standards of work and employment, healthcare, education and 
social security. For a younger generation of Malaysians who have come 
to expect such material well-being as a fact of life, the quest for broader 
political participation and a stronger civil society has become more 
apparent. Rubbing up against these desires has been the state, dominated 
since independence by a coalition government known as Barisan Nasional 
(or the National Front). 
The BN, as the coalition is known, is dominated by its biggest party, 
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), whose leader is the 
Prime Minister, while the coalition's multi-ethnic composition includes 
the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC), along with a variety of smaller parties. The coalition has 
held power since independence, and Dr Mahathir Mohamad became the 
fourth Prime Minister in 1981. After 18 years in power, he is now the 
longest-serving Prime Minister of Malaysia. Dr Mahathir has overseen 
the growth of a burgeoning middle-class, an essential part of the urban 
areas where more than half of Malaysia's population now lives (Malaysian 
Department of Statistics 1991). 
At the same time, he has nurtured a foreign policy that proposes a 
theme of 'Asian values'. The Prime Minister has pushed for a new global 
agenda that speaks on behalf of a poor south against the rich developed 
countries of the north; within this debate, Dr Mahathir has argued against 
the universality of the concept of human rights and the fundamental 
freedoms it contains. Specifically, he has questioned the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the general understanding of article 
19, which guarantees the right to freedom of opinion and expression. He 
has argued instead the importance of framing the concept of human rights 
around economic and social rights rather than basing it on civil and 
political rights. 
As lawyer and human rights activist R. Sivarasa once noted, Malaysia 
has a constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech, 'but not freedom after 
speech' (Sivarasa 1995). The constitution allows the government to impose 
restrictions, as it deems necessary, to protect national security. Under such 
provisions, Dr Mahathir's government has passed and amended laws in 
parliament that severely curb freedom of expression. 
An authoritarian political culture has developed both pervasively and 
deeply. Not surprisingly, the media in Malaysia reflects the culture of 'soft 
authoritarianism' -where the institutions of a democratic state and the 
division of its powers may exist in principle but have been made ineffective 
or absent in practice. 'In spite of fairly regular multi-party elections and 
some other features requiring accountability of the regime', write Edmund 
Terence Gomez and K.S. Jomo in Malaysia's Political Economy (1997), 'the 
Malaysian state has been authoritarian since the colonial period, though 
analysts have characterised the political system as semi-authoritarian, 
semi-democratic, or quasi-democratic ... some features of authoritarianism 
have been pronounced since Mahathir Mohamad became Prime Minister 
in 1981'. Malaysia's rapid development has revealed a basic contradiction, 
as these political economists explain-the authoritarian style of Dr 
Mahathir's government has on the one hand enhanced economic growth 
and material well-being while on the other hand led to abuses of power 
and a shrinking of democratic space. 
The Malaysian Human Rights Report, published in 1998 by the human 
rights group Suaram, describes Malaysia as a severely restricted democracy, 
where the government maintains its control with a 'sophisticated 
combination of draconian laws, controls on civil liberties, with social and 
economic policies favouring elite and middle-class sectors' (1998). 
The media as an institution has been particularly vulnerable to such a 
culture; its independence as an institution has largely disappeared in the 
past two decades of legislative and licensing control. Mixed in with this 
has been the corporate manoeuvering of media assets and management 
further consolidating this control. 
Using the laws to stoke fear 
For most Malaysian journalists, the Printing, Presses and Publications Act 
(PPPA) of 1984 presents the frontline threat to free and critical reporting. 
The Act provides the Home Minister-until recently, a portfolio held by 
Dr Mahathir-the right to suspend or revoke publishing and printing 
permits. The threat of these laws to media organisations is very real, as 
was demonstrated in 1987 when four newspapers including the dailies 
The Star and Sin Chew fit Poh had their permits revoked under the PPPA. 
Although no journalists were arrested, several were interrogated by the 
police. 
Two months after the closures, the PPPA was further amended by Dr 
Mahathir 's government, with parliament approving changes that removed 
the right of judicial review. As a result, the amended Act declared that the 
Minister's decision to revoke or suspend a licence or permit' shall be final 
and shall not be called in question by any court on any ground 
whatsoever'. The Prime Minister said at the time that such rights of review 
were based on notions inherited from the British and thus alien to 
Malaysian life. The Act also requires annual applications from printers 
and publishers for licences and permits, with stiff penalties mandated for 
editors, journalists, publishers or printers if found guilty of 'maliciously 
publishing false news'. Not surprisingly, establishing a media or printing 
business in Malaysia is a particularly risky investment. The PPPA has 
served as an effective deterrent to a culture of independent journalism, 
especially since 1987. 
The PPPA has also been used in two well known cases against 
opposition activists: the Democratic Action Party (DAP) deputy leader 
Lim Guan Eng was released recently after a year in prison. He was 
convicted of 'maliciously publishing false news' after producing a 
pamphlet questioning the handling of a rape case involving a senior 
government leader and a young girl from his constituency. As a result of 
his sentence, he automatically lost his parliamentary seat and has been 
barred from running for election again. 
The PPPA is being used against Irene Fernandez in a similar way. Ms 
Fernandez's organisation, Tenaganita, campaigns for workers' rights and 
as a result of research, issued a memorandum in August 1995 detailing 
allegations of deaths in the detention camps of migrant workers and calling 
for an independent investigation into these reports. But since March 1996, 
when Ms Fernandez was arrested and charged under the PPPA for 
'maliciously publishing false news', her trial has been ongoing, making it 
the longest running in Malaysia's legal history. 
Many journalists have therefore adopted a policy of 'don't rock the 
boat'. This common sentiment may be challenged if a petition by Malaysian 
journalists is sustained. On World Press Freedom Day on 3 May 1999, a 
memorandum calling for the repeal of the PPPA was signed by 581 
journalists and handed over to the Home Minister and deputy Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi. The memorandum drew attention to the 
various powers under the Act, including closing down publications and 
'arrest without a warrant any person found committing any offence under 
the Act'. Despite the number of signatories, a key initiator of the 
memorandum Qournalist Shaila Koshy) acknowledged that there had been 
much resistance among journalists to sign, with many expressing fears 
for their careers. In some newsrooms, senior journalists discouraged their 
colleagues from signing, arguing that it was disloyal to the government. 
Few journalists from the Malay-language newspapers and the New Straits 
Times signed, suggesting a media culture divided not only along language, 
but also ownership, lines. 
Broadcasting is completely regulated by the Broadcasting Act of 1988. 
The Act requires licensing for radio and television stations. The Minister 
of Information has wide control over what goes on the air. Not surprisingly, 
the electronic media comprises only the state-owned Radio Television 
Malaysia (RTM1 and 2) and a handful of politically linked private stations. 
The other tool of offical control is the Internal Security Act (ISA). It has 
been used to suppress political criticism in the media as well as in civil 
society. The most notorious use of the ISA was the crackdown against 
dissent in October 1987, dubbed Operation Lallang (lallang means weed), 
when 106 people were detained, including most of the Opposition. 
Recently, the ISA has been used against Anwar Ibrahim and his supporters. 
The ISA was originally introduced by the British colonial government 
as a means of containing the communist insurgency of the post-war years. 
The law was retained and enhanced after independence in 1957, with the 
declared objective of controlling internal subversion threatening the 
security of the state. Since independence however, thousands of 
Malaysians have been detained without trial under the ISA, many of whom 
have been social and religious activists and members of political parties. 
The ISA allows for detention by the police for up to 60 days for 
interrogation of any person suspected of acting against the 'security' of 
Malaysia. After the initial60 days though, the Home Minister can extend 
the detention for up to two years with no right of appeal by the detainee. 
Not only are detainees held but they are often at risk of ill-treatment-a 
risk that became most apparent when Anwar Ibrahim appeared in court 
after over two weeks in ISA detention, suffering from serious assault by 
the police while in custody. Other accounts of psychological and physical 
torture in detention have been documented in books by former detainees 
such as Dr Syed Husin Ali of the People's Party (1996), and former member 
of Parliament Dr Kua Kia Soong (1998). Though the government indicated 
its intention of reviewing the ISA in early 1996, the use of the Act since 
that time has actually increased in the wake of the political crisis in 1999. 
No journalist has been detained under the ISA, but its threat to the media 
is evident. 
The Official Secrets Act (OSA) of 1972 is also a colonial legacy based 
on the British OSA of 1911, originally intended to stop information flows 
(to foreigners) that might endanger national security. But Malaysia's 1972 
Act gave the authorities broad powers to restrict the unauthorised 
publication of any information held by the government, regardless of its 
insignificance or the fact that it is in the public domain. As the Act doesn't 
contain definitions of what constitutes an 'official secret', a compliant 
judiciary can distort the process of natural justice and logic. 
Three cases in 1985 featured the use of the OSA against the media and 
in all three cases, hefty fines were imposed-the first for a story by New 
Straits Times journalist Sabry Sharif alleging irregularities in military 
aircraft purchases; the second for the investigations taken by two Asian 
Wall Street Journal foreign reporters (one of whom was expelled from 
Malaysia after being fined); and the third for the citing of an allegedly 
confidential government document by a Far Eastern Economic Review 
foreign correspondent (the essence of which had already been publicised 
by the Prime Minister at an earlier press conference). The government 
passed amendments to the Act in 1986, adding provisions for mandatory 
prison terms. Although the OSA has rarely been applied since, its 
intimidatory effects on civil society and the media have been highlighted 
by occasional threats of prosecution against journalists in 1992 and 1995. 
The use of contempt of court and defamation laws to discourage debate 
and silence critics of the establishment have been a more recent 
phenomenon when compared with the use of laws such as the ISA and 
PPP A. The costs of defending and paying damages in defamation suits 
have become particularly onerous. 
There are several cases involving the media and freedom of expression 
now before the Malaysian courts. The oldest of these related cases involves 
the veteran freelance journalist M.G.G. Pillai, who was ordered to pay 
damages of RM2 million (at the time, US$800,000) after being found guilty 
in 1994 of defaming and libelling the reputation of Vincent Tan, one of the 
Prime Minister's closest business associates. He is awaiting the outcome 
of his appeal. 
In November 1995, a foreign journal, International Commercial Litigation, 
published an article that discussed the issue of the Malaysian judiciary's 
independence and its conduct in a civil suit in unflattering terms. Several 
large companies and Mr Tan filed libel suits against the journal and the 
people quoted in the article. Among those sued were the then secretary of 
the Bar Council Tommy Thomas and all the partners of his firm; the UN 
Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the independence 
of judges and lawyers, Param Cumaraswamy; and the Asian Wall Street 
Journal's Southeast Asia correspondent Raphael Pura, who is based in 
Kuala Lumpur. A total of 15 suits were filed, seeking nearly US$200 million 
in damages. 
The case against Mr Pura began with an ongoing dispute over the 
filing of additional defence documents. These documents allegedly 
substantiate the claims of complicity between top judges and lawyers 
representing the companies and Mr Tan. In a related case, the UN Special 
Rapporteur Mr Param is facing four defamation suits seeking damages 
totalling US$108 million; the suits against him are for his comments used 
in the same journal, detailing his investigations into allegations of 
corporate interference with the Malaysian judiciary. The Malaysian 
government refused to advise the court ofMr Cumaraswamy's immunity, 
a matter that came before the International Court of Justice. In a 14-1 
decision, the Court held that the Special Rapporteur is entitled to immunity 
from legal process as maintained by the UN Secretary-General. The Court 
held 'that the Government of Malaysia should have informed the courts 
of the finding of the Secretary-General. .. and now had the obligation to 
communicate the Court's Advisory Opinion to the Malaysian courts' 
(International Court of Justice 1999). The Malaysian government has not 
yet undertaken the action required. 
'Scandalising the court' 
The media's most recent brush with the law resulted in the jailing of 
Canadian journalist Murray Hiebert. Mr Hiebert had written an article 
about the Malaysian judicial process in the Far Eastern Economic Review 
(1997). An action was brought against him by the wife of a judge whose 
case Mr Hiebert had mentioned in the article. When sentencing Mr Hiebert 
for 'scandalising the court', Justice Low Hop Bing warned the media not 
to disrespect Malaysia's courts and its justice system. The Court of Appeal 
upheld this conviction though it halved the sentence to six weeks; Mr 
Hiebert was released after four weeks for good behaviour. His lawyers 
are appealing his conviction to the highest court, the Federal Court. 
Unsurprisingly, Mr Hiebert's jailing for contempt of court raised many 
protests worldwide, the first time in 50 years that a journalist has been 
jailed for contempt of court in a Commonwealth country. A statement 
from US President Bill Clinton expressed deep concern about the jailing 
and the undermining of press freedoms. International journalists' 
organisations such as the US-based Committee to Protect Journalists and 
the Paris-based Reporteurs San Frontieres (RSF) protested and said the 
decision by the courts represented 'a dramatic step back for press freedom 
in Malaysia, where local journalists are already pushed to self-censorship 
because of drastic laws' (press statements, CPJ and RSF, 14 September 1999). 
A sister publication of Mr Hiebert's magazine, the Asian Wall Street 
Journal, warned that 'the Hiebert decision may presage other, even more 
draconian, uses of contempt' in Malaysia (13 September 1999). After the 
upholding of the conviction, the head of the Malaysian Bar, R.R. Chelvarajah, 
noted that Malaysian courts had drawn criticism in a number of recent 
cases, stressing that 'these comments should not be brushed aside' (1999). 
'What happened to me is a shot across the bows for other journalists'. 
said Mr Hiebert in Hong Kong, two days after his release from prison. 
'It's a warning that in Malaysia, it's difficult for journalists to function 
... Most countries in Asia are moving towards a more open press but 
Malaysia seems to be moving in the opposite direction' (Agence Presse 
France, 14 October 1999. 
But none of this has blunted Prime Minister Dr Mahathir's defence of 
Malaysia's judiciary and due process. He has countered the criticisms in 
typical style, pointing out that he does not 'interfere' with the courts 
despite western pressures to do so in cases like Mr Hiebert's. He claims 
the condemnation of Malaysia for the jailing is because Mr Hiebert is a 
western journalist, not because the protests have been about media 
freedoms in the country; the inconsistent human rights records of the 
United States and other western countries are then lambasted, with Dr 
Mahathir lamenting in international fora the 'very distorted perception 
of right and wrong'. 
His government's special envoy to the United Nations, Abdullah 
Ahmad, has already stated in a recent newspaper article the whispered 
part of the government's argument: 'The question is would they have 
taken as much trouble if S. Jayasankaran (Mr Hiebert's Malaysian 
colleague in the bureau) instead of Murray was jailed? The implication is 
clear. Don't touch white journalists but the Malaysian court can sentence 
a Malaysian, coloured, Asian or Senegalese journalist' (1999). 
It has become apparent through these cases that the right to freedoms 
of speech and expression is severely curtailed when threatened with such 
legal suits. It has had a 'chilling effect' on the freedom of expression and 
'needs to be curbed,' advises Abid Hussain, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the freedom of opinion and expression in a report on Malaysia (1998}. 
The cases of Mr Pura, Mr Param and Mr Hiebert have all added to the 
culture of fear and intimidation apparent in the media in Malaysia. 
These cases also reveal the intricate relationships the corporate elite 
has with the Prime Minister and his government, amidst allegations of 
judicial impropriety and a corruption of due process. The increasing use 
of the courts to resolve such disputes and the propensity to award 
extraordinarily large sums for damages echo the trend first noticed in 
Singapore, where opposition politicians have been bankrupted as a result 
of judgments against them. 
In the broader politics, there has been a deepening cynicism and 
distrust amongst the public of the judicial process and its alleged use 
against the government's enemies. This has been highlighted in the past 
year by the trial and subsequent conviction of former deputy Prime 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim for corruption. This does not bode well for the 
media, already hamstrung by laws that contain mandatory jail terms and 
do not provide for judicial review. 
The politics of the newspaper business 
The media tradition in Malaysia has long been centred on a task of 
informing and educating its audience from a partisan position. This was 
apparent before independence, when Malay-language and Chinese-
language newspapers featured nationalist campaigns against the British, 
whereas English-language newspapers such as The Straits Times were 
identified as journals of the colonialists. While the newsroom at The Straits 
Times continued to host British editors several years after Malaysia's 
independence, editors such as Said Zahari and Samad Ismail of the Malay-
language Utusan Melayu and Berita Harian newspapers were jailed for 
their Malayan nationalist efforts. The Malay-language media supported 
an UMNO-led coalition for independence, and this continued after 
independence as the coalition won at successive general elections. 
For the most part, the Malaysian media did not question the 
government's economic agenda for the country. But the disparities of 
wealth that had become defined according to ethnicity soon resulted in 
the tragedy of the 1969 race riots. One explanation of the media's close 
alignment with the government after 1969 was that the riots, its casualties 
and the political aftermath had traumatised the media. Abdullah Ahmad, 
who was special assistant to the Prime Minister at the time, Tun Abdul 
Razak, argued that Malaysian media's traditions 'were in fact more 
westernised than many people might suspect. Something happened before 
and after 1969'. An 'excessive self-censorship' culture developed within 
the media. By the 1970s, the media participated in government efforts of 
'nation-building', elaborating on concepts of 'developmental journalism' 
that were hailed as politically progressive and in tune with the Third 
World's agenda for change. 
These themes worked in well with the moves by the dominant political 
party UMNO to gain control of the media. From around 1972, UMNO's 
investment vehicle Fleet Holdings began buying up a substantial share of 
Malaysia's biggest media company, the New Straits Times Press Bhd 
(NSTP); the company's assets included the Malay and English-language 
broadsheets, Berita Harian and the New Straits Times, as well as several 
tabloids and a magazine publishing division. The initial goal was to wrest 
control of the media-newspaper company from its traditional Singapore 
and British owners. By 1984, the party through its investment vehicles 
owned almost 76 per cent of the NSTP. It was also through this media 
company that Malaysia's first licence for a commercial television 
broadcaster (TV3) was secured. 
The 1990s have proven somewhat more complicated, as the ownership 
of this media organisation has followed the course of the bitter split in 
UMNO which saw the ouster of Anwar Ibrahim. The 1993 management 
buy-out of the NSTP by a company called Realmild featured four senior 
editors of the group; three of whom were seen as close associates of the 
then deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Realmild is the main 
shareholder in the NSTP group and TV3 through the heavily indebted 
conglomerate MRCB. In a sweeping ownership and management shake-
up announced in July, the control of Realmild is now in the hands of Abdul 
Rahman Maidin, a little known businessman favoured by the political 
leadership. The only survivor of the original four editor-owners is Abdul 
Kadir Jasin, a Mahathir loyalist who as group editor-in-chief now oversees 
all of the group's media; this adds to the widely-held view of the NSTP's 
control being wrested away from Anwar Ibrahim's associates by Dr 
Mahathir's supporters. 
The best-selling English-language newspaper in Malaysia, The Star is 
the centrepiece of Star Publications (M) Bhd, one of the most profitable 
companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Through a 
complex web of holdings, the newspaper and its sister publications such 
as Day&Night magazine are indirectly owned by the investment arm of 
the MCA political party, a senior partner of the ruling coalition. Originally 
a small regional newspaper founded in Penang, The Star's migration to 
the capital and to a national audience was complete by the early 1980s. 
Although it lost its licence in the 1987 crackdown, the daily returned the 
following year and has charted a commercially successful course over 
the past decade. The company's listing on the stock exchange two years 
ago was a success, and its shares now trade at good premiums. The Star 
has the greatest share of print advertising in the country and its staff-
with six-month bonuses and stock options-are the best paid in the 
mainstream media. 
The top-selling Malay-language newspaper Utusan Malaysia is the lead 
product of Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd, a profitable listed company on the 
stock exchange. The majority controlling stake is held by the dominant 
party in the ruling coalition, UMNO. This shareholding was disclosed 
when the company listed on the stock exchange in August 1994. 
The newest member of this exclusive club of licensed newspapers is 
The Sun, an English-language daily tabloid. Established at the height of 
the economic boom in 1993, the daily relaunched itself the following year 
with a series of modemisations that improved wages and introduced new 
editorial and advertising styles across the industry. The newspaper is 
mostly owned by Vincent Tan through one of his private companies. He 
has a reputation in Malaysia's business world as an active corporate player 
through his listed conglomerate, the Berjaya Group. This conglomerate 
has interests in everything from telecommunications, transportation, 
gaming companies to stock brokerages; it also holds or has held rare 
licences and exclusive contracts in lucrative sectors such as the lotteries, 
cellular and long-distance telecoms, and the national sewerage system. 
The two best-selling Chinese-language newspapers, Sin Chew fit Poh 
and Nanyang Siang Pau, are also owned by corporate figures close to the 
political leadership. The latter newspaper has suffered circulation losses 
since the political crisis because of perceived imbalanced reporting of the 
crisis (see below). Like the NSTP group, the Nanyang Press group has 
been part of a politically approved corporate play during the 1990s: after 
a few change of hands by UMNO-linked businessmen such as Wan Azmi 
Wan Hamzah and his brother Wan Ariff, the media group was bought 
through a series of complicated transactions by the Hong Leong Group, 
an ethnic Chinese-controlled conglomerate led by Quek Leng Chan. 
Although Mr Quek has been perceived in the political crisis as an associate 
of Anwar Ibrahim, the newspaper has generally not reflected this partiality 
to the former deputy Prime Minister. The newspaper's market share has 
slid since the crisis began last year, and the gap has grown against the 
Chinese-language market leader, Sin Chew fit Poh, which claims recent 
readership figures of over 300,000. 
According to Sin Chew fit Poh, the publication is alone among the 
mainstream dailies in all languages to have posted an improved circulation 
over the past two quarters (AC Nielsen readership polls). Especially 
significant are the drops in circulation of up to 20 per cent for newspapers 
identified with UMNO's interests, such as the New Straits Times, Berita 
Harian and Utusan Malaysia. The Chinese-language market leader is owned 
by Rimbunan Hijau, a regionally focused Sarawak company founded by 
low-profile timber tycoon Tiong. Sin Chew fit Poh has had a relatively 
independent editorial management and it has probably benefited in sales 
because of this perception. Moreover, the Prime Minister has used this 
perception to counter allegations of a lack of media freedom in Malaysia 
(Chanda, Hiebert and Jayasankaran 1999; Jamaludin and Ahmad 1999). 
TV as a government information seroice 
The electronic media, however, has rarely been guilty of such sins, even 
though those in opposition to the government has often complained of its 
sins of omission. Parliamentary Opposition Leader, Lim Kit Siang, who 
has held this position for nearly 20 years, has not enjoyed 'a full minute 
on television at any time during that period' (Suaram 1998). Much of this 
bias can be blamed on its ownership and the working culture that 
dominates television and radio, where the typical career progresses from 
the state-owned Radio Televisyen Malaysia (RTM) to one of the four newer 
electronic media organisations of TV3, MetroVision, NTV7 or satellite 
service Astro. 
The state's RTM broadcasts nationally on two television channels, 
RTM1 and RTM2 (often known as TV1 and TV2) and six radio services, 
mostly in Malay. All news and information is supplied from a centralised 
newsroom, with a great reliance on the state-owned news agency Bemama, 
for hourly news bulletins. Financed partly by the public through taxes 
and the annual licence fee, RTM also takes in advertising. Because of its 
comprehensive national reach and its status as the first national 
broadcaster, it remains popular with advertisers. Although commercial 
broadcaster TV3 has for several years taken the lion's share of total 
advertising spending, RTM's TV2 has been runner-up in the race by 
screening popular American programming to attract the wealthier, urban-
oriented audience needed by advertisers. 
In 1998, in spite of new competition and the economic crisis, TV2 and 
TV1 took the second and third-largest share of advertising after TV3, 
collectively taking in RM118.1 million (US$31 million) or nearly 40 per 
cent of market share (AC Nielsen Adex Service). With a mandate to inform, 
educate and entertain, RTM has long been seen as a tool of government, 
with its senior management appointees of the minister of information-
under Dr Mahathir's Prime Ministership, this portfolio is usually held by 
his party's propaganda chief and political whip. RTM's television and 
radio stations also commission and broadcast regular long-form 
advertisements and jingles promoting government campaigns of the day; 
in the past year, this has included campaigns for information technology, 
patriotism against foreigners, and unity in the face of economic adversity. 
The Minister of Information and UMNO's Secretary-General, Khalil 
Yaacob, declared in June that RTM's airwaves were the sole preserve of 
the government, explaining that this was why the broadcaster would not 
be featuring any opposition voices in its news and other programs. This 
brought a storm of protest from the opposition and civil society. Social 
reform organisation Aliran accused the information minister of 'total 
ignorance', stressing that RTM was public property: 
RTM can be used to explain government policies but the people also 
have a right to know what others, including opposition parties and 
non-governmental organisations, think about those policies. It cannot 
be used to broadcast propaganda only from the ruling party while 
denying access to opposition parties (Aliran 1999). 
But as Dr Farish Noor of the social justice organisation JUST pointed 
out, the ruling coalition's claim on RTM 'would rob RTM of what little 
credibility it has left and as such deprive the government of one more 
channel of communication to the public' (Noor 1999). He added that the 
implications of this RTM ban on the opposition and its supporters is far-
reaching and serious, as it demonstrates how 'the democratic culture of 
the Malaysian constitutional model is being eroded on a daily basis'. 
This was illustrated in 1999 with two separate features on RTM's 
television channels. One was a multi-part dramatised series on the life 
and struggles of Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, offering an obvious 
propaganda tool in the run-up to the next general elections. The other, 
running throughout the week at prime time, involved multi-lingual and 
slickly produced long-form advertisements contrasting Malaysia's stable 
government and social conditions with riots, deaths and property 
destruction in neighbouring Indonesia-the voiceover message clearly 
urged viewers to support the ruling coalition. 
The most successful broadcaster is the commercial station TV3 whose 
parent company Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd (STM) has been part of 
a major corporate overhaul as a result of heavy debts and political 
realignment in the wake of Anwar Ibrahim's ouster from government. It 
has been a lucrative broadcaster for the political leadership to control, in 
terms of both audiences and revenue. In 1998, TV3 regularly captured 
upwards of two-thirds of the viewing audience and took in RM151million 
(US$40 million), or half of all TV advertising spending. The first to be 
issued a commercial television license in 1983, STM' s TV3 was part of a 
selective privatisation exercise by the government to politically linked 
corporate interests-its controlling shareholder then and now remains 
interests linked to Dr Mahathir's party UMNO. Aside from a first year 
loss the company has reported that pre-tax profits rose nearly fifteen-fold 
in five years. Unsurprisingly, the rise of Anwar Ibrahim as deputy Prime 
Minister in 1994 coincided with his business associates at listed 
conglomerate MRCB taking control of TV3 (Gomez and Jomo 1997). It is 
ironic then to witness how quickly TV3 has changed soon after the quiet 
resignations in August 1998 of various editorial managers seen as Mr 
Anwar's appointees. News programs became more overt in their editorial 
line against Mr Anwar's economic rescue plans, a month before his sacking 
as deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister. Since Mr Anwar's sacking 
and conviction, TV3's prime-time news has run disparaging and often 
inaccurate reports on the opposition and its supporters. 
The new kids on the broadcasting block, Metro Vision and NTV7, were 
launched in 1993 and 1998 respectively. Both have suffered badly in the 
economic crisis as a result of expensive borrowings by their owners in the 
boom years, and have also struggled to reach audiences as a result of 
their allocations on the UHF broadcast band. As a result of cost cutting, 
ministerial criticism of its broadcasts and management turmoil, 
Metro Vision abandoned its newsroom altogether and has been 
rebroadcasting the various language news bulletins of RTM2 for over a 
year. With its mix of new and rerun seasons of mostly commercial US 
programming, MetroVision has not been producing any local 
programming of note since the economic crisis. 
NTV7 has also faced reduced circumstances and has similarly adopted 
the target of a mostly urban, middle-class audience demanded by 
advertisers. Owned by the family interests of Effendi Norwawi, a Sarawak 
tycoon with interests in banking, education and property who is close to 
that state's premier and the Prime Minister, NTV7 was originally destined 
to be the Sarawak 'window' for other Malaysians. The broadcaster 
established a newsroom that introduced a more contemporary, American 
feel to its news bulletins, partly as a result of consultants' advice from Los 
Angeles and the hiring of key editorial staff from Europe and Australia-
NTV7 billed itself as the 'intellectual news provider'. Unfortunately, while 
the form has changed for the better, the content remains much the same 
albeit with a slightly different running order than TV3 and RTM-the 
Prime Minister's events for the day do not always lead NTV7 news, unlike 
rival bulletins. 
According to current and former staffers, substantial pressure has been 
brought to bear on daily editors of the news programs since the political 
crisis erupted. There is close scrutiny of productions for mentions and 
images of the opposition, and in-house 'political controllers' have been 
installed to vet assignments and eventual output. In a brief flourish at the 
start of this year, NTV7 news and current affairs department produced a 
controversial discussion program called Dateline, hosted by youthful 
supporters of the government (one now an aide of the deputy Prime 
Minister and home minister, Abdullah Badawi, who licenses the media). 
For the first time on Malaysian television, the weekly prerecorded program 
featured opposition party members and non-government organisations 
that were critical of the ruling coalition, debating current issues such as 
whether the opposition is denied mass media access. Several of the 
program's discussants complained after broadcast that their views were 
selectively edited, taken out of context and effectively misrepresented. 
Finally, the smallest electronic media organisation in terms of audience 
(but not of investment) is the satellite television service Astro, which last 
year captured 2.7 per cent of viewing audiences. With 25 channels and its 
five radio broadcasts it is part of Binariang Sdn Bhd, a RM3.5 billion (about 
US$1 billion) satellite project launched in 1996. Binariang is part of the 
corporate empire of another of the Prime Minister's close business 
associates, Ananda Krishnan; Mr Ananda's interests have included 
shipping, petroleum, property and a series of lucrative gaming licences 
that have helped bankroll a media empire. In 1992, The Star estimated the 
net worth of Mr Ananda's corporate assets at about RM1.8 billion. 
Malaysians are only allowed to buy and use satellite dishes of the Astro 
service, which is subscriber-based and mostly a relay for foreign services 
such as CNN, CNBC and Bloomberg News. Astro produces one channel, 
RIA, which features only Malay-language entertainment and no news 
programming. The radio stations rewrite and broadcast news feeds from 
RTM and the Bernama news agency. At the height of the demonstrations 
in support of Anwar Ibrahim throughout 1999, reports on Malaysia run 
on CNN and CNBC feeds were censored for Malaysians with in-house 
advertising and promotional items. There have been reports of CNN's 
feeds being delayed by one hour to allow censorship while foreign media 
reports on Malaysia are rarely ever allowed to run. Satellite feeds of reports 
of Malaysian demonstrations in September by the BBC, the ABC and 
TVNZ were jammed for several hours, according to staff of the BBC; the 
Information Minister announced three days later that the facilities were 
not to be used for news reports. 
Different languages, differing perspectives 
The question of media freedom in Malaysia must also take into account 
the different languages of the media, a demarcation which has traditionally 
reflected ethnicity and class. For most of the 20th century; English was 
the language of the colonial ruling class, while Malay was the language 
of the majority Malay rural population. The two major Chinese-language 
dailies, on the other hand, were established earlier the 20th century to 
cater for the mass immigration of workers from China to the peninsular. 
Today, these factors still bear some influence in perceptions of political 
and economic power. English is widely used in urban areas but this is not 
the case in the suburbs and beyond, where Malay, Chinese and Indian 
dialects are still more common. For example, the advertising industry's 
research reveals that while the biggest-selling news dailies in Malaysia 
have long been the Malay-language Berita Harian and Utusan Malaysia, 
and the Chinese-language Sin Chew ]it Poh, advertisers prefer to reach the 
mostly urban audience that reads English-language publications such as 
The Star and the New Straits Times newspapers. Similarly, the magazine 
publishing boom of the early 1990s was driven by new English-language 
consumer magazines competing for both affluent urban readers and 
product advertisers such as watch companies, computer and car 
manufacturers. 
The Malay, English and Chinese-language media each put their own 
spin on thorny political issues. In late 1999, a list of election demands 
calling for greater liberalisation was endorsed by a large coalition of ethnic 
Chinese organisations. Over a two-week period, the Malay-language 
newspapers ran daily commentaries and reports attacking the integrity 
and loyalties of these organisations and amplified the Prime Minister's 
dismissal of these demands. The tone of the reports was antagonistic, 
appealing to racial sentiment and traditional resentments against the 
Chinese community; longer articles even revived long-retired political 
foes in order to condemn the organisations along racial lines; there was 
little or no discussion of the contents of the list. The English-language 
newspapers, however, adopted a more removed position, detailing the 
list's contents but sceptical of the organisations' motives. The criticisms 
of the demands were muted, on the one hand reflecting the Prime 
Minister's displeasure while on the other, still aware of its mostly urban 
and discriminating readership. The Chinese-language newspapers 
generally reported the endorsement of the list's demands by parties in 
the ruling coalition; there was also discussion and examination of the 
specific demands for greater liberalisation. 
Where to from here? 
While a raft of restrictive legislation has played an important role in 
stunting the growth of a media culture of inquiry and debate, it is clear 
that the ownership of media organisations has played a critical part in 
curbing media freedoms. Both these constraints of legislation and 
ownership are the reasons commonly given by senior Malaysian journalists 
as to why there is hesitation (and some reluctance) to report on events 
deemed 'sensitive' by the authorities. 
Responding to criticisms in the New Straits Times, sociologist and 
opposition politician Dr Chandra Muzaffar questioned the journalistic 
integrity of the mainstream media. He asserted that 'the NST has made 
Dr Mahathir into a sacred icon, beyond reproach and beyond 
criticism ... the interrogation of power is, after all, the essence of democratic 
accountability. The NST cannot rationalise its subservient attitude to the 
Prime Minister in the name of press laws and media ownership.' He went 
on to point out that 'wealth, culture and social stability have conspired to 
thwart the emergence of such courageous and principled journalists in 
this country' (Muzaffar 1998). The relatively comfortable wages that allow 
for car and house ownership, annual bonuses of up to six months' wages 
and a broader social mobility for Malaysian journalists into the middle-
class have indeed helped in obscuring journalism's ideals-the freedom 
to shop remains more attractive than the freedom to investigate the trading 
practices of such a shop. 
At the 1998 Commonwealth Press Union conference, the editor-in-chief 
of the NSTP group, Abdul Kadir Jasin, said 'although the three (main) 
media organisations are independent and owned by publicly listed 
companies, they want to continue supporting the government. The 
government may not be too perfect, but it is not too bad either' (1998). 
His colleague at the best-selling English-language newspaper, The Star, 
shared this attitude and elaborated further at the same conference. 
According to news editor Wong Chun Wai, 'the responsibilities of the 
local media are to help the country and its people develop by providing 
positive information which would keep the peace' (1998). 
Throughout the 1980s, The Star captured a growing middle-class 
readership interested in and sympathetic to its relatively balanced news 
policy and populist verve. Its masthead continues to declare itself 'The 
People's Paper'. But by October 1987, this apparent popularity with the 
people went horribly wrong when it lost its printing and publishing licence 
along with its Sunday edition. The Star and two other newspapers were 
all casualties of Operation Lallang. The Star's attempts at journalistic 
balance, especially in its coverage of the bitter political contest between 
Dr Mahathir and a former finance minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, 
was a clear lesson to its owners and the staff. 
Virtually overnight, a tentative culture of inquiry was cowed and 
eventually disappeared, as a generation of journalists left the trade taking 
their skills and experience with them. And not all of them were from 
banned newspapers; there were also refugees from other dailies like the 
New Straits Times. Rehman Rashid, embarked on his 'years of (self-
imposed) exile' after the sacking of the Lord President (Chief Justice) and 
two other Supreme Court judges in 1988. 'Until then, I had doggedly kept 
believing we might recover from the rapid-fire concatenation of calamities 
that had assailed us ... I could see causes and effects, and I could still 
rationalise what had happened ... But when the Supreme Court got its head 
blown off, I gave up' (Rashid 1993:241). 
The 'quiet resignations' of the two editors of Malaysia's best-selling 
newspapers, the Malay-language Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harian, in 
July 1998 suggest the media's fundamental problems of control and 
ownership have not gone away in the decade or so since Operation Lallang. 
It was the first media salvo in the political war between the Prime 
Minister's forces and Anwar Ibrahim's. Media commentator and academic 
Zaharom Nain was forthright at the time. 
Calling these resignations 'a crackdown on the media' does appear a 
trifle overstated, primarily because there wasn't anything much to 
crack down on in the first place. Such assertions merely reinforce the 
myth of an independent Malaysian media. Malaysian media's role in 
shaping public opinion cannot be understated: most rural Malays glean 
information about what's happening in the country from state-
controlled television and radio stations-and from Utusan and Berita 
Harian' (Nain 1998). 
Another commentator, Dr Mustafa Anuar of social reform group Aliran, 
added 'most of the local media are ready to 'co-operate' with the leadership 
under the concept of 'development journalism' so much so they practise 
self-censorship (quoted in Netto 1999). 
The constraints of legislation and ownership have nurtured a media 
culture that reflects the wider society, where some freedoms and 
democratic rights have been traded away for promises of economic 
prosperity. There has been a process of socialising Malaysians to 'accept 
and even appreciate authoritarian rule, norms and institutions' (Gomez 
andJomo 1997). Inadvertently confirming this view, the editor-in-chief of 
the state-owned Bernama news agency Syed Jamil Jaafar defended the 
mainstream media's self-censorship while acknowledging the culture: 
'You can't blame the press for that. Because of the atmosphere you operate 
in, you tend to play safe. You follow the banker's maxim-err on the side 
of prudence' (The Sun, 1 July 1999). 
But the traditional media's audience seems tired of playing safe, 
especially since September 1998. The political crisis has spawned new 
and unlicensed phenomena such as the Internet, full of Malaysian opinion, 
rumours and sometimes inaccurate news savaging Dr Mahathir and his 
government. There is also the cottage industry outside the realm of 
licensing, in the sales of cassettes, videos and video CDs featuring reports 
not found on domestic television-for example, at demonstrations and 
elsewhere, the consumer camcorder has played a popular role in 
documenting police brutality for audiences outside Kuala Lumpur. 
The government's vociferous attacks on the Internet's news credibility 
and bias have not slowed the numbers of Malaysians surfing the web for 
alternative news and points of view; one result, suggests a journalist whose 
newspaper is affected, was a marked decline in mainstream newspapers' 
readerships in 1999. Another is the proliferation of cybercafes with cheap 
access (RM2 or USO.SO cents an hour) in even small towns across the 
country. Articles from such websites are also reprinted and copied for 
further distribution. 
The Bernama chief Syed Jamil Jaafar has argued that media freedom 
will come about once the government realises the inevitable change 
brought on by technology and the Internet: 'In other words, governments 
can no longer suppress information ... they might as well open up ... unless 
the mainstream media open up, the public would rather turn to the 
alternative media,' he told The Sun. There are now three Internet service 
providers, more than half a million subscribers and many more thousands 
with free Internet access through work and education centres. 
The foreign media have been similarly difficult for the government to 
controL While its reach is generally not as deep nor wide when compared 
with Malay or Chinese-language news reports, it has a substantial 
audience in urban areas. The regional news weeklies Asiaweek and the Far 
Eastern Economic Review have substantial markets in Malaysia. Malaysia 
has also attracted newspapers such as the Asian Wall Street Journal and 
the International Herald Tribune, both of which print there. It is fair to say 
that foreign media such as CNN, CNBC, the BBC's World Service radio 
as well as print remain, despite the government efforts, a small though 
influential part of the Malaysian media diet. 
Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin claims the foreign media has played 
a large role in 'strenuously painting a negative picture of the Malaysian 
economy, politics and local leaders'. His solution to the 'negative' reporting 
was to establish a public relations team that has been more successful 
than previous attempts at putting out 'positive spins' to counter 
'misinformation' on Malaysia (Reuters, 26August 1999). 
The political crisis has witnessed the booming sales of opposition 
newspapers such as Harakah, a members-only publication produced by 
the Islamist party PAS. The biweekly's sales have swelled from 40,000 a 
week to a peak of 200,000, a circulation much larger than that of most of 
the mainstream newspapers. It has done so illegally, as its publishing 
licence only allows for sales to its members yet there is evidence that 
suggests many non-Muslim and non-members are buying Harakah for its 
version of political events. While PAS has a substantial membership and 
controls the state government of Kelantan, smaller non-party organisations 
like Aliran have a much harder time with the authorities. Facing serious 
'unofficial' hurdles-printers do not want to print the magazine after being 
pressured not to do so. As printers also require licensing under the PPPA, 
this hurdle of Aliran Monthly is another example of covert censorship; the 
organisation has again called for the repeal of the PPPA as the law 
discourages honest journalism and 'retards the growth of a free and just 
society'. 
In Malaysia, media freedom and sense of responsibilities have been 
historically determined by the wider society's tolerance of anti-democratic 
measures by the state. If the democratic process involves the scrutiny of 
the state, ensuring accountability of an elected government, the defence 
of an independent judiciary and the free flow of information, then the 
Malaysian media has often failed in serving this process. It can only be 
hoped that the present political crisis will give way to a more democratic 
and a larger civil society, so that the media can assume a critical role in 
dialogue and debate. 
Media websites 
Berita Harian, www.jaring.my /bharian/ 
Daily Express, www.infosabah.com.my I daily _express/ 
A black chapter 
Krzysztof Darewicz 
s the sun rises over the world's most 
totalitarian and isolated state, 
intelligence officers begin the 
deliveries of Bulletin No 1. This top-, 
secret document, a compendium of the most important local and 
international events of the day, would probably be called a newspaper 
anywhere else. But, true to the outdated teachings of Stalin, the hermit 
regime of North Korea continues to believe that as information is power, 
control of information equals total political control. Thus, the real news 
of the nation and the world is restricted to a limited number of top political 
leaders-all members of the Politburo and some members of the Central 
Committee. At the other end of the scale the masses are treated to total 
ignorance, the few drips of information coming their way through the 
formidable propaganda machine. 
So few people even have access to the approved Communist Party 
newspapers that selected articles are read aloud and broadcast by a series 
of loud speakers. Foreign information is so highly suspect, that those tiny 
number of North Koreans who are permitted to venture outside their 
impoverished borders are subject to rigorous searches, with intelligence 
officers instructed to confiscate even old newspaper wrappings from 
neighbouring China. The penalty for North Koreans caught listening to 
hostile foreign propaganda such as the BBC World Service is several years 
of slavery in a labour camp for the entire family. In the past few years, 
North Korea's crippling economic crisis and famine has meant a great 
reduction in the volume of propaganda material disseminated locally and 
overseas, a welcome relief for the postmen of Nepal who used to go on 
strike over the tons of books sent by friendly North Korea to their fellow 
Communists in the Himalayas. But, poverty has nothing to relieve the 
people of North Korea of the burden of the state's message: for all the 
people of North Korea know Dear Comrade Kim Jong Il just might be 
demonstrating North Korea's fame all over an unknown world, which 
lies outside their hermetically sealed nation. 
Juche democracy 
North Korea, which is officially named the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea, bases its political system on the 'guiding idea of Juche'. In theory, 
Juche means 'self-reliance'. In practice, it means the total monopoly on 
power of the ruling Communist Party (the Korea Workers' Party), and 
the Party's total control over every aspect of life including the maintenance 
of the nation's isolation from the rest of the world. The mass media plays 
a crucial role in a system in which the Communist leaders deem themselves 
the ultimate authority in deciding what the masses are both allowed to 
know and to think. The mass media, according to the North Korean 
constitution, 'should serve the aims of strengthening the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, bolstering the political unity and ideological conformity 
of the people and rallying them solidly behind the Party and the Great 
Leader in the cause of revolution' (1975, Article 53, Chapter 4). As the late 
Great Leader Kim 11 Sung observed 'Printed materials are the most 
important means of linking the Party and the masses-a powerful weapon 
for organizing the working masses in the crucial tasks of political, 
economic and cultural construction the Party has proposed'. 
Obviously, there is no form of democracy or freedom of the press in 
North Korea. The leadership, having watched the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and many of the Communist regimes in former Soviet satellite 
states, is well aware of the media's potential to hasten the fall of totalitarian 
regimes. Thus, North Korean leaders attach such enormous importance 
to the 'guidance' of the media that they directly supervise the production 
of the daily newspapers. The official book, The Great Teacher of Journalists, 
explains that 
The Great Leader, the Dear Comrade Kim Jong Il is always among 
journalists and teaches them (about) every detailed problem arising 
in their activities, and kindly leads them to write and compile excellent 
articles that arouse the sentiment of the masses in keeping with the 
Party's intentions. He also brings up journalists to be the Party's reliable 
writers under his wings and takes meticulous care of every facet of 
their life and activity ... The love and generosity he confers upon the 
journalists is indeed boundless (first published in Pyongyang in 1983). 
Most North Korean citizens have no concept of a mass media free of 
government control. In the five years I worked as a correspondent of Polish 
Press Agency in North Korea, I was frequently asked-even by high 
ranking officials-who gave me my instructions on what I should write. 
When I answered, 'No one gives me instructions, I am free to write 
whatever I consider correct, I was met with disbelief and suspicion 'No 
guidance at all? Impossible!' At least I was, personally, able to understand 
their suspicions because my journalistic career had begun in Poland under 
Communist rule, when the press was still subject to strict controls. 
A Stalinist model 
To understand the role of the media in North Korea it is useful to examine 
the model of information control devised by Stalin, and copied in some 
form by most, if not all, of the former Soviet Union's satellite states. The 
system is based on a concept of two circles of information flow-the inner 
(internal) and the outer (external) circles. Within the inner circle, 
information is provided solely to the ruling elite-the party, government 
and army leaders. This task belongs to the Korean Central News Agency 
(KCNA), which is a government press agency equal to the Ministry of 
Information and subordinated directly to the Propaganda and Agitation 
Department of the Party Central Committee. Every day KCNA publishes 
a series of 'special bulletins'. 
Bulletin No. 1 is distributed every morning among a limited number of 
top leaders. This strictly top-secret bulletin updates its readers on most 
important events in the country and the world. News is gathered by a 
network of local and foreign correspondents of KCNA as well as from 
foreign press agencies, collected by KCNA at their headquarters in 
Pyongyang. The bulletin includes also translations of every possible wire 
or press report published abroad about North Korea. Another strictly top 
secret bulletin provides information on developments in South Korea 
gathered by the KCNA who monitor the South Korean media. Less 
detailed bulletins are distributed among lower ranking officials, while 
local party cadres receive a bulletin with only selected international news, 
abridged translations of articles concerning North Korea and brief updates 
on South Korea. There are also special version of bulletins for the army, 
the police, worker's unions and other institutions in which news is 
selectively highlighted or deleted. The bulletins serve not only as a source 
of reliable information to party cadres but access to them is one of society's 
most important indicators of a citizen's position within the political elite. 
Ironically, the KCNA bulletins are not usually censored. Thus, information 
is genuinely equated with power. 
Newspapers, TV and radio form an outer circle of information. Among 
newspapers published in North Korea, the major national daily is Rodong 
Sinmun, the organ of the Korea Workers' Party. The Minju Chason, the 
organ of the North Korea government, as well as some other organs of 
the army, workers and youth unions or professional associations are also 
circulated nationally. There are also several local newspapers, including 
the Pyongyang Daily, the Hamnam Daily and the Pyongnam Daily. North 
Koreans have access to two national TV channels and handful of local TV 
stations in the bigger cities such like Pyongyang and Kaesong. Radio is 
much the same, with Korean Central Radio and Radio Pyongyang 
broadcasts covering the whole country, while provinces, cities and counties 
also have their own local radio programs. They are all owned by the State 
and are directly subordinate to central or local propaganda departments 
of the party. 
The outer circle serves as a channel of propaganda and agitation for 
party policies. Whatever national or international news it provides is 
simply reprinted from KCNA wire services for the outer circle. Some local 
news is gathered independently, but editorials are provided directly by 
the propaganda department of the Central of local party committees. 
National newspapers are not sold on the streets; they are distributed to 
subscribers only, according to their political or professional affiliations. 
So, members of the party are allowed to subscribe to Rodong Sinmun, 
administrative staff receives Minju Chason, officers of the armed forces 
read the army newspaper, teachers read Teachers News and the railway 
management reads Railway News. Local newspapers are sold in news-
stands in big cities. But, the majority of North Koreans-the working class 
masses-do not have any access to newspapers. Excerpts from newspapers 
are read to them through loudspeakers in factories and villages or written 
out on blackboards. TV and radio broadcasts, due to the very limited 
number of receivers, cover only a small portion of the North Korean 
population. Due to the acute shortage of electricity of the past few years, 
the electronic media's reach has virtually collapsed. 
Between the inner and the outer circles of information stands 
censorship. KCNA obviously produces different wire services for the inner 
and outer circles. Outer circle information is prepared in line with strict 
instructions from the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central 
Committee. But even then, the KCNA outer circle service is scrutinised 
again by censors before it reaches its subscribers' offices. News prepared 
locally is also subject to censorship, with the convenience of the 'special 
censorship cell' in every editorial office. 'The less the masses know the 
better'-this golden rule of the North Korean regime is confirmed by the 
way in which outer circle information is selected. Only national 
newspapers distributed among approved subscribers in Pyongyang and 
the few other bigger cities contain a column with international news. The 
same newspapers that go into the provinces have already been stripped 
of this column. And it is not difficult to guess that local newspapers carry 
no news from abroad except about North Korea's glorious diplomatic 
triumphs. 
No foreign contagion 
The regime takes no risks when is comes to broadcasting, despite the pitiful 
state of the television industry. On the one hand, foreign broadcasts are 
jammed, and on the other, those who own TV and radio sets must have 
them adjusted so they can receive only domestic broadcasts. Even 
foreigners coming into North Korea, must hand over their TVs or radios 
for the authorities 'to fix'. Car radios are especially suspect as foreigners' 
cars are regarded as one of the most dangerous locations for potential, 
unsupervised meetings between foreigners and North Koreans. North 
Korean drivers of foreign diplomats or businessmen are considered at 
risk of being exposed to the danger of listening to foreign hostile 
propaganda. 
There are, of course, no foreign newspapers or TV and radio programs 
legally available to ordinary North Koreans. Law strictly prohibits reading 
such newspapers or watching or listening to foreign stations. Access is 
limited to the ruling elite only. Still, some North Koreans try to listen in 
secret to South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, Russian or US radio stations. 
But, the number of listeners is tiny because of the risk of being denounced 
by neighbours, and the harsh punishments meted out to those caught. 
North Koreans are not allowed to lock their doors at night so security 
agents may check their activities at any time. Routine punishment in cases 
of 'illegally listening to hostile foreign propaganda' is several years of 
slavery in a labour camp for the whole family. Those North Koreans who 
travel abroad are subject to thorough searches on their return. Border 
guards or Customs officials confiscate any foreign-printed material as well 
as any tapes or photos. I remember during one of my train trips from 
China to Pyongyang, I was sitting in a compartment with a representative 
of a North Korean foreign trade company. He was returning from China 
where he was inquiring about models of Chinese tractors his company 
was intending to import. At the North Korean border station of Sinuiju, 
Customs officers very carefully combed through his luggage. They 
confiscated all Chinese newspapers in which he had wrapped boxes of 
cigarettes and bottles of vodka. Then, they confiscated all the 
documentation about the Chinese tractors, claiming the authorities 
concerned must examine them first. 
The information barrier is just as hermetically sealed in the reverse 
direction. North Korea borders are closed to foreigners, except for a tiny 
number of escorted tourists. The regime is particularly wary of foreign 
journalists. Of those western journalists who have managed to get into 
North Korea, many have posed as tourists. Only a tiny group of foreign 
correspondents is accredited in Pyongyang-journalists representing the 
Xinhua news agency and the Renmin Ribao daily from 'friendly' China 
plus Russian journalists representing ITAR-TASS agency. They base their 
reports on news gathered from the outer KCNA service, whispers from 
within the diplomatic community and from observing life on the streets. 
Because everything in North Korea is a secret, including statistics and 
phone numbers, there is not much news to gather from North Korean 
officials. It is possible to wait weeks, even months, for interviews with 
officials, only to hear them parroting the official line. Foreign 
correspondents' contacts with the regime are even more limited than those 
of diplomats and foreign businessman residing in Pyongyang, because 
North Korea considers every foreign journalist a spy. The logic behind 
this assumption is a simple extension of the fact that every North Korean 
correspondent abroad is closely cooperating with the intelligence service. 
As in Stalinist Soviet Union or Maoist China, North Koreans are not 
allowed to talk with foreigners without authorisation. Interaction between 
foreigners and ordinary citizens is virtually non-existent. 
Before the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, there 
was a larger foreign correspondents community in Pyongyang, with 
journalists from the then 'friendly' countries such as Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria or Cuba. After 1989 only the Polish 
correspondent to North Korea was allowed to stay thanks to the agreement 
on the exchange of correspondents signed between KCNA and Polish Press 
Agency. I happened to be that correspondent and managed to report from 
North Korea for almost five years. I tried to portray the terrifying reality 
of poverty and totalitarianism and, finally, was expelled for this. The 
official pretext was an article I had published in Far Eastern Economic 
Review, warning of deteriorating North Korean-Chinese relations 
following the death of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung. Later, I was told by 
a reliable North Korean source that the article reached the son of Kim Il 
Sung, then the Dear Leader Kim Jong Il, who personally ordered my 
expulsion in 1995. I was arrested at the Pyongyang airport, proclaimed 
persona non grata and expelled back to China. In the official statement sent 
to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the North Korean government 
accused me of 'insulting the DPRK leaders and whole nation' as well as 
'spying'. By the mid 1990s, the North Korean authorities had expelled all 
correspondents of Russian newspapers but one on similar accusations-
ITAR-TASS was allowed to maintain its office in Pyongyang. 
The workers' paradise 
The North Korean regime goes to a great deal of, largely wasted, effort to 
propagate the image of a 'workers' paradise', and promote its leaders 
abroad. An English-language weekly Pyongyang Times and some monthly 
pictorial magazines in English, Russian, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, 
Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Esperanto are distributed abroad by North 
Korean diplomatic missions or sent to readers directly from Pyongyang. 
Radio Pyongyang also has broadcasts in these languages. The KCNA has 
wire news services in English, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, French and 
Spanish. Most recently, KCNA opened its website on the Internet in 
English, Japanese and Korean (www.kcna.co.jp). It is operated in 
cooperation with the Korea News Service, run by North Korean residents 
in Tokyo. The following is a typical example of 'news' from KCNA to 
foreign readers. 
Pyongyang, September 13 (KCNA)-A delegation of the Khmer 
Democratic Party paid a congratulatory visit to the DPRK embassy in 
Cambodia on September 7 on the occasion of the 51st anniversary of 
the founding of the DPRK. The delegation laid a floral basket in the 
name of the party before the portraits of the President Kim Il Sung 
and General Secretary Kim J ong Il and paid respects to them. The head 
of the delegation said that the DPRK, founded by the great Kim Il 
Sung and led by the respected Kim Jong Il, is now demonstrating its 
fame all over the world, decisively smashing the isolation and 
suffocating moves of the international reactionaries. He said: 'We 
sincerely hope that the Korean people will achieve brilliant success in 
the struggle for building a powerful nation under the wise leadership 
of Marshal Kim Jong Il, true to the behest of Generalissimo Kim II 
Sung' (1999). 
After the war in the Persian Gulf, North Korean leaders realised that 
CNN, which promotes itself as 'apolitical' and enabled the Iraqi regime 
to present its position to the world, may also be of use for their propaganda 
purposes. They have invited CNN crews to Pyongyang, from time to time, 
for coverage of special events. However, CNN's hopes for establishing a 
permanent bureau in Pyongyang have not been realised. The crisis has 
also caused a major reduction in volume of propaganda magazines and 
books printed in Pyongyang in foreign languages for dissemination 
abroad, praising Kim 11 Sung and Kim Jong Il's brilliant achievements. 
But, the message remains the same. 
The conclusion cannot be optimistic. Hopes for change following the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, market economic reforms and 
the opening up of China and Vietnam have not materialised. The death of 
Kim Il Sung may have further sapped the regime's confidence. The 
besieged regime of Kim J ong Il seems to be clinging on ever more tightly 
to totalitarianism and isolation, its ideology almost comical in the late 
1990s were it not for the consequent suffering of the people. The North 
Korean media plays only a minor role in providing information to its 
society, and remains a blind tool of propaganda and manipulation in the 
hands of the regime. With this reality, the paragraph of North Korean 
constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech, press, association and 
political activities is as meaningless as the 'news' North Korea produces. 
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Free as a mocking bird 
Sheila S. Coronel 
or three days and nights millions of 
Filipino civilians, led by Catholic 
nuns armed only with flowers and 
prayers, faced down the soldiers of 
their dictator on the streets of Manila as the world watched. As a news 
story, the knifed-edge stand-off of 1986 was perhaps the most spectacular 
political tale of the decade. Here was a poor, developing nation cowed by 
years of authoritarian rule challenging the guns and tanks of the armed 
forces, women and children packing the crowds with the men as helicopter 
gunships swirled menacingly overhead. The leader of the opposition was 
merely a housewife, the widow of the nation's political martyr, Benigno 
'Ninoy' Aquino, who had been assassinated after challenging then 
President Ferdinand Marcos three years earlier. Corazon Aquino, or 'Cory' 
as she was known, was a reluctant politician, a mother of five who 
preferred her home life, but had been thrust into the limelight by fate. As 
the drama played out, culminating in the extraordinary and bloodless 
defections of key elements of the armed forces to the side of the masses of 
demonstrators, the international and local media covered developments 
hour by hour. 
But, importantly, the fall of President Marcos in February 1986 was 
not just a sensational story. The local Filipino media, itself, played a key 
role in the political confrontation and-it could be argued-tipped the 
scales in favour of the pro-democracy movement. Like many political 
confrontations which have followed, such as the middle-class uprising in 
Thailand in 1992, and the fall of President Soeharto in Indonesia in 1998, 
the media did not just cover the events, but contributed to the outcome. 
Two weeks before the final showdown, guerrilla editions of local 
newspapers exposed the massive cheating which Marcos had engineered 
in national elections, provoking widespread anger and stoking discontent. 
Since the assassination of 'Ninoy' Aquino in 1983, underground 
newspapers, and even xerox copies of articles from foreign newspapers, 
had challenged the views of the censored press, raising awareness that 
the dictatorship was not indestructable. Then, as the three-day stand-off 
unfolded Marcos's troops destroyed the transmitter of the Catholic radio 
station, Veritas, which had been used to rally the people. But, Veritas stayed 
on the air-broadcasting from a string of safehouses across the city-
carrying calls from Cory Aquino and Catholic Cardinal Jaime Sin to mass 
on the streets. On 25 February 1986 Marcos and his family fled the country 
on board a US helicopter. After 14 years of dictatorship, the country-
and the press-was finally free. 
The role played by the anti-Marcos press, and to a lesser extent, 
independent radio stations, in raising awareness about the excesses of 
the Marcos government and in encouraging citizens to take part in protests, 
guaranteed that the media would play a central role in the post-
dictatorship era. In the last years of the Marcos regime, opposition 
newspapers reported on anti-government demonstrations, showing 
Filipinos the extent of the protest movement and emboldening them to 
organise and participate in mass actions. The coverage of the massive 
cheating conducted by the government in the February 1986 elections 
that pitted Marcos against Corazon Aquino stoked the public's ire. 
Nowadays, the Philippines boasts a rowdy and vibrant press which 
thinks of itself as the freest in Asia. With the fall of the Marcos regime, a 
14-year-old system of media controls collapsed overnight. Into that 
vacuum rushed dozens of new newspapers, and radio and television 
stations, as old Marcos-controlled media outlets folded, or were taken 
over by the new government. A pluralistic, but somewhat anarchistic, 
media industry came into being. Today, Filipino journalists are noisy and 
powerful, their freedoms guaranteed by the constitution and the law. 
Media exposes make politicians quake, because negative coverage can 
mean the death of a political career. The media is among the most 
important influences on voting behaviour, and news anchors and talk-
show hosts have become so popular that they have themselves been elected 
to national office. 
Filipino journalists guard their freedoms fiercely and are strong 
believers in the adversarial role of the press as watchdog and the Fourth 
Estate. Thus, the media play an important role in democratic governance 
by forcing officials and institutions to account for their actions. The 
downside is that such an adversarial stance has meant sober debate is 
sometimes difficult in an atmosphere of media hectoring. Moreover, the 
media has been accused of irresponsible and sloppy reporting and of using 
their freedoms to exploit the public's taste for the sensational. Intense 
competition in a crowded market, the lack of trained journalists, 
'checkbook' journalism, and the business interests of media owners are 
among the problems that stunt the professional development of Philippine 
journalism. 
In the late 1990s, those who wish to silence or control the Philippine 
press do so through market mechanisms, rather than through the strong 
arm of state control. The more sophisticated methods-including the 
pulling of advertisements, bribery, and the linking of business success in 
other spheres to the editorial line of the owner's newspaper-may serve 
as useful examples of alternative threats to press freedom in the region's 
new democracies. President Joseph Estrada, for example, has lobbied 
advertisers and business-owners to put pressure on critical newspapers. 
For this, he has been widely attacked for muzzling the press, but these 
actions simply reflect his own understanding that the use of state power 
directly to control the press in the Philippines is not publicly acceptable. 
Despite its excesses, there is strong support for a free press among 
Filipinos. Any attempt to muzzle the press is resolutely opposed. In part, 
this is because of fresh memories of the Marcos rule, when the press was 
the mouthpiece of dictatorship. But it also the legacy of a century-long 
tradition of a fighting, anti-colonial press. 
From anti-colonialism to market forces 
Philippine journalism's first influences were from the 19th century 
European press, when newspapers were the carriers of political ideas and 
were at the centre of political activity in the emerging nation states. In the 
1880s and 1890s, clandestinely distributed newspapers helped raise 
awareness of the evils of nearly 400 years of Spanish colonial rule, 
germinating the idea of an independent Philippine nation (Corpuz 1989 
and Schumacher 1997). 
Over the next century, newspapers proliferated during periods of war, 
revolution and other political upheavals. When the political situation 
stabilised, many of the papers died. A longer period of relative inactivity 
followed until the next upheaval-and the next newspaper boom-took 
place. Successive waves of colonisers-the Spaniards, Americans and 
Japanese during World War II-used the press to promote the colonial 
agenda and impose stringent censorship. But a series of anti-colonial 
movements also employed clandestine newspapers in their fight against 
the colonial masters. To this day, the samizdat tradition remains strong, 
with anti-government groups continuing to publish clandestine 
newsletters. 
One lasting and important legacy of 50 years of US colonialism is that 
of privately owned media outlets competing in a free market. As such 
there is no tradition of party or state-owned presses in the Philippines. 
After independence in 1945 and the subsequent establishment of a liberal 
democratic government, a free press patterned after that of the United 
States became a powerful weapon wielded by competing political, 
business and ideological groups to advance their interests and causes 
(Ofreneo 1986). This changed during the Marcos dictatorship from 1972-
86, when the media system was controlled by the dictator's family and 
friends. 
The commercial orientation of the Philippine media is most evident in 
broadcasting. Radio and television have a far shorter history than 
newspapers, with the first commercial radio station opening in 1930 and 
the first TV broadcast airing in 1953 (Feliciano and Icban 1967). Unlike 
other countries in the region, where radio and TV from the beginning 
were controlled by the state and used for propaganda, information and 
educational purposes, the broadcast media in the Philippines have always 
been commercially driven and profit oriented. 
This is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the system has 
meant freedom from state control, except under Marcos. On the other 
hand, it has also meant that broadcast media content is oriented toward 
quick profits and is therefore largely fluff and entertainment. Programming 
is often frivolous and lightweight, with media personalities 
overshadowing media content. The concept of public broadcasting is alien 
to the Philippines, and the potential of radio and TV for education and 
inspiring critical thought remains largely untapped. 
The Philippine media operate under a lax system of state supervision. 
The post-Marcos constitution, influenced by that of the United States 
guarantees free expression. Article IV, Section 4 of the Bill of Rights says 
'No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, 
or of the press'. No government body oversees or supervises the press. 
No licence or permit is required to publish a newspaper or magazine. 
There is no prior review or censorship, and in theory, the press can report 
on what it wants, subject only to restrictions set by libel, slander and 
sedition laws. 
Broadcasting, however, is subject to greater regulation. As in the pre-
Marcos era, the power to give broadcasting franchises was turned over to 
Congress. The industry itself was placed under the supervision of the 
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). A self-regulatory body 
for broadcasting set up by Marcos, known by its Tagalog acronym KPB, 
still exists and continues to set ethical and other standards for both radio 
and television. The Movie and Television Review Classification Board 
(MTRCB) has the power to classify, restrict or ban films and TV for public 
viewing. But, the MTRCB standards are more concerned with decency, 
violence and contemporary Filipino values than with politics (Stuart 1996). 
There is considerable tolerance for critical foreign reporting in the 
Philippines. Although the constitution bans foreign ownership of the 
media, foreign newspapers and magazines circulate freely in the country. 
Only during the Marcos period were foreign publications banned. The 
wide use of English means that the Philippines is a significant market for 
English-language foreign publications. TIME, Newsweek, Asiaweek and the 
Far Eastern Economic Review enjoy brisk sales, although readership is 
limited to the Manila elite. Foreign TV programs are aired via cable and 
satellite without prior review or censorship. And, for foreign journalists, 
the Philippines is probably the easiest country in Asia in which to work. 
No special licences or permits are required apart from a work permit, and 
immigration regulations are rarely manipulated to harass journalists. So 
free are the regulations that many foreign journalists simply enter the 
country as tourists, then apply for an extension to stay. 
Questionable quality 
New freedoms unleashed by the 1986 uprising gave the media wide 
latitude to report on events and issues. Media exposes have caused the 
resignation of officials, raised public awareness about such issues as 
environmental destruction and the rights of women, and prompted 
investigations of official abuses and wrongdoing. Investigative reports 
have a wide audience, and are given prominence on both television and 
newspapers. 
Unfortunately, the media have also used their freedoms to outdo rivals 
in the race to peddle newspapers and television programs. Intense 
competition has distorted the conduct of journalism, the content of 
newspapers, and the programming of radio and television. In the crowded 
and expanding media market that emerged after the fall of Marcos, the 
most aggressive media organisations emerged on top (de Jesus 1999). The 
model, particularly for television, was the United States, a media culture 
much more familiar in the Philippines than other parts of East Asia because 
of the American colonial legacy. The expansion of free-wheeling, 
muckraking type of news organisations was put on hold by Marcos, but 
they re-emerged once the controls were loosened. 
Today, 'TV Patrol', the highest-rating television news program, serves 
a daily diet of skimpily clad starlets and bloodied corpses. It runs 
scandalous accounts of the private lives of celebrities and sensationalises 
crime. As it gobbled up the audience share, the program's rivals were 
forced to compete by offering more of the same. Competition has resulted 
in homogeneous reporting and programming because newspapers and 
broadcast stations produce news reports that are guaranteed to sell. 
Another factor hobbling the development of Philippine media is the 
level of skills. There is a shortage of trained journalists and editors who 
can raise the quality of reporting and analysis. After the media explosion 
in 1986, there were not enough experienced journalists to staff newspapers 
and broadcast agencies. With insufficient on-the-job training, even young 
journalists are opting out of the profession in search of better-paying 
careers, contributing to a fast-and damaging-staff turnover at most 
media outlets. 
The petty corruption of journalists by politicians or businessmen who 
are seeking stories twisted in their favour is almost routine. At press 
conferences swarms of young, poorly paid journalists are frequently 
handed envelopes of 'taxi' or 'lunch' money for attending. 'Envelopmental 
journalism', refers to these widely expected envelopes of cash. A 1998 
survey of 100 beat reporters conducted by the Philippine Center for 
Investigative Journalism showed that 71 had been offered money by their 
sources. Of these, 33 per cent admitted they took the money, with 22 per 
cent keeping the cash, and 11 per cent turning it over to their editors (Chua 
and Datinguinoo 1998). The generally low pay of journalists in comparison 
to other professions is partly responsible for this situation. But other 
factors, including the reluctance or inability of editors and publishers to 
enforce ethical standards and the egregious practices of public relations 
people should also be cited. 
Another problem is media ownership, which is concentrated in the 
hands of wealthy business houses that sometimes use their newspapers 
to defend and advance their business and political interests. The major 
dailies and broadcast networks are owned by the giants of Philippine 
business who operate a wide range of interlocking corporate concerns, 
including banking, manufacturing, telecommunications and real estate. 
While most owners rarely intervene in day-to-day editorial decision-
making, they can nevertheless place clear constraints on the freedom of 
journalists. 
Newspapers have been used by their owners to promote their 
businesses, denigrate rivals and, on occasion, contest the results of public 
bid dings in which the press proprietors have been losers. At the very least, 
editors tone down or censor negative reporting on their owners' 
businesses. Many newspaper proprietors have also tended to take 
politically safe positions, discouraging reports or exposes that will incur 
the ire of government. Because business in the Philippines is subject to 
often whimsical government regulation, newspaper owners who run 
business empires are vulnerable to government pressure. 
In October 1995, the Manila Bulletin ran daily front-page stories 
criticising the awarding of the purchase of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian 
consortium, saying that the historic hotel was part of the 'national 
patrimony' and should therefore be sold to a Filipino company. The fact 
was that the Bulletin publisher Emilio Yap, whose other business interests 
till then lay mainly in banking and shipping, had lost the bid and used his 
paper to pressure then President Fidel Ramos to reconsider the sale. The 
President did intervene, by asking his aides to work out a compromise 
with the Malaysians. In the meantime, Yap filed a case in the Supreme 
Court, using the national patrimony argument, and again, the Bulletin, to 
argue his point. The Supreme Court, in a controversial decision, decided 
in Yap's favour. 
Likewise, in August and September 1996, the Manila Standard ran 
editorials and news stories questioning the awarding of the contract for 
port services at the Subic Freeport to the Hong Kong company Hutchison 
Ports Philippines Inc. One of the Standard's owners, the Razon family, 
who runs the International Container Terminal Services Inc. (ICTSI), had 
lost the bid. The paper campaigned for a reconsideration of the bid, and 
other papers followed with news reports of the controversy. In the end, as 
a result largely of the media brouhaha led by the Standard, President Ramos 
ordered the bidding rescinded (Coronell997). 
These two cases demonstrate how press proprietors have abused their 
powers, setting aside the canons of good journalism by using the opinion 
and news pages of their papers to campaign for their business interests. 
In both instances, media owners have put the profitability of their business 
enterprises over the duty of their newspaper to report without fear or 
favour. 
It would be simplistic, however, to say that newspapers are merely 
mouthpieces of their owners. The reality is more complex. Proprietors 
intervene in editorial matters to varying degrees and in different ways. 
Some owners meddle only when their business interests are directly at 
stake but otherwise leave their editors to decide on what the paper can 
print-the situation at the Standard. At the Manila Bulletin, on the other 
hand, the owner takes the place of the editors as gatekeeper of news and 
information, deciding what readers will find in their morning paper. 
There are more liberal-minded owners who give their editors a wider 
freedom to choose. This is the case with the hard-hitting Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, whose owners realise that the paper's strength lies in its ability 
to report critically, even stridently, on current affairs. Some owners may 
refuse to intercede on behalf of their business interests, but will intervene 
only when they are under severe pressure from powerful officials to slow 
down on critical reporting. For example, the Gokongwei family, owner of 
the Manila Times, allowed its editors to print negative reports about senior 
government officials. The Gokongweis run a vast business empire that 
includes shopping malls, manufacturing, telecommunications and 
banking. In July 1999, the family was forced to sell the paper (its editors 
claim) to appease President Joseph Estrada, who was offended by articles 
alleging corruption and anomalies in his administration. The paper was 
sold to a pro-government business group and it is widely believed that 
the Gokongweis sold it for fear of the government squeezing their other 
businesses (Singh and Lopez 1999). 
An explosion of diversity 
The media explosion that followed the fall of Marcos was largely a 
response to the public's hunger for news. There are currently ten English 
and two Tagalog broadsheets published in Manila and circulated 
throughout the country, compared to three broadsheets during the Marcos 
era. In addition, there are 17Manila-based tabloids. Five Chinese-language 
daily newspapers serve the country's small but influential ethnic Chinese 
business community. In 1998, some 408 newspapers, mostly weeklies, were 
distributed in the provinces (Philippine Information Agency 1998). 
The biggest and most influential newspaper is the Manila-based, 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, which began as an opposition newspaper in 1985 
and emerged as a market leader combining daring reporting with savvy 
marketing. The Inquirer, with its adversarial, reporting and strident tone 
has a loyal following built from its days as an anti-Marcos paper. It has an 
audited circulation of 240,000 on weekdays and 260,000 on Sundays. 
The second biggest paper is the Manila Bulletin, which was founded in 
1900 and is the oldest existing newspaper. The Bulletin is conservative-
the Inquirer's complete opposite, it avoids controversy and is inclined to 
print headlines like, 'Schools Open Today.' The Philippine Star, which ranks 
third, adopted a sober reporting tone since its founding in 1986 but has a 
stable of star columnists who dish out sizzling political gossip and spicy 
commentary. Filipino readers love opinion-the more strident, the better. 
Columnists, rather than editors or reporters, are the crowd-drawers of 
newspapers. 
All but two of the nationally circulated broadsheets are published in 
English, the language of the educated classes, from which newspaper 
readership is mainly drawn. Many of the provincial newspapers are in 
English as well. The biggest chain of community newspapers is run by 
the Sun Star Publications Network based in Cebu, the second largest city 
after Manila, and owned by the Garcia family, a prominent business and 
political clan in the Visayas (Chua 1996). The Sun Star has 14 papers 
throughout the country plus one based in Manila and launched in 1999. 
Except for one government-run newspaper chain, all newspapers are 
privately owned. In the 1980s, journalists and entrepreneurs set up new 
papers to cater for the demand for news and information. Many of these 
papers eventually folded or were bought by prominent businesspeople. 
Within a few years, the owners of the nationally circulated newspapers 
were mainly businesspeople with a wide range of interests in other sectors 
of the economy. The exception is BusinessWorld, a respected business 
newspaper that is 70 per cent owned by its staff. Only four of the dozen 
broadsheets are profitable, the rest are subsidised by their owners, who 
finance loss-making newspapers for the prestige and influence they bring, 
giving credibility to the oft-repeated observation that Philippine 
newspapers are rich people's toys. 
Even though there are close to 30 national newspapers, their combined 
print run is small and has remained stagnant over the years. It is difficult 
to estimate exactly what total circulation figures are, as newspapers, with 
the exception of the Inquirer, refuse to be audited. The informal consensus 
in the newspaper industry, however, is that the total circulation of the 
Manila-based broadsheets and tabloids is about 1.5 million. This is small, 
even allowing for a pass-on readership of 10 persons per newspaper copy, 
given that the Philippine population breached the 70 million mark in 1998. 
In the last decade, while the real growth in terms of audience reach 
has been in radio and television, newspapers remain important in setting 






Source: 1996 Media Index. 





the broadcast media. Moreover, radio and TV take their cue from the 
broadsheets for reporting on news and public affairs. 
Much more than print, the broadcast media experienced dramatic 
growth since the fall of Marcos. In 1996, the national organisation of 
broadcasters, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP), 
reported 517 radio stations throughout the Philippines, of which 283 were 
AM stations. The bulk of these are commercial radio stations although 
the government has retained ownership of 32 AM and one FM station. 
There are eleven religious stations and five educational stations, most of 
them FM. AM radio is still the dominant format nationwide, except in 
Metro Manila where FM radio controls 68 per cent of the listeners (KBP 
Website and AC Nielsen 1997). 
The top radio station is DZRH, owned by the once fabulously wealthy 
Spanish mestizo Elizalde family. DZRH is 60 years old, and has maintained 
its leadership by combining witty and hard-hitting commentary with on-
the-spot news coverage-in contrast to the business clout of the Elizaldes 
which has been much diminished. The other top-rating AM stations 
(DZMM, DZRV and DZBB) offer much the same menu-a brew of news, 
commentary, pop music, and soap. On FM radio, the main fare is music. 
Radio is the medium with the greatest reach, with nearly all households 
owning a radio set. Radio is mainly broadcast in Tagalog and the other 
Philippine languages, although English is used by FM music stations. On 
the whole, radio reporting focuses on breaking news. There is no tradition 
of documentary or in-depth radio reporting in the Philippines. Radio 
commentators, much like newspaper columnists, have a wide following. 
Radio commentary, however, is known more for its piercing decibel level 
rather than its incisiveness or depth. 
In 1986, the government took control of the television stations as part 
of the drive to ferret out the 'illegal wealth' accumulated by Marcos and 
his associates. To this day, government-appointed boards still run two of 
six TV stations (RPN-9 and IBC -13) pending their eventual privatisation. 
While these boards occasionally interfere to ensure that news reporting 
toes the government line, the stations have much the same commercially 
oriented programming as the private networks. The government has also 
kept PTV-4 as the official government TV station, broadcasting shows in 
support of government programs and initiatives. 
Television and radio ownership (per cent) 
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Meanwhile, Channel 2 was handed back to its former owners, the 
Lopez family, who returned from exile in the United States after the fall 
of Marcos. The Lopez firm, ABS-CBN, turned Channel 2 into the most 
popular station through mass-oriented programming in Tagalog. The 
Lopezes run a diversified business empire that includes, apart from 
broadcasting, telecommunications, power, water and infrastructure. They 
also own radio station DZMM, the second largest in the country. In the 
Philippines, the owners of TV networks also operate radio stations, but 
they are banned from owning newspapers. 
Major television networks 
TV network Radio affiliate Owner 
ABS-CBN (Channel2) DZMM Lopez family 
PTV4 DZRB Official government 
station 
ABC-5 DWET(FM) Tan and Yuchengco 
families 
GMA-7 DZBB Jimenez family 
RPN-9 DWAN Taken over by gov't 
after 1986 
IBC-13 Taken over by gov't 
after 1986 
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In addition to the Manila-based networks which have a national reach, 
over 150 smaller TV stations operate in the provinces. There are also five 
UHF channels. Cable television has grown phenomenally in the 1990s, 
with some 300 cable operators currently operating throughout the 
Philippines at the end of the decade. The biggest among these is SkyCable, 
also owned by the Lopez family and accounting for about 60 per cent of 
some 450,000 cable subscriptions in 1996 (AC Nielsen 1997). The number 
is expected to double in the next 4 or 5 years, with SkyCable maintaining 
its lead. 
Until quite recently, the television audience was largely middle class 
and programming consisted mainly of canned US entertainment programs 
as well as local news and public affairs shows in English. In the 1980s, 
only a third of all Filipino households owned TV sets. But economic growth 
in the 1990s spurred the demand for television sets and other consumer 
goods. In the high-growth years of the 1990s, broadcasting executives 
estimated that Filipinos purchased some 500,000 new TV sets every year. 
The consumer boom fuelled an advertising boom that financed the 
expansion of television networks. In addition, the re-establishment of 
democracy brought about a keen interest in uncensored TV news and no-
holds-barred talk shows. A 1997 survey found that 84 per cent of Filipinos 
watched television, with the figure rising to 97 per cent in the capital (AC 
Nielsen 1997). 
The television explosion caused major shifts in programming. ABS-
CBN was the first to see the trend. From the bottom of the ratings chart in 
its first broadcast in October 1986, the station made it to the top in only 6 
months. By 1993, it had an audience share of 62 per cent. This phenomenal 
rise was due largely to how ABS-CBN re-engineered the concept of news 
and public affairs, producing glitzy, if often trivial, programs that focused 
on crime, sex and the occult rather than news. Its model was US television's 
'infotainment'. ABS-CBN also shifted to Tagalog and produced original 
programs in the local language instead of relying on shows provided by 
US distributors. The station was so successful that other networks soon 
followed suit. In the cut throat competition that ensued, ratings became 
the sole criterion for programming (Rimban 1996). 
Today what are passed off as news and public affairs programs are 
fast-paced accounts of such wonders as a man who cracks coconuts with 
his teeth, dwarves who walk on water, or politicians who dance the tango. 
The chat-show format was recast, with starlets, rape victims and criminals 
crowding out experts and officials. The voice of television was also 
modified-gone was the sober, serious tone. In its place, the voice has 
become chatty and often loud, arrogant, and hectoring. 
While the fortunes of ABS-CBN rose, those of the government networks 
felt in part because of mismanagement and corruption. Like privately 
owned networks, government stations are oriented toward profitability 
rather than education or public service. In the last decade, they have 
suffered from mediocre programming, diminished numbers of viewers 
and plummeting profitability (Tirol1999; Chua 1998). 
Continuing constraints 
While the freedom Filipino journalists enjoy is the envy of their colleagues 
elsewhere in Asia, there are also real impediments on their ability to report 
freely and responsibly. The most alarming is the high casualty rate of 
community journalists. Although Manila journalists can accuse the highest 
officials of grave wrongdoing, there is less tolerance for critical reporting 
in the provinces, particularly in areas where political bosses or clans have 
ruled for decades. The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists 
puts the number of Filipino journalists killed since 1986 at 33 (Committee 
to Protect Journalists 1998). It is difficult to say, however, how many of 
these were killed because of their work. To be sure, a number were victims 
of the waves of criminality that have swept the country. But many of them 
were murdered because of their journalism. 
One of the recent victims was Ferdinand Reyes, editor of Press Freedom, 
a weekly in Dipolog City, on Mindanao. Reyes was a crusading journalist 
who took on local officials, military officers, and even a faraway hotel 
that had mined the white sands of a local beach. He was only 33 years old 
when he was shot in his home on 12 February 1996. His killers have not 
been traced (Severino 1999). 
A similar fate befell Nesino Toling, founder and editor of the Panguil 
Bay Monitor, also on Mindanao island. Toling was gunned down in 1991, 
just three years after he started his independent paper that ran exposes 
on the abuses of local officials, including a town mayor whom Toling had 
accused of stealing steel beams intended to repair a local bridge. The mayor 
is one of the suspects in the journalist's murder which, to this day, nearly 
a decade later, remains unsolved (Rimban 1999a). Certainly, the impunity 
with which those wishing to silence journalists can operate contributes to 
the rising casualty count. The judicial and law-enforcement system in the 
Philippines is weak and prone to pressure from the wealthy and powerful, 
providing little protection for citizens, journalists included. 
Philippine libel laws, which are patterned after those of the United 
States, are less restrictive than those elsewhere. But this has not stopped 
officials and other parties who feel offended by critical reporting from 
filing harassment suits against journalists. Libel in the Philippines is both 
a civil and a criminal offense, with penalties ranging from six months to 
six years. Journalists can be jailed for what they have written, and the law 
provides that even publishers, business managers and the entire cast of 
editors in a newspaper may be included in a case. 
Fortunately, Philippine courts have tended to rule in favour of the 
freedom of journalists to report and comment. The Supreme Court has 
held that the media 
should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to 
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our 
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors 
usually have to race with their deadlines, and consistently with good 
faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a 
point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice 
of words (Coronel1991). 
In 1987, a Philippine Star columnist was sued by the then President 
Aquino, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, for 
reporting that she had been hiding under her bed as rebel troops 
surrounded the Palace, in one of the bloodiest coup attempts of her first 
years in power. It was a pivotal moment for Philippine politics which had 
been marked by persistent questioning of the ability of a former housewife 
to run the country, and command the armed forces. For Cory the suit was 
a deeply personal battle against her detractors. The lower court ruled in 
her favour but the Supreme Court later reversed the decision. 
In March 1999, President Estrada sued the Manila Times for PlOl million 
in damages for reporting that he was an 'unwitting godfather' to a 
supposedly anomalous power contract. Estrada withdrew the suit after 
the owner of the Manila Times apologised for the 'anxiety' caused by the 
story, although the paper stood by its report. 
While many high-profile cases are withdrawn before they get to court, 
lawsuits filed against small newspapers and little-known journalists are 
often tried. Court cases are time consuming and expensive and often a 
damper on critical reporting. They can also lead to prison sentences. In 
1997, journalist Joy Francisco, editor of a small weekly in Cotabato, was 
jailed after a local revenue official filed a case against her (Francisco 1997). 
The case had not yet been processed by the prosecutor but a warrant was 
already issued for her arrest, in clear defiance of court procedure. This 
was a case of 'local bosses' putting pressure on the courts, and journalists 
like Francisco, who work out of the protection of the limelight, are the 
most vulnerable. 
The threat of advertising withdrawals in retaliation for adverse 
reporting is commonplace. Television, which absorbs the largest share of 
advertising revenue, tends to be the most cautious about incurring the ire 
of advertisers. One of the largest advertisers is beer and tobacco magnate 
Lucio Tan whose firms spent some P1.6 billion in advertising in 1997. TV 
advertising managers say that Tan's policy is to air commercials only in 
programs considered friendly to the tycoon-a man who has been accused 
oftax evasion and of being a Marcos crony. In 1996, when ABS-CBN anchor 
Korina Sanchez read a news report detailing tax evasion charges against 
Tan, the businessman's tobacco company promptly pulled out its ads from 
her program (Rimban 1999b ). 
Tan's case is not unique. In 1997, the Philippine Long Distance 
Telephone Co. (PLDT), which for years ran a profitable 
telecommunications monopoly, withdrew its ads from a TV program 
which ran a story on how the firm was delaying interconnection with 
rival telephone companies (Rimban 199b). PLDT also pulled out its ads 
from Business World in 1993, after the paper ran critical reports about its 
monopolistic practices (Coronel1998). 
Article III(7) of the Philippine Constitution recognises 'the right of the 
people to information of matters of public concern'. It states that 'access 
to official records and documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, 
transactions, or decisions as well as to government research data used as 
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen'. Other pertinent 
laws guarantee public disclosure of information and make it the duty of 
public officials to release information. 
As a whole, Filipino officials tend to be more cooperative about 
releasing documents and information than many officials elsewhere in 
the region. Some government agencies even entertain information requests 
over the phone, although most require a written letter of request. But 
problematic areas remain. Officials are often not cooperative about 
releasing sensitive information, especially in the provinces. They normally 
delay disclosure for weeks or months or else provide only incomplete 
documents. 
The quality of information that is made public often falls short of 
journalists' expectations. Partly this is because government recordkeeping 
is bad, but it is also because disclosure laws are sometimes a disincentive 
to filing complete or truthful information. For example, all government 
officials are required to file statements of assets and to release these to the 
public. But because journalists have used these statements to write reports 
on corruption or the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, officials have 
tended to fudge their declarations or to leave out assets that may rouse 
the suspicions of inquisitive reporters. 
Moreover, while there is a constitutional provision that guarantees 
disclosure, there is no freedom of information law that will ensure that 
the constitutional mandate is implemented. There is no system of appeal 
if requests for disclosure are turned down. Recourse can only be made 
through the courts and that means expensive and time-consuming 
litigation. The Philippine judicial system is clogged with cases and lawsuits 
often take years before they are decided. 
Some conclusions 
The problems of the Philippine media have less to do with state control 
than with the anarchy of a crowded and competitive market. Respect for 
a free press is institutionalised in the constitution and the law, and is deeply 
ingrained in the political culture. Most Filipino journalists agree that the 
killings of their colleagues in the provinces do not form a pattern of state 
repression. Rather, they appear to be isolated incidents that have more to 
do with the configurations of power and the breakdown of law and order 
in specific localities. In this sense, the problem is a weak state unable to 
enforce the rules and to protect its citizens. 
It is interesting to note that in the late 1990s, those who wished to 
control or silence the press were using market forces rather than state 
control. Increasingly sophisticated methods of controlling or influencing 
the media may serve as a good example of the novel forms the threats to 
press freedom can take in new democracies. One is 'envelopmental 
journalism' or the systematic bribing of journalists by business and 
government agencies to ensure favourable coverage. It is also well known 
that some journalists are on the monthly payroll of politicians or private 
companies. 
Special pay-offs are made during periods like elections or the launching 
of new products. The bribes are so discreet that they are now often coursed 
through automated teller machines, so as not to leave a paper trail. Instead 
of openly distributing envelopes of cash or handing out checks, more 
sophisticated PR practitioners have resorted to depositing the bribes 
directly in the bank accounts of journalists, or more discreetly, the accounts 
of their friends or relatives (Hofilena 1998). But in whatever form the 
pay-offs are made, they result in some stories bemg silenced while others 
are unduly highlighted. 
Another way to muzzle the press is by pressuring media proprietors. 
Ownership is the true chink in the armor of the Philippine media. The 
fact that most of the media are owned by big business houses makes them 
especially vulnerable to intervention from government or business. At 
the giant ABS-CBN, for example, the news department's unwritten rules 
say that topics that have some sort of connection with the extensive 
business holdings of the Lopez family, the network's owner, have to be 
treated carefully. This becomes difficult because the Lopezes are involved 
in, among other things, public utilities-from electric power to telephones 
to water. Moreover, the recent marriage of a member of the family to a 
daughter of President Estrada means that the network has to tread 
carefully when reporting on the president as well. In the Philippines, family 
and business interests often overcome most other considerations. 
Neither former Presidents Aquino and Ramos exploited the 
vulnerability of media owners. But Estrada, angry at a barrage of negative 
media reporting, has made his displeasure known to media proprietors 
and has not baulked at pressuring them to tone down critical coverage. In 
February 1999, he criticised the owner of the Standard on the telephone 
for a news report that insinuated that he was using a BMW that belonged 
to a congressman known for brokering shady deals. Enrique Razon Jr., 
who owns 50 per cent of the paper, was contrite and offered to fire his 
editors. After all, he runs a company that has cornered major contracts 
for servicing ports throughout the country (Coronel1999). 
Since the re-establishment of democracy in 1986, Estrada is the first 
Philippine president to employ non-state mechanisms systematically 'to 
clamp down on a critical press. In addition to putting pressure on the 
businesses of media proprietors, the president's open encouragement of 
an advertising boycott of the Inquirer was decried by citizens and media 
groups as a threat to press freedom. The manipulation of advertising 
budgets is another way in which the proxy battle between the government 
and the press is being waged. 
Estrada, himself a former film star and movie producer, encouraged 
movie producers in July 1999 not to place ads in the Inquirer, which he 
said was unfairly critical of his administration. In addition, big companies 
with huge advertising budgets and sympathetic to the President have 
withdrawn ads from the paper (Asiaweek, 6 August 1999). 
All these methods-bribery, pressure on owners and the withdrawal 
of advertising-silence the press in various ways and reduce the diversity 
of voices that can be heard by the public. The new-generation tactics, 
however, involve the 'privatisation' of media repression, allowing Estrada 
to argue that the government is not clamping down on the press. Rather 
than state mechanisms, so-called market forces are being used to silence 
critical reporting. 
These developments have divided the journalist's community. Some 
newspapers and journalists argue that ad pullouts and the sale of 
newspapers are private initiatives that do not constitute a threat to press 
freedom. Others, however, are more critical of the government and accuse 
it of conducting a sustained campaign to intimidate the media. They think 
media corruption is insidious and harmful because it hampers the media's 
capability to report freely and responsibly. 
There has been a public outcry about Estrada's attempts to clamp down 
on the press. Even if divided, Filipino journalists can rely on broad public 
support to defend a free press. But journalists also have to show greater 
responsibility if they want continuing public sympathy. There have been 
some attempts to address the problems of ethics and professionalism 
through a Codes of Ethics and training programs that improve 
investigative and reporting skills. But most observers of the Philippine 
media think these efforts do not suffice. After 12 years of democracy, they 
realise that it takes time-and great effort-to build a truly professional 
corps of journalists. But they also know that professional journalism is 
possible only if the press is free. 
Media organisations 
., Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP or the Association 
of Filipino Broadcasters). Formed in 1973, shortly after the declaration 
of martial law, the KBP is the trade organisation for the broadcast media. 
At the outset, the KBP-supposedly a self-regulatory body composed 
of industry representatives-was a fiction to mask government control 
of broadcasting. But the KBP was able to overcome initial difficulties 
and contribute to the professionalisation of broadcasting by drafting a 
Code of Ethics that became the basis for self-regulation. It also 
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cooperates with the government in airing 'developmental messages' 
on such issues as AIDS awareness, drug prevention and other 
government programs. The KBP' s Standards Authority acts as a quasi-
judicial body and can impose fines and reprimands for violation of its 
code on such matters as decency and violence. It also sets a cap on the 
volume of advertising per broadcast hour. Website: www.kbp.org.ph 
" Press Institute . The association of newspaper 
publishers was formed in 1964 to represent the interests of the 
newspaper industry, to raise ethical and professional standards, and 
to provide support for community newspapers that make up the bulk 
of the institute's membership. The PPI set up a Press Council in 1965 
to investigate ethical violations. Both the PPI and the Press Council 
closed down with the declaration of martial law. The PPI was reopened 
in 1987 and the Press Council was reconvened in 1993 but with a much 
more focused scope to investigate complaints involving the right to 
reply. The PPI has drafted a Code of Ethics and conducts regular 
seminars to upgrade ethical and professional standards. Website: 
www.pressasia.org /PFA/ members I index.html/ 
" National Press Club (NPC). An association of more than 1,500 
individual reporters, the NPC was formed in 1954. Over the years, 
depending on the inclinations of its leadership, the NPC has sometimes 
taken a stand on press freedom and ethical issues but in recent years 
has become a purely social club. 
" Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR). Founded in 
1989 as a private, independent initiative to monitor the media, the 
CMFR publishes a quarterly review of the press, the Philippine 
Journalism Review. It also conducts seminars and workshops on issues 
concerning the media and brings journalists together for consensus-
building discussions. The Center is a non-profit organisation with a 
board of trustees composed of academics, journalists and 
businesspeople. Website: www.cmfr.com.ph/ 
" Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ). An 
independent, non-profit media organisation that specialises in 
investigative reporting, the PCIJ was founded in 1989 by journalists 
who saw the need for newspapers and broadcast agencies to go beyond 
routine, day-to-day reportage. The PCIJ was set up to promote 
investigative reporting and to create a culture within the Philippine 
media. The Center funds investigative projects, publishes books on 
current issues and manuals on reporting, and publishes a quarterly 
investigative reporting magazine. It also organises training seminars 
for journalists in the Philippines and the region. Website: www.pcij.org/ 
Information lockdown, business as usual 
Garry Rodan 
ithin the neat, high rise towers of 
Singapore's economic success sit 
hundreds of thousands of personal 
computers, the gateways into the 
global information age in one of the world's most technologically 
sophisticated societies. Yet, behind the gentle whirring of the browsers 
and the email, lie the gatekeepers of the global information age, the officials 
of the Singapore government. Earlier this year, that government wandered 
into almost half of the 400,000 computers of Internet users, without their 
knowledge, in what was explained as a sweep for computer viruses. Five 
years earlier a similar search of private and business computer files was 
attributed to a crack down on pornography. By the year 2000, through the 
government-contracted Singapore One Cable Network, all 750,000 
households on the island will be connected to a comprehensive national 
computer web, including broadband coaxial and optical fibre networks, 
linking homes to businesses, schools, government departments and 
libraries. In the world's first fully interactive nation state, all citizens will 
have the facility to carry out commercial transactions, access interactive 
services and communicate with each other via the Internet. And the 
Singapore government will have cyber access to every home on the island. 
Confounding the theorists 
For decades Singapore has fascinated political observers with its 
apparently contradictory mix of free market capitalism and political 
controls-Asia's big brother or big father society was making it in the 
freewheeling international marketplace. Founding Prime Minister, Lee 
Kuan Yew, contributed significantly to the regional debate of the mid 1980s 
to the late 1990s over Asian values. Lee Kuan Yew argued that in Singapore 
the curtailing of western-style freedoms such as freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press met a 'higher' goal of social stability in turn paving 
the way for rapid economic development. Thus, a government had the 
moral right to curtail an individual's freedoms in exchange for economic 
rights, the right to be richer and more comfortable in Singapore's carefully 
planned high rise residential developments. Critics contended that 
Singapore worked only because of its size-Singapore was confounding 
conventional political theory because it was small enough to manage, more 
a moderate sized modern city than a nation. 
But, as Asia enters the new millennium Singapore seems poised to 
confound theorists yet again, this time by defying the explosive forces for 
change unleashed by rapid developments in information technology. 
While other authoritarian governments are chasing dissidents flashing 
ideas and information across the Internet and attempting to build 
electronic firewalls when the fire is already burning, the Singapore 
government is building the entire system itself. While there is considerable 
evidence to demonstrate that new information technology has directly 
contributed to the collapse of authoritarian regimes, Singapore is applying 
sophisticated strategies to control both the local and foreign media. 
Ironically, Singapore is poised to become the world's second-most 
dominant information society, after the United States, by the year 2000 
(Chellam 1999), yet there are no signs of media controls being loosened. 
What is lost to the local population is not just freedom of speech to a 
political end, but the right to scrutinise the economy, including the 
investments worth S$100 billion dollars made by the government using 
tax payers' money (Ong 1999). 
Singapore's impressive economic development over recent decades 
has been accompanied by a tight regime of controls over all media, 
including the Internet. While the East Asian economic crisis, which began 
in 1997, has fuelled forces for political change elsewhere, the comparatively 
moderate impact of the crisis on Singapore has strengthened the 
authorities' belief that existing social and political systems are essential 
to the country's economic well-being. 
This is not to say there are no challenges ahead for Singapore's leaders. 
In particular, the ambitious new goal of turning the city-state into an 
international finance centre could entail functional, if not political, pressure 
for a freer media. Is it any coincidence that leading international finance 
centres such as London, New York and Frankfurt boast free and critical 
media? Yet Singapore is already an important Asian media centre. Thus 
far, then, a flourishing volume and range of media forms and activities 
have been reconciled with selective and strategic control over information 
and critical analysis. Against this background, the capacity of authorities 
to respond to new challenges should not be underestimated. 
Any understanding of how media operate in Singapore must be 
coupled with an appreciation of the political system. Uninterrupted rule 
by the People's Action Party (PAP) since self-government in 1959 has 
involved the establishment, and consolidation, of a state that 
systematically limits political competition. The space for critics and 
opponents of the PAP is highly conditional and channelled almost 
exclusively through the controlled electoral process. Organisations that 
engage in politics are expected to be specifically registered for that 
purpose, otherwise they risk dissolution under the Societies Act. 
Individuals who publicly criticise the government are challenged to join 
a political party and warned not to use independent social organisations 
as a front for a 'hidden agenda'. Thus, critical comments about 
amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act in 1986 by Law 
Society office bearers aroused official rebuke (Duthie 1986), followed by 
changes to the Legal Profession Act. This prohibited the Society from, 
inter alia, commenting on existing or proposed legislation unless the 
government specifically requested its views (Seow 1997). Similarly, 
novelist Catherine Lim's (1994) lamenting in a Sunday Times article that 
Goh Chok Tong's promise of a more consensual approach was not 
materialising sparked a series of fierce public denunciations by the Prime 
Minister (Chua 1994; Fernandez 1994). The concept of 'out-of-bounds' or 
OB limits to public engagement was introduced with Lee Kuan Yew 
declaring '[y]ou want to move the OB markers, then you come out (into 
politics) and persuade the electorate' (Ng 1995). 
This suppression of civil society deprives opposition parties of the 
opportunity to forge social links and to mobilise support through interest 
groups. The political risk of elections for the ruling party is thereby 
considerably reduced. 
Within this system, there is also little scope for critical media. Contests 
with, and challenges to, the ruling party through the media are regarded 
as covert political activities which should also be reserved for the electoral 
process. Nevertheless, the domestic media loom large in Singapore politics, 
being systematically harnessed to the exercise of explaining PAP policy 
and generating support for it. As the government and local editors admit 
without apology, they are partners in nation building. Local newspapers 
are full of bland reports on community-based activities, the pinnacle of 
which seems to be the annual 'Singapore Swing' dance in the city streets, 
as well as self-congratulatory articles on upstanding members of society. 
Meanwhile, editors and reporters from the international media have learnt 
to report cautiously on local affairs or face the consequences of costly 
legal cases and commercially injurious circulation limits. 
In neighbouring Indonesia and Malaysia, economic and political crises 
in the last two years have dealt major blows to the credibility, and 
effectiveness, of government-controlled media. The appetite for accurate 
and speedy accounts of the tumultuous recent events drew domestic 
populations to alternative sources of information, such as Internet 'culls' 
of more critical reports from foreign publications bounced back into both 
Malaysia and Indonesia. There has been no parallel in Singapore. 
Nevertheless, the regional crisis has set in train an unprecedented 
emphasis by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and 
influential economic analysts on the importance of transparency. With 
international investors in mind, the Singapore government has been quick 
to embrace the rhetoric of transparency. This language at least gives 
advocates of a freer media in Singapore something to exploit. If 
international business in Singapore were seriously committed to a 
comr.rehensive transparency agenda, and valued the role of a free media 
to it, the prospects of some change might be enhanced. Thus far, there is 
no evidence of either. 
The local press remains tongue tied 
At the beginning of self-government in 1959 and well into the 1960s, 
Singapore boasted a wide range of independent newspapers. These 
provided a significant measure of scrutiny and critical examination of 
public policies and issues, and newspapers owned and run by families or 
individuals were relatively free from government intrusion. However, 
sensitivity to media reporting intensified after 1961 as the PAP set about 
defeating its formal political opponents, the breakaway Baris anN asional 
(BS). Incrementally, a new regime was installed through a combination of 
pressures on media organisations and journalists. This included general 
harassment of journalists, some of whom were detained under the Internal 
Security Act (ISA), such as four senior executives of the Chinese-language 
daily Nanyang Siang Pau, and the closure of the English-language dailies 
Eastern Sun and the Herald (Seow 1998). Under the ISA, suspected 
subversives can be detained without trial and the relevant minister is 
empowered to prohibit the printing, publication, and sale, inter alia, of 
subversive publications (Seow 1998). But, it was structural changes to the 
newspaper industry which had the most profound and lasting impact. 
The decisive step was a set of amendments to the Newspapers and 
Printing Presses Act (NPPA) in 1974. The official rationale for the changes 
was to 'safeguard public interest by ensuring undesirable foreign elements 
do not gain control of our newspapers and use them against the welfare 
of our society' (Hansard quoted in Seow 1998). The amendments required 
the compulsory divestiture of ownership shareholdings, which allowed 
governments to own newspapers, and forced all newspaper organisations 
· to become public companies. It also created different classes of shares-
ordinary and management-with the latter carrying more votes and 
owned only by people approved by the Ministry of Culture (as it was 
then known). Subsequently, in 1977, a further amendment prevented any 
person from owning more than three per cent of the ordinary stock issued 
by a newspaper. The purpose of the amendments was to ensure that 
private families and individuals could no longer own newspapers and 
that the government could secure reliable management of the press. 
In the early 1980s, the government's ability to control the local media 
was extended further through a major restructuring, in the guise of 
commercial rationalisation. This involved the establishment of a new 
government-initiated company, Singapore Monitor Ltd., to produce a new 
English-language afternoon daily to complement The Straits Times. 
Meanwhile, leading daily Chinese-language rivals, Nanyang Siang Pau 
and Sing Chew fit Poh, were merged into a single holding company, 
Singapore News and Publications Ltd. (SNPL), of which the Singapore 
Monitor became a subsidiary. The management of SNPL was entrusted 
to senior government officials. By March 1983, Sin Chew fit Poh and 
Nanyang Siang Pau had been replaced by two new dailies-Lin He Zaobao 
(United Morning News) and Lian He Wanbao (United Evening News). These 
changes meant there were now two newspaper groups, each producing a 
morning and afternoon daily in English or Chinese. However, the 
concentration of ownership and control of Singapore's press was 
consolidated further still when in 1984 the Straits Times group, which 
comprised the Straits Times Press and its sister company Times Publishing, 
merged with the SNPL to form Singapore Press Holdings (SPH). 
Capitalised at S$1.4 billion (US$660 million), it constituted the largest 
industrial group in Singapore and the country's sixth largest listed 
company (Lent 1984). 
This restructuring cemented, what was by then, a powerful capacity 
by government to exert control over domestic newspapers. The subsequent 
purchase in 1995 by SPH of Tamil Murasu made the holding company the 
ingapore media profile 
Today there are eight daily newspapers in Singapore: The Straits 
Times, The New Paper and The Business Times (English); Lianhe Wanbao, 
Shin Min Daily News and Lianhe Zaoboa (Chinese}; Berita Harian (Malay); 
and Tamil Murasu (Tamil). All of these publications have online editions 
and all but The Business Times produce a Sunday edition. Daily circulation 
of newspapers has risen steadily from 743,334 in 1988 to 1,054,802 by 
the end of 1998. The greatest gains have been made by English-language 
publications, the daily circulation of which rose from 340,401 to 530,628 
in the same period. By the early 1990s, this eclipsed daily circulation of 
Chinese-language dailies, which increased from 354,840 to 454,651 over 
the decade. The Straits Times is the dominant English-language 
newspaper, with a daily circulation in 1998 of around 396,000 and an 
estimated total daily readership in 1997 of 1,228,000. Lianhe Zaoboa is 
the Chinese-language equivalent, with daily circulation in 1998 of 203,000 
and a total daily readership in 1997 of 696,000 (Singapore Press Holdings 
1999). These figures tower over the circulation of the publications 
servicing Singapore's minority ethnic groups. Nevertheless, between 
1988 and 1999, daily Malay-language newspaper circulation grew from 
42,458 to 59,690 and Tamil-language newspaper circulation rose from 
5,635 to 9,833 (Singapore Department of Statistics 1999). Significantly, 
the advent of the Asian crisis has not stymied the growth of the local 
press. 
owner of all daily newspapers published in Singapore. SPH has used its 
massive capital base to ensure the highest technological standards of 
production and the commercial prospects of the group remain extremely 
bright. 
While journalists working for the SPH group are well paid and have 
excellent infrastructure, they operate within a political context that 
conditions reporting and editorial orientation. This is most conspicuous 
in the lengthy and uncritical reproduction of government policy and 
ideological statements. Equally, the government's critics or detractors are 
often lampooned, ignored, or alternately, subjected to a relentless scrutiny 
of the sort those actually wielding power in Singapore are spared. In recent 
times there has been some increased space for non-establishment (but not 
opposition) figures to express criticisms of government policy through 
the forum pages of local newspapers. In the main, though, this concerns 
details of policy rather than any fundamental challenge to the PAP agenda 
or philosophy. By contrast, local press coverage of regional and 
international affairs is of a high standard. Even local business reporting 
is, within limits, of a reasonable standard-invariably more probing in its 
exposure and scrutiny of private organisations not under the considerable 
umbrella of government-linked companies. 
Charges against Singapore's government-controlled press of political 
interference are common from neighbours, especially Malaysia. 
Throughout 1998 there was a string of complaints from Kuala Lumpur 
about negative reporting from Singapore's domestic media, including 
reports on the new international airport, tourism and the economy. Similar 
accusations are made from Singapore about reporting in Malaysia's 
government-controlled media. 
One of the latest episodes concerns an editorial in the 18 June 1999 
edition of Singapore's The Business Times. Among other things, in an 
analysis of issues surrounding a looming Malaysian election, the editorial 
lamented the possibility that Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir would 
'end up hogging the stage for longer than he should'. Singapore Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong's Press Secretary, Ong Keng Yong (1999), 
subsequently wrote to The Business Times describing the editorial as 'rash, 
unwise and inappropriate'. Essentially, the problem is not so much one of 
poor reporting. Rather, it is in frank and critical analysis of the region 
where local journalism is generally at its best. However, given that both 
governments understand the degrees of control each exert over local 
media, critical reports are invariably interpreted as having an imprimatur. 
At times, these conflicts can also be a useful way of shoring up nationalism 
and diverting attention from domestic issues. 
The international press bites its tongue 
The Singapore government was irritated by critical international press 
reporting in the 1960s and 1970s, but it did not seriously dedicate itself to 
combating it until the mid 1980s. With the domestic press now well under 
control, and against a background of a general election in 1984 in which 
the government vote slipped 13 per cent, authorities embarked on a clever 
and effective strategy to curb critical coverage of local affairs. The essence 
of this strategy has been to exploit the commercial instincts of international 
media organisations. Despite Singapore's size, its educated and affluent 
population represents a prize market for English-language publications 
in Asia-at least as much for its advertising dollar as its circulation sales. 
Costly legal cases have combined with measures to restrict access to this 
lucrative market to enforce a high degree of self-censorship among even 
the most reputable international media organisations operating in 
Singapore. 
Under amendments to the NPPA in 1986, the Minister of 
Communications (now Information) can restrict the local circulation.of 
newspapers published outside Singapore considered 'engaging in the 
domestic politics of Singapore'. Conveniently vague, the meaning of this 
phrase is a matter of the Minister's discretion. This of course leaves editors 
guessing where the line of tolerance might be drawn. The Act was further 
amended in 1988 to allow the reproduction and sale of restricted, or 
'gazetted' publications in Singapore, on the proviso that advertisements 
are deleted. On this basis, the Singapore government rejects claims that it 
is obstructing critical comment. Instead, it contends, it is merely preventing 
newspapers and magazines from commercially profiting by 'engaging in 
the domestic politics of Singapore'. Additional amendments in 1990 
introduced an annual permit system for 'foreign publications', involving 
a substantial bond that could be drawn on to cover any legal liabilities 
incurred in the local courts as a result of an offending story. Each 
publication was then required to appoint an agent in Singapore to ensure 
legal action encompassed the publisher as well as other parties, such as 
the author and distributor. 
During the mid-to-late 1980s, TIME, Far Eastern Economic Review, The 
Economist, Asian Wall Street Journal and Asiaweek all incurred substantial 
circulation cuts-often amounting to de facto bans. With the exception of 
the case involving the Far Eastern Economic Review, a central theme to the 
disputes was the Singapore government's assertion of the right for its 
replies to articles to be published in' offending' publications. At that time, 
Fred Zimmerman, of the Asian Wall Street Journal, insisted 
[i]t is the fundamental condition of a free press that newspapers should 
be free to decide what they will print without fear or favour from any 
external source, and that it is the judgement of the editor and not the 
dictates of any government which should determine what appears in 
the newspaper (quoted in Dow Jones & Co. 1990). 
In conjunction with circulation cuts, various international journalists were 
expelled or had their visa applications denied. A string of legal actions 
were also exchanged between the government and publishers, including 
an unsuccessful attempt by Dow Jones to challenge circulation restrictions 
imposed on the Asian Wall Street Journal. 
Despite the initial protests by members of the international press, by 
the early 1990s they had resigned themselves to the special conditions 
associated with reporting on Singapore. Government responses were being 
printed in full and, under new Vice-President Karen House, Dow Jones 
withdrew an appeal against a court decision in favour of Lee Kuan Yew. 
The Singapore government reciprocated by gradually restoring circulation 
levels and in 1997 granted the Far Eastern Economic Review permission to 
again locate a correspondent in the city-state. Without doubt, exclusion 
from the strategic Singapore market inflicted economic pain on these 
publications. Commercially, it made little sense to be in Asia but not in 
Singapore. 
An equally effective means of discouraging critical reporting is the 
pursuit of publications through defamation, libel and contempt of court 
cases. The International Herald Tribune has been the major casualty of this 
practice. The first suit was in reaction to an article written by Philip 
Bowring entitled 'The claims about Asian values don't bear scrutiny', 
published on 2 August 1994. Lawyers for Lee Kuan Yew and his son, 
Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, complained to the Tribune that 
irculation of Singapore's media 
For the full year of 1998, average weekly circulation for specialist 
regional publications of Asiaweek was 15,867, The Economist 11,482 and 
Far Eastern Economic Review 7,892, while TIME, which now produces an 
Asian edition, averaged 30,181. The average daily copies sold by the 
Asian Wall Street Journal was 8,078 and for the International Herald Tribune 
6,348 (Hong Kong Audit Bureau of Circulations 1999; US Audit Bureau 
of Circulations 1999; UK Audit Bureau of Circulations 1999). 
the piece inferred that nepotism was responsible for Lee junior's political 
rise. Although the Tribune published an apology which many observers 
believed unwarranted, this didn't appease the Lees. Instead, the 
newspaper finished up in court and ultimately had to pay S$950,000 in 
total damages, with Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong joining in on the action. 
Subsequently, in response to the 7 October 1994 edition of the Tribune 
carrying a piece by Christopher Lingle, an American academic at the 
National University of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew embarked on further 
law suits. Lingle had observed in 'The smoke over parts of Asia obscures 
some profound concerns' that some authoritarian regimes in the region 
use 'a compliant judiciary to bankrupt opposition politicians'. Lee 
interpreted this as an oblique reference to Singapore and the Singapore 
government mounted contempt of court actions against Lingle, the Tribune 
and the newspaper's distributors. Lee himself took civil libel suits out 
against Lingle and the executives of the Tribune. 
Significantly, there was no attempt by the Tribune to defend its actions 
on the grounds of fair comment. This was deplored by leading 
international jurist and human rights activist Michael Kirby (Merritt 1995). 
Yet again Singapore's courts showed little mercy on the Tribune for coming 
quietly. All defendants in the action by the government were found guilty 
of contempt of court by way of 'scandalising the Singapore judiciary' 
(Lague 1995). The fines and costs amounted to in excess of S$100,000. 
Additionally, in Lee's separate action, damages of S$100,000 were 
awarded. After the major showdowns between publishers and the 
Singapore government over how local affairs are reported, international 
newspapers and magazines have been able to restore circulation levels-
their lessons learned. 
While circulation cuts and costly legal actions vividly demonstrate 
government preparedness to punish reporting it finds unacceptable, these 
measures are intended to foster self-censorship, and avoid more draconian 
measures. For the most part, this is how things work as editors cautiously 
interpret the nebulous concept of 'engaging in the domestic politics of 
Singapore'. Periodically, however, miscalculations occur, serving only to 
instil even greater caution thereafter. The Tribune cases centred on two of 
the most sensitive topics-the interests of the Lee family and the 
judiciary-where there is virtually no margin for critical reporting. The 
net effect of the punitive consequences of upsetting authorities has resulted 
in most major international press organisations routinely drawing on legal 
advice before publishing reports that even remotely contain critical or 
sensitive content. 
Self-censorship in Singapore is also encouraged by less conspicuous 
means. Employment passes are renewed on an annual basis, with an 
official policy of two to three years maximum stay. This is, however, 
selectively waived-apparently as a reward to those journalists deemed 
to have shown due sensitivity. The Ministry of Information and the Arts 
(MITA) has an extensive infrastructure monitoring in great detail what is 
being reported by international journalists. Official and unofficial 
communications through letters and phone calls-either from MITA or 
the Prime Minister's office-quickly educate journalists of this. Even the 
tone of an article can be enough to precipitate a phone call. These calls are 
not always hostile, and indeed sometimes quite friendly. But they 
invariably impress upon journalists that their reports are the subject of 
intense scrutiny. Journalists are also acutely aware of the possibility that 
their telephone conversations are being tapped. 
The impact of this working environment means international media 
organisations-in varying degrees-fail to employ the same standards of 
investigative and critical reporting as elsewhere. One of the clearest 
illustrations of the way the international media has' acclimatised' itself to 
local conditions was the coverage in 1996 of the controversial discounts 
on purchases of luxury private condominiums received by Senior Minister 
Lee and his family from HPL Limited. Reports were almost uniformly 
descriptive, repeatedly making the point that nothing illegal had occurred. 
The critical question of political morality was almost totally ignored-
something one journalist volunteered he would elsewhere make the central 
issue in such a case (Rodan 1998). Details of the extent of Lee family 
purchases of private condominiums were eventually revealed in 1998 in 
an obscure offshore publication entitled Singaporeans for Democracy, 
produced by an organisation of the same name (Singaporeans for 
Democracy 1998). 
The paradox is that none of these obstacles to the free practice of 
journalism have prevented Singapore from becoming Southeast Asia's 
pre-eminent media centre. How do we explain this? The answer lies in 
the fact that reporting on Singapore at all, let alone specifically on 
potentially controversial social and political issues, represents a minuscule 
component of total international media activities from the city-state. The 
vast bulk of reporting is either about the region or involves business data 
and information that steers well clear of the government's concerns. 
Singapore's advanced infrastructure renders it a very attractive base for 
regional reporting and Singapore boasted a total of 203 accredited 
correspondents and camera crews representing 73 international media 
organisations by the end of 1998. 
Broadcasting: business is business 
Over 90 per cent of Singaporean households own radios. The average 
number of daily hours of collective radio transmission increased from 
653 to 2,828 between 1988 and 1998 (Singapore Department of Statistics 
1999). A total of 18 domestic radio stations are available through Radio 
Corporation of Singapore (RCS), NTUC Media Cooperative Limited, 
SAFRA Radio, the National Arts Council (NAC) and the commercially 
run Rediffusion (Singapore) Pte Ltd, all of which are wholly or partly 
government owned. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World 
Service is also available on a local radio frequency-the only foreign free-
to-air and completely independent station in Singapore. Foreign 
programming, including German, French and Japanese, is available on 
an international radio station operated by RCS. 
There are four terrestrial channels operated by the government-owned 
Television Corporation of Singapore (TCS) and Singapore Television 
Twelve Pte Ltd (STV12). In addition, Singaporeans have access to all three 
Malaysian free-to-air channels-the government-owned RTM1, RTM2 and 
TV3. Terrestrial television licenses increased from 554,133 in 1988 to 
704,296 a decade later (Singapore Department of Statistics 1999). TCS 
captures in excess of 90 per cent of the population and has a weekly 
audience reach of 82 per cent (Foo and Kwok 1999). 
In broadcasting, though, it is undoubtedly the dramatic developments 
in satellite and cable television throughout the 1990s that are most 
noteworthy. The Singapore government continues to ban satellite 
television for all but selective business and diplomatic uses domestically. 
However, beginning in 1993 it started promoting the city-state as a regional 
base for the penetration of satellite and cable television markets in the 
rest of the region. Thus far it has attracted some 20 private broadcasters, 
including such major international networks as CNBC Asia, Discovery 
Asia, ESPN Star Sports, Walt Disney Television, Sony Entertainment 
Television (SET), Home Box Office Asia and BBC Worldwide. 
The minor exceptions the government makes for domestic access to 
satellite television are explained in terms of the commercial imperative of 
up-to-the-minute information. But the government is also dedicated to 
preserving what it refers to as 'cultural values' and is not prepared to 
leave this to market forces (George 1994). It is therefore putting in place a 
comprehensive cable system to meet domestic demand for international 
broadcasts. This way it retains the technical ability to screen out 
'objectionable' material. Cable television in Singapore is run by a 
conglomerate called Singapore Cable Vision (SCV). This is comprised of 
the three state companies Singapore International Media (31 per cent) 
Singapore Technologies Ventures (24 per cent), Singapore Press Holdings 
(20 per cent), and the third largest cable operator in the United States, 
Continental Cablevision (25 per cent). Currently it offers 46 channels, but 
when the infrastructure is completed, SCV will be able to offer around 70 
channels to all Singaporean households. Cablevision subscriptions have 
risen from 22,214 when the medium was introduced in 1993 to 144,000 by 
the end of 1998 (Singapore Department of Statistics 1999). CNN, CNBC 
and BBC World can be received through SCV's single cable news network. 
To date, self-censorship among international companies eager to secure 
a position in the Singapore market has avoided the need for authorities to 
exercise much direct control over the content of cable television companies. 
CNN has gone as far as to alerting SCV of potentially sensitive material, 
as it did before screening coverage of a report involving US teenager 
Michael Fay who was caned after being found guilty of vandalising cars 
in Singapore (Atkins 1995). More generally, cable service providers have 
offered material that is either apolitical, such as music or sport, or that is 
family oriented and reinforces the sort of conservative values championed 
in government rhetoric. These companies are demonstrating the pragmatic 
nature of business; that there are profits to be made from accommodating 
rather than challenging authoritarian leaders in Asia. 
Nevertheless, in March 1999, TCS launched an 18 hour all-news free-
to-air television channel-Channel News Asia (CNA). The express 
purpose of the new station, as explained by George Yeo, Minister for 
Communications and the Arts between November 1990 and June 1999, is 
to provide an 'Asian viewpoint' on current events. The advertisements 
preceding the station's launch proclaimed that CNA understands the 
region's sensitivities and complexities (Dolven and Granitsas 1999). The 
government views with alarm the enhanced stature and influence of 
foreign satellite and cable television, linked to dramatic coverage of the 
tumultuous events in the region associated with the Asian crisis. Yeo 
remarked in parliament on 12 May 1999, '[j]ust look at the way foreign 
channels have become part of the domestic politics in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. We should worry for ourselves' (Fernandez 1999). 
The Singapore government was especially irritated by international 
media coverage of the civil disobedience campaign of oppositionist Chee 
Soon Juan. Chee, Secretary-General of the Singapore Democratic Party, 
was twice jailed in early 1999 for speaking in a public place without a 
permit and refusing to pay fines for the offence. Yeo could not conceal his 
annoyance that editors would take Chee' s push for free speech so seriously: 
'[w]e have witnessed many interviews on CNBC and BBC with some 
populist politicians in Singapore of late for frivolous causes' (Associated 
Press 1999). The Minister put international cable television stations 
operating in Singapore on notice that there would need to be less coverage 
of government critics by the time of the next election. Yeo added,'[ d]uring 
election time, the rules of campaigning must apply to these foreign 
channels, as they apply to TCS and STV 12. Otherwise, some candidates 
may be tempted to lobby channels or even buy airtime from them' 
(Fernandez 1999). Exactly what that might entail is not clear. The practice 
that has been adopted by government-controlled media is for broadcasting 
time for political parties to be allocated in proportion to the number of 
candidates they are running at an election. The concept of 'right of reply' 
would be technically difficult to impose on this medium (Political & 
Economic Risk Consultancy 1999). 
The promotion of cable television is one component of a broader 
government strategy to transform Singapore into a leading global 
information technology society. Through the Singapore One cable network, 
all750,000 households on the island will be connected to a comprehensive 
computer network by the end of 2000. Households, businesses, schools, 
government departments, libraries and statutory authorities will be 
electronically inter-linked to facilitate commercial and other transactions, 
as well as interactive services and communication through the Internet. 
According to Yeo (1995), this infrastructure drive is necessary for Singapore 
to 'remain a junction for goods, services, people, information and ideas' 
in the 21st century. But as with other electronic media, the government's 
aggressive promotion of the Internet is fundamentally driven by 
commercial objectives and accompanied by a desire to maintain a high 
degree of content control. 
With approximately 40 per cent of its population now having direct 
Internet access, Singapore has one of the world's highest rates of Internet 
use. The number of Internet users in Singapore doubled between 1996 
and 1998 to more than 500,000, while the number of websites in the city-
state jumped from 900 to over 4,000 in the same period (Foo and Kwok 
1999). As elsewhere in the media industry, the government's indirect 
presence looms large. All of Singapore's three Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs)-Cyberway, Pacific Internet and Singnet-are either government-
owned or government-linked companies. In corporatist Singapore, this 
necessarily leads to speculation about the level of cooperation between 
ISPs and authorities in surveillance of the Internet. 
The technical capacity for surveillance has been amply demonstrated. 
In 1994, a total of 80,000 files were searched for 'GIF' (Graphic Interchange 
Format), in what authorities explained as a swoop on pornography 
(Shenon 1995). Then in early 1999, the computers of almost half of 
Singapore's 400,000 Internet subscribers were scanned without 
subscribers' knowledge. This involved the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
Singtel, both of which claimed the purpose was to identify which 
subscribers' computers were virus-infected (Sesser 1999). 
Internet usage is regulated via a licensing system and guidelines that 
include the requirement of ISPs to filter material via proxy servers. Political 
parties and religious organisations must be licensed and ISPs have to 
obstruct access to web pages identified as objectionable by the Singapore 
Broadcasting Authority (SBA). According to The Internet Code of Practice 
'(p ]rohibited material is that material that is objectionable on the grounds 
of public interest, public morality, public order, public security, national 
harmony, or is otherwise prohibited by applicable Singapore laws'. 
Currently the SBA screens out 100 such sites. They are not publicly 
identified, but all are pornographic according to authorities. 
When opposition political parties attempted to employ the Internet in 
the lead-up to the 1997 election, they were instructed by the SBA to remove 
biodata and posters of candidates from their web sites. They were deemed 
to have contravened the Parliamentary Elections Act, which predates the 
technology of the Internet, because the rules pursuant to the Act did not 
provide for campaigning on the Internet. Incidentally, amendments to 
the Films Act in 1998 also ban political advertising using films or videos. 
Authorities' attempts to limit the political impact of new electronic 
technologies also draws on the same libel and defamation laws that have 
intimidated other media. The PAP's ideological hegemony is another factor 
in the moderate political impact of the Internet in Singapore. Discussion 
groups operate within self-imposed and unconscious boundaries. The 
inclination to draw on alternative sources of analysis and information 
through the web is also conditioned by political motivation or lack thereof. 
Constraints range from the bland to the sophisticated 
Already the discussion has touched on various factors constraining the 
media in Singapore, including the various provisions of the Newspaper 
and Printing Presses Act, the use of defamation, libel and contempt of 
court suits, the Official Secrets Act and the Internal Security Act. Additional 
legislation that can be harnessed to restrict what is published are the 
Sedition Act and the Undesirable Publications Act. The former prohibits 
speeches and publications with 'seditious tendency', which includes 
arousing people's disaffection with the government and the judiciary and 
between races and classes. Under the latter Act, which covers books and 
magazines, such publications as Playboy, Penthouse and Cosmopolitan are 
banned in Singapore, but so too are some religious and political materials. 
In 1998, the Act was amended to include CD-ROMs, sound recordings, 
pictures, and computer-generated drawings. 
An additional constraint on reporting in Singapore is the difficulty of 
getting information other than that which authorities are promoting. This 
problem involves state bureaucrats and the private sector, as well as 
politicians. However, the government sets the tone for this in two 
important respects: first, by its view on information as a matter for strategic 
control, and second, by its political resistance to citizenship claims about 
the right to information. 
Official rhetoric about transparency reform is currently high in 
Singapore, as part of the government's ambitious attempt to promote the 
city-state as an international financial centre. Indeed, there have been some 
important improvements towards greater corporate disclosures. Local 
banks, for example, are now required to publicly declare the extent and 
nature of bad loans and previously undisclosed reserve assets. These 
changes are certainly helpful for business journalists as well as 
shareholders. Meanwhile, however, state control over a great deal of 
information is likely to be retained for both commercial and political 
reasons. 
A few examples illustrate how strategic control restricts some basic 
data, with obvious implications for reporting. Singapore-Indonesia trade 
figures are not published. These data are sensitive politically because 
during Konfrontasi in 1963 there was supposed to be an embargo on trade 
between Malaysia (of which Singapore was a part at the time) and 
Indonesia. They are sensitive commercially because they could reveal a 
discrepancy with Indonesian records of what has been exported to 
Singapore and, by inference, demonstrate the extent of smuggling into 
the city-state. Information about the number and nationalities of 
permanent residents and guest workers in Singapore is also not freely 
available. This limits informed analysis of the domestic labour force-
whether in terms of supply questions or the social impact of imported 
labour. From the government's perspective, though, these are sensitive 
ethnic and racial issues to be managed through information control 
(Dolven 1999). The government may periodically release unpublished data 
on such issues, but this will be a matter of discretion. 
One of the most significant information black holes concerns the 
operations of the government's investment arms, an issue over which 
Singapore earned the criticism of the IMF in March 1999 (IMF Public 
Information Notice No. 99 /26). They are shielded from any detailed public 
record or scrutiny, despite the enormous scale and importance of the 
capital involved. The Government Investment Corporation (GIC) manages 
more than S$100 billion of taxpayers' money in overseas investments. Its 
sister firm Temasek Holdings presides over S$34 billion, most of which is 
invested among the more than one thousand government-linked 
companies (GLCs). Singapore's legal and regulatory regimes exempt both 
from routine external reviews of operations. The GIC is especially secretive, 
exempted from any purview by the Auditor General or Accountant 
General and with no requirement to report to parliament. It reports only 
to its board, which is chaired by Lee Kuan Yew. Temasek Holdings reports 
selectively and only to the Finance Minister and a small parliamentary 
budget committee (Vennewald 1994). 
GLCs listed with the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) do divulge 
investment details as required by regulations. However, little extra is 
volunteered. With few exceptions, GLCs are amongst the poorest 
performers in independent rankings of corporate transparency in 
Singapore (Teo 1999). They are also distinctly uncooperative with financial 
journalists and openly discriminatory towards the international media. 
The international media have also been excluded from press conferences 
by the SES and statutory boards, resulting in letters of protest from both 
the Foreign Correspondents' Association and individual media companies. 
Another problem for journalists is that state bureaucrats tend to act as 
custodians of the ruling party's policies and interests. This often translates 
into political judgements in information management. The suppression 
of civil society since the mid 1960s has also freed bureaucrats from interest 
group pressure to reveal more detail than they wish about government 
activities. Singapore's outgoing President and former Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, Ong Teng Cheong, dramatically highlighted the absence 
of transparency within the public sector in a recent speech. The President's 
most important constitutional responsibility is to safeguard official 
reserves. Yet Ong revealed that in 1993, when he asked the Accountant-
General what total reserves were, he was told the data had not been 
systematically collected and the value of assets was difficult to determine. 
His request for an inventory, he was told, would take '52 man years' to 
accommodate. He finally received a list of properties in 1997 (Ibrahim 
1999). Obviously journalists without Ong's degree of authority face even 
greater difficulties in extracting information. 
On one of the rare occasions that a journalist was able to penetrate 
state control over sensitive data, the repercussions were serious. In 1992, 
the Business Times reported seemingly innocent official'flash estimates' 
of economic growth ahead of official release. Two years later an economic 
director from the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the editor and the 
journalist from the Business Times, and two economists from a stockbroking 
firm were found guilty of breaching the Official Secrets Act and fined. 
Not surprisingly, nothing approximating a Freedom of Information 
Act exists in Singapore, nor is it being contemplated. On the contrary, 
there are signs that the government is drawing a clear distinction between 
improved corporate transparency and broader dimensions of open 
governance. The Prime Minister's private secretary, Tan Tee How, 
dismissed the establishment recently of an Open Singapore Centre by two 
opposition politicians. According to Tan, there is no need for such a centre 
because Singapore is widely recognised as an open society, practising 
transparency and democratic accountability (The Straits Times Interactive 
1999b ). It was an almost comic irony that the tea party launch of the Open 
Singapore Society on 12June 1999 appeared to attract official surveillance 
(Gomez 1999). In Singapore, it seems, advocacy of political transparency 
arouses suspicion of subversion. 
Finally, journalists face the problem of the deep reluctance of those 
with dissenting views to put their opinions on the record. The Singapore 
government has an extensive range of commercial interests and therefore 
dispenses a great many contracts. It also has a record of legal recourse 
against critics. There is a widespread perception that there is nothing to 
gain and everything to lose from being quoted. 
None of the above observations mean that there is not a lot of official 
and publicly available information in Singapore. On the contrary, there is 
an abundance of it-much very helpful to journalists. But it is also 
predominantly information that either reinforces state economic, social 
and political agendas or cuts the costs of business transactions. In other 
words, it is information functional to state strategic objectives. Journalists 
are courted with this through extensive and well-resourced public relations 
machinery. 
Assessment: a love-hate relationship 
In Singapore, the influence of the government over the media is 
considerable-both through a string of regulations and also more indirectly 
through the dominance of government-linked companies in the industry. 
This influence over the local media translates into a marked reporting 
bias in favour of the ruling party. Scrutiny of the PAP's exercise of power 
is therefore minimal and debate over alternative political ideas is 
systematically restricted. Not surprisingly, in Freedom House's 1999 
worldwide assessment of press freedom, Singapore was ranked 'not free'. 
In terms of the safety of journalists, the city-state was awarded the highest 
possible ranking, but in the laws and regulations governing content and 
the extent of political pressures imposed on reporting, it fared poorly. 
Under such a regime, the media are limited in the capacity to assist 
informed public debate and the development of a genuine civil society-
a fundamental precondition for liberal democracy-is not possible. 
However, from the perspective of the Singapore government, these 
observations are predictable and grounded in a false assumption. The 
PAP doesn't share its critics' views on the virtues of liberal democracy. 
On the contrary, it wants to avoid the sort of competitive politics 
championed by its critics. In its place, it remains committed to the 
consolidation of a political system that embodies a high degree of state-
sponsored consensus. Clearly, the media have a critical ideological role to 
play in producing that consensus. Securing this, however, is an ongoing 
exercise that must take effective account of the dynamics of contemporary 
Singapore and the international context within which Singapore operates. 
Technological developments and the information requirements of an 
increasingly sophisticated market system are among the more obvious 
challenges to the city-state's control-minded authorities. 
Whatever the challenges, the capacity of the Singapore government to 
reconcile high levels of media control with market development is 
impressive. In spite of the absence of media freedom, Singapore has 
become both a regional media centre and Southeast Asia's most advanced 
economy. The economy has also withstood the Asian crisis far more 
effectively than other economies in the region with freer flows of 
information and critical analysis. 
The likely trajectory is for the Singapore government to continue to 
maintain high levels of media control, and to engage in periodic clashes 
with the international media for not playing by the same rules as their 
local counterparts. Yet for all the friction that characterises relations with 
the international media, the government-and Lee Kuan Yew in 
particular-has used them very effectively to both promote the local 
economy and to project views onto the global political stage. The local 
media also selectively harness their reports in the service of domestic 
political agendas. The international media and the Singapore government 
seem to need each other, but for a while yet it may continue as a love-
hate relationship. 
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Fear is a hard habit to break 
Roger du Mars 
n the outskirts of Seoul, among those 
vast, grey industrial plains of 
factories and dull, uniform high rise 
apartments, the first editions of the 
day's newspapers are being 'touched up' by senior editors, government 
officials looking over their shoulders. This is not censorship as most South 
Koreans understand it; having lived through military regimes so brutal 
that journalists were beaten, tortured and murdered for challenging 
totalitarian rule, and entire newspaper groups were unceremoniously 
swept up by the power holders. As we begin the 21st century, South Korea 
presents a democratic face to the world, government officials 'hint', 
'request', 'entreat' or even 'cajole' editors into self-censoring sensitive 
articles. That this is tolerated points to the history of the media in South 
Korea: fear of authority, say journalists, is a hard habit to break. 
After decades of authoritarian rule, South Korea has a largely tame 
media, unaccustomed to challenging the power brokers and, in many 
ways, professionally ill-equipped for their role in the democratic system. 
While blatant government control has been removed, new forces are 
threatening press reform while it is still in its infancy and, therefore, most 
vulnerable. Media ownership is concentrated in very few hands and 
business interests can fill the vacuum left by the state. At the same time, 
the government seems to be finding more sophisticated ways of managing 
editorial directions-the latest, a series of aggressive tax evasion 
investigations of executives of newspapers critical of the President. 
Struggling to find the right path 
After decades of strict censorship which reduced the press to a convenient 
mouthpiece of the dictators of the day, the media in South Korea is evolving 
towards genuine democratic standards. Stories critical of the government 
no longer attract the violent attentions of the secret police, nor do they 
precipitate phone bugging or harassment. Since President Roh Tae Woo 
repealed the notorious Basic Press Law in 1987, censorship laws have 
been removed from books. Apart from the National Security Act, there 
are few laws that can interfere with the dissemination of information. If 
newspapers steer clear of pro-North Korea stories, journalists and editors 
can expect to publish almost anything without fear of being jailed. 
Official monitoring, however, continues despite the democratically 
reformed government. The extent of this monitoring and the ensuing 
censorship it produces is difficult to gauge. There are no defined 
'untouchable' subjects, but government officials still actively monitor every 
issue of the major dailies. First editions are sent to the outskirts of Seoul 
where they are used as a 'rough copy' to be amended ahead of printing 
later editions. By and large there are no direct instructions to kill a story 
or change a headline: pressure nowadays is more personal, and moments 
of recalcitrance on the part of the media are tolerated. 
'In the past the state restricted the media through repressive reporting 
guidelines. Now "private control" takes the place of overt restrictions. 
Government authorities call the media desks in private and coax them. 
They eventually persuade the media to accept a kind of self-censoring by 
using their private relationships,' says Lyu Eun-suk, of the human rights 
group Sarangbang. 
Further undermining press freedom is the reality that Korean 
journalists are not accustomed to searching for news. Rather, they let the 
news come to them. The press releases issued by government ministries 
are typically regurgitated in the newspapers. Government policies 
questioned by reporters are usually those which have already attracted 
public opposition, the media does not lead the scrutiny of the 
administration. Being willing to go out on a limb to challenge authority, 
or conducting extensive research in pursuit of the truth is rare. Exerting 
the minimum effort is not a stigma in Korean journalism. Korean articles, 
frequently short exercises in stilted, formal language, use limited 
background material and few direct quotes. The sources, unnamed more 
often than not, are complemented by the reporters' own opinions. 
So superficially are many issues considered in the press that this 
restricted mode of reporting brings with it an intrinsic 'self-censorship'. 
Press release journalism is practised across the board. Public relations 
people working in the culture industry, the huge business conglomerates 
and other commercial sectors are all too willing to provide reporters with 
prewritten stories. Businesses take great care to cultivate amiable 
relationships with reporters. Perks, such as cash gifts (chonji) are sometimes 
used to strengthen the relationship. It is a mutually beneficial 
relationship-business has their tailored stories printed and reporters are 
provided with convenient access to material. Meanwhile, the public is 
deprived of professional journalism which attempts to analyse or discuss 
current affairs seriously. 
The backdrop to South Korea's ideologically weak media industry is 
decades of war, military rule and colonial subjugation. Forty years of harsh 
Japanese colonial rule and 47 years of war or military rule have produced 
a media culture in which journalists still expect to submit to some kind of 
pressure from authority figures. While reporters are no longer tortured or 
killed for pursuing an independent line, the legacy of totalitarianism and 
the cultural overlays of Confucianism run deep. In The Unfolding Lotus, 
Jon Vanden Heuvel and Everett E. Dennis argue there is little incentive 
for South Korean journalists to pursue the news aggressively. 
The pressure on journalists to blend into the establishment fabric cannot 
be underestimated. This coziness between those in power and the press 
is tolerated and even encouraged because it does not seem the least bit 
unnatural to most Koreans. Theirs is a very homogenous, Confucian 
society, where harmony, cooperation and consensus between the 
powers that be and the press are more valued than a journalist's exposes 
of injustices and individual bravado. In the pantheon of Korean 
journalism there is little investigative reporting in the US style of Bob 
Woodward and Carl Bernstein of Watergate fame (1993). 
The paths leading into the journalism profession tend to reinforce a 
culture of bowing to authority and fitting in with the system, rather than 
breaking new ground. The field is extremely competitive, with about ten 
jobs for every 1,000 applicants. Entering the profession is about as difficult 
as entering one of the country's most prestigious universities. As a result, 
applicants with strong general knowledge, good writing skills and foreign 
languages win the entry-level jobs. However, the best academic 
qualifications do not necessarily equip young journalists to seek out the 
truth. South Korea's education system is highly conformist and reflects 
the community values-it does not seek to produce graduates who 
question that system. 'Today's journalist is not very much of a true 
journalist who is charged with a public mission', says Chung Yeon-woo, 
assistant professor of advertising and media at Semyung University. 'He 
is just a salaried man who has to make a living. Journalists need to be 
more professional and to have more dignity.' 
Working within the establishment and writing inoffensive stories 
cultivates another form of self-censorship when reporting on foreign news. 
For example, stories on Japan invariably conform to Korea's view of the 
Japanese as unrepentant oppressors. When Kwon Hee-ro, the Korean who 
in 1968 killed two Japanese gangsters who called him a 'little dirty Korean 
pig', was released from prison and returned to South Korea in September 
1999, not one newspaper suggested that murder was an inappropriate 
method of protesting discrimination. The press unanimously joined the 
national celebration for this hero who valiantly raised awareness of the 
cruelty, and arrogant superiority, of the Japanese. If the media defines the 
perimeters of the news, the public's perception of daily events, too, seems 
to be trapped within this limited range of reporting. 
A of oppression, a decade of freedom 
Notwithstanding the democratic reforms of the past 12 years, the people 
of South Korea have been victims of successive, oppressive governments 
for much of the 20th century. The Japanese effectively usurped control of 
the government in 1905 when it made Korea a protectorate. After formal 
annexation in 1910, the Japanese exercised unremitting and brutal 
authority over the neighbours they considered an inferior race. The end 
of World War II drove out the Japanese, but opened the way for the 
establishment of Soviet Communism, gaving birth to the Stalinist regime 
of Kim Il-Sung which occupied the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. 
Two years later the Korean War devastated this relatively small and 
crowded stretch of territory. The division between the North and South 
at the 38th parallel remains to this day, with the two Koreas each bidding 
warily for reunification on its own terms and enduring the ever present 
threat of each other's military and intelligence apparatus. 
Throughout decades of threats to stable government and the severe 
poverty and famine which followed the Korean War, a free media was 
consistently viewed as a potentially destabilising influence that the fragile 
society could not support. With no historical tradition of democratic 
principles in South Korea, the media has never had the opportunity to 
blossom within the intrinsic principles of freedom. 'While the notion of 
the freedom of the press and of democracy have literally evolved hand to 
hand in the west, the South Korean media have lacked such an institutional 
foundation', notes Lee Jae-kyoung, professor of journalism at Ehwa 
Women's University in Seoul. 'Simply put, the idea of the free press in 
South Korea was nothing more than a superficial imposition of a foreign 
idea which completely lacks indigenous institutional support' (1993a:6). 
The United States, which tried to establish law and order in South 
Korea following World War II, imposed US press concepts that never took 
root and were only ever in force theoretically. An ordinance designed to 
promote a free press in 1946 was simply too advanced for such an insecure 
country. 'As of today all the laws and decrees with legal authority shall 
be rescinded if their judicial and administrative applications result in 
discrimination because of race, nationality, creeds or political beliefs' 
(Youm Kyo-ho 1996:38). Designed to set Koreans free from the harsh yoke 
of the Japanese, such laws invariably crumbled under the more pragmatic 
realities of wielding political power in a starving, chaotic land. 
When South Korea's first president, Syngman Rhee, guaranteed 
freedom of expression as a basic constitutional right in 1948, for example, 
he promptly undermined the integrity of his own proclamation by issuing 
a set of tough decrees, ostensibly intended to protect South Korea from 
communist-inspired activities. The press was prohibited from publishing 
" articles which run contrary to the national ideals and policies of the 
Republic of Korea 
" articles which defame the government 
" articles which propagate and praise communism and the puppet 
regime of North Korea 
• articles based on fabricated facts which agitate the general public 
" articles which interfere with relations between the Republic of Korea 
and other friendly allies and that damage the national prestige of Korea 
" articles that, in addition to inciting the people through provocative 
and radical editorials or reporting, affect the national unity harmfully 
" articles that divulge the national secrets detrimental to the security of 
the Republic of Korea. 
So overwhelming were these restrictions that almost any controversial 
issue could be considered taboo. 
During the Korean War of 1950-53 President Rhee upgraded 
restrictions with total military censorship of the Korean press. But after 
the war, the Rhee government, itself crippled by widespread official 
corruption, called on the National Security Act to prohibit 'problematic 
views'. A few anti-government newspapers, however, survived, fuelling 
public discontent and stoking the April 1960 student's uprising which 
toppled the Rhee administration. Under the shaky rule of Rhee' s successor, 
Chang Myon, long-suppressed voices erupted into a rash of new 
newspapers. Ten days after Chang rescinded the laws stifling the press, 
49 new media outlets were opened. News agencies increased 20-fold and 
the number of daily newspapers tripled by the end of Chang's brief rule. 
But, press freedom did not necessarily bolster democracy. Bernard Lavine, 
former director of the United States Information Service recalls living in 
South Korea during Chang's brief foray as leader, 'when President Yun 
Bo-sun and his Prime Minister Chang Myon took control of the 
government in July 1960, it was a heady time for political "wannabe's", 
the press and other media. Unrestricted freedom for 10 months, which 
many Koreans understood to be democracy in action, created a chaotic 
situation which resulted in the military coup d'etat by Major General Park 
Chung Hee on May 16, 1961.' 
Park immediately set out to 'purify' the Korean press. He spearheaded 
the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction which imposed 
standards designed to 'clean out those phony journalists and press which 
were catering to defile the sacred freedom of press, and to establish a 
fresh order in journalism and develop a truly democratic press' (Youm 
Kyo-ho 1996:12). This cleansing campaign included the arrest of 960 
reporters and the closure of 1,200 news organisations, newspapers and 
periodicals. Government officials routinely dropped by newsrooms to 
check for unfavourable content. Under Park's 16-year authoritarian rule, 
journalists who took too many liberties were either thrown into prison, 
tortured or on occasion, even killed. 
Under Park's military junta, the Revolutionary Court sentenced to 
death in August 1961 three executives of the Minjok Ilbo newspaper for 
'advocating political and ideologjcal doctrines similar to those of North 
Korea such as-neutralization of Korea, negotiations with the North 
Korean communists, exchanges of mail with North Korea and student 
meetings between North and South Korea' (Youm Kyo-ho 1996). One of 
the three was executed in December 1961. The other two had their 
sentences commuted to life imprisonment. In 1964, student protests were 
growing, culminating in massive demonstrations over Park's decision to 
restore diplomatic relations with Japan. Park blamed the upswing in street 
opposition on the media, which in tum demanded more freedom; opening 
a new confrontation between journalists and the regime. Park's answer 
was the Press Ethics Commission, which added yet another raft of 
restrictions to the code of ethics for the Korean press. 
Suppression of the press under Park seemed to intensify every few 
years. Journalists were required to carry government-issued press cards 
and access to information was confined to government offices. A series of 
Presidential Emergency Measures enacted in 1974, however, peremptorily 
mocked his ridiculous claims of support for a free press. The decrees 
prohibited criticism of the constitution, demonstrations and reporting on 
them, and the 'act to publish, produce, process, distribute, exhibit and 
sell papers, books, disks and other presentations relating to the National 
Federation of Democratic Youths and Students', an important student 
organisation which Park outlawed in April that year. The Dong-A Ilbo 
newspaper attempted to strike back, launching a free press movement on 
24 October when it issued the Declaration of Freedom of the Press 
The unprecedented crisis of our society, today can only be overcome 
through the practice of freedom of speech. There can be no reason to 
suppress freedom of speech which is the fundamental task we must 
fulfill. It is not a task which can be permitted by the government or 
granted by the people. We will never kneel to any pressure which comes 
from the opposition to free speech. We declare that we will do our best 
to practice free speech. 
With these forceful words, the newspaper vowed to stand up to the 
formidable Korean Central Intelligence Agency. 
Not surprisingly, Park responded by threatening the newspaper's 
advertisers. By January 1975, Dong-A Ilbo had lost 98 per cent of its 
advertising revenue. Supporters both within and outside South Korea 
tried to offset the losses by increasing circulation. But, Park dealt the 
finishing blow by sacking 133 of its reporters. The few remaining 
journalists who clung to the free press movement were imprisoned. 
As a business, however, the media actually expanded considerably 
under Park. Total newspaper circulation figures, nationwide, hovered 
around the three million mark in 1970. Ten years later this figure leapt to 
6.2 million. Park's strategy was to expand the economy and in so doing 
he empowered a select group of businesses. From within this group of 
entrepreneurs he helped the media owners who helped him. A handful of 
newspapers which toed the official line thrived, while others which still 
attempted more independent reporting were systematically purged and 
forced to close. The increase in circulation figures reflected the overall 
growth in the economy as South Korea began to industrialise rapidly, 
rather than any improvement in the quality of the press. Professor Park 
Yeong-gyu at Sangji University observed at the time 
The press has developed rapidly through all kinds of preferential 
treatments and benefits granted in exchange for accepting suppression. 
These pressures lead the press to join hands with the 'power brokers' 
and seek only profits. Naturally, the press lost their sense of duty and 
purpose, bringing about a distortion of public opinion and the 
suppression of civil rights. 
A false 
Arguably though, the assassination of Park in October 1979 and the 
inauguration of his successor General Chun Doo Hwan ushered in an 
ever more repressive era for the media. Chun's constitution grossly belied 
the true state of affairs, stating 'All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech 
and of the press, and freedom of assembly and association; neither speech 
nor the press shall violate the honour or rights of other persons nor 
undermine public morals or social ethics. Should speech or the press 
violate the honour or rights of other persons, claims may be made for the 
damage resulting therefrom' (Article 20(1)(2), amended in 1980). But such 
high-minded ideals were swiftly buried under Chun' s paranoid, dictatorial 
regime. 
No sooner had he declared himself President than he swiftly sacked 
700 reporters and editors for indulging in unethical conduct or lacking 
proper journalistic abilities. With the elements most detrimental to a free 
and prosperous country out of the way, Chun proceeded to overhaul the 
entire media industry. He merged 27 daily newspapers into 21, dumped 
the two commercial television networks, and added an additional state-
run network. The hallmark of Chun' s notorious clampdown on the media, 
the Basic Press Act, forced the media to adopt a set of practices that 
thoroughly adulterated the process of reporting, and shifted the engine 
of democracy into reverse at a time when it most needed to go forward. 
From the time it was enacted in December 1980 until it was repealed in 
June 1987, this draconian law not only extinguished the spirit and 
professionalism of the media, but caused diplomatic tensions between 
South Korea and critics in democratic nations. 
Characterised by journalism scholar Lim Sang-won as' one of the most 
restrictive and comprehensive laws in capitalistic societies', the Basic Press 
Act imposed complicated technical standards for publication facilities, 
preventing the growth of existing newspapers and the opening of new 
publications. It turned what the government defined as the 'responsibility' 
of the press into a legal obligation; gave the whip to the Ministry of Culture 
and Information which issued press guidelines instructing the media on 
how events should or should not be reported. Headlines were selected by 
the Ministry as were article lengths and the pages where they could be 
printed. The Ministry also limited the number of pages newspapers could 
print and determined which correspondents were stationed in provinces 
outside of Seoul. The Ministry retained the right to suspend or close any 
publication, radio or television station at any time. 
In reality, the Basic Press Law was seldom employed, nor was it ever 
challenged in court by the journalists, editors or proprietors it controlled. 
'The fact that the law was never challenged in court demonstrated how 
the judicial system had forfeited its role as the guardian of the Constitution 
and how effectively the press itself had been cowed', says journalism 
scholar Chang Hosoon. Afraid of offending the government, the press 
became even more removed from any concept of responsibility in reporting 
the daily news. Chun also frequently employed the Korean Army Security 
Command and the Korean National Security Planning Agency (formerly 
the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) to intimidate and, occasionally, 
force the press to submit to its demands. When the Chosun Ilbo took the 
risk of reporting on opposition politician Kim Young-sam's hunger strike, 
for example, KNSPA agents harassed the political reporter who wrote the 
story, pressuring other reporters not to continue to follow the issue. 
According to a report issued by the International Press Institute, the 
KNSPA literally beat into submission the Dong-A Ilbo. In reporting on the 
Chinese H-5 bomber which crash-landed in Korea on 24 August 1985, the 
newspaper contradicted official announcements when it noted that Korean 
fighter planes failed to intercept the Chinese aircraft. Embarrassed by the 
revelation and livid over Dong-A Ilbo's rash decision to break a government 
news embargo on a 'diplomatically sensitive' issue, KNSPADirectorChang 
Se-dong hauled in the newspaper's managing director and two other 
journalists. Inside his office, Chang ordered his lieutenants to punish the 
three men physically. They left the office severely beaten and less eager to 
defend high journalistic ideals. The Dong-A Ilbo also agreed not to run a 
story on the KNSPA's intimidation tactics. 
A good example of Chun' s control of the media resulted in widespread 
confusion over the truth about the Kwangju incident, arguably the most 
tragic and controversial event since the Korean War. What started as 
routine street demonstration on 18 May 1980, deteriorated into violent 
clashes between the citizens of Kwangju and the military. The masses, 
who took up home-made arms, managed to rule the streets of the city for 
about a week. To regain control, the military unleashed a wave of terror, 
killing at least 200 civilians. In his dissertation, Anti-Americanism in South 
Korea: The Media and the Politics of Signification, Lee Jae-Kyoung 
describes how Chun deceived the public. 
The reporting of the Kwangju incident was under the control of the 
military regime. In fact, it seems that every major editorial decision 
was made and enforced by the military censors, and the media were 
simply reduced to propaganda organs of the regime. The South Korean 
media completely neglected even the occurrence of this extraordinary 
incident for nearly four full days, indicating well the intensity of the 
regime's media control. Every major news item, from the top front-
page story to entries in the society and cultural sections, including 
editorials, by lined columns and comments, was meticulously screened, 
placed and constructed to serve the military's political objectives 
(1993b:100). 
Chun's blackout on the massacre instigated a rash of anti-American 
sentiment that continues to linger today. Many Koreans were expecting 
the United States, which has maintained significant military bases in South 
Korea, to intervene on the side of the people. Regardless of the validity of 
these expectations, the absence of US intervention was interpreted in some 
quarters as categorical proof that Washington supported Chun and that 
the US government was actively plotting to control Korean society to serve 
the interests of US citizens at the expense of Korean liberties. A document 
issued by the US embassy in Seoul explains 
It is clear that one cause of increased anti-Americanism in Korea in the 
1980s is the false impression held by many Koreans that the US was 
directly involved in, and significantly responsible for the Kwangju 
tragedy-a misperception in part fostered by the deception of the 
Korean authorities at the time, and in part by the restriction on the 
dissemination of facts about the Kwangju incident during the Fifth 
Republic (Backgrounder, 19 June 1989:26). 
New freedoms, habits 
In the summer of 1987, the streets of Seoul were filled with the sting of 
tear gas and the pounding of military boots. Day after day, highly-
organised student protesters faced down the ranks of anti-riot troops, their 
own sense of courage preventing them from donning the gas masks which 
protected the security forces and the swarms of foreign reporters from 
the suffocating clouds of tear gas. Some smeared their faces with toothpaste 
and wrapped their eyes with 'cling wrap', innovations of the mass protest 
movement. But, among the students stood ordinary citizens and many of 
the students' mothers, their hand bags swinging, their twin sets buttoned 
to the neck; a sign the regime had truly lost its power. Finally, with two 
million people on the streets backing the student protests1 the city was 
paralysed, and the government squirming uncomfortably in the 
international spotlight as the upcoming host of the 1988 Olympic Games, 
Chun was forced to step down. Chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice 
Party and presidential candidate, Roh Tae Woo, was handed control, 
vowing to break Korea's 'cycle of authoritarian rule' despite his own 
military roots. Roh, who went on to serve as president from 1988-92, was 
in many ways as corrupt as his predecessor. But, in terms of press freedom 
Roh took the first steps towards a new era. 
Roh got off to a promising start when the Basic Press Law was repealed 
in November of 1987, and the new liberties he granted the media made 
his administration seem like a shining light of democratic principles. But, 
for three decades the press had been an integral part of a corrupt and 
authoritarian power structure and so thoughtful, honest reporting could 
not spring up overnight. Himself a past master of taking bribes, Roh 
nonetheless proclaimed an end to envelope journalism. The practice of 
chonji reached its height during Chun's rule but seems to have steadily 
waned thereafter. In a press survey of 700 journalists conducted by the 
Korean Press Institute in 1989, 93 per cent of the respondents said they 
received bribes from their news sources. But five years later, another survey 
showed that this figure had dropped to less than 30 per cent and today 
most reporters say the practice is uncommon. 
But, some reporters continue to be hooked on the white envelopes, 
and have resorted to extortion to have their benefits' reinstated. In just 
three months, from May 1998 to July 1998, the Ministry of Culture alleged 
43 journalists were involved in 70 cases of extortion. In these cases, 
journalists typically approach a company with scandalous information 
which they threaten to expose if they are not given chonji money. 
Roh's reforms, while far from sweeping, were nonetheless sufficient 
to produce an atmosphere in which ethically minded, liberal publications 
could prosper. In a signal that times had truly changed, a group of dissident 
journalists banded together and formed Han-kyoreh Shin mum, in December 
1987, a completely new type of newspaper which not only prohibited the 
practice of taking chonji, but dared to adopt a left of centre political posture. 
After a lengthy struggle to obtain government approval and with its coffers 
filled with US$7 million donations, Han-kyoreh published its first paper 
on 15 May 1988. Owned by citizen shareholders and written entirely in 
the Korean alphabet, hangul (as opposed to featuring the customary 
spattering of Chinese characters), the newspaper was founded as a grass 
roots publication that could empathise with North Korea, support 
opposition politicians and attack the Korean establishment. 
While the mainstream press has remained reluctant to expose the 
malfeasance of the power elite, Han-kyoreh has come to represent a voice 
willing to challenge entrenched power structures. 
Korean journalists cannot shake overnight the habits acquired during 
decades of repression. There is still a tendency to avoid attacking 
someone in power, someone who could later exact revenge upon a 
troublesome reporter. For instance, during the 1992 elections, it became 
known that the central government and the Seoul city government 
were funneling money into the ruling Democratic Justice Party's 
election coffers. This blatant misappropriation of funds was largely 
ignored by the Seoul press, except for Han-kyoreh Shinmun, which ran 
the story (VandenHeuvel and Dennis 1993:21). 
Broadcast journalism under the government's thumb 
The government has always regarded broadcast media as the most 
powerful and influential medium and has consequently afforded it the 
least amount of freedom. The airwaves were strictly controlled under Park 
Chung-hee's dictatorial regime, Chun Doo-whan's Basic Press Law and 
Roh Tae-woo's Broadcast Act. 
While the repeal of the Basic Press Law significantly freed up the print 
media with the Periodicals Act, the corresponding Broadcast Act of 1987 
continues to constrain broadcast media to government-approved material. 
The three TV stations, two of which, KBS and MBC, are owned by the 
government, are still bound to the 'public responsibility' provisions of 
Broadcast Act to the 'improvement of national culture' and are prohibited 
from undermining public morality and social ethics. 
Ever since the Broadcasting Law was amended in 1990, reforms were 
regularly debated. The integrated broadcasting law was finally passed 
by the National Assembly on 28 December 1999. The National Broadcast 
Labor Unions had frequently warned about the President's control over 
the commission to be established under the new law, which they said, 
should operate with autonomy, a measure of objectivity, and without 
undue foreign influence. The commission influences programming under 
the ostensible objective of promoting morality, free democracy, national 
identity, pure family life, proper guidance for children and social ethics. 
The government congratulated itself on the passage of the 
integrated broadcasting law. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP), 
however, boycotted the vote and complained of the ruling party unfairly 
setting up a censorship mechanism. Comprised of nine members, three 
selected by the president, three by the chairman of the parliament and 
three by the culture and tourism committee, the Opposition charges that 
the new commission will be under undue government control. 
'With the passage of the integrated broadcasting law, the government 
is still controlling the press,' says Chung Byung-joon, Secretary General 
of the Korean Federation of Press Unions. 'If the government is responsible 
and chooses good commissioners who have large capacities and talents, 
then there might be some progress. But the ideal is not happening yet. 
There is still a clear line linking the press and government authorities.' 
The new broadcasting law settles a second controversial point 
concerning outside investment. The trade unions had lobbied vigorously 
to prevent foreigners and the chaebol from investing in the media. The 
Ministry of Information and Communication had insisted that foreign 
capital and expertise were necessary to make competitive the range of 
new media, such as satellite-based, digital and cable TV, and optic cable 
projects. The new law restricts foreign firms and the chaebol from owning 
more than a 33 per cent stake in local media companies. With the door 
thus open for joint ventures, cash and technology are expected to stimulate 
the industry. 
Launched in 1995, the nation's 28 cable TV channels have racked up 
losses in the neighborhood of US$1 billion. With only 830,000 subscribers, 
paltry advertising revenues, numerous operators are teetering on the verge 
of bankruptcy. Says Eom Ju-woong, Director of the People's Coalition for 
Media Reform: 'The censorship has changed from direct to indirect but 
with the government still controlling the media and intervening, it's even 
more important to have citizens participate in the political process'. 
Where to from here? 
The establishment press is chiefly owned by Korea's behemoth business 
conglomerates called the chaebol. Long criticised for obvious conflicts of 
interests, two influential newspapers have apparently severed ties with 
the chaebol. South Korea's second largest chaebol, Hyundai, announced its 
managerial withdrawal from Munhwa llbo on 16 January 1998 and 
Samsung from JoongAng Ilbo on 21 January 1998. However, an informal 
survey indicates a skeptical public assumes the previous business 
relationships still exist. This is a particularly worrisome relationship 
because the power vacuum left by the authoritarian governments has been 
filled by big business. Kim Tak-hwan, senior researcher at the Korean 
Press Institute says, 'It cannot be denied that newspapers have been 
inclined to represent a particular group of business interests instead of 
representing public opinion, as collaborators of the powerful and not as 
watchdogs'. 
The power of one particular business sector over the press was 
demonstrated in late 1997 as the full impact of the regional financial crisis 
was starting to take hold. The Maeil Kyungje, a local economic daily, 
reported that a major Seoul bank was virtually dry of funds, and published 
a special supplement examining Korea's banking industry. The first copies 
of the supplement news-stands in the late evening, causing many 
depositors to swarm into the bank's headquarters to protest. Later that 
evening, the members of the union of the bank stormed the offices of the 
newspaper. 
In a more subtle form of control, South Korean governments have taken 
advantage of ubiquitous tax fraud to shadow the press. By threatening to 
conduct tax audits on individual newspapers or their companies, the 
government finds plenty of editors all too willing to allow the government 
to influence content. 
Since the repeal of the Basic Press Law media analysts agree that South 
Korea has been moving steadily towards freedom of the press. However, 
recent accusations levelled against the incumbent administration hark back 
to the dark past. A vocal critic of the present Kim government, the Segye 
Times-run by Rev. Moon Sun-myong of the Unification Church-was 
recently the subject of a special tax audit. Then, there is the friction between 
a popular daily, the JoongAng Ilbo and the South Korean government, which 
points to a more troubling case of media autonomy being short-circuited 
by the ruling administration. In September 1999 a tax audit was ordered 
on the sundry financial operations of Hong Seok-hyun, publisher and 
president of the JoongAng Ilbo and the largest shareholder of the Bokwang 
Group. Prosecutors arrested Hong for evading 1.33 billion won in taxes 
by failing to report 3.23 billion won inherited from his mother; evading 
950 million won in taxes on 79,000 shares that he received from three 
executives from former Samsung executives; and evading another 50 
million won by understating the amount he paid for 20,000 shares of an 
electronics firm. The JoongAng Ilbo claims its regular reporting on the 
scandals that have dogged the administration eventually landed it in hot 
water. 
Suspicious of the government's motives in taking the unusual move 
to carry out the probe, the International Press Institute fired off a letter to 
the Government Information Agency which states 
If our sources of information are correct, there have been several audits 
of the Bokwang Group over the past years, the most recent one in 1997, 
which ended with a clean bill of health ... The tax probe which started 
on 29 June 1999, was not a routine one, since without prior notice-
approximately 50 tax officers searched the company and confiscated 
its accounting books ... Since the case is now in the hands of the 
prosecution, we do not see any legal grounds for an arrest and 
detainment, as all confiscated material is available to the prosecuting 
attorney's office anyway; the danger of suppressing relevant evidence 
is minimal and there is certainly no danger that the accused person 
would try to escape out of the country (Korean law prevents such an 
attempt by requiring exit visas). We agree that it is a democratic 
principle for legal investigations of irregularities or violations of law 
to be applied to every citizen equally. A publisher or president of a 
newspaper is no exception to that. However, a fundamental legal 
principle holds that a person is innocent until proven guilty by the 
courts. 
But, the case is more complicated than it may seem. Tensions between the 
JoongAng Ilbo and Kim Dae-jung began escalating when he was campaigning 
for the 1997 presidential elections and believed the newspaper was unfairly 
supporting his opponent, Lee Hoi-chang. Reports circulated that money 
had illicitly flowed from Lee's campaign war chest to the coffers of either 
the Joong-ang Ilbo or the Samsung Group, the huge conglomerate that 
owned a major stake in the newspaper. The various rumours are difficult 
to confirm. But, what is evident is that neither the newspaper nor the 
government regards each other as neutral. 
The prosecution pressed for a six-year term and a 5.1 billion won fine 
shortly after Hong Seok-hyun was arrested in October. When the Seoul 
District Court meted out a suspended 3-year sentence and a 3.8 billion 
won fine, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) accused the 
government of cutting a deal with the JoongAng Ilbo. 
'The JoongAng Ilbo had a plan to make an all-out assault on the 
government after Hong Seok-hyun's arrest in order to get the Kim Dae-
jung administration to back off', said a member of the GNP. 'As far as I 
see, the plan only partly worked because the prosecution tried to get a 
severe punishment and the judge gave him a major fine.' 
Consequently, Lee Hoi-chang, leader of the opposition Grand National 
Party, claims foongAng Ilbo is waging a struggle to protect the freedom of 
the press. The GNP launched a special in-house panel to break up 
'increasing government repression of the press', and submitted a dismissal 
motion to the National Assembly against Culture and Tourism Minister 
Park Jie-won, a former spokesman for President Kim who allegedly 
pressured the foongAng Ilbo to tone down its criticism of the government. 
The GNP has also accused Mr Park of trying to influence major staff 
appointments at the paper, control the treatment of stories and intimidating 
Mr Hong by throwing a glass at him. During the National Assembly's 
annual policy evaluation meeting in early October, Mr Park explained his 
actions, 'As I drank a lot that night, there are some things I can remember 
and some things I cannot'. 
President Kim Dae-jung insists there is no relationship between the 
attention the National Tax Administration and his public relation officials 
are giving to the foongAng Ilbo and an attempt to control the media. 'This 
government of the people respects freedom of the press and it never 
intends to suppress the press', he says. 
If the rift between the foongAng Ilbo and the Kim Dae-jung 
administration simply centered on allegation of the government pressuring 
the press to toe the line, the conflict would simply fall into a long tradition 
of Korean authoritative practices. But the conflict takes on the trappings 
of an all too common political drama, rife with stealth and multiple 
accusations, all difficult to verify. 
For all the antipathy marking the relationship, it seemed initially 
peculiar that a foongAng Ilbo reporter was accused of trying to help the 
Kim Dae-jung Administration. In November, Moon 11-hyun, on the 
apparent behest of the ruling coalition, faxed to Lee Jong-chan, Vice 
President of the NCNP, a list of suggestions designed to help the ruling 
party gain more public favour. The suggestions covered various ways in 
which the government could exploit the press to encourage the public to 
muster support for Kim Dae-jung's reforms. 
The plot thickened when Lee Do-joon, a reporter for Pyonghwa 
Broadcasting Corp. visited Lee Jong-chan's office, discovered the letter, 
turned it over to GNP lawmaker Chung Hyung-keun who paraded it at a 
National Assembly hearing as evidence of the president manipulating 
and controlling the media. 
The GNP found more fodder for its offensive when rumors spread 
that President Kim had received illicit contributions from the JoongAng 
Ilbo. While apparently intoxicated, National Intelligence Service chief Chun 
Yong-taek told reporters 1 off the record', that Hong Seok-hyun had indeed 
supplied Mr Kim with secret political funds prior to his presidency. 
Issues such as hidden motive and shifting alliances sparked much 
speculation. The rival parties exchanged accusations, the public assumed 
the worst and numerous questions remain unresolved. Such is the state 
of politics and the media in South Korea. 
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All politics, no privacy 
Ma-li Yang and Dennis Engbarth 
n the scramble to outdo the 
competition, one Taiwanese 
television station recently reported on 
an alleged case of wife swapping. It 
solved the problem of having no available footage by broadcasting scenes 
from an illegal pornographic VCD, with the helpful label 'simulation' 
overlaid. In a recent news report on a police crackdown on 'girlie' bars 
another television station gave over six full minutes of air time to the 
opinions of the establishment's 'public relations ladies', the camera 
scanning their bare thighs and skimpy tops. So fierce is the battle for 
viewers, and the accompanying advertising revenue, in Taiwan's crowded 
television market that it seems there is no limit to the violence, sex, drama 
or gore. Television cameras have taken to following suspects into police 
interrogation rooms and accident victims into emergency surgery in 
hospitals; often resulting in distressingly detailed coverage of brutal or 
bloody scenes. 'Privacy, what is this?', lamented a Taipei-based journalist. 
'I mean people are being filmed in the last moments of their lives while 
doctors are giving them heart massage, with no permission from anyone.' 
In its March 1999 annual report the US-based Committee for the 
Protection of Journalists concluded that Taiwan boasted the freest press 
environment in Asia. Twelve years after the lifting of the draconian press 
restrictions of martial law, newspapers, radio and television stations and 
magazines are booming in an often raucous media industry. The 
democratisation of politics is reflected in the democratisation of the media, 
with radio talk back shows offering new opportunities for ordinary people 
to have their views heard, as well as directly question members of their 
government on air. The scrapping of the last of the press laws in 1999, the 
Publication Law, means anyone in Taiwan can own or publish newspapers 
or magazines. There are no limits on foreign ownership in the media, nor 
is there any form of censorship. 
But, at the same time there are signs which suggest freedom of 
expression is still curtailed by the highly politicised ownership structure 
of much of the media and by the business interests of media owners 
themselves. The mere expansion of the number of media outlets does not 
necessarily imply a positive trend in the industry. So oversupplied have 
parts of the industry become that competition has pushed the media into 
a downward spiral of sensationalism and voyeurism. In the race to be 
first, accuracy and professionalism are being sacrificed, particularly in 
the popular live-to-air broadcasts in which reporters are on-the-spot 
without the means to check the facts they are presenting as truth. To protect 
certain sensitive state information from the voracious appetite of the 
media, the government is now considering an official secrets act, in the 
spirit of the controls of the past. Journalists, on the other hand, are 
campaigning for a freedom of information act as a balance. At the same 
time the first independent media organisation has been formed and, 
although it represents a minority of Taiwan's journalists, work is underway 
on voluntary codes of ethics and standards of professionalism. 
Martial law: China's other dictators 
In almost half a century under martial law Taiwan's citizens learned to 
read the fine print. The government issued only 32 newspaper licences 
nationwide and restricted each publication to between four and twelve 
pages; thus forcing editors to employ the smallest possible typefaces. 
Radio, too, was strictly controlled, with frequencies reserved for military 
and official use, and licences restricted to government agencies or the 
ruling party. While there was no official limit on the number of magazine 
licences, new magazines were required to demonstrate that they were 
promoting the national interest. Operating under these vague guidelines, 
many magazines were later banned or had specific issues confiscated in 
lightning swoops by security officials. So too were a number of editors, 
publishers, writers and printers arrested and jailed on the same grounds. 
Even more disturbing was the use of journalists by the feared secret police 
to collect intelligence from within the media; a practice which strained 
relations between the press and the underground opposition. 
Taiwan was ruled under a martial law decree imposed by the 
Kuomintang (KMT), or the Nationalist Party of China, from 1949, led by 
Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Ching-kuo. Chiang, his army and his 
supporters had fled mainland China after losing the civil war to the forces 
of the Chinese Communist Party. Arriving on the offshore island, formerly 
known as Formosa, Chiang suspended civil freedoms and imposed severe 
restrictions on the press. Taiwan had enjoyed a brief period of freedom 
with the end of half a century of Japanese colonialism in 1945, but a new 
authoritarian regime was building in its wake. In the late 1940s and early 
1950s Taiwan endured the 'white terror' purge of left-wing dissidents 
and suspected communists or communist sympathisers as the Chiang 
regime established its dictatorship in direct opposition to the communist 
victors on the mainland. The last liberal media outlet, the Free China Review 
biweekly, was finally closed down in 1960 after the arrest of its founder, 
Lei Chen. Lei was himself a senior member of the KMT and had attempted 
to bring liberal mainland Chinese and local politicians into a China 
Democratic Party. But, for all its anti-communist rhetoric, the Chiang 
regime was setting up an authoritarian state-despite his ideological 
commitment to free market capitalism-employing many of the same 
political controls used by his communist enemies. 
During the martial law period the media was virtually entirely owned 
and controlled by the KMT, and its allies in the armed forces. The dominant 
Central Daily News was operated by the party itself, and other key 
publications, such as the China Times and the United Daily News were each 
owned by a member of the KMT central standing committee. The only 
daily newspaper which was relatively independent of the KMT was the 
non-partisan Independent Evening Post, which was operated by a Taiwanese 
textile group. Only three television stations were permitted 
• Taiwan Television, established in 1962 by the Taiwan Provincial 
Government, which held 49 per cent ownership with the KMT holding 
12 per cent 
.. China Television, established in 1969 with the KMT holding 68 per 
cent of the shares 
" China Television System, opened in 1971 with the Ministry of National 
Defence holding 76 per cent of its stock and the Ministry of Education, 
10 per cent. 
Such an ownership pattern served as an effective back-up to restrictive 
media laws. 
With the airwaves virtually owned or controlled by the KMT and their 
political supporters, the media produced blatantly slanted news programs, 
serving largely as a propaganda tool for the power elite. 
Taiwan's closed political system, however, was increasingly challenged 
as rapid and successful industrialisation built a better-educated middle 
class. In the 1950s Taiwan was a poor, agrarian-based society of farmers 
with little education. By the 1970s, aggressive industrialisation policies 
had propelled the island state into the ranks of East Asia's economic tigers, 
alongside South Korea and Singapore. With education and affluence came 
new pressures for information and openness. 
While the government-approved media remained in the hands of the 
ruling party, the loophole in the restrictions on new magazines was 
exploited to the limit by opposition activists. Members of the Tangwai 
movement, a grass roots opposition movement which defined itself outside 
the all-pervasive KMT, published a whole range of magazines. Most 
survived only for a couple of editions before being banned, but they served 
their purpose nonetheless. In the politically turbulent years between 1979 
and 1982, 23 out of 28 opposition-linked magazines were shut down. 
Among the best known of the dissident publications were the monthly 
magazines, Taiwan Political Review (1975), China Tide (1976-79), Our 
Generation (1977-79), The Eighties and its sister publication, The Asian (1979-
mid 1980s) and Formosa (September to December, 1979). Formosa served 
as the focus for an attempt by opposition figures to form an opposition 
political group, without specifically breaching martial law regulations 
banning new political parties. After a major human rights rally in southern 
Taiwan erupted into a riot, probably due to provocation by the security 
forces, most of Formosa's key staff were arrested in a nationwide 
crackdown. Eight opposition leaders were sentenced to 15 years in jail for 
sedition. Many have since been elected as legislators. 
In mid 1987 martial law was finally lifted. Chiang Kai-shek was old 
and ill, and his system of controls overtaken by economic prosperity. In 
January the next year he died. The lifting of the martial law decree 
immediately sparked dramatic growth in all sectors of the media. A virtual 
storm of press exposes of previously taboo issues followed as the 
frustrations, which had built under authoritarian rule, were unleashed. 
From the limit of 32 dry 12-page newspapers of the past, emerged scores 
of new dailies, with 367 being published in 1999. Magazines boomed, 
from almost 1,500 in the early 1970s to close to 6,000 today. Radio stations 
leaped from 33 to 80 and by the end of 1999 there were 140 cable and 
satellite TV operators in the market (see tables opposite). 
The stranglehold of the KMT declined sharply as new private owners 
entered the media industry. Directly KMT-owned and managed media 
outlets fell into an apparently irreversible decline as consumers rejected 
the newspapers which had served as propaganda mouthpieces. The China 
Times and the United Daily News, once controlled by senior KMT members, 
distanced themselves from party politics to compete with the new market 
leader, the privately owned Liberty Times. However, direct control has been 
replaced by more subtle political influence. In 1999, the KMT still ruled 
Taiwan through a multi-party democracy. As such, the main newspapers 
continued to play an important role in bolstering the government and 
individual newspapers had aligned themselves with factions within the 
KMT or the opposition. The result is a press with little pretence to balance, 
consumed by a public which expects political pressure behind the scenes. 
'To get all sides of the story you really have to buy all the newspapers', is 
a common observation. 
In local free-to-air television the power of the KMT is still considerable. 
It continues to control three of the four wireless TV stations, TTV, CTS 
and CTV. Appointments to these stations are usually politically motivated 
and executives often have little professional experience of broadcasting. 
Numerous surveys of television coverage of election campaigns have 
shown that the KMT still receives the lion's share of air time; in quality, 
editorial slant and quantity. The only exception in the TV sector is the 
Formosa Television Network (FTN), which was formed in 1997 after the 
Government Information Office granted a fourth wireless TV licence to a 
consortium led by opposition politicians. Predictably, FTN has been 
accused of favouring the opposition but the public has also complained 
that Formosa is not sufficiently anti-KMT, demonstrating that expectations 
of political interference in the media continue. 
The political control of the management of Taiwan's four television 
stations points to a serious problem for press freedom, regardless of the 
recent entry of the opposition into the sector. Television is entirely 
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Number of radio stations more than doubled 
1950-93 
Jan 1999 
Number of radio stations 
33 total (of which) 
20 privately owned 
12 state owned 
1 KMTowned 
80 (another 65 under construction) 
Cable and satellite TV service providers joined the market 
Over the air Cable TV Satellite TV 
1962 1 0 0 
1969 2 0 0 
1971 3 0 0 
1993 3 Cable TV law passed 
1997 4 -140 -100 
Jan 1999 5 -140 -100 
Note: -means approximately. 
Source: Government Information Ofice, Taiwan, ROC. 
controlled by political parties, meaning programming cannot be neutral, 
nor news and current affairs coverage free from political influence. The 
major newspapers have adopted clearer editorial positions aligning 
themselves with political interests and have taken up the interests of 
different KMT factions in recent years. Under martial law the island's 
main newsagency, the Central News Agency, was directly controlled by 
the KMT. It is owned and operated by the KMT to this day. A 1993 survey 
of readers by National Chengchi University Professor, Huang The-fu, 
concluded that there this an obvious political identification of readers 
with individual newspapers, reflecting the political stance of the 
newspapers. Balance then, can only be discussed in a wider context, in 
that alternative media outlets now exist, meaning people have a choice to 
switch off the KMT. 
There is also the issue of business influence. Commentators are 
concerned that the press can be used to promote the commercial interests 
of its owners directly. In the years of the post-martial law period, the media 
was filled with dramatic exposes of the former regime, particularly human 
rights abuses of the Chiang era. Nowadays, business and financial 
magazines are becoming more and more popular and make up about one-
fifth of all publications. Two of the most popular current affairs magazines 
which had their roots in political commentary-The Journalist and The 
Global View-recently announced they would increase their financial and 
business coverage. 
The sources of pressure on journalists to restrict or distort news 
coverage have now shifted from the heavy-handed influence of the 
KMT regime to a more subtle mix of both political and economic 
influences, often combining the purchases of newspapers of other 
media outlets by politically ambitious leaders of conglomerates, or by 
the formation of media conglomerates. One consequence is that the 
quality of news coverage and professional and ethical standards of 
reporters has come under intense social criticism (senior Taiwanese 
journalist, Cheryl Lai Shou-lu, 1995). 
So much Tv, so little news 
From the rubble of the tragic 1999 earthquake which killed hundreds of 
Taiwanese and razed vast swathes of buildings, a small child was plucked. 
As in so many tragedies of this scale, this was the miracle people were 
looking for, that tiny ray of hope in a sea of death and destruction-that 
magic story for television executives. But as rescue workers pulled him 
into the open, a swarm of television cameras crushed so forcefully around 
the boy that he was almost buried again in panic. So disturbing were the 
images of the media swarm that the Taiwanese government strongly 
criticised the television coverage of the earthquake. Beyond the real threat 
to the fragile, little survivor was the reality that television crews were 
reaching sites ahead of rescue teams and broadcasting live the graphic, 
gory scenes, with no thoughts of the distress of relatives, the rights of the 
victims themselves or the impediments they were creating for emergency 
services. Television stations slammed the government's slow response in 
reaching the victims, however journalists privately conceded that they 
did get in the way of legitimate emergency efforts. So shocked were the 
cable TV operators by the incident that they agreed, for the first time ever, 
to form pool television crews and to share footage, so that fewer cameras 
would be on the spot. 
The earthquake coverage marked a peak in a rising trend of 
sensationalism in the media, particularly on television. With party political 
interests dominating local free-to-air stations, more and more Taiwanese 
have been turning to cable television, seriously threatening the influence 
of the local broadcasters. More than 70 cable channels are offered by 140 
providers around the island including NHK from Japan, HBO, CNN, 
Disney, as well as sports, home shopping services, music video channels 
and talk shows. According to an AC Neilsen survey, cable television 
subscriptions had reached 79.1 per cent of households by 1998, the highest 
rate of cable TV viewing in Asia. Recently changes legalising satellite 
dish receivers have also opened up the way for direct satellite broadcasts. 
Of the cable channels four are devoted entirely to news, down from a 
peak of eight, in a nation of only 22 million people. The local cable TV 
news operators are attempting to copy a CNN-type 24-hour news format. 
These news services, however, mainly cover local news which, in itself, is 
unlikely to provide sufficient material for endless news broadcasts. 
Increasingly, crimes, fires, gang conflicts, sex, violence and drugs are 
making TV headlines. President, Lee Teng-hui, recently lamented that the 
obsession with crime in the cable TV evening news bulletins could have a 
negative influence on the young generation. But, with so much TV for so 
few viewers, sensationalism is seen as the commercial formula which will 
attract the largest slice of the market. 
Another recent trend has been the introduction of spot-news gathering 
using satellite technology. This means more and more news is being 
transmitted unedited live from the scenes of various accidents and 
disasters. As we know from similar broadcasts in the west, reporters are 
often underprepared or simply do not know what is happening. As such, 
this type of reporting frequently features stunned looking journalists 
discussing conjecture and rumours on air as though they were facts, 
abandoning the basic journalistic principle of verifying news first. Fires, 
in particular, are getting more and more air time, simply because they 
make good pictures. Serious news is being pushed further and further 
down the news bulletins as viewers are served up a dramatic, but often 
meaningless, series of shocking images night after night. 
The media under control or out of control? 
During the long years of martial law only one newspaper offered anything 
approaching balanced news reporting: The Independent Morning Post, and 
its sister evening edition. The Post was owned by the Taiwan Spinning 
Group, a large textile company which was not directly influenced by the 
KMT. But, in 1994 the Post was bought out by a construction company 
controlled by a senior KMT politician and businessman, Chen Cheng-
chung. Chen wanted to use the respected and popular publication to 
expand both his business empire and his political clout. He also purchased 
The Great News and Freedom Times. Chen's first move as a media magnate 
was to end editorial autonomy and sack journalists he considered hostile 
to his new editorial line. The buyout was seen by many supporters of 
press freedom as a demonstration of the new power of money, that 
commercial controls in a democratic era could be just as effective as the 
martial law decrees in determining editorial content. 
In September 1994, in the driving rain on the streets of Taipei, hundreds 
of journalists staged their first-ever demonstration, backed by a full page 
advertisement purchased in local newspapers calling for editorial 
autonomy. The advertisement carried more than 1,000 signatures. 
Following the protest, hundreds of Taiwanese journalists formed the first 
independent professional association, The Association for Taiwan 
Journalists (ATJ). The ATJ now has close to 250 members, but represents 
only a small minority of working journalists. However, it is a start and is 
working on a range of issues including editorial autonomy, ethics, self-
discipline and working conditions. The most serious problems identified 
by the ATJ are the politicisation of the media and ethics. 'Members of the 
public very much expect ownership affiliations to affect the nature of 
coverage', said one ATJ representative. 'In a sense there is a lack of 
independent thinking both in society and the media, and a poor 
understanding of history, which is a legacy of a tightly controlled education 
system and press restrictions during decades of martial law.' On the issue 
of ethics the ATJ codes are purely voluntary, but, 'the earthquake case 
was a start, it shocked people into thinking a bit more about their role'. 
Other issues under review by the ATJ are corruption, or the culture of 
the red envelope, and violence against journalists. A detailed survey of 
bribes offered to journalists found corruption was petty, but ranged from 
gifts of cash and watches to reporters attending a press conference called 
by a chain of beauty salons, to the payment of cash for travel expenses to 
reporters attending seminars presented by KMT officials and the 
While small in scale these incidents reflect a culture of co-option-
journalists are seen as as agents of propaganda, not impartial reporters of 
facts. During election campaigns in particular, budgets are allocated by 
political parties for cash gifts and other incentives such as the hosting of 
'overseas tours' for journalists covering particular candidates. Journalists 
refusing to participate in these find they have limited access to 
the in question, or are shunned by their media peers. Another 
recent and worrying trend has been the infiltration of powerful gangs 
into local governments, real estate and construction, particularly in 
provincial areas. Gang control has made the 'monitoring' of local 
governments, and their decisions on issues such as building permits, by 
the media more difficult. There have been recent reports of local journalists 
being beaten or intimidated by members of local gangs. 
At the same time legislators are now reviewing drafts of two new 
laws-one to protect sensitive government information from the media 
(an official secrets act) and another to open government information 
formally to the public and the press (a freedom of information act). Every 
year, for example, the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries put up secret 
budgets, considered highly sensitive by the government because of 
continuing tensions with mainland China. In the free press environment, 
however, the budgets are on the front pages of the national newspapers 
the next day. Media commentators believe the government may be able 
to win the battle for an official secrets act with a trade off, a freedom 
information act, offering the media wider pastures on which to graze. 
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A troubled path to a hopeful future 
Kavi Chongkittavorn 
(additional material by Louise !Iiams) 
he weight of this sad time we ought 
to obey, speak what we feel, not what 
we ought to say.' So ran the editorial 
of Thailand's The Nation newspaper 
on 20 May 1992. The quote from the last act of Shakespeare's King Lear-
when the good and the bad, the strong and the weak, all die alike, and the 
stage is so littered with corpses that it is left to Edgar to stammer the 
curtain down-was edged in the editorial in the black of mourning. The 
remainder of the editorial box was left blank, for the point had been made. 
During the previous three days soldiers of the regime of former military 
chief, General Suchinda Krapayoon, had opened fire on hundreds of 
thousands of pro-democracy protesters at San am Luang, one of Bangkok's 
most famous parks set amidst the golden domes and spires of the Buddhist 
temples which line the Chao Phraya river. How many people actually 
died is still unclear, but hundreds of local and foreign journalists witnessed 
the massacre and trailed the bands of brutal troops through the eerily 
empty streets of the Thai capital as they hunted down fleeing 
demonstrators. 
The 1992 pro-democracy uprising in Thailand was dubbed the 'mobile 
phone revolution' because it was the first major political movement in 
Southeast Asia in which new communication technology-combined with 
rising levels of affluence due to rapid industrialisation-meant that a 
crucial protest movement could be pulled together by phone. The 
protesters were predominantly middle class, those who had benefited 
from economic growth under authoritarian regimes but believed Thailand 
could now afford to open up its political life. 
At that time the Thai media was, supposedly, under strict government 
control, following the bloodless military coup of 1991 and imperfect 
elections which left the country with an appointed, not elected, retired 
General as Prime Minister. Thai TV and radio stations continued on behalf 
of the besieged regime, to lie and fabricate reports, which bore little 
resemblance to the terrifying scenes on the streets. But technology had 
already defeated the censors and the propaganda departments. With 
satellite TV functioning and with enough receivers of live and recorded 
pictures from services such as CNN and the BBC, it was impossible to 
shield the Thai people from the truth. Pro-democracy activists made 
thousands of video copies of the carnage, which were sold on the streets 
and passed from neighbour to neighbour. Rising income levels of the past 
few years meant many Bangkok homes had their own video compact discs 
(VCDs). 
The Thai government tried to block the newspapers and several did 
not print normal editions during the chilling 72-hour stand-off which 
brought Bangkok to a standstill, most of the city's residents huddling 
inside, the dull roar of the traffic replaced by cracks of gunfire. But, with 
rumours racing across the city that the General's tanks were moving on 
the offices of The Nation-and after an acid bomb attack on the home of 
the newspaper's editor-in-chief-the journalists and editors inside decided 
to go ahead with an uncensored edition anyway. For freedom of the press 
in Thailand, The Nation's bold stance marked a critical turning point which 
has since shaped the media's future. For Thailand as a nation, the pro-
democracy movement marked the beginning of the end of the direct 
political control of the Generals, and the cycle of coup d' etats marring the 
development of democracy. 
How the drama was resolved is already history. Thailand's deeply 
revered King Bhumiphol Adulyadej intervened. On national television 
General Suchinda and pro-democracy leader, Chamlong Srimuang, were 
seen crawling along the carpet to prostrate themselves at the King's feet, 
as commoners must. The military was effective! y banished from political 
life, but without the punishment for their excesses many would have liked. 
A transitional government led by a respected former diplomat, Anand 
Panyarachun, was put in its place to prepare for new elections. 
Nowadays, Thailand boasts one of the freest presses in East Asia. In 
recent years significant changes to the regulations controlling the media 
have allowed newspaper, radio and television reporters to carve an 
important role as social'watchdogs', focusing on government corruption 
and incompetence, as well on social issues such as the impact of the recent 
economic crisis on Thai society. In 1997 a new constitution was 
promulgated, including 37 articles which promote a free press, freedom 
of speech, and individual rights. For the first time the constitution 
stipulates that the airwaves belong to the people-and not the government 
or the military-and, as such, must be managed by an independent 
commission. 
But the legacy of decades of military and government control, as well 
as the power of big business groups and individual politicians means 
that the Thai media is still struggling to establish a new balance between 
the demands of commercialism and the responsibility of a free media. 
Many Thai newspapers, for example, have been accustomed to taking 
partisan positions, their stories freely mixing facts with opinions and 
reflecting the views or political positions of their owners. Thai newspapers, 
too, have continued to pursue the commercially successful formula of sex 
and violence, with some tabloids using extraordinarily gory photographs 
of horrific accidents alongside bikini girls, with little thought for serious 
political news. 
Recently, some sectors of the serious press have been subjected to 
harassment and threats by political power brokers. The incidents are 
described by the government as 'personal matters' between the politicians 
and the newspapers, but they represent a form of potential censorship. 
At the same time the Thai media industry is starting to realise that its 
history has stunted the development of a core of professional journalists 
with the skills to operate effectively within the new environment. 
Corruption, or the culture of the white envelope, has long been part of 
the industry due to low wages and long working hours as well as the 
partisan tradition of the media. But, ironically, just as new laws have 
secured press freedoms, and provided expanded opportunities for the 
media to hold bureaucrats and politicians to account, some journalists 
and editors have also been exposed. Working in the field, journalists and 
TV personalities do not always practise the ethics espoused by their bosses. 
Proud of its watchdog role, the press was rocked recently by the disclosure 
of a list of names of alleged bribe-taking journalists from established 
newspapers. What was new was the scale and audacity of the 
arrangements journalists are willing to make with politicians and 
businessmen. Traditional bribe-giving through the so-called white 
envelope has given way to direct deposits, stock options and gifts of cars 
and houses. 
As Thailand approaches the end of the century media analysts agree 
much has been accomplished, but the new question which must be 
answered is 'Who will watch the watchdogs?' 
From dictatorship to democracy 
The history of the Thai media parallels the nation's political history: a 
roller coaster ride of military coups and anti-government uprisings, the 
rapid rise and fall of governments, but the appearance and reappearance 
of many of the same old political players through the revolving door of 
power. 
Thailand was ruled by the Royal Family until 1932, but western-
inspired democratic forces pushed King Rama VII into accepting a shift 
from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. However, the 
success of early democratic forces was limited to shuffling aside the King. 
For the following four decades the country remained under the control of 
the successive authoritarian, military governments of Field Marshals 
Phibun Songgram, Sarit Thanarat and Thanom Kittikarcharon. Press 
censorship by the state was routine, and was justified on the grounds that 
media controls were essential to protect the monarch and to counter the 
communist insurgency, which threatened Thailand's domestic stability 
from the 1950s to the 1980s. During this period numerous newspaper 
editors were accused of being communists or collaborators and 
subsequently jailed. Critical newspapers were closed down and others 
hijacked by politicians and military leaders to serve as mouthpieces for 
their own personal interests. 
The printed and electronic media came under the direct control of the 
feared Police Special Branch and the Public Relations Department. These 
two arms of government monitored the media and took appropriate action 
against those acting counter to the national interest. The police had the 
power to revoke printing licences and confiscate publications, and their 
role as guardians of the national interest meant charges could be pressed 
against journalists on almost any pretext. More specifically the media was 
prohibited from commenting on the Royal family, national security issues, 
or making statements which could incite disturbances or insult Buddhism. 
In 1973, a popular uprising ushered in a new period of democracy and 
openness, celebrated with the establishment of a number of new daily 
newspapers. However, despite the government being in the hands of the 
democratic forces, restrictive press laws and regulations of the past 
remained in force, a constant reminder to journalists and editors that the 
winds could change at any time. The relationship between the press and 
the new government improved dramatically, but much of the goodwill 
and tolerance of criticism from the media relied on personal relationships 
between editors and the power brokers and not on any kind of impartial 
legislative protection. Government press officials granted the media much 
wider boundaries for reports on corruption, crime and scandals, but 
retained sensitive local taboos such as reporting on the Royal family or 
insulting Buddhism. The result, though, of this personalised system of 
press freedom was partisan reporting. Newspapers came to identify with 
particular, friendly powerholders and their ongoing access to 
information-and in a sense their commercial survival-relied on 
supporting their patrons on their pages. 
Thailand lapsed back into right-wing dictatorship following the bloody 
suppression of students in 1976. The restrictive media laws were still in 
place. The new government tried to take control of the press one step 
further by publishing its own newspaper, Chao Phraya. But, so unpopular 
was this daily that it folded after only three months. The print media 
remained in the hands of the private sector, but under the watchful eyes 
of the censors; the electronic media continued to be directly controlled by 
the government or the armed forces. Journalists' and editors' associations 
mounted a concerted campaign against the restrictive press laws, because 
the country's cycle of military coups-17 in all since 1932-meant the 
media was always vulnerable. During political transitions police and press 
officials sometimes directly intimidated journalists, or used other forms 
of harassment, to control the content of newspapers. At times of intense 
political uncertainty journalists, themselves, often became the victims. 
Between 1979 and 1984 at least 47 Thai journalists were killed, mostly in 
provincial areas. 
The 1980s marked the beginning of high economic growth and the 
gradual movement away from military dictatorships. As the economy 
boomed, the restrictions on the press were relaxed under the government 
of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond. This was a period of political 
stability, rare in Thai politics. The country retained the same leader for 
almost a decade, despite successive cabinet reshuffles. Compared to other 
East Asian nations at the time, Thailand enjoyed relative press freedom. 
But, there were still attempts by the Prem administration to blunt criticism, 
particularly in the final years of his rule. 
business 
The economic boom spurred the growth of the media as an industry. 
Dozens of new, mainly business-oriented publications were published, 
to compete for an increasingly middle-class readership. Radio and 
televisions stations spiced up programming formats with more business 
and economic information. The new business papers, however, were 
largely advertorials, their editorial content driven by the interests of 
advertisers or the business stables of their owners. But, at the same time 
economic growth stirred underlying social pressure, exacerbating the gap 
between the rich and the poor and the disparity between the developed 
urban areas and the poor provinces. The vernacular press began to report 
on these issues, which more and more were bringing the people into 
conflict with the state. 
Populist Prime Minister, General Chatchai Choonhavan, who 
succeeded Prem at the end of 1988 was a defender of press freedom, 
'"'"""""'"'his roots. Riding high on years of double digit growth 
and increasing international optimism about the sustainability of 
Thailand's economic boom, Chatchai saw a free press as a means of 
promoting Thailand both regionally and globally. Editors and journalists 
used the buoyancy of the late 1980s to agitate for the scrapping of archaic 
press laws. The most stringent of all, known as the Revolutionary Decree 
No. 42, was enacted by the military junta in 1976 and gave overwhelming 
powers to the Interior Ministry to withdraw licences simply because the 
government or military did not like critical articles or editorial content. 
From 1988 the decree was finally scrapped and the media industry 
boomed. About 150 new dailies, weeklies, 
fortnightlies and monthly newspapers and magazines, entered the highly 
competitive market. Significantly, the scrapping of Decree No. 42 opened 
the way for Thailand's media to enter the regional media market. For 
decades, Bangkok had been an important base for foreign correspondents 
covering the region, particularly Indochina. But, Thailand's own strict 
anti-communist regulations governing the press had prevented the Thai 
media from actively engaging in reporting on their nearest neighbours. 
From 1988, however, first-hand reporting from the Communist Party-ruled 
states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia-then in the process of a UN-
supervised transition-was encouraged and both Thai and English-
language dailies despatched their own correspondents to begin exploring 
the social and economic conditions of their neighbours for the first time 
in decades. 
But, unlike newspapers, the electronic media remained in government 
hands, partly due to the long-term concessions handed out in the past to 
the armed forces and various government agencies, but also partly due 
to relatively successful programming formats. Since 1954, when television 
was first broadcast in Thailand, it had been under military or government 
control. Television continued to broadcast news reflecting the opinions of 
government with little analysis or current affairs. Popular games, quiz 
shows and sit-coms dominated time slots. Radio has always been 
more popular in rural areas and continued to reach the majority of people. 
Of more than 400 radio stations nationwide, all were owned by the 
government or military, with the armed forces directly controlling more 
than 200. Both television and radio stations were used as tools by the 
government and the security apparatus and, in contrast to the increasingly 
outspoken print media, the electronic media broadcast news bulletins 
heavily influenced by their masters. To boost their own financial fortunes 
various military officers leased radio stations to private operators. These 
deals bred large-scale corruption and the huge concessional fees for control 
of radio stations did not find their way into the military's coffers. 
The 1980s and early 1990s changed Bangkok, and much of Thailand. 
So rapid was economic growth that building continued 24 hours a day, 
the capital rumbling under the weight of delivery trucks, the air filled 
with dust as scores of new high-rise towers edged their way upwards, 
transforming streetscapes and laying out a new middle-class dreams for 
millions. In Thailand everyone had a job; tourism was booming thanks to 
a successful international advertising campaign promoting the soft land 
of smiles, industry was booming because wages were still low, real estate 
and construction was booming, and infrastructure was booming as the 
demand for roads, gas and power rose exponentially. But, just as quick to 
rise were expectations. And with the boom came a sharp rise in housing 
costs, horrific traffic jams which destroyed the social fabric of the city and 
forced family life into the car-complete with portable potty and meals-
and caused industrial accidents and pollution so severe that it threatened 
the tourist industry. The progressive Thai Research Development Institute 
predicted that unless economic growth could be held above seven per 
cent, raised expectations could not be met, and the downside of roaring 
industrialisation would overtake the optimism for the future. 
Coincidentally, perhaps, growth dropped to 6.8 per cent at the beginning 
of 1992, just as the military regime of General Suchinda was due to hand 
over power to an elected government. In March that year the elections 
did go ahead, but Suchinda moved to appoint himself Prime Minister 
and the scene was set for the bloody confrontation on the streets of 
Bangkok. 
massacre its 
The 1992 May massacre shook Thailand to the core. Those charming, sunny 
images of the kingdom of Thailand, sold by travel agents around the world, 
would never be quite the same again. The King replaced Suchinda with 
Anand Panyarachun, a respected civilian, who set about trying to catch 
up with the social and political problems created by the economic boom. 
One of his first bold steps was to deregulate the electronic media, allowing 
both independent operators and owners. A new non-government TV 
station was approved and private operators were handed radio 
concessions previously reserved for the armed forces. The result was 
Thailand's first independent TV station, iTV, a new 40-channel cable TV 
operator, United Broadcasting Co-operation, and a raft of special interest 
private radio stations ranging from those focusing on women's affairs to 
agriculture and business. 
Thailand's revolving door of political power continued to tum through 
the 1990s, with the nation facing several leadership changes, each one 
affecting press freedom in different ways. During the reigns of former 
Prime Ministers Banharn Silapa-archa and General Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh, repeated attempts were made to influence the press 
through rewards and incentives. Certain newspapers received more 
advertisements from government agencies and state enterprises. Selected 
columnists enjoyed access to government leaders. Under Banharn, a select 
group of top editors was granted special access to him and his cabinet 
members. But, even with such a patronage system in place, the 
independent press continued to be critical of the government. Responding 
to bad media reviews of his government, Banharn sought to ban some 
radio and television programs and applied pressure to have anti-Banharn 
journalists dismissed. In the prevailing post 1992 political environment 
these tactics tended to reflect badly on the government in the eyes of the 
public, rather than functioning to tame the press effectively. 
Chavalit tried a similar strategy but became more openly hostile and 
manipulative. In June 1997, the Chavalit government set up a Media 
Monitoring Centre under the auspices of the Interior Ministry. Its 
announced purpose was to clarify inaccurate reporting and limit 
sensationalism in the media. Although the Centre had no power and did 
nothing more than issue occasional warnings to journalists, it did harm 
the atmosphere of press freedom in Thailand. After five months, it 
collapsed and was ridiculed as one of the biggest fiascoes of the Chavalit 
government. Apart from a critical press, the growing number of public 
opinion polls-a new phenomenon since 1992-also contributed to 
Chavalit's downfall. At its peak in 1995-96, at least three dozen pollsters, 
took daily samples of the public's reaction to government policies. Opinion 
polls became an integral part of freedom of expression, and the marriage 
of media and the polls was inevitable. Not a single day passed without a 
newspaper citing an opinion poll. But, by the end of 1998, only a few 
credible and independent pollsters survived. 
The financial crisis 
The devaluation of the baht in July 1997 which triggered the East Asian 
crisis was both a blessing and a curse. The economic crisis, coupled with 
a critical press, literally drove out the unpopular and incompetent Chavalit 
government and its hostile attitude to the media. The new government, 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, was a welcome 
change. The government acted qui.ckly to restore local and international 
confidence. With a decent, clean image, Chuan has been reasonably 
successful in rebuilding confidence amongst key foreign investors and 
winning support for his government's ongoing economic and financial 
reforms. Chuan's new slogan was that the public should know what the 
government knows. Through the print and electronic media, the Chuan 
government was able to present its policies for overcoming the crisis which 
saw the new middle class facing unemployment and reduced to hawking 
the goods of their recent success-their snappy clothes, expensive furniture 
and electronic goods-in sidewalk markets reserved for the new poor. 
During the first year of the Chuan government, the media was 
generally supportive of the government, particularly its economic reforms 
and financial restructuring. But as the crisis worsened and began to hurt 
ordinary people, the Thai-language media became predictably more 
critical of the government's failure to protect disadvantaged groups from 
the impact of reforms. More and more negative assessments of the 
government's economic recovery policies frustrated officials. Despite the 
Chuan administration's repeated assurances that it would uphold press 
freedom, many politicians and officials have been unable to hide their 
hostility toward the independent press and have, from time to time, urged 
them to be cautious with their commentaries. 
It is true that certain hard-hitting newspapers have acted as if they are 
campaigning against Chuan. It is also important to note that during the 
economic crisis the public has increasingly relied on the press to provide 
them with information and analysis of the economic collapse. The public 
has little trust left in officials who failed to take note of impending signs 
of economic disaster, nor the public relations machinery which had 
wrongly assured everyone that Thailand was on the right track. The press 
has been responsible for reminding the authorities of the painful, social 
consequences of economic restructuring. Before the crisis, financial 
reporting was mediocre at best. Many reporters failed to detect early signs 
of economic problems partly because the government did not tell the truth 
about Thailand's economic conditions. The government refused to divulge 
reliable statistics and figures and misled the public about the severity of 
the crisis. But, with the imposition of the International Monetary Fund 
restructuring package, transparency has been forced on the administration 
and information is now much more readily available. 
The press has since exposed corruption, incompetence and 
overspending. During the financial crisis, newspapers expanded 
corruption investigations to virtually all government agencies, both at 
the national and local levels. In the past, the press would concentrate on 
key cabinet ministers, but with the recent decentralisation of political 
power towards provinces and districts, the press has also begun to focus 
on sub-national politics. The result is more and more corruption stories, 
exposing even low ranking bureaucrats. Even the extensive vote-rigging 
at the 1999 council election in Samut Prakarn was extensively covered by 
the local and national media, an event which would have been largely 
ignored in the past. 
In the second half of 1999, the unblemished record of the Chuan 
government on freedom of the press has been tarnished by incidents of 
abuse and intimidation. Within the Thai context, there is a correlation 
between the level of press freedom and the length of government's reign 
of power. It has almost become an axiom that the longer the government 
lasts, the more hostile its attitude towards the press. Since the 
democratisation of 1973, no Thai government has completed its four-year 
parliamentary term. In July, a private aide of a deputy Prime Minister 
together with seven men, some armed, burst into the newsroom of the 
Thai Post around midnight. The aide demanded the paper, a three-year-
old hard-hitting daily, correct a news report which referred to the deputy 
Prime Minister as a coward. The incident led to widespread condemnation 
by local and foreign media organisations and academics. The Chuan 
government treated the incident as a personal matter between the 
newspaper and the Minister, but the Prime Minister urged the press to 
exercise self-control and become more responsible and ethical. Media 
associations and academics expressed deep disappointment over the 
government's response, labeling its indifference as 'growing arrogance'. 
Because the authorities took no action against the minister and his men, 
there are fears that such blatant acts of thuggery may be repeated with 
impunity. Press organisations have urged the government to investigate 
the incident and punish the culprits, but apparently the Chuan goverment 
remains so confident of its 'free press' image that it feels there is no need 
to act. 
The economic crisis has also, of course, greatly impacted on the media 
as an industry. Media proprietors expanded their operations considerably 
during the 1980s and 1990s, focusing on expected new gold mines such 
as property and hotels. Consequently, the economic collapse has forced 
significant contractions. Both the dominant Wathajak and Phujadkarn 
groups, whose ambitious projects included newspapers, business 
publications and satellite communications, collapsed under the weight 
of bad debts as the baht tumbled, leaving only their flagship newspapers 
in operation today. In the two years since Thailand's baht crisis triggered 
the region's financial tsunami, a dozen newspapers and magazines have 
been closed, including the English-language Asia Times and Thailand Times, 
and about 3,500 journalists and other media-related personnel laid off. 
The number of pages in major newspapers has been halved and the use 
of colour reduced due to soaring newsprint prices. Advertising revenue 
has plunged 60 per cent. Each of the failed newspapers had its own early 
retirement and compensation plans, but half of the journalists laid off 
were not paid out in full or adequately compensated. Surviving 
newspapers have had to restructure debts to reflect the baht's lower value, 
and slash the salaries of their administrators and journalists by as much 
as 50 per cent. 
The difficulties have increased competition and forced editors to be 
more creative just to survive. Press organisations have been re-engineering 
and downsizing. Surviving dailies are biting the bullet and their editorial 
staff, hit with huge cuts in salary and fringe benefits, are working overtime. 
To lower costs, reporters are no longer assigned specific stories, but cover 
broader issues and take up additional beats. With fewer pages and 
journalists, proprietors and editors have to change the way their 
newspapers are run-most importantly to improve the accuracy and 
accountability of news reporting. Thai journalists have had to tighten their 
usual pompous and long-winded style of news coverage. Most Thai and 
English-language papers now feature more investigative reports and 
analysis. But, the mass circulation sensational dailies, such as Thai Rath, 
Daily News and Khao Sod, continue to rely on their successful formula of 
combining gossips, crime, social and political scandals and exposes with 
bikini-clad women. These papers still publish grotesque pictures of 
accidents and crime scenes. 
In a similar vein, foreign language publications, mainly English and 
Chinese, have had to reorganise to stay alive. The country's two major 
English-language newspapers, The Bangkok Post and The Nation, were 
forced to cut down staff and page numbers and suspend foreign and 
domestic expansion plans. New marketing strategies were adopted to 
maintain and increase subscription and readership levels. Overseas 
bureaux of both newspapers, mainly in Indochina, were shut down and 
foreign assignments trimmed or discouraged to decrease costs. Stringers 
are now used instead. Specialised journalists were urged to expand their 
news beats and become roving reporters taking up general assignments. 
In the case of the Chinese-language press, the financial crisis has had less 
impact, because of their small editorial staffs and low-cost operation. 
However, the combined circulation of the six Bangkok-based Chinese 
newspapers was down by 20 per cent last year. With less advertising, 
their pages were also reduced, as was colour printing, to save money. 
Two Japanese-language weekly papers continue to rely on advertisements 
from Japanese companies. 
hopes, 
There are high hopes that the Thai press will emerge from this crisis as a 
more professional industry. However, the evidence to date suggests the 
press has not improved enough in response to trying times. Even though 
Thai society is now more open, the issues tackled by the press remain 
narrow and parochial. Most news reports continue to lack proper 
backgrounding, or clear interpretations of the news. Despite the increase 
in exposes of corruption by the media, few journalists have serious 
investigative skills. Editors and mid-level Thai journalists at the major 
Thai dailies are fiercely independent, highly opinionated, and often 
partisan. The voice of a newspaper is often that of the proprietor, or of his 
or her political allies and connections outside. Cooperation between 
editors and journalists from competing newspapers on issues such as 
responsibility is virtually non-existent. Cooperation is only seen when 
dealing with issues of press freedom, but under Chuan legislative controls 
are no longer a problem. 
The struggles over the past decade have resulted in press freedom 
becoming one of the main pillars of Thai society, and one which has shaped 
the country's journey towards a civil society. The new constitution, 
promulgated in 1997-containing 37 articles promoting freedom of the 
press, freedom of expression and individual rights-is one of the most 
comprehensive in the world. It also·stipulates that the airwaves used by 
the electronic media belong to the people-effectively preventing the 
government and the armed forces from ever again asserting complete 
control over radio and television. Some of the highlights are as follows. 
" A person shall enjoy the liberty of communication by lawful means 
(Article 37). 
• A person shall enjoy the liberty to express his or her opinion, make 
speeches, write, print and publicise; the closure of a press establishment 
or a radio or television station is forbidden; the censorship of news or 
articles before their publication in a newspaper, printed material, radio 
or television is not allowed (Article 39). 
" An independent newspaper body will distribute the frequencies and 
supervise radio and television broadcasting (Article 40). 
• Newspaper, radio or television broadcasting enterprises shall enjoy 
the liberty to present news and express their opinions without the 
mandate or direction of any government agency (Article 41). 
" A person shall enjoy the right to have access to information held by 
the government, its agencies or state enterprises (Article 58). 
With the new constitution in place, over two dozen existing anti-press 
laws are considered unconstitutional and must be abolished. The Chuan 
government has repeatedly pledged to do just that But the government's 
refusal to act after the July intimidation incident has raised suspicions 
amongst some journalists and the public that the government will keep a 
card or two up its sleeve, such as the archaic Printing and Advertisement 
Act of 1941. The Act permits police closures of newspapers or printing 
presses in time of war or national emergency, but only with a court order. 
Police can also reprimand the press if they publish reports deemed to be 
disturbing the peace, or offending public morals. Even though press 
officials claim to be convinced of the need for a free press, they insist that 
there must be some new laws in place of the 1941 Act to oversee the local 
and foreign press, and retain some form of media registration process. 
Press associations strongly object to the idea citing the new 
constitution's guarantee of a free press without any licensing. But they 
agree with the government's proposal that any new publication in 
Thailand must notify an independent bureau, outside the purview of the 
Interior Ministry or the police, for the sole purpose of keeping records. 
Conservative quarters of the Chuan government, particularly some 
lawmakers, are still deeply skeptical about granting wide-ranging 
freedoms to the foreign press. Newsweek's negative coverage of the state 
of Thai economy in July 1999 upset the Thai leaders and has been cited by 
conservatives as a justification for controlling the foreign press and 
distribution of foreign publications. In October 1999, the cabinet 
unanimously approved the new bill called, the Press Notification Act of 
1999, pending deliberations by the parliament. It obliges all new 
publications to notify the authorities of details of their new titles, names 
of publishers and editors and their addresses. 
In the Southeast Asian region, Thailand is the most progressive nation 
in terms of the dissemination of publicly held information. The Official 
he foreign press 
The first printing press was introduced to Thailand by a western 
missionary, and in 1844 the first newspaper was born. Since then the 
foreign press has enjoyed press freedom because of extra-territorial laws. 
Using satellite technology, foreign newspapers began to publish on a 
daily basis in Bangkok in 1993. The Japanese-language Yomiuri Shimbun, 
the world's largest circulation daily, was the first foreign newspaper to 
be printed via satellite in Bangkok. Later, the Asian Wall Street Journal 
joined in the satellite-editions. Since May 1999, the International Herald 
Tribune has been printed locally. Furthermore, a local Chinese-language 
daily printed in Bangkok, Universal Daily, has its front pages and 
entertainment sections prepared in Taipei. 
With more than 300 foreign journalists representing 110 major news 
organisations from around the world, Bangkok is second only to Hong 
Kong in terms of the number of foreign correspondents. Japanese 
correspondents are still the largest single group based in Bangkok since 
the 1980s, mainly due to massive Japanese investment in the Thai 
economic boom of the time. Despite negative news reports by Bangkok-
based foreign correspondents in recent years, the government has so far 
resisted the temptation to ban correspondents it has identified as 
unfriendly. In the past two years, the government has also been trying 
to lower costs of satellite feeds and telecommunications because of 
complaints by foreign media organisations and journalists. With cheaper 
services and improved traffic conditions, the government hopes to attract 
more media organisations to use Bangkok as a regional base. The 
government has also recently published a handbook for foreign press 
with contact addresses and phone numbers of all spokespersons from 
all government agencies and enterprises. 
Information Act was enacted in October 1997 as part of the overall political 
reforms. Among 16 countries, mostly in the west, which have a freedom 
of information act, Thailand is the only developing country in East Asia 
to adopt a law authorising public access to government information. Japan 
followed suit and passed a similar act in July 1999. The Thai Information 
Act has been hailed regionally and internationally as a means to promote 
transparency, good governance and accountability of the government and 
the civil servants. The public hopes the Act will serve as a deterrent to 
corruption and inefficiency on the part of officials, as journalists or pressure 
groups will have access to records of their decisions and performances. 
In the past 12 months, nearly 200 petitions were filed with the Office 
of the Information Act Committee requesting various government agencies 
to release basic information ranging from details of government contracts 
and state examinations to budget allocations and past minutes of the Bank 
of Thailand. The high number of petitions reflects the lack of 
understanding of the spirit of the new Act, as officials continue to resist 
giving the public access to information under their control. The Thai media 
has only made two dozen applications for government-held information, 
all of which related to telecommunications contracts and TV concessions. 
Journalists appear to be relying on traditional sources of classified and 
personal data-their own personal connections. Their reliance on 
politicians to leak documents, however, means they can become tools 
within political power plays. It will require more than a change in the 
information law to change long-standing work practices and ethics. 
Some sectors of the media have been less than enthusiastic about the 
new information laws because they can also be used to expose how well 
known journalists and televisions personalities abuse their own power 
and influence. The most damaging case for the media was the release in 
1999 of a list of journalists, many from influential media outlets, allegedly 
involved in accepting bribes and exploiting their press privileges and 
connections. The bribe list highlighted the low wages and long working 
hours within the industry, particularly since the economic crisis. Some 
journalists work second jobs to make ends meet, but for others the solution 
lies with politicians and business people who are more than willing to 
pay for favourable reports. More shocking to many Thais than the reality 
of bribe taking by journalists was the scale of the corruption. The indus try 
has long been accustomed to the culture of the white envelope, tips of 
taxi money handed out to journalists and press conferences, for example. 
But it appears the white envelope has given way to direct deposits, stock 
options, gifts of computer laptops, mobile phones and vehicles. 
After some initial stalling, the Reporters' Association of Thailand and 
the self-regulatory Press Council of Thailand (PCT) launched their own 
investigations into the scandal. The PCT has still to prove it can monitor 
and regulate the local press-especially the sensational dailies-and make 
it more responsible. The corruption probe has prompted editors to review 
their newsroom ethics and phase out journalists who might have abnormal 
relationships with the power brokers. One of the corruption cases involved 
a reporter, who used his connection with a Cabinet Minister to speed up 
the delivery of a car he had ordered. The Minister paid the deposit on the 
he provincial press 
There are more than 300 provincial newspapers spread 
throughout 76 provinces including weekly, fortnightly and monthly 
publications. They are competing in a small market and have only a 
handful of staff each, who do the reporting, page layout and map 
advertising and marketing plans themselves. 
Focus Songkhla, a Thai-language weekly, is a successful community 
newspaper in Southern Thailand, selling well with a circulation of about 
5,000. The weekly has filled the gap left by national dailies by focusing 
on issues affecting local communities in the four southernmost provinces, 
ranging from investment opportunities to the misappropriation of 
government funds. Regional newspapers can play the role of an early 
warning system with the first reports of local scandals or malfeasance, 
which are later picked up by the Bangkok press. With decentralisation 
and the spread of economic growth to remote areas, these small 
provincial publications have played an important role in providing local 
economic data and other useful information, including a local advertising 
service. Only Chiangmai and Nakhon Ratchasima have daily provincial 
newspapers. 
However, the overall quality of provincial newspapers is poor, often 
reflecting the views of local interest groups and their connections with 
the editors and publishers. Politically, these newspapers can have 
influence in their local communities, as they can mobilise sentiment much 
better than national newspapers. During political campaigns, especially 
prior to local district or provincial elections, they are the primary sources 
of information on local politics. 
car. The incident came to light after the Minister's personal memo was 
leaked to the press. In a letter to the PCT 68 journalists demanded an 
investigation as they considered the incident a violation of press ethics. 
After a six-week investigation, the council reached the verdict that the 
journalist in question must not use his connection or any form of influence 
for personal interest as it was considered inappropriate. Before the council 
reached the decision, however, the journalist in question resigned from 
his newspaper. But he was immediately given a job a pro-government 
newspaper. As such, questions have been raised about the effectiveness 
of the PCT in providing social sanction against corrupt journalists. 
Who will watch the watchdogs? 
Clearly, more education and training is needed for the media, the 
bureaucracy and the public on how to use the new Information Act 
effectively. There are two key provisions of the act. 
" A person has the right to scrutinize and obtain a copy of official 
information. All government information is considered open and the 
public may have access to it, except in specific cases related to the 
royal family, security and lawsuits. 
" Any person who considers a state agency has failed to make the 
information available for public inspection is entitled to lodge a 
complaint with the Official Information Act Committee after seven 
days. 
In other areas, the Thai media also needs to make serious efforts to 
improve professional standards. Because of fierce competition, the press 
tends to report quickly on stories which focus on scandals and personal 
matters. Inaccurate news, intentional or otherwise, is common. Entire 
stories are sometimes based on quips or off-the-cuff comments, without 
any background research or attempts to verify the information. News 
coverage is also heavily focused on Bangkok, and especially Government 
House, ignoring many important social issues in the rural areas. The 
predominant writing style continues to mix facts and the personal opinions 
of the writers, without any clear distinction. Moreover, inaccurate 
translations from Thai (particularly of colloquial political discourse}, into 
English and Chinese have increased factual distortions without malicious 
intent. 
One of the most serious problems is the quality of journalists. Without 
proper training nor a clear understanding of press ethics, reporters are 
out in the field struggling to understand the labyrinth of Thai politics and 
the complicated social and economic environment the recent crisis has 
produced. With inexperienced reporters and heavy work loads, journalists 
tend to concentrate on single issue stories such as comments made by 
political leaders. Although there are 53 universities and colleges offering 
media-related subjects, few new graduates choose to work as journalists, 
perhaps because of the low pay rates. Editors have also complained that 
the graduates are not well equipped to take up the challenges of 
journalism. At the end of 1998 representatives of journalists' associations 
and institutions, which used to treat each other as adversaries, met for 
the first time and immediately agreed to work out a syllabus for future 
journalists. They shared the common view that Thai journalists need sound 
basic training in interview techniques, writing styles and verification of 
news stories. Field experience and on-the-job training could also help 
enhance media professionalism. 
Now that Thailand has undertaken far-reaching reforms in media laws, 
questions have been raised about reforming the press itself, 'Who will 
watch the watchdogs?' In response to growing public pressure for a more 
responsible and accountable press and to counter future press restrictions, 
25 publishers and editors from all national newspapers met and 
established the long-envisioned PCT in July 1997. The main aim of the 
self-regulatory body is to monitor press ethics and promote greater 
professionalism. Since its establishment, more than 50 public complaints 
have been filed with the PCT mainly concerning sensationalism and 
obscene pictures as well as inaccuracy and right of rebuttal. Despite the 
PCT composition of editors and publishers from all the major dailies, they 
have failed to enforce a uniform code of ethics. The 1999 corruption scandal 
has, instead, prompted individual editors to issue their own codes of 
conduct to ensure journalists do not misbehave. In the past two years, a 
few non-government organisations have been established to monitor the 
media, but their work has had little impact so far. 
Currently, ten professional associations represent the interests of 
various groups of journalists including photographers, crime and 
entertainment reporters, both in the capital and in the provinces. The 
Reporters' Association of Thailand (RAT), established in 1955, is 
considered the main press organisation, because it boasts the largest 
number of members and the most comprehensive agenda including 
scholarships, and training programs. But only 60 per cent of active 
journalists have joined the organisation, and some continue to view 
professional associations with disdain. To broaden its membership base, 
RAT last year admitted broadcasters as associate members. In the 
foreseeable future, the remaining press associations could merge with RAT 
due to overlapping functions and memberships. As a core professional 
body, RAT will soon merge with the Journalists Association of Thailand. 
With increased public expectation and more democratisation, the Thai 
press has to clean up its own house. It must also demonstrate that greater 
freedom will raise newspaper quality and make journalism more 
responsible. Otherwise the hope that the Thai press will be a force to be 
reckoned with, at home and in the region, will remain just that. 
Media websites 
The Nation, www.nationmultimedia.com/ 
The Bangkok Post, www.bangkokpost.net/ 
Thai Rath Daily, www.thairath.com/ 
Daily News Daily, www.dailynews.co.th/ 
Matichon Group, www.matichon.co.th/ 
Propaganda is not a dirty word 
Peter Mares 
very morning in cities, towns and 
villages across Vietnam, people go 
about their business to the crackle of 
loudspeakers. The monotonous daily 
broadcasts, courtesy of the local level administration, the peoples' 
committee of the ward or commune, is a mix of patriotic music, official 
news, decrees and mundane announcements. People may be reminded 
not to clutter the pavement with motorcycles or ordered to be alert to the 
threat of 'peaceful evolution' (the coded catchphrase for attempts to 
undermine communist rule). 
The nationwide network of around 900,000 loudspeakers dates back 
to Vietnam's revolutionary struggle, when party cadres would travel from 
village to village to proselytise, or to warn people about the latest military 
advance by French colonial troops. The cadres would often set up a 
portable loudspeaker to amplify their message. During the' American War' 
a more permanent loudspeaker system was established to warn of 
impending raids by US B-52 bombers. At a time when few people had 
radios, it served as a broadcast network, providing news from the front, 
solace and motivation in the face of war. 
These days, no one pays much attention to the loudspeakers. In some 
places, villagers have lobbied to get the broadcasts turned down, or turned 
off, or shifted to a later hour in the morning. But, mostly the broadcasts 
have become background noise and people just do not hear them any 
more. When the Communist Party held its National Congress in 1996-a 
landmark political event that takes place once every five years-General 
Secretary Do Muoi's closing speech was carried live via the network of 
loudspeakers strung from lampposts and trees along the streets of Hanoi. 
But no one bothered to stop and listen. 
The ritual of the loudspeaker neatly symbolises the Communist Party's 
continuing efforts to control the flow of information in Vietnam through 
a dogged attachment to the idea that the media is, first and foremost, a 
vehicle for state propaganda. On one level the strategy is a miserable 
failure because, like the loudspeaker broadcasts, much of the media output 
in Vietnam goes unheeded. There are newspapers and magazines that 
remain neatly folded on desks, television shows that command far less 
attention than the advertisements that precede them, radio programs that 
babble on like white noise. Much of Vietnam's media output fails to engage 
or entertain and the audience is often cynical about the value of the 
information it carries. 
In a negative sense, however, the Communist Party's media strategy 
succeeds remarkably well. While the party may no longer be successful 
at generating revolutionary fervour and commitment through the media, 
it does efficiently circumscribe the type of news, information and ideas 
reaching a general audience, blocking criticism of the regime and critical 
debate about its policies and performance. In this sense the morning 
loudspeaker ritual is a daily reminder that the party's power still reaches 
deep into society. 
Colonialism to communism 
Vietnam has a long history of scholarship and learning linked to the 
mandarin tradition of civil service which it shares with China. In the late 
nineteenth century, this elite of educated Vietnamese formed the corps of 
the colonial administration in Indochina, but also provided the kernel of 
nationalist opposition to French rule. 
After the tum of the century, members of this small literati began to 
publish newspapers and periodicals in French and Vietnamese in Saigon 
and Hanoi. Circulations were small, reflecting low literacy levels, and 
editors were constrained by censors who would quickly shut down any 
publication which challenged the colonial order too directly. 
Nevertheless these journals were an important venue for debating 
nationalist ideas, including the growing conviction that it was superior 
knowledge and technology that enabled the Europeans to subject the 
Vietnamese to their colonial yoke. This reasoning led early nationalists to 
view education as the key to liberation. They began to push for the 
popularisation of the Romanised Vietnamese script quoc-ngu. Quoc-ngu 
had originally been developed by a 17th century French missionary 
Alexandre de Rhodes, primarily in order to aid in his own language 
learning and proselytising. The nationalists now adopted the script to 
replace the complex nom characters in which Vietnamese texts had 
traditionally been written and to establish Vietnamese as an acceptable 
language for intellectual debate. Previously classical Chinese and French 
were regarded as the only languages of higher learning and discourse. As 
publisher Phan Van Truong argued, reaching a tiny minority of 
Francophones was of 'very little benefit'. The aim was to produce writings 
on every conceivable subject so that 'all of our people are able to study' 
(Marr 1981:162). 
By the 1930s, Vietnamese writers were experimenting with 
contemporary journalistic forms recently pioneered in Europe, such as 
investigative journalism and first person reportage (or phong su). 
One of the most celebrated examples was an expose of the suffering of 
Hanoi's rickshaw coolies called, I Pulled a Rickshaw. Foreign visitors to 
contemporary Hanoi are often charmed by the (now disappearing) cyclos, 
but these pedal trishaws are essentially a modern phenomena. The 
rickshaw coolies of the 1930s were human horses, running bare-foot 
between the shafts and hauling their passengers behind them. In 1932, in 
a deeply shocking and socially courageous act for an educated man of the 
time, journalist Tam Lang donned a coolie's garb and went 'undercover' 
to investigate the conditions of the rickshaw pullers. His florid reports 
were published as a series of newspaper articles. 
With the friend that I met on the road, I slipped into an eating booth 
that was dark and as constricted as a rat's hole. I breathed in the air of 
fetid, choking smells. This stench was called the 'chopping board smell', 
but this was only partly correct, because aside from the smell of stale 
fat, rotten fish, tainted meat, raw onions and a hundred other kinds of 
food, there was, if you analysed it carefully, also the smell of excrement 
mingling with that of habitual sweat. 
To lower a powerless person from his status as a human being to 
that of a horse, to give him two wooden shafts and say 'I will sit up 
here while you pull me' is the same as saying 'You are not a human 
being' (Tam Lang 1932). 
Parallel to the rise of reportage in the 1930s, other writers were 
attempting to redress social injustice through literary realism. The novel, 
Impasse (Buoc Duong Cung) by Nguyen Cong Hoan, was published in 1938 
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and banned soon after by the French authorities because it described how 
farmers struggled to pay exorbitant French taxes only to see their money 
squandered by a lazy, corrupt Vietnamese official. 
Representative Lai's villa is located in the very centre of the village of 
An Dao. But his villa and the village of An Dao are two completely 
separate worlds ... Representative Lai is frightfully rich. Other people's 
money, rice, paddies, and dwellings can slip into his possession with a 
wave of his hand (Ngo Vinh Long 1991). 
Impasse is set in the northern coastal province of Thai Binh, where 
grievances over unfair taxes were at the heart of peasant rebellions against 
the French and their local collaborators-rebellions that helped give birth 
to Vietnam's communist revolution. 
Ironically, it was in Thai Binh in 1997 that farmers echoed the 
complaints of their forbears. They were infuriated to see district officials 
constructing elaborate private homes while promised local roads remained 
unbuilt. A considerable portion of the farmers' precious rice harvest was 
consumed by a plethora of different taxes, including such arbitrary imposts 
as a tax on ducks crossing the road. When local officials failed to respond 
to peaceful demonstrations and petitions, the farmers' anger finally boiled 
over into violent protests. Officials' houses were burnt down and in one 
village some twenty policemen were taken hostage by farmers wielding 
sticks. But in the 1990s, under communist rule, no Vietnamese journalist 
or writer was able to give voice to the frustrations of the Thai Binh farmers. 
In his introduction the English translation of Tam Lang's, I Pulled a 
Rickshaw Greg Lockhart writes that a democratic transformation in the 
political, social and literary consciousness during the colonial era produced 
'a new way of writing' but he also notes that this type of writing 'has 
failed to flourish since the revolution of the 1940s'. 
During the struggle against the French from 1945 to 1954, many 
journalists and writers were content to bend their pens to the service of 
the party and the cause of national liberation. Improvised presses were 
set up in the jungle, cranking out the first copies of the underground 
newspaper, Thang (Victory). 
After the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and 
independence was achieved in the north, journalists, artists and 
intellectuals began pushing for a more liberal approach during the so-
called Ngan Van/Gai Pham (Humanism/Works of Beauty) movement. They 
were encouraged by external events such as Kruschev's 1955 denunciation 
of Stalin and by Mao's Hundred Flowers Campaign in China. But by late 
1956 the party's threshold of tolerance had been reached and it reasserted 
control. One person who suffered was the poet/ composer Van Cao, who 
wrote Vietnam's national anthem along with other well-known ballads 
that chronicle and celebrate the liberation struggle. Because of his role in 
the Nhan Van/Giai Pham movement Van Cao' s work was no longer played 
in public or broadcast. The only exception was the national anthem and 
in the early 1980s the party even tried to find a replacement by organising 
a nationwide competition for alternatives. 
Van Cao was rehabilitated in 1987 when another ray of light broke 
briefly through the oppressive clouds that hover over Vietnam's media 
landscape. Again influenced by developments elsewhere in the communist 
world, particularly Europe and the Soviet Union, party leadership relaxed 
controls over the media. There was a sudden re-emergence of phong su, 
socially engaged, critical reportage, particularly in the weekly journal Van 
Nghe published by the Writers Association. 
But in 1989, with communism crumbling in Eastern Europe and 
massive pro-democracy protests erupting in China, the pendulum swung 
back towards control. Even though there is more apparent diversity in 
the media today than ten years ago, the past decade has seen a tightening 
of media laws and increased surveillance over journalists and editors. 
One of Ho Chi Minh's first acts after declaring independence in 1945 
had been to decree a nationwide campaign to stamp out illiteracy. In less 
than eighteen months, some 100-thousand volunteer instructors had 
reputedly taught more than two and a half million people to read and 
write. 
One characteristic of the newly independent Vietnam was the bare-
footed peasant walking to evening classes, tiny oil lamp in one hand, 
battered quae ngu primer in the other ... For those who could not or 
would not attend evening sessions, there were special classes at the 
marketplace, in the rice fields, and aboard fishing boats. Study words 
were scrawled on the sides of buildings and train cars, and even on 
the mud encrusted flanks of water buffalo (Marr 1981:184). 
It is a sad irony of Vietnam's communist revolution that just as the 
party succeeded in dramatically expanding literacy, it simultaneously set 
strict limits on the range of material available. In 1958 the Communist 
Party declared that the press was to be 'the collective agitator, propagandist 
and organiser, an instrument of the party to lead the masses, a sharp 
weapon in the class struggle against the enemy'. In late 1996, not much 
had changed-politiburo member Lt. General Le Kha Phieu (who became 
party chief one year later) reminded journalists that they were 
'revolutionary soldiers in the field of culture ideology' and that the 
newspaper was 'a weapon for struggling on the political and ideological 
front'. 
Newspapers: an extensive menu serving the same dish 
At first glance, Vietnam appears to have a lively press scene, with around 
four hundred separate titles appearing as daily, weekly or monthly 
publications. They range from serious literary journals, to tabloid crime 
blotters; from science and technology manuals to glossy fashion 
magazines. The menu of newspaper choice has expanded dramatically 
since 1986, when the Communist Party formally endorsed the economic 
reform policy known as doi moi at its landmark 6th National Congress, 
opening the way for private enterprise to operate in many sectors of the 
economy. Before, the entire country had about ten newspapers, weeklies 
and journals owned by the central authorities and stories about sport, 
culture, science and social affairs had not been recognised as proper food 
for public thought. 
In Vietnam's limited market economy, some newspapers (though not 
all) now have an economic incentive to attract readers. The new element 
of competition has helped to push out editorial boundaries. Newspapers 
vie to print stories of genuine interest, rather than just reams of tired 
ideological rhetoric or proud socialist statistics. This has had a particular 
impact on the coverage of popular but politically safe topics like sport. 
One of the big commercial success stories of recent years has been the 
special supplements published by Vietnam Newsagency (VNA) to 
coincide with international soccer tournaments such as the World Cup. 
The first supplements were so popular they caused major traffic jams when 
they hit the streets, at a time when most of the population was still riding 
bicycles. Officials, however, bristled, arguing that readers were not 
supposed to be pre-occupied with football at the cost of political awareness 
(Do Phoung 1997). Ten years later, however, there is an awareness within 
the Party of a need for more diversified, accurate information. 
Advertising and competition have also had an impact on the language 
of journalism, though stultified, meaningless announcements are still 
common in reporting the activities of top officials. This quote from Vietnam 
News is typical. 
General Secretary Le Kha Phieu said foreign delegations to the eighth 
National Confederation of Labour Congress have brought warm 
sentiments of friendship and solidarity to the Vietnamese people. He 
told the foreign delegations that he appreciated their organisations' 
valuable assistance and solidarity during VietNam's past struggle for 
national liberation and reunification and current drive for national 
construction and defence (7 November 1998). 
This type of language still characterises such august publications as 'The 
central organ of the Vietnam Communist Party', the national daily Nhan 
Dan (The People) which proclaims on its masthead that it is 'The Voice of 
the Party, the Government and the Vietnamese People'. The turgid 
language employed by Nhan Dan is shared by its military equivalent Quan 
Doi Nhan Dan (The People's Army) and such newspapers as Hanoi Moi 
(New Hanoi), published by the Hanoi branch of the Communist Party. 
However, in the search for readers there has been a shift by some 
newspapers to employ more direct and active prose. Leading the charge 
are the police, with highly successful tabloids that corner the market in 
their own special area of expertise-stories of crime and punishment. 
Sidewalk vendors spruik out the juiciest story lines from Cong An Thanh 
Po Ho Chi Minh (Ho Chi Minh City Police), such as 'the father chopped 
his son into many pieces and put them in a bag .. .' or 'the girl wearing a 
thin nightdress lay under the dim lamp and the vile old man could not 
control himself ... ' 
Thu, who has been selling newspapers on the same corner since the 
war, says that everyone reads Cong An Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh, 'from cyclo 
drivers to office workers'. In 1997, the paper's weekly special edition sold 
550,000 copies and its regular daily sold 100,000 copies, returning a per 
edition profit of about US$10,000 in a country with an average per capita 
annual income of US$300. 
Nearby at police headquarters, chief editor Ha Phi Long denies that 
Cong An Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh trades on sensationalism and scandal. 
He says crime stories make up just five per cent of the paper's coverage 
and he protests that readers do not like sensationalism. 'What they are 
interested in' he lectures me sternly, 'is the lessons that they can learn in 
order to contribute to the authorities' efforts to ensure law and 
order'(1996). 
While there is little evidence to bear out his claim, it does point to the 
fact that for all their entertainment value, police newspapers like Cong 
An Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh carry a conservative ideological message. For 
example, they are often at the forefront of attacks on writers and artists 
who dare to test the limits of cultural expression. The paper accused 
leading young author Pham Thi Hoai of 'insulting the Vietnamese people' 
when she published an innovative collection of short stories, which offered 
a biting satire on contemporary Vietnam and such sacred cows as the 
institution of the family. More recently the police newspapers directed 
their barbs at Vietnam's emerging new generation of pop stars, claiming 
various male singers were gay. 
In Vietnam, all singers must audition before a panel of cultural officials 
and have their lyrics approved by censors before they perform in public. 
But this is clearly not producing the level of patriotism and skill demanded 
by another similar weekly, An Ninh The Gioi (Security World) 'Their money 
making performance has killed any creativity, many sing like machines, 
their voices are not rooted in their soul, they contain the smell of money' 
(Reuters, 27 August 1999). 
As author and journalist, Robert Templer, points out in his recent book, 
Shadows and Wind the police tabloids glorify the Interior Ministry, the main 
apparatus of political repression in Vietnam, while promoting the idea 
that yet more social controls are needed. 'Like many tabloids, the police 
paper plays on the public's capacity for cognitive dissonance by sending 
out a very mixed message; it offers up a dystopia of rampant crime and 
deviancy and at the same time reassures the public that the police have 
got it all under control' (Templar 1998:173). 
By comparison to Cong An Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh, the party daily 
Nhan Dan is struggling. Officially Nhan Dan claims a circulation of more 
than 200,000, but the paper relies heavily on a captive audience of readers 
(or at least of people who receive the paper). According to Politburo 
instruction llCT /TU issued in January 1997, 'each party cell, municipal 
peoples committee, peoples councils at district and board level and each 
cell of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League all over the country' 
should have a copy of Nhan Dan. Usually the paper lies neatly folded 
until it is eventually collected for re-cycling. The most avid readers of 
Nhan Dan are foreign journalists and diplomats, who comb the arcane 
language for any hint of official shifts in policy or personnel within the 
secretive upper echelons of the Communist Party. 
Between the extremes of the police tabloids and staid party organs, a 
number of other newspapers have earned a degree of popular respect for 
their willingness to print real news and provide more thoughtful comment 
on a range of pressing social issues, from the abuse of factory workers to 
the spread of HIV-AIDS. The youth newspaper Tuoi Tre (estimated 
circulation 200,000) and the labour newspaper Lao Dong (70,000) are good 
examples, though the editorial space in which they operate is strictly 
circumscribed. 
There is no private ownership of the media in Vietnam. All newspapers 
and magazines are published by official organisations answerable to the 
Communist Party leadership. Tuoi Tre is published by the Ho Chi Minh 
Youth League and Lao Dong by the Confederation of Trade Unions. Both 
have evolved from their sectoral origins into general newspapers, and 
according to local journalists, Tuoi Tre at least, is a relatively profitable 
enterprise, operating as a semi-autonomous business and paying above 
average salaries in order to attract the best writers to its editorial team. 
However, Tuoi Tre and Lao Dong remain on a short leash. Apart from 
answering to their own supervisory bodies, editors also come under 
scrutiny from the Ministry of Culture and Information and more 
importantly, from the Culture and Ideology Department of the Communist 
Party. No editor will ever be appointed to a newspaper without the 
approval of these authorities, and once in the job, editors are expected to 
'drink tea' each week with department officials to ensure that they are 
following the correct line on key issues. Such constant monitoring ensures 
editorial conservatism and, as Robert Templer points out, while 
newspapers are now writing about official corruption they rarely initiate 
investigations and much of what they publish amounts to official 
exhortations to better behaviour. 
Corruption has replaced ideological correctness as a means of 
overpowering opponents in political battles. Now that accusations of 
straying from the correct path of Marxism have no resonance, the best 
way of attacking a political opponent is to catch his hand in the till. 
Most newspaper stories on corruption or fraud are either about 
pervasive petty graft or they are officially approved (Templar 1998:169). 
Party leaders frequently encourage journalists to expose corruption, 
but the experiences of Nguyen Hoanh Linh prove that it is dangerous to 
take them at their word. Linh wrote a series of investigative articles for 
the business newspaper Doanh Nghiep, in which he detailed high-level 
corruption in the purchase of four patrol boats from the Ukraine by 
Vietnam's Customs Department. Linh was subsequently arrested and 
charged with revealing state secrets. After spending thirteen months in 
jail, he was finally brought to trial, found guilty, given a thirteen-month 
sentence, and released. 
The party also keeps a watchful eye over foreign language magazines 
and newspapers published in Vietnam, such as the daily English-language 
Vietnam News, the Weekly Vietnam Investment Review and the monthly 
Vietnam Economic Times. One morning in 1996, embarrassed staff from 
Vietnam Investment Review were sent out door-knocking seeking the return 
of the latest issue of the magazine. The problem was a front-page 
photograph of the State Bank building in Hanoi, with a cyclist riding past 
in the foreground. The photograph accompanied a financial story, and in 
the corner was an inset of Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet. Apparently the 
relative size and placement of the Prime Minister's image (with the cyclist 
riding over his head) caused so much offence that the entire issue had to 
be recalled. Vietnam Investment Review also produces a weekly leisure insert 
called Time Out. In July 1996 the cover of a special summer edition of 
Time Out showed a young woman lying on a blue and white striped beach 
towel with a piece of green star fruit over each eye. Staff at the magazine 
were chastised for surreptitiously trying to reproduce the American flag. 
Vietnam Investment Review is a joint venture between Vietnam's Ministry 
of Planning and Investment and Australian business interests, including 
media tycoon Kerry Packer. Former Managing Director Alex McKinnon 
did not deny that the magazine's links to the government set the overall 
editorial agenda. 
'Well I don't think we are afraid to say that we are in fact, if you like, a 
public relations department of the Ministry of Planning and Investment' 
he said in an interview for ABC Radio. 'I mean that's why we came here, 
to promote Vietnam' (McKinnon 1996). Vietnam Investment Review has a 
resident censor from the Ministry of Culture and Information who holds 
the post of Deputy Editor and who in, McKinnon's words, 'monitors all 
the material...to make sure it is okay.' 
McKinnon admitted that 'there's still an incredible amount of paranoia' 
when it comes to the press in Vietnam but he also says that Vietnam 
Investment Review's editorial team put up a solid fight to push out the 
boundaries of acceptable journalism. Certainly the magazine has nurtured 
some skilled, young Vietnamese journalists, although the more prominent 
and successful they become, the more likely they are to face professional 
difficulties. 
Despite continuing suspicion towards domestically produced foreign 
language publications, government agencies also seek to use them to their 
own advantage, albeit rather clumsily. On 28 July 1997, Vietnam Investment 
Review ran the text of an exclusive interview between Reuters newsagency 
and politburo member Nguyen Tan Dung, a rising star within the 
Communist Party. In reality no interview had taken place. Reuters Hanoi 
office had requested an interview and submitted (as is required) a 
proposed list of questions. In return Reuters received written answers. 
Because no face-to-face interview had taken place, and because the 
answers were of little interest, Reuters did not file any stories based on 
the copy. However, some official decided to share the transcript of Dung's 
exclusive interview with Vietnam Investment Review, who dutifully 
published it in full. 
Radio and television: politically correct 
Despite the large number of press titles in Vietnam and the undoubted 
importance of the printed word to an educated urban elite, newspapers 
have limited relevance to the vast majority of the population who live in 
rural areas (except perhaps to provide convenient wrapping for food). 
According to a survey by Radio the Voice of Vietnam (VOV), only 8 per 
cent of people have regular access to newspapers in the northern provinces 
of Hai Hung and Ninh Binh and most are teachers, pensioners and 
government employees (Vietnam News, 6 October 1996). Radio is by far 
the most accessible medium for the 80 per cent of people who live outside 
Vietnam's cities and who may be literate enough to write their name, or 
to read signs, but who would struggle to comprehend the relatively 
complex language of the urban press. 
The Voice of Vietnam first went to air on 7 September 1945, five days 
after Ho Chi Minh declared independence. During the following nine 
years of nationalist war against the French, The Voice of Vietnam's 
rudimentary transmitters were constantly relocated to different points in 
Vietnam's rugged northern mountains. As a symbol of that struggle, the 
Voice of Vietnam broadcasts still begin with the original signature tune 
Smashing Fascism. 
Today The Voice of Vietnam transmissions reach more than 80 per cent 
of the country, with five domestic channels (including a channel 
broadcasting in minority languages such as Khmer and H'Mong) and a 
network of 53 local radio stations throughout the country. The Voice of 
Vietnam also has an international shortwave service broadcasting in eleven 
languages. There are no private radio stations in Vietnam and foreign 
investment in the electronic media is not allowed. 
With its reach and accessibility there is no doubt that The Voice of 
Vietnam plays an important role in disseminating essential information 
(such as weather reports or health messages) to far-flung parts of Vietnam. 
However as an institution, The Voice of Vietnam is staid and conservative 
with the majority of staff over 40 years old. In press terms it is more like 
Nhan Dan than Tuoi Tre, with the explicit duty to disseminate the party 
line and state policies. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Radio The Voice of Vietnam attracts 
listeners with music and sport, but fails to win much of an audience for 
its talk-based programming. The editorial straitjacket imposed on The 
Voice of Vietnam means that international shortwave transmissions in 
Vietnamese (and to a lesser extent French and English) remain a crucial 
source of information. The BBC's Vietnamese service is the most widely 
listened to, provoking both public admiration and official ire for its series 
of extended interviews with dissident journalist Bui Tin, former editor of 
Quan Doi Nhan Dan-broadcast after he went to Paris in 1990. The French 
service RFI and Voice of America also attract strong audiences, as did the 
Vietnamese Service of Radio Australia until its signal strength was severely 
compromised by 1997 federal government cuts which shut down Radio 
Australia's Darwin transmitters. More recently the Washington-based 
Radio Free Asia has begun Vietnamese language broadcasts, provoking 
repeated tirades in Nhan Dan and other newspapers. 
Abusing modern broadcasting technologies under the pretext of 
'freedom' and 'democracy', a handful of hostile forces in the United 
States have been pursuing a plan of 'peaceful evolution' in an attempt 
to interfere in other countries' internal affairs, destabilise and 
eventually overthrow political regimes out of their favour ... [they] 
intentionally use information and cultural means as an invasive 
instrument [and] persist in realising their scheme cooked up carefully 
for heinous purposes (Nhan Dan, 22 February 1997). 
By contrast to the Voice of Vietnam, Vietnam Television (VTV) has been 
more innovative in its programming. For example its student quiz show 
SV96 was a hit with young viewers, even though it was loaded with heavy 
handed moral messages. For example, competing university teams were 
asked to improvise a skit on the theme of countering social evils, so that 
young viewers would be warned away from such vices as gambling, 
alcohol and pornography. VTV also has the advantage of being able tore-
broadcast high quality (or at least slick) foreign programming, which can 
vary from re-runs of such dated Hollywood dramas as Charlies Angels, to 
recent Australian productions like Blue Heelers or the hit Taiwanese series 
The Judge, about a Chinese mandarin who dispensed justice with a fair 
but iron hand. VTV also wins huge audiences for its sport broadcasts, 
especially live transmissions of major soccer matches, which draws about 
half the population. In the middle of the night, across Vietnam, neighbours 
crowd around shared television sets out on the pavement to escape the 
oppressive July heat, watching matches half way around the world. 
These broadcasts are funded by advertising or, more correctly 
sponsorship. An advertising agency will negotiate to buy the rights to a 
foreign show, or sports telecast, and will then provide the programming 
to VTV in exchange for the right to sell the advertising spots around the 
broadcast. (Most soccer telecasts in Vietnam are sponsored by Dunhill for 
example.) The strict legality of such arrangements remains murky and 
the Communist Party has explicitly ruled out direct foreign investment in 
television (much to the frustration of Australia's Mr Packer and Mr 
Murdoch, who invested large sums of money to build goodwill with VTV). 
While VTV has adapted its general programming to appeal to audience 
tastes, there is still a heavy dose of dour war films in the programming 
mix and VTV' s news broadcasts remain clumsy and stilted. Domestic news 
bulletins consist almost entirely of an announcer's script-over vision of 
official handshakes and greetings. Foreign organisations working in 
Vietnam find that it is relatively easy to get coverage of their activities on 
an evening news bulletin by 'inviting' a news crew to cover an event and 
offering to pay them for their trouble. (In fact envelope journalism, where 
lunch money or taxi money is placed in an envelope in the press kit, is 
common in all media in Vietnam.) 
The advent of satellite television has allowed VTV to re-broadcast items 
of international news recorded from such sources as CNN and the ABC, 
but strict editorial judgments are made about its suitability. Satellite dishes 
are not widespread in Vietnam, and the Communist Party is keen to keep 
it that way, concerned that foreign TV could undermine its efforts to shape 
the political and cultural values of Vietnamese citizens. Under a decree 
issued in late 1996 only senior party, government and state officials, media 
organisations, sections of the security apparatus and up-market hotels 
are authorised to receive satellite broadcasts. 
The Internet-taking the slow lane down the information 
superhighway 
In December 1997, after years of procrastination and debate, Vietnam 
finally allowed computer users to gain access to the Internet. The first 
reason for the delay was Communist Party concerns that the Internet 
would be a source of counter-revolutionary information and propaganda 
generated by exiled Vietnamese groups deeply antagonistic to the Hanoi 
regime. And like governments elsewhere around the world, Hanoi was 
also worried about Internet pornography. While the issues were debated, 
teams of Vietnamese officials were despatched to Singapore and China, 
to study tactics in building firewalls and monitoring online content. The 
reason for the delay was more prosaic; it was a question of money and 
who would control the anticipated income. A major bureaucratic and 
political tussle ensued to be finally resolved in favour of the General 
Department of Post and Telecommunications which has a monopoly on 
the provision of Internet connections through its subsidiary Vietnam Data 
Communications. Service costs are five to ten times higher than in other 
Southeast Asian countries and this has proved the key barrier to Internet 
use in Vietnam. 
At the end of 1998, there were an estimated 400,000 computers in use 
in Vietnam, but only about 15,000 Internet subscribers. Around half the 
subscribers were foreigners and a fifth were government ministries or 
other state agencies. It is believed that only 5 per cent of Internet 
subscribers are private citizens. Internet services can also be frustrating 
for users in Vietnam. For example, firewalls make it impossible to use 
RealAudio to access radio broadcasts via the Internet. 
The Vietnamese authorities are attempting to use the Internet for their 
own benefit. For example Nhan Dan has established its own website 
(www.nhandan.org.vn) as has the Vietnam News Agency. Vietnam 
Airlines and the Vietnam Tourism Authority have also established a 
presence on the net, but it is unlikely that critical websites will proliferate, 
as any organisation or individual wishing to provide Internet content must 
first be licensed to do so by the Interior Ministry. The Ministry's attitude 
towards the Internet is summed up by its actions in shutting down a cyber 
cafe in Ho Chi Minh City, because foreign backpackers were allegedly 
sending unsavoury messages to their friends back home. Outside Vietnam, 
dissident groups critical of Hanoi are enthusiastic users of the Internet 
(see for example the California-based Vietnam Insight, www.vinsight.org 
and the Paris-based Free Vietnam Alliance www.fva.org), and even before 
Vietnam connected to the Internet, when only limited email exchange was 
available, some critical messages did get through. 'The Saigonese', an 
acerbic Ho Chi Minh City-based critic, sent detailed postings which 
revealed what he claimed were the past misdeeds of leading party figures. 
Bitter tea: Vietnam and the foreign media 
Foreign journalists working in Vietnam are expected to engage in a process 
of mutual cooperation with the Press and Information Department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In essence this means adhering to an elaborate 
and, at times, opaque set of controls. 
The first condition is that foreign media can only set up bureaux in 
Hanoi and not in the larger, more open, southern business capital Ho Chi 
Minh City. Second, reporters need a permit for any professional travel 
outside the capital. The permit must be applied for well in advance and 
requires approval from local officials in the province to be visited as well 
as authorities in Hanoi. 
All foreign correspondents in Vietnam must also hire via the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, a press assistant, who is supposed to act as interpreter, 
guide and monitor whenever the correspondent undertakes any 
journalistic activity. Each Saturday afternoon the press assistants attend a 
weekly briefing at the Ministry and may be singled out and chastised 
over the activities or reporting of 'their' correspondent. Press assistants, 
and other Vietnamese nationals who assist foreign journalists, may also 
find themselves subject to questioning by security officials from the Interior 
Ministry. At worst this turns the correspondent's assistant into a spy-at 
best it put the assistant in the invidious position of having to serve two 
masters. 
The frustrations of these controls were acutely felt in 1997 by foreign 
reporters attempting to cover the unrest that rocked the province of Thai 
Binh, just 60 km from Hanoi. All formal requests for permission to travel 
to Thai Binh were refused. One foreign journalist based in Hanoi who did 
break the government ban was spotted and immediately 'invited' into 
the Press Department 'to drink tea' -a euphemism for being reprimanded 
and officially warned. All correspondents rely on the Press Department 
for assistance in the six-monthly renewal of their visas, otherwise they 
can be forced to leave the country when their current visa expires. This 
happened in 1996, when Adam Schwarz, correspondent for the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, was effectively expelled from Vietnam. And for 
correspondents there is also the problem of trying not to expose a 
Vietnamese bureau assistant to unacceptable risks. While a foreign 
journalists may be let off with a warning a local assistant could find their 
chances to study denied, their application to travel overseas stalled or, at 
worst, end up in jail for revealing state secrets. 
Correspondents also rely on the Press Department for assistance in 
obtaining official interviews and travel permits, a power which can be 
turned against those who refuse to 'cooperate'. Behind that power lies 
Article 13 of the Regulations on Press and Information Activities of Foreign 
Journalists, Offices and Organisations in Vietnam, which states 'In order 
to carry out journalistic activities mentioned in the Regulations, the 
resident journalists must send their requests on a case-by-case basis to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at least 5 days in advance and are not 
allowed to carry out those activities before the issuance of the 'Press Permit' 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'. 
Taken literally, Regulation 13 means a foreign journalist should request 
written permission from the Foreign Ministry five days before picking up 
the telephone to their own embassy. The Press Department insists it is 
'flexible', but flexibility means the regulation is arbitrary. Like so many 
Vietnamese laws, the regulations governing foreign media activities are 
broad-brush provisions that can be applied to prevent a journalist from 
engaging in any activity that any official body at any time decides is off-
limits. Sensitive meetings between foreign journalists and dissidents are 
often observed by secret police who appear to make themselves obvious 
as a form of intimidation. At other times appointments are cancelled at 
short notice, presumably because the people involved have been warned. 
The government is also concerned that foreign correspondents could 
glean sensitive information from Vietnam's new crop of young, 
enthusiastic and increasingly critical domestic journalists. In order to 
address this issue the government introduced new regulations in 
September 1997 explicitly banning Vietnamese journalists from providing 
their foreign colleagues with information, photographs or articles without 
prior approval from the government. The interaction between local and 
foreign media was already sadly limited because foreign journalists are 
excluded from most domestic media conferences organised by government 
departments or agencies in Vietnam. The Communist Party clearly wants 
to limit ideas or information flowing in either direction. In August 1997, 
the head of the Ho Chi Minh Political Academy, politburo member Nguyen 
Due Binh, launched a blistering attack on western influence on the 
Vietnamese media, saying such 'cultural and political 
trespassing ... destroys the boundaries of social order and national 
sovereignty in press and information activities' (Nhan Dan, 26 August 
1997). There also appears to be an unofficial ban on Vietnamese journalists 
going to the United States to study, though countries like Australia or the 
United Kingdom still appear to be acceptable destinations. 
Despite its role in regulating and reprimanding foreign journalists, 
the Foreign Ministry must still be regarded as one of the most open and 
progressive of all Vietnamese government agencies and the Ministry's 
Press and Information Department seems to respond to other more 
security-minded sections of the state apparatus, particularly the Interior 
Ministry. With the important exception of television stories, the Press 
Department has no means of exerting direct control or censorship over 
the material that foreign journalists file from Vietnam. Radio reports, for 
example, are generally filed directly over a standard telephone line and 
without rigorous monitoring. 
Television is an exception. Any video or film footage shot in Vietnam 
must be cleared by the Foreign Ministry prior to its export or transmission 
via satellite. Courier companies will refuse to carry a tape that has not 
been cleared. Vietnam Television will refuse access to satellite ground 
station facilities unless the appropriate clearances are obtained first. When 
the subject of filming is controversial, it has usually been shot without a 
permit and the journalist must find an unofficial route to get it out of the 
country. 
In the print media, particularly US citizens working for influential 
regional magazines like the Far Eastern Economic Review or the Asian edition 
of TIME were closely scrutinised. Far Eastern Economic Review and TIME 
appear once a week; the index can be easily checked for stories on Vietnam 
and officials know that articles are easily photocopied and passed around. 
A government agency has the monopoly on the import of foreign 
publications to Vietnam and Far Eastern Economic Review and TIME are 
routinely censored, with paragraphs or even entire stories blacked out 
before magazines are distributed domestically. Journalists and editors are 
routinely called in to' drink tea' and forced to mount a line-by-line defence 
of their copy. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s many western journalists who arrived 
in Hanoi to open up offices on behalf of foreign news organisations 
harboured a considerable residue of sympathy for Vietnam as a result of 
the war years and the subsequent economic embargo. Their initial 
reporting of the country focused on business opportunities for foreign 
investors, and on the nation's own attempts to reform and rebuild its 
economy and society. Much of this coverage was broadly optimistic in 
tone, supportive of the reform process and enthusiastic about the nation's 
achievements. 
By late 1997 the mood had soured dramatically. The advances made 
in journalistic and editorial independence in the Vietnamese media in the 
late 1980s had been reversed and controls on the activities of both the 
foreign and domestic press had been tightened. With a slowdown in 
investment, Vietnam was producing few positive news stories and with 
inward-looking Communist Party policies, the country was producing 
very few stories at all, leaving foreign news organisations with flagging 
enthusiasm for the frustrating daily battle against the bureaucratic 
restrictions. In addition, the restrictions hinder the accurate and timely 
reporting of real problems which can, ironically, lead to a more exaggerated 
version of the story appearing in the foreign press. 
Vietnamese officials repeatedly stress that they want foreign journalists 
to 'understand Vietnam' but the real intention of existing regulations is 
exactly the opposite; the aim is to corral correspondents into acceptable 
comers where they can cause minimal embarrassment to the regime. When 
foreign journalists are summoned to the Press Department for criticism 
sessions, it is usually because their understanding of what is going on 
around them is too acute. It is knowledge, rather than ignorance, which 
generally causes offence. Older revolutionaries may be gradually moving 
on but their technocratic younger comrades, trainedJn the former Soviet 
Union, Cuba or East Germany, are not necessarily any more sympathetic 
to notions of press freedom. 
The Communist Party was deeply disturbed by the collapse of 
European Communism-more recently it watched with alarm as the 
apparently enduring edifice of Soeharto' s New Order crumbled in its own 
neighbourhood. The Communist Party has attempted to shore up its 
leading role in society by reinvigorating its nationalist credentials (and 
allowing its rather tattered Marxism to fade into the background) and, 
above all, by delivering the prosperity and economic stability that it knows 
the population craves. Yet by unleashing the creative and destructive 
power of the market, the Communist Party has created a new set of social 
forces that it cannot hope to control. Rapid growth creates a yawning gap 
between rich and poor and between city and country. It accelerates the 
dramatic demographic migration from rural to urban areas and 
encourages a psychological shift from austerity to consumerism. 
Established notions of solidarity are under pressure from a new 
individualism; the lure of easy wealth corrupts the values of public service 
and altruism; commercial development puts new pressure on limited 
resources like land and water. In short, new contours of conflict are 
emerging in Vietnam, as the society undergoes fundamental and rapid 
change. Yet the Communist Party has a limited repertoire for dealing with 
conflict; and when confronted by critics, usually reaches for the trusty 
tools of repression. 
Recent protests in north and south Vietnam are a sharp reminder that 
Vietnam's veneer of political stability is brittle, but the Communist Party's 
dogged determination to project an outward image of harmony precludes 
it from engaging in frank and constructive exchanges, let alone allowing 
others outside its ranks to conduct such exchanges through the media. 
The pressures building up in Vietnamese society are still a long way from 
boiling point, but in its determination to keep the lid firmly on the pot, 
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Office of Strategic Studies (Burma) 
People's Action Party (Singapore) 
Parti Islam SeMalaysia 
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism 
Press Council of Thailand 
Indonesian Democratic Party 
Philippine Long Distance Telephone company 
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